

REDACTION KEY

- A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.
- C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING ONGOING CONSULTATION.
- C-2. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THAT GOVERNMENT'S DIRECTION FOLLOWING CONSULTATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.
- D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED WILL BE RELEASED.
- F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR HANDLING INFORMATION.
- G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.
- J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).
- J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT (BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.
- J-3. INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).
- O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.
- P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.
- P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.
- S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.

NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted without a code throughout the release.

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (S)

On 04/20/2004 the following investigation was conducted by [REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (S) and [REDACTED] (S) and [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S) in Los Angeles, CA:

Caysan Bin Don, also known as [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P), with telephone number [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (P-1) was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents. [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (P)

Mr. Bin Don was asked if he could recall traveling with Omar al-Bayoumi to Los Angeles from San Diego, CA during January 2000 to visit the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA and other business. Mr. Bin Don stated that he did remember this trip with al-Bayoumi. [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (P)

(P)



(P)



As for the trip to Los Angeles, al-Bayoumi asked Bin Don either one or two days before the two of them actually traveled to Los Angeles if Bin Don would accompany al-Bayoumi to the Saudi Arabian (Saudi) Consulate. Mr. Bin Don told the present interviewers that al-Bayoumi specifically asked for assistance with his (al-Bayoumi's) "I-94."

The I-94 is Immigration and Naturalization form that specifies the type of visa and length of time the holder (al-Bayoumi) is allowed to remain in the United States. Mr. Bin Don said that the trip to Los Angeles occurred on a "regular workday" and was not on Friday or the weekend. At this time, Bin Don had known al-Bayoumi about one month..

Mr. Bin Don said that al-Bayoumi drove his (al-Bayoumi's) automobile to the consulate in Los Angeles. Before arriving at the consulate, al-Bayoumi stopped at a photographic shop on Sepulveda Boulevard, in Los Angeles to get photographs of him suitable for a passport. Mr. Bin Don recalls that al-Bayoumi pulled his vehicle up to a gated entrance to a parking garage that was under the Saudi Consulate. Al-Bayoumi spoke in Arabic on the intercom microphone at the gate and the gate was opened and al-Bayoumi drove into the garage and parked. They parked in a normal parking place and walked towards a reception area. Both Bin Don and al-Bayoumi were dressed in Islamic clothing, i.e. a "thobe." The reception area was accessible from the garage. As they

approached this area, three men dressed in western business suits, walked out of the reception area and greeted al-Bayoumi. The conversation was in Arabic and only lasted for a brief period of time. Mr. Bin Don stated that he considered this a happenstance meeting and that the three men from the consulate were only being polite to another “brother.” Mr. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi then entered the reception area. There was no receptionist present and al-Bayoumi used a telephone in the reception area to announce his presence. Mr. Bin Don described the reception area as plain, with a few seats, an airport type metal detector and an airport type X-ray machine.

Mr. Bin Don said that shortly after the call was placed by al-Bayoumi a mid-eastern male, dressed in a western business suit, with a full beard, “two fists length” came out to the reception room and greeted al-Bayoumi in English. Al-Bayoumi introduced the consular employee to Bin Don, but Mr. Bin Don no longer recalls the employee’s name. Al-Bayoumi and the employee spoke briefly about al-Bayoumi’s interest in obtaining religious materials, including Korans from the consulate. Also mentioned in Mr. Bin Don’s presence was the fact that al-Bayoumi had not been at the consulate for at least three months. On the drive up to Los Angeles, al-Bayoumi told Mr. Bin Don that he, that is al-Bayoumi routinely traveled to the consulate to obtain Islamic religious materials.

Mr. Bin Don then stated that he “ran in to” the consular employee at a shopping mall in Anaheim, CA within the last six months. (P)

(P)

(P)



(P)



Mr. Bin Don was asked about the rest of the visit to the Saudi Consulate. Mr. Bin Don said that al-Bayoumi followed the consulate employee into the offices of the consulate while Bin Don waited in the reception area. After some period of time, al-Bayoumi reappeared carrying a box of Korans and other religious materials. Mr. Bin Don said that the religious literature was to be used at the El Cajon, CA mosque. Al-Bayoumi, with the sponsorship of a well-to-do Muslim, was helping to establish that mosque. Mr. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi left the consulate by returning to al-Bayoumi's automobile. At Mr. Bin Don's suggestion they drove to the King Fahad Mosque, in Culver City, CA, which was not far from the Saudi Consulate's location in west Los Angeles. Mr. Bin Don explained that they prayed at the "*masjid*" (mosque). After their prayers, al-Bayoumi suggested that they both go to a near by *halal* restaurant. Al-Bayoumi drove from the King Fahad Mosque to the restaurant, which Bin Don recalls as being located on Venice Boulevard in Culver City. They found a parking place in front of what al-Bayoumi stated was the restaurant. They went inside and determine that this business was not a restaurant but a *halal* meat market. The proprietor of the market told

al-Bayoumi that there was a *halal* restaurant a short walk from the market. Al-Bayoumi and Bin Don left the market and walked to the restaurant which is named the Mediterranean Café. Mr. Bin Don noted that they did not have to move the automobile. Mr. Bin Don is now very familiar with the Mediterranean Café and had patronized the establishment on the day of this interview. Mr. Bin Don said that he showed FBI agents both businesses during a previous interview.

Mr. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi ordered their food over a counter, in a fashion similar to a fast food restaurant. Mr. Bin Don stated that they then sat in an “alcove” to wait while their food was prepared. While waiting at the table, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar walked into the restaurant. They were speaking Arabic and ordering coffee. Al-Bayoumi overheard them. Mr. Bin Don said that al-Bayoumi is “very friendly” and immediately addressed the two in Arabic, and invited them to sit with Bin Don and al-Bayoumi. Al-Bayoumi asked al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar their names and where they were from. They told al-Bayoumi that they were from Saudi Arabia. The conversation was in Arabic, but al-Bayoumi occasionally translated the responses of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar into English. Mr. Bin Don said that al-Bayoumi offered to buy a meal for the two in the “Islamic tradition.” Al-Hazmi told al-Bayoumi and Bin Don that he was from Mecca,

(P)

(P)

(P)

When brought back to the subject at hand, Mr. Bin Don said that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar told al-Bayoumi that they were living in an apartment “near by.” Al-Hazmi went on to tell al-Bayoumi that they had just arrived in the United States and were studying English. Mr. Bin Don said that the exchange was vague to him, since he only spoke limited Arabic. Mr. Bin Don recalls at this late date that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar told al-Bayoumi they were unhappy in Los Angeles. Al-Bayoumi invited them to visit San Diego to see if they would want to move to San Diego. Al-Bayoumi and al-Hazmi apparently exchanged telephone numbers. Mr. Bin Don was asked if he specifically recalls that al-Hazmi had a telephone, or whether al-Bayoumi only provided his telephone number. Mr. Bin Don could not recall the exact sequence. After about

thirty minutes al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar left the restaurant. Mr. Bin Don said that they did not have a motor vehicle. He does not recall the direction that they walked after leaving the Mediterranean Café. Mr. Bin Don stated emphatically, that he had no information from al-Bayoumi in advance that they would meet al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar at the Mediterranean Café. He further said that the meeting was “purely a coincidence” and that al-Bayoumi’s friendly nature was the reason that al-Bayoumi showed an interest in the situation of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Mr. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi then left the restaurant and returned to the King Fahad Mosque for the sunset prayer. Al-Bayoumi did not offer to take al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar to the mosque, nor did Bin Don see them at the mosque for the sunset prayer. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi left Los Angeles before the evening prayer.

(P)



The next contact with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar was at the party that al-Bayoumi organized. The party was held in the apartment occupied by al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Mr. Bin Don described the attendees at the party as, “many people from the community.” Mr. Bin Don described the behavior of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar as normal and that they both appeared to be at ease. Mr. Bin Don videotaped the party at the request of al-Bayoumi, using al-Bayoumi’s video camera. Some of the guests at the party did not want to be videotaped and Bin Don assumed that this was for religious reasons. Mr. Bin Don said that for most of the party, he remained in the kitchen area. During the party, based

on what little conversation Bin Don could understand, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar told the others that they were students. Mr. Bin Don said that everyone at the party was a “brother” that he recognized from attending prayer services at the ICSD.

(P)



Mr. Bin Don’s statement to the 9-11 Commission and the Commissioners which has been paraphrased in part is as follows:

(P)



(P)



[REDACTED]

OPERATION ENCORE

Multiple Subjects:

Fahad al-Thumairy

(F)

Omar al-Bayoumi

(F)

Musaed al-Jarrah

(F)

Iyad al-Rababah

(F)

Ahmed al-Zahrani

(F)

Firas al-Bayoumi

(F)

(F)



(G)

Field Office POCs:

(S)

Headquarters POCs

(S)

Operation Encore Update (as of 20 March 2014):

- 19 March 2014 – Interview of [REDACTED] (P), Iyad Al-Rababah's [REDACTED] (P) at her place of employment [REDACTED] (P) in Paramus, NJ. [REDACTED] (P) advised that she has been in contact with Al-Rababah, currently in Jordan, as recently as one month ago, and maintains regular contact with him by telephone. [REDACTED] (P) agreed to a future interview to provide additional details on her relationship with Al-Rababah, her knowledge of Al-Rababah's former roommate [REDACTED] (P) and Al-Rababah's current living situation in Jordan.
- 17 March 2014 – Fox News provided internet link to a 28 minute interview of [REDACTED] (P) in [REDACTED] (P), NJ in September 2011. Interview will be reviewed [REDACTED] (D), (P)
- 06 March 2014 - Case team meeting with FBI Newark regarding Encore subject [REDACTED] (P). Several leads pertaining to [REDACTED] (D), (P) were discussed to include, [REDACTED] (P) relatives in PA, [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) Iyad Al-Rababah.
- 28 February 2014 – SVTC with San Diego case team re Encore background regarding significance of San Diego subject Mohdar Abdullah, and San Diego based connections to Encore.
- 26 February 2014 - Case strategy meeting with SDNY AUSA [REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (D), (P)

- **24 January 2014 – Case strategy meeting with SDNY AUSA** (S) (D) (D)
- 19-20 December 2013 – (G), FBI LA, FBI WFO interview Mohdar Abdullah (F) (F) (G)
- December 2013 – SDNY advised that defense counsel (D), (P) (D), (P)
- 05 November 2013 – (G) advised they would seek to arrange an interview with Al-Mansoori at the US Embassy in (G)
- 14 October 2013 – (J-3)
- October 2013 – (A), (G), (J-1)
- 19 August 2013 (C-1)
- 13 August 2013 – SDNY advised that (P), (D) (P), (D)
- 09 July 2013 - (P), (D)
- May/June 2013 - Coordination with USAO SDNY regarding (P), (D)
- 13 May 2013 – SDNY advised that (P) is represented by counsel and that discussions are under way for a proffer of (P) at SDNY in June 2013.
- 1 May 2013 - (J-3) (J-3)
- 18 April 2013 FBI Newark agrees to turn over (F) (P) to New York for investigation under Operation Encore.
- 11 April 2013 SDNY confirmed positive contact made with a defense attorney (D), (P) (D), (P)
- 08 April 2013 - (A), (G), (J-1) reporting provided by Al-Rababah.
- 05 April 2013 - (A), (G), (J-1) reporting and background of Al-Rababah.
- 20 March 2013 meeting with SDNY, was held regarding investigative approach on (P) DHS's appeal of the U.S. Immigration judge's order granting asylum to (P) was issued a final denial.
- March 2013 - (D) (D)

- February 2013 - (A), (G), (J-1) to conduct an interview of Mohamed Al-Mansoori (A), (G), (J-1)
- 25 January 2013 - Encore Case team met with SDNY AUSA (S) SDNY AUSA (S) and DOJ main attorney (S) During the meeting, SDNY and DOJ were advised of case developments.
- 30 November 2012 - (C-2)
- 24 September 2012 - Meeting with AUSA (S) and DOJ attorney (S) at NYO Chelsea. At the request of (G) AUSA (S) will explore potential charges for Mohdar Abdullah, including providing material support to the 9/11 hijackers, as well as lesser crimes, which investigators could present at a future interview with Abdullah (G)
- 10 September 2012 - (G) has assisted Legat Copenhagen in providing information to (C-2) (C-2) advised on 10 September 2012 that (C-2) Upon resolution of the claim and its likely rejection, (G) will coordinate with SDNY (A), (G), (J-1)
- (P) her mother (P) father (P) and mother's sister (P) were sentenced on (P) 2012, in the Southern District of California to five years' probation and a \$2,500 fine, each. The Office of Immigration Litigation is preparing civil denaturalization cases against (P) and (P) (G) including (P) Upon successful denaturalization, (P) (G) will be served with Notice to Appear (NTAs) and placed in immigration removal proceedings. This sentencing stems from guilty pleas from the defendants on (P) 2012 in San Diego, CA for naturalization fraud charges.
- (P) was arrested in Tampa, Florida on 15 May 2012 for Treasury Check Fraud by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. (P) of the Texaco gas station in San Diego at which Mohdar Abdullah and 9/11 hijacker Nawaf al Hazmi were both employed, along with additional people of interest to Operation Encore. On 17 September 2012 (P) was proffered in Tampa, Florida. During the proffer, (P) echoed previous statement he had made, denying any knowledge of the hijackers' terrorist affiliation and providing no additional details of use to investigators. (P) seemed optimistic about the charges he was facing. (G) investigators anticipate future proffer sessions with (P) on the Operation Encore-related national security issues. During the week of 28 September 2012, (P) proffered a second time. There was no National Security related information disclosed during the second proffer.
- In August 2012 (G) sent a lead to JTTF Los Angeles seeking confirmation of two possible current addresses for (P) an (P) individual who was known to have extremist views, and was identified as having met with Omar al Bayoumi in private on the same day as Bayoumi's alleged "chance" first meeting with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. FBI Los Angeles confirmed Mana's current residence. (G) is planning to approach (P) for an interview of his role aiding Bayoumi in facilitating the hijacker's arrival and settlement in California, for which (P) has never provided adequate explanation. (G) will conduct the interview with (G) should it be necessary to serve on (P) to obtain a statement.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (F) an individual who, similarly to Mohdar Abdullah, facilitated the day-to-day life of 9/11 hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar during their time in San Diego, has been identified by FBI San Diego as living in Canada. [REDACTED] (P) is reported to be very concerned about his presence on U.S. no-fly lists [REDACTED] (G), in conjunction with the San Diego office, will address seeking an interview of [REDACTED] (P)
 - [REDACTED] In June, 2012, NYO investigators, along with AUSA [REDACTED] (S) and HQ analysts, traveled to London, UK, to exploit evidence seized in 2001 in New Scotland Yard's searches of Omar al Bayoumi's residences and offices. Working directly with SO15 section of Scotland Yard, the document exploitation team reviewed materials and New Scotland Yard's procedures for searches/evidence collection, discussed the potential for use in trial, and returned to the United States with copies of hundreds of pages of documentation with potential probative value. [REDACTED] (G) is undertaking the translation of these documents, to determine relevancy. To date, documents detailing the visits of Mutaib al Sudairy [REDACTED] (F) and Adel al Sadhan [REDACTED] (F) as well as directions indicating that Bayoumi was very familiar with trips from the Saudi Consulate in L.A. to the King Fahad Mosque, have been uncovered. Both documents provide evidence contradicting direct claims Bayoumi has previously made to FBI investigators, particularly about his actions on the day he allegedly randomly met the 9/11 hijackers, and highlight gaps in Bayoumi's story that undermine his claims of innocence.
 - [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Details on Mohdar Abdullah and his connection to Operation ENCORE:

[REDACTED] The FBI is seeking to indict Mohdar Abdullah (Mohdar) in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) for providing material support to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, pursuant to USC 18 section 2339B. Mohdar is the subject of San Diego's full field investigation, [REDACTED] (F) and currently resides in Sweden. The immediate goal of Operation ENCORE is to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] Mohdar played a key role facilitating the daily lives and assisting future Flight 77 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Shortly after February 4, 2000, al-Bayoumi tasked Mohdar to assist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Mohdar was also a family friend and associate of Anwar Aulaqi and they may spent time together with the hijackers. After September 11, 2001 Mohdar was investigated by the FBI for assisting the hijackers. On September 19, 2001 he was arrested by FBI San Diego on charges of immigration fraud for his claim of being a Somali asylee (Mohdar is Yemeni). Mohdar pled guilty to the immigration charges and was deported to Yemen in 2004.

[REDACTED] While Mohdar was detained in an immigration facility he bragged to two fellow inmates that he assisted the hijackers. The FBI and the SDNY have debriefed these individuals. Both are cooperative, but there is some prosecutorial concern about their value as witnesses.

(C-2)

In a January, 2012 meeting with FBI NYO,

(C-2)

The FBI has also provided [redacted] with relevant derogatory information on Mohdar via a DIDO, including details of Mohdar's false U.S. asylum claim.

[redacted] Recent investigation revealed strong indications that prior to September 11, 2001 Mohdar confided details of his conversations with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar to a young woman named [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) and her family are [redacted] (P) although they claimed to be [redacted] (P) refugees. They have now gained U.S. citizenship.

On [redacted] (P) 2012, [redacted] (P) her parents and her aunt were arrested and charged with immigration fraud in San Diego. The post-arrest debriefings of [redacted] (P) provided additional evidence of Mohdar's guilt. However, [redacted] (P) continues to conceal additional information concerning Mohdar's involvement with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, as well as the role that [redacted] (P) s family played in assisting Mohdar. The impending possibility of criminal and civil penalties facing [redacted] (P) s entire family may motivate her to cooperate more fully with the FBI. [redacted] (P) and her family are scheduled to next appear in court on [redacted] (P), 2012 for pre-trial motions.

Synopsis of Operation ENCORE:

[redacted] Operation ENCORE is an investigation into individuals known to have provided substantial assistance to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar during their time in California, prior to the attacks. Operation ENCORE main subjects include Fahad al-Thumairy, Omar Ahmed al-Bayoumi, and Musaed al-Jarrah. These subjects provided (or directed others to provide) the hijackers with assistance in daily activities, including procuring living quarters, financial assistance, and assistance in obtaining flight lessons and driver's licenses. Operation ENCORE seeks to prove these subjects provided such assistance with the knowledge that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were here to commit an act of terrorism.

[redacted] Fahad al-Thumairy was the Imam at the King Fahad Mosque near Los Angeles, California when al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar first arrived in the United States. Al-Thumairy immediately assigned an individual to take care of them during their time in the Los Angeles area.

[redacted] Omar al-Bayoumi was living in San Diego on a student visa, despite not attending classes, and receiving a salary from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for job duties he never performed. Shortly after arriving in Los Angeles, the two hijackers had an allegedly accidental meeting with al-Bayoumi, who claims to have been in Los Angeles on personal business. At this meeting, al-Bayoumi advised the hijackers to relocate to San Diego, which they did. Once in San Diego, al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers with a place to live, opening a bank account, and also assigned two individuals to care for them, one of whom was Mohdar Abdullah.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Telephone numbers assigned to the Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE) in Washington, D.C., where Musaed al-Jarrah was the director of the Islamic Affairs Department, had significant telephonic contact with al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi while the hijackers were in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas. There is evidence that al-Jarrah had possible links to al Qaeda and tasked al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi with assisting the hijackers.

[REDACTED]

OPERATION ENCORE

(F)

Multiple Subjects:

Fahad al-Thumairy

(F)

Omar al-Bayoumi

(F)

Musaed al-Jarrah

(F)

Iyad al-Rababah

(F)

Ahmed al-Zahrani

(F)

Firas al-Bayoumi

(F)



(G)

Field Office POCs:

(S)

Headquarters POCs

(S)

Operation Encore Updates and Initiatives (as of 5 October 2012):

- [REDACTED] 24 September 2012 - Meeting with AUSA [REDACTED] (S) and DOJ attorney [REDACTED] (S) at NYO Chelsea. At the request of [REDACTED] (G) AUSA [REDACTED] (S) will explore potential charges for Mohdar Abdullah, including providing material support to the 9/11 hijackers, as well as lesser crimes, which investigators could present at a future interview with Abdullah in [REDACTED] (G)
- [REDACTED] 10 September 2012 - [REDACTED] (G) has assisted Legat Copenhagen in providing information to [REDACTED] (C-2)
[REDACTED] Legat Copenhagen advised on 10 September 2012 that [REDACTED] (C-2) Upon resolution of the claim and its likely rejection, [REDACTED] (G) will coordinate with SDNY to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
- [REDACTED] (P) her mother [REDACTED] (P) father Aiderous [REDACTED] (P) and mother's sister [REDACTED] (P) were sentenced on [REDACTED] (P) 2012, in the Southern District of California to five years' probation and a \$2,500 fine, each. The Office of Immigration Litigation is preparing civil denaturalization cases against [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (G) including [REDACTED] (P) Upon successful denaturalization [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (G) will be served with Notice to Appear (NTAs) and placed in immigration removal proceedings. This sentencing stems

[REDACTED]

from guilty pleas from the defendants on (P) 2012 in San Diego, CA for naturalization fraud charges.

- (P) was arrested in Tampa, Florida on 15 May 2012 for Treasury Check Fraud by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. (P) of the Texaco gas station in San Diego at which Mohdar Abdullah and 9/11 hijacker Nawaf al Hazmi were both employed, along with additional people of interest to Operation Encore. On 17 September 2012, (P) was proffered in Tampa, Florida. During the proffer (P) echoed previous statement he had made, denying any knowledge of the hijackers' terrorist affiliation and providing no additional details of use to investigators. (P) seemed optimistic about the charges he was facing. (G) investigators anticipate future proffer sessions with (P) on the Operation Encore-related national security issues. During the week of 28 September 2012, (P) proffered a second time. There was no National Security related information disclosed during the second proffer.
- In August 2012, (G) sent a lead to JTTF Los Angeles seeking confirmation of two possible current addresses for (P) and (P) individual who was known to have extremist views, and was identified as having met with Omar al Bayoumi in private on the same day as Bayoumi's alleged "chance" first meeting with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. FBI Los Angeles confirmed (P)'s current residence. (G) is planning to approach (P) for an interview of his role aiding Bayoumi in facilitating the hijacker's arrival and settlement in California, for which (P) has never provided adequate explanation. (G) will conduct the interview with a (G) should it be necessary to serve on (P) to obtain a statement.
- (P) (F), an individual who, similarly to Mohdar Abdullah, facilitated the day-to-day life of 9/11 hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar during their time in San Diego, has been identified by FBI San Diego as living in Canada. (P) is reported to be very concerned about his presence on U.S. no-fly lists. (G) in conjunction with the San Diego office, will address seeking an interview of (P)
- In June, 2012, NYO investigators, along with AUSA (S) and HQ analysts, traveled to London, UK, to exploit evidence seized in 2001 in New Scotland Yard's searches of Omar al Bayoumi's residences and offices. Working directly with SO15 section of Scotland Yard, the document exploitation team reviewed materials and New Scotland Yard's procedures for searches/evidence collection, discussed the potential for use in trial, and returned to the United States with copies of hundreds of pages of documentation with potential probative value. (G) is undertaking the translation of these documents, to determine relevancy. To date, documents detailing the visits of Mutaib al Sudairy (F) and Adel al Sadhan (F), as well as directions indicating that Bayoumi was very familiar with trips from the Saudi Consulate in L.A. to the King Fahad Mosque, have been uncovered. Both documents provide evidence contradicting direct claims Bayoumi has previously made to FBI investigators, particularly about his actions on the day he allegedly randomly met the 9/11 hijackers, and highlight gaps in Bayoumi's story that undermine his claims of innocence.

(A), (G), (J-1)

Details on Mohdar Abdullah and his connection to Operation ENCORE:

The FBI is seeking to indict Mohdar Abdullah (Mohdar) in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) for providing material support to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid

[REDACTED]

al-Mihdhar, pursuant to USC 18 section 2339B. Mohdar is the subject of San Diego's full field investigation, (F) [REDACTED] and currently resides in Sweden. The immediate goal of Operation ENCORE is [REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] Mohdar played a key role facilitating the daily lives and assisting future Flight 77 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Shortly after February 4, 2000, al-Bayoumi tasked Mohdar to assist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Mohdar was also a family friend and associate of Anwar Aulaqi and they may spent time together with the hijackers. After September 11, 2001 Mohdar was investigated by the FBI for assisting the hijackers. On September 19, 2001 he was arrested by FBI San Diego on charges of immigration fraud for his claim of being a Somali asylee (Mohdar is Yemeni). Mohdar pled guilty to the immigration charges and was deported to Yemen in 2004.

[REDACTED] While Mohdar was detained in an immigration facility he bragged to two fellow inmates that he assisted the hijackers. The FBI and the SDNY have debriefed these individuals. Both are cooperative, but there is some prosecutorial concern about their value as witnesses.

[REDACTED] (C-2)

[REDACTED] (C-2)

[REDACTED] In a January, 2012 meeting with FBI NYO,

[REDACTED] (C-2)

[REDACTED] (C-2) The FBI has also provided [REDACTED] with relevant derogatory information on Mohdar via a DIDO, including details of Mohdar's false U.S. asylum claim.

[REDACTED] Recent investigation revealed strong indications that prior to September 11, 2001 Mohdar confided details of his conversations with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar to a young woman named [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P) and her family are [REDACTED] (P) although they claimed to be [REDACTED] (P) refugees. They have now gained U.S. citizenship.

[REDACTED] On [REDACTED] (P), 2012, [REDACTED] (P), her parents and her aunt were arrested and charged with immigration fraud in San Diego. The post-arrest debriefings of [REDACTED] (P) provided additional evidence of Mohdar's guilt. However, [REDACTED] (P) continues to conceal additional information concerning Mohdar's involvement with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, as well as the role that [REDACTED] (P)'s family played in assisting Mohdar. The impending possibility of criminal and civil penalties facing [REDACTED] (P)'s entire family may motivate her to cooperate more fully with the FBI. [REDACTED] (P) and her family are scheduled to next appear in court on [REDACTED] (P) 2012 for pre-trial motions.

Synopsis of Operation ENCORE:

[REDACTED] Operation ENCORE is an investigation into individuals known to have provided substantial assistance to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar during their time in California, prior to the attacks. Operation ENCORE main subjects include Fahad al-Thumairy,

[REDACTED]

Omar Ahmed al-Bayoumi, and Musaed al-Jarrah. These subjects provided (or directed others to provide) the hijackers with assistance in daily activities, including procuring living quarters, financial assistance, and assistance in obtaining flight lessons and driver's licenses. Operation ENCORE seeks to prove these subjects provided such assistance with the knowledge that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were here to commit an act of terrorism.

[REDACTED] Fahad al-Thumairy was the Imam at the King Fahad Mosque near Los Angeles, California when al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar first arrived in the United States. Al-Thumairy immediately assigned an individual to take care of them during their time in the Los Angeles area.

[REDACTED] Omar al-Bayoumi was living in San Diego on a student visa, despite not attending classes, and receiving a salary from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for job duties he never performed. Shortly after arriving in Los Angeles, the two hijackers had an allegedly accidental meeting with al-Bayoumi, who claims to have been in Los Angeles on personal business. At this meeting, al-Bayoumi advised the hijackers to relocate to San Diego, which they did. Once in San Diego, al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers with a place to live, opening a bank account, and also assigned two individuals to care for them, one of whom was Mohdar Abdullah.

[REDACTED] Telephone numbers assigned to the Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE) in Washington, D.C., where Musaed al-Jarrah was the director of the Islamic Affairs Department, had significant telephonic contact with al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi while the hijackers were in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas. There is evidence that al-Jarrah had possible links to al Qaeda and tasked al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi with assisting the hijackers.

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of

Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California 92123
October 26, 2001

OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA , OMAR KHADIB
(A), (G), (J-1)

(G)

(G)

Date Full Field Investigation (FFI) authorized:
(A), (G), (J-1)

The purpose of this communication is to set forth justification for renewal of a Full Field Investigation (FFI) of Omar Abdi Mohamed, aka Omar Khadib, a United States Person (USPER), San Diego, CA.

Office of Origin: San Diego Division of the FBI is the office of origin in this investigation.

Date investigative summary prepared: October 26, 2001.

Basis for Investigation: A Full Field Investigation has been authorized by San Diego Division on the basis of specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that Omar Abdi Mohamed is or may be engaged in international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor, or knowingly aiding and abetting any person in the conduct of these activities.

Previous Investigation:

(G) advised that Omar Abdi Mohamed was born on (P-1) in Somalia. Mohamed was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1) Mohamed was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic

Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by [REDACTED] (P-1) On April 11, 2000, Mohamed submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Omar Mohamed of San Diego, was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States approximately six months ago. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) members of the AIAI are very secretive. A close friend of [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

[REDACTED] AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia. [REDACTED] (G) has reported that AIAI makes extensive use of non-government organizations (NGOs) for its money laundering and fund-raising activities.

[REDACTED] According to FBIHQ, AIAI believes the U.S. and other western nations support the Ethiopian Government. Therefore, attacks on U.S. citizens and Western interests overseas are possibilities. Intelligence also reports that AIAI threatened unspecified attacks on [REDACTED] (G) in Addis Ababa in December 1996.

[REDACTED] (O-1) In December 1998 [REDACTED] (C-2) advised the [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) that Usama Bin Laden (UBL) pledged financial support to AIAI and, in turn, the group is to work with UBL against Western interests and facilities.

[REDACTED] UBL has purchased shares in the Al-Barakaat company currently managed by AIAI. AIAI is believed to use Al-Barakaat to finance its operations. UBL asked Shaykh Muhammad Ahmad Gassim (or Qasim), who resides in Saudi Arabia, and Shaykh Muhammad Utham, who owns the Amal Bank, to take over the management of the Al Barakaat company as they are both high- ranking members with AIAI. The Al-Barakaat company owns the Halima Rouge Hotel in

Nairobi, Kenya and uses it as a clearing station for weapons to be sent to the various AIAI groups. The AIAI fighters and group members use the hotel as a base until they are given their travel orders.

[REDACTED]
(O-1)

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]
(G)

[REDACTED] during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. Omar Khadib and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) among others attended the meeting in Los Angeles. Khadib is a close associate of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (P) sponsored Mohamed when he came to San Diego from Canada. The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including

fund-raising for Islamic causes. These causes include building more mosques in the U.S. and supporting Islamic groups in foreign countries such as Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon and Afghanistan. It was also discussed that America is an enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

Current Investigation:

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) a prominent Somali community leader, [REDACTED] (P) (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) alleged that KHADIB was actively providing financial support to an unnamed terrorist organization outside the U.S. [REDACTED] (P) was astounded that the FBI had not arrested KHADIB and guessed that KHADIB must be providing information to the FBI.

[REDACTED] (O-1)

On 09/14/2001 [REDACTED] (C-2) advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes is in the U.S. The male was identified as OMAR KHATIB (phonetic spelling) and his phone number is [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (C-2) advised that KHATIB is the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qa'idah movement. (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by [REDACTED] (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

In [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (O-1)

he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

WALI, a Somali national, was described as 38 - 40 years old, tall, thin, bowlegged, strong hands and legs. He has a gray patch of hair in the front of his scalp, which was surrounded by dark hair. He is married and has five children. He has a Master's

Degree and is working on his Ph.D in economics. He lives in the northeast section of Mecca, called Azizia.

WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year in places such as Mecca and Nairobi, Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to (O-1) and told (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, (O-1) and KADIB are from the Oqaden tribe (O-1) (O-1)

(O-1) identified ABDIAZIZ LNU as another AL-QAEDA member who lived in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (O-1) met ABDIAZIZ at WALI's house in Mecca during the Hajj.

Minneapolis FBI advised that the AIAI had a meeting of its United States leaders in Minneapolis Minnesota over the September 2001, Labor Day weekend. (A), (G), (J-1)

OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: (P-1). On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions (A), (G), (J-1). KHADIB received a monthly stipend of (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too

radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown (A), (G), (J-1)

█ The following information is known regarding Omar Abdi Mohamed:

Name: Omar Abdi Mohamed, aka Omar Khadib
Sex: Male
Date of Birth: █ (P-1) 1960
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: █ (P-1)
CADLN █
INS A#: █
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes: Black
Residence: █ (P) █ La Mesa, CA 91941
█ (P) █
Occupation: Director, Western Somali Relief Agency 4979 University Avenue., #C San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-6013
(619) 563-9443
President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

█ Objectives: The objectives of this investigation are to: (1) develop additional facts demonstrating that Omar Mohamed continues to be a leader of the AIAI or a splinter terrorist group in the United States, (2) determine if Mohamed is a member of AL-QAEDA, (3) identify other AIAI and AL-QAEDA members and associates of Mohamed and neutralize their support of terrorist activities.

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/24/2005

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [Redacted] (G), (S)

From: San [Redacted]

(G)

Contact: [Redacted]

(S)

Approved By: [Redacted]

(S)

Drafted By: [Redacted]

(S)

Case ID #: [Redacted]

(F)

Title: [Redacted]

Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka Omar AlKhatib,
Omar Khadib,
Cumar Khadhiib,
abu Hafsa;

(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [Redacted]

Submission of (A), (G), (J-1) LHM

(G)

Full Field Investigation Instituted: [Redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

Administrative: Enclosed for (G) for dissemination is (A), (G), (J-1) LHM ref. investigation of captioned subject.

Details: Previous Investigation:

(P-1) [Redacted] (P-1) INS advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED was born on (P-1) [Redacted] in Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) [Redacted] Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1) [Redacted] MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by Imam (P) [Redacted] On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

To: Count [REDACTED] From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 01/24/2005

submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

[REDACTED] AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB AND [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) among others attended the meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB is a close associate of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]. The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including fund-raising for Islamic causes. It was also discussed that America

[REDACTED]

To: Count [REDACTED] From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 01/24/2005

is an enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[REDACTED] On 09/14/2001, [REDACTED] (C-2) advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes is in the U.S. The male was identified as [REDACTED] K (phonetic spelling) and his phone number is [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (C-2). [REDACTED] advised that KHATIB is the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qa'idah movement. (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by [REDACTED] (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

[REDACTED] In [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[REDACTED] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year in places such as Mecca and Nairobi, Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to [REDACTED] (O-1) and told [REDACTED] (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, [REDACTED] (O-1) and KADIB [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[REDACTED] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB,

To: nterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F) 01/24/2005

pager number, (P) and (P) Also noted was an E-mail address:
(P-1) On January 25, 2000, telephone records for
AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P) which has been used by
OMAR KHADIB.

(A), (G), (J-1) OMAR KHADIB has been
seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions. (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1) KHADIB received a monthly stipend (A), (G), (J-1) from the
Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described
as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from
various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling
various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI
leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical,
especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim
splinter group whose name is unknown (A), (G), (J-1)

Current Investigation:

On January 22, 2004, Omar Mohamed was arrested on
immigration charges of lying on his naturalization application and
is currently in federal custody awaiting trial.

Mohamed's wife (P) born (P-1) (P)
in (P) California drivers license number (P-1)
SSAN (P-1) telephone number (P) was interviewed upon
Mohamed's arrest. (P) stated they were married in 1986 and have
six children. Four of the children are Canadian citizens by birth
and two are US citizens by birth.

Mohamed was employed by the San Diego City Schools
at a school on 54th and University (NEI). (P) and Mohamed have
no other business or employment. (P) and Mohamed have no business
interests or employment outside the US.

In July or August 1998 (P) Mohamed and their two
oldest children traveled to Kenya. (P) recalled they flew from
San Diego to New York to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

(P) recalled that her relationship with Mohamed
changed in 2000. In late 2000, Mohamed traveled to Australia. (P)
is not sure of his purpose of travel, but believed that Mohamed was
traveling related to his relationship with an Australian woman.

According to (P) Mohamed has relatives in Sydney,
Australia. Mohamed's fathers cousin lives in Sydney, and he also
has relatives in Kenya. (P) recalled that Mohamed had returned
one time each year since 2000. (P) did not know Mohamed's travel

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 01/24/2005

plans, but according to Mohamed he went to Australia. Mohamed's last travel was from September 2003 to December 25, 2003, [REDACTED] (P) believed that the trip took Mohamed to Australia.

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] Investigation further determined that [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) of the Masjid Taqwa in San Diego, California, sponsored Omar Abdi Mohamed's religious worker entry into the US. [REDACTED] (P) was approached by a blue eyed Somali who represented the San Diego Somali Muslim community. The blue eyed Somali, not [REDACTED] (P) encouraged [REDACTED] (P) to sponsor Mohamed.

[REDACTED] As Mohamed was arrested, a search warrant was served on his residence. In this search several Arabic language documents on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, IFTA Office, letterhead with address 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington DC 20037, Telephone (202) 342-3700, were seized by investigating agents.

[REDACTED] These documents were subsequently translated by a San Diego Division Arabic language specialist. Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar Abdi Mohamed to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel changes within the American Dawa Office.

[REDACTED] Mohamed received, by his own admission, over \$100,000 from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was recently receiving \$1,750.00 a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.

[REDACTED] With specific regards to captioned subject, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 01/24/2005

their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P)

wrote Saudi Arabia a handwritten request for funding a school they wanted to start in San Diego, California. The Ministry was contacting Mohamed so he could provide further information on the people and the circumstances surrounding the starting of the new school. According to the handwritten letter the five men were forced to flee their native lands because of the "infidels" and they wanted to start an Islamic school because "This land is the land of the infidels, and you are aware of that."

[REDACTED] The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." San Diego notes that AlThumairi is the subject of [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] According to LA LHM dated 1/24/2004, the investigation of AL-THUMAIRY was predicated on FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.

[REDACTED] To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F), 01/24/2005

frequent domestic and international travel. Investigation at San Diego is ongoing.

Also found were two Arabic language certificate style documents. One of these documents, as translated by San Diego, was issued to Omar Abdo Mohammad al-Khatib by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Islamic Affairs Endowments, Dawa and Guidance, Deputyship of Islamic Affairs Forum Program. The document was noted to be an "Attendance Certificate" for the "first forum for training Propagators in America that was organized by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 27/08/1998 to 04/09/1998". According to the document the attendees received training in Science of the Koran, Science of the Hadith, Islamic Dogma, the Jurisprudence of Islamic Law, Principles of the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, and Propagation." The document was signed by Mohamad bin Abed AlMuhsen AlTurki.

A second similar Arabic certificate was found from the "Islamic African Center in Khartoum, the Dawa Branch, for a training course for Imams and Propagators held in coordination with the Saudi Fatwa body, the World Muslim League, and Imam Mohamed bin Saud Islamic University" from 06/08/1988 to 31/08/1988. This document also certified that Omar Abdi Mohamad attended the training course which included "lectures on Propagation, Science of the Koran, the life of the Prophet Mohamed, the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, anti-Islamic ideologies, and Islamic education issues in the African continent. The signatory for the document was illegible.

Mohamed's attorney, (P) submitted declarations from (P) born (P-1) (P) California drivers license number (P) La Mesa, California, (P) and (P) (A), (G), (J-1) 315N-SD-67075), born (P-1) (P) California drivers license number B4284713, (P) San Diego, California, (P) as character references on behalf of captioned subject's immigration removal/deportation proceedings.

Of note in the declaration, both (P) claim that they were partners with Mohamed in the corporation (P) San Diego, California, telephone number (P) According to both (P) was opened in August 2003 and as of March 2004, was still in operation. Mohamed is an officer of the corporation and was going to make use of his MBA for the benefit of the business. Mohamed was actively participating the building of the business when he was arrested.

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F) 01/24/2005

(J-2)

Investigation to date has not found that Omar Abdi Mohamed is associated as a board member or officer of (P)

The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex:
Date of Birth: (P-1) 1960
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: (P-1)
CADLN
INS A#:
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes: Black
Residence: (P-1)
La Mesa, CA 91941
(P-1)

Occupation: President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

[REDACTED]

To: C unt From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 01/24/2005

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] disseminate enclosed LHM as appropriate.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/25/2007

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

(G), (S)

From: San

(G)

Contact:

(S)

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

(S)

Case ID #:

(F)

Title:

Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka Omar AlKhatib,
Omar Khadib,
Cumar Khadhiib,
abu Hafsa;

(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis:

Submission of LHM

(A), (G), (J-1)

(G)

Full Field Investigation Instituted

(A), (G), (J-1)

(USPER)

Enclosure(s):

(A), (G), (J-1)

LHM for

(G)

Details: Previous Investigation

(P-1) INS advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED was born on (P-1) in Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1) MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by (P) On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 01/25/2007

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

[REDACTED] AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia.

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB AND [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) among others attended the meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB is a close associate of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including fund-raising for Islamic causes. It was also discussed that America is an enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[REDACTED] On 09/14/2001, [REDACTED] (C-2) [REDACTED] advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes is in the U.S. The male was identified as OMAR K [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (C-2) [REDACTED] (phonetic spelling) and his phone number is [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 01/25/2007

advised that KHATIB is the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qa'idah movement. (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by [REDACTED] (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

[REDACTED] In [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[REDACTED] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year in places such as Mecca and Nairobi, Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to [REDACTED] (O-1) and told [REDACTED] (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, [REDACTED] (O-1) and KADIB are from the Ogaden tribe. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[REDACTED] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: [REDACTED] (P-1). On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to [REDACTED] (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) KHADIB received a monthly stipend [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI

[REDACTED]

To: Count [REDACTED] From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 01/25/2007

leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown (A), (G), (J-1)

Current Investigation:

[REDACTED] On January 22, 2004, Omar Mohamed was arrested on immigration charges of lying on his naturalization application and is currently in federal custody awaiting trial.

[REDACTED] Mohamed's wife [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] born [REDACTED] (P-1) (P) in [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] California drivers license number [REDACTED] (P-1) SSAN [REDACTED] (P-1), telephone number [REDACTED] (P) was interviewed upon Mohamed's arrest. [REDACTED] (P) stated they were married in 1986 and have six children. Four of the children are Canadian citizens by birth and two are US citizens by birth.

[REDACTED] Mohamed was employed by the San Diego City Schools at a school on 54th and University (NEI). [REDACTED] (P) and Mohamed have no other business or employment. [REDACTED] (P) and Mohamed have no business interests or employment outside the US.

[REDACTED] In July or August 1998 [REDACTED] (P) Mohamed and their two oldest children traveled to Kenya. [REDACTED] (P) recalled they flew from San Diego to New York to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

[REDACTED] (P) recalled that her relationship with Mohamed changed in 2000. In late 2000, Mohamed traveled to Australia. [REDACTED] (P) is not sure of his purpose of travel, but believed that Mohamed was traveling related to his relationship with an Australian woman.

[REDACTED] According to [REDACTED] (P) Mohamed has relatives in Sydney, Australia. Mohamed's fathers cousin lives in Sydney, and he also has relatives in Kenya. [REDACTED] (P) recalled that Mohamed had returned one time each year since 2000. [REDACTED] (P) did not know Mohamed's travel plans, but according to Mohamed he went to Australia. Mohamed's last travel was from September 2003 to December 25, 2003, [REDACTED] (P) believed that the trip took Mohamed to Australia.

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (P) Investigation further determined that [REDACTED] (P) of the Masjid Taqwa in San Diego, California, sponsored Omar Abdi Mohamed's religious worker entry into the US. [REDACTED] (P) was approached by a blue eyed Somali who represented the San Diego Somali Muslim community. The blue eyed Somali, not [REDACTED] (P) encouraged [REDACTED] (P) to sponsor Mohamed.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 01/25/2007

[REDACTED] As Mohamed was arrested, a search warrant was served on his residence. In this search several Arabic language documents on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, IFTA Office, letterhead with address 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington DC 20037, Telephone (202) 342-3700, were seized by investigating agents.

[REDACTED] These documents were subsequently translated by a San Diego Division Arabic language specialist. Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar Abdi Mohamed to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel changes within the American Dawa Office.

[REDACTED] Mohamed received, by his own admission, over \$100,000 from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was recently receiving \$1,750.00 a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.

[REDACTED] With specific regards to captioned subject, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[REDACTED] In a letter dated May 28, 1998, [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P)
wrote Saudi Arabia a handwritten request for funding a school they wanted to start in San Diego, California. The Ministry was
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Count [REDACTED] From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 01/25/2007

contacting Mohamed so he could provide further information on the people and the circumstances surrounding the starting of the new school. According to the handwritten letter the five men were forced to flee their native lands because of the "infidels" and they wanted to start an Islamic school because "This land is the land of the infidels, and you are aware of that."

[REDACTED] The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." San Diego notes that AlThumairi is the subject of [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. According to LA LHM dated 1/24/2004, the investigation of AL-THUMAIRY was predicated on FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.

[REDACTED] To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his frequent domestic and international travel. Investigation at San Diego is ongoing.

[REDACTED] Also found were two Arabic language certificate style documents. One of these documents, as translated by San Diego, was issued to Omar Abdo Mohammad al-Khatib by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Islamic Affairs Endowments, Dawa and Guidance, Deputyship of Islamic Affairs Forum Program. The document was noted to be an "Attendance Certificate" for the "first forum for training Propagators in America that was organized by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 27/08/1998 to 04/09/1998". According to the document the attendees received training in Science of the Koran, Science of the Hadith, Islamic Dogma, the Jurisprudence of Islamic Law, Principles of the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, and Propagation." The document was signed by Mohamad bin Abed AlMuhsen AlTurki.

[REDACTED] A second similar Arabic certificate was found from the "Islamic African Center in Khartoum, the Dawa Branch, for a training course for Imams and Propagators held in coordination with the Saudi Fatwa body, the World Muslim League, and Imam Mohamed bin Saud Islamic University" from 06/08/1988 to 31/08/1988. This document also certified that Omar Abdi Mohamad attended the training [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 01/25/2007

course which included "lectures on Propagation, Science of the Koran, the life of the Prophet Mohamed, the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, anti-Islamic ideologies, and Islamic education issues in the African continent. The signatory for the document was illegible.

[REDACTED] Mohamed's attorney, [REDACTED] (P) s [REDACTED] (P) itted declarations from [REDACTED] (P) born [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P) California drivers license number, [REDACTED] (P) La Mesa, California, [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) , born [REDACTED] (P-1) / [REDACTED] (P) California drivers license number [REDACTED] (P) San Diego, California, [REDACTED] (P) as character references on behalf of captioned subject's immigration removal/deportation proceedings.

[REDACTED] Of note in the declaration, [REDACTED] (P) claim that they were partners with Mohamed in the corporation [REDACTED] (P) , San Diego, California, telephone number [REDACTED] (P) According to both [REDACTED] (P) was opened in August 2003 and as of March 2004, was still in operation. Mohamed is an officer of the corporation and was going to make use of his MBA for the benefit of the business. Mohamed was actively participating the building of the business when he was arrested.

[REDACTED] (J-2)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Investigation to date has not found that Omar Abdi Mohamed is associated as a board member or officer of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [Redacted] (F) [Redacted], 01/25/2007

[Redacted] (C-1)
[Redacted] (C-1)

[Redacted] (C-1) (C-1)
[Redacted] (C-1)

[Redacted] (C-1) (C-1)
[Redacted] (C-1)

[Redacted] (C-1) (C-1)
[Redacted] (C-1)

[Redacted] (C-1) (C-1)
[Redacted] (C-1)

[Redacted] (C-1) (C-1)
[Redacted] (C-1)

[Redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 01/25/2007

[REDACTED] (C-1)

Trial results

[REDACTED] After two trials, Mohamed was found guilty of six counts of immigration fraud and acquitted on three. Mohamed was sentenced to 18 months (time served) on each of the six guilty counts, assessed a fine, and was given two years supervised release. After his sentencing, Mohamed was remanded into ICE custody and was subsequently deported to Mogadishu, Somalia.

[REDACTED] In late 2006, AUSA [REDACTED] (S) notified San Diego that all appeals related to Mohamed's conviction had been denied.

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G)

The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex: Male
Date of Birth: [REDACTED] (P-1) 1960
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)
CADLN: [REDACTED]
INS A#: [REDACTED]
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes: [REDACTED]
Residence: [REDACTED] (P-1)

La Mesa, CA 91941

[REDACTED] (P-1)

Occupation: President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 01/25/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] disseminate enclosed LHM as appropriate.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/17/2007

To: San Diego

Attn: (G) (S)

From: San Diego (G)

Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F)

Title: Omar Abdi Mohamed, aka Omar AlKhatib, Omar Khadib, Cumar Khadhiib, abu Hafsa; (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: Reassign case and all subfiles. (G)

(U) Full Field Investigation Instituted: (A), (G), (J-1) (USPER)

Details: Request case and all subfiles be reassigned go (S)

Previous Investigation

INS advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED was born on (P-1) in Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1) MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by (P) On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: (F), 05/17/2007

(O-1)

AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1) during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB AND (P) (A), (G), (J-1) among others at the meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB is a close associate of (P) The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including fund-raising for Islamic causes. It was also discussed that America is an enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

On 09/14/2001, (C-2) advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes is in the U.S. The male was identified as (P) K (C-2) (phonetic spelling) and his phone number is (P) (C-2)

[REDACTED]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 05/17/2007

advised that KHATIB is the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qa'idah movement. (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by [REDACTED] (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

[REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] that he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[REDACTED] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year in places such as Mecca and Nairobi, Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to [REDACTED] (O-1) and told [REDACTED] (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, [REDACTED] (O-1) and KADIB are from the Ogaden tribe. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[REDACTED] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: [REDACTED] (P-1). On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to [REDACTED] (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[REDACTED] (A), (J-1), (G) [REDACTED] OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) KHADIB received a monthly stipend [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 05/17/2007

various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown (A), (G), (J-1)

Current Investigation:

[REDACTED] On January 22, 2004, Omar Mohamed was arrested on immigration charges of lying on his naturalization application and is currently in federal custody awaiting trial.

[REDACTED] Mohamed's wife [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], born [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P) in [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], California drivers license number [REDACTED] (P-1) SSAN [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED], telephone number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] was interviewed upon Mohamed's arrest. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] stated they were married in 1986 and have six children. Four of the children are Canadian citizens by birth and two are US citizens by birth.

[REDACTED] Mohamed was employed by the San Diego City Schools at a school on 54th and University (NFI). [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and Mohamed have no other business or employment. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and Mohamed have no business interests or employment outside the US.

[REDACTED] In July or August 1998, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Mohamed and their two oldest children traveled to Kenya. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] recalled they flew from San Diego to New York to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] recalled that her relationship with Mohamed changed in 2000. In late 2000, Mohamed traveled to Australia. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] is not sure of his purpose of travel, but believed that Mohamed was traveling related to his relationship with an Australian woman.

[REDACTED] According to [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Mohamed has relatives in Sydney, Australia. Mohamed's fathers cousin lives in Sydney, and he also has relatives in Kenya. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] recalled that Mohamed had returned one time each year since 2000. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] did not know Mohamed's travel plans, but according to Mohamed he went to Australia. Mohamed's last travel was from September 2003 to December 25, 2003, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] believed that the trip took Mohamed to Australia.

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] Investigation further determined that [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Fardan of the Masjid Taqwa in San Diego, California, sponsored Omar Abdi Mohamed's religious worker entry into the US. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] was approached by a blue eyed Somali who represented the San Diego Somali [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]), 05/17/2007

Muslim community. The blue eyed Somali, not [REDACTED] (P)
encouraged [REDACTED] (P) to sponsor Mohamed.

[REDACTED] As Mohamed was arrested, a search warrant was served on his residence. In this search several Arabic language documents on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, IFTA Office, letterhead with address 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington DC 20037, Telephone (202) 342-3700, were seized by investigating agents.

[REDACTED] These documents were subsequently translated by a San Diego Division Arabic language specialist. Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar Abdi Mohamed to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel changes within the American Dawa Office.

[REDACTED] Mohamed received, by his own admission, over \$100,000 from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was recently receiving \$1,750.00 a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.

[REDACTED] With specific regards to captioned subject, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[REDACTED] In a letter dated May 28, 1998, [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 05/17/2007

wrote Saudi Arabia a handwritten request for funding a school they wanted to start in San Diego, California. The Ministry was contacting Mohamed so he could provide further information on the people and the circumstances surrounding the starting of the new school. According to the handwritten letter the five men were forced to flee their native lands because of the "infidels" and they wanted to start an Islamic school because "This land is the land of the infidels, and you are aware of that."

[REDACTED] The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." San Diego notes that AlThumairi is the subject of [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. According to LA LHM dated 1/24/2004, the investigation of AL-THUMAIRY was predicated on FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.

[REDACTED] To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his frequent domestic and international travel. Investigation at San Diego is ongoing.

[REDACTED] Also found were two Arabic language certificate style documents. One of these documents, as translated by San Diego, was issued to Omar Abdo Mohammad al-Khatib by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Islamic Affairs Endowments, Dawa and Guidance, Deputyship of Islamic Affairs Forum Program. The document was noted to be an "Attendance Certificate" for the "first forum for training Propagators in America that was organized by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 27/08/1998 to 04/09/1998". According to the document the attendees received training in Science of the Koran, Science of the Hadith, Islamic Dogma, the Jurisprudence of Islamic Law, Principles of the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, and Propagation." The document was signed by Mohamad bin Abed AlMuhsen AlTurki.

[REDACTED] A second similar Arabic certificate was found from the "Islamic African Center in Khartoum, the Dawa Branch, for a training course for Imams and Propagators held in coordination with the Saudi Fatwa body, the World Muslim League, and Imam Mohamed bin [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: n Diego From: San Diego
Re: (F), 05/17/2007

Saud Islamic University" from 06/08/1988 to 31/08/1988. This document also certified that Omar Abdi Mohamad attended the training course which included "lectures on Propagation, Science of the Koran, the life of the Prophet Mohamed, the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, anti-Islamic ideologies, and Islamic education issues in the African continent. The signatory for the document was illegible.

[REDACTED] Mohamed's attorney, (P) [REDACTED] submitted declarations from (P) [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], California drivers license number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] La Mesa, California, (P) [REDACTED] and (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] born (P-1) (P) [REDACTED] California drivers license number (P-1) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], San Diego, California, (P) [REDACTED] as character references on behalf of captioned subject's immigration removal/deportation proceedings.

[REDACTED] Of note in the declaration, both (P) [REDACTED] claim that they were partners with Mohamed in the corporation (P) [REDACTED], Suite I, San Diego, California, telephone number (P) [REDACTED]. According to both (P) [REDACTED] the Kilimanjaro Cafe was opened in August 2003 and as of March 2004, was still in operation. Mohamed is an officer of the corporation and was going to make use of his MBA for the benefit of the business. Mohamed was actively participating the building of the business when he was arrested.

(J-2)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Investigation to date has not found that Omar Abdi (P) [REDACTED] ed is associated as a board member or officer of the (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [Redacted] (F) [Redacted], 05/17/2007

[Redacted] (C-1)

[Redacted] (C-1)

[Redacted] (C-1)

[Redacted] (C-1) (C-1)

[Redacted] (C-1) (C-1)

[Redacted] (C-1) (C-1)

[Redacted] (C-1) (C-1)

[Redacted] (C-1) (C-1)

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 05/17/2007

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1)

Trial results

[REDACTED] After two trials, Mohamed was found guilty of six counts of immigration fraud and acquitted on three. Mohamed was sentenced to 18 months (time served) on each of the six guilty counts, assessed a fine, and was given two years supervised release. After his sentencing, Mohamed was remanded into ICE custody and was subsequently deported to Mogadishu, Somalia.

[REDACTED] In late 2006, AUSA [REDACTED] (S) notified San Diego that all appeals related to Mohamed's conviction had been denied.

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex: Male
Date of Birth: [REDACTED] (P-1) 1960
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)
CADLN: [REDACTED]
INS A#: [REDACTED]
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes: Black
Residence: [REDACTED] (P-1)
La Mesa, CA 91941
[REDACTED] (P-1)

Occupation: President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of

transcription

Investigation on

at

File #

Date dictated

by

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;

it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

07/24/2002

On July 16 2002, (P) voluntarily appeared at the NYO office (NYO (P) white date of birth (P-1) ss# (P-1) address (P) St. Clair Michigan. was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview. (P) volunteered the following information:

(P) stated Avco Overseas, a Houston based company purchased its contracts with The Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA) through contacts with Sheik Salih Kamel. Kamel is the principal of Dallah Al Baraka and his son Abdullah Kamel runs the Los Angeles office of Al Baraka. (P) is sure Al Bayoumi was receiving monies from Avco but was unaware of the vehicle for transferring these monies to Al Bayoumi. (P) could not remember the name of the individual at Avco who was familiar with the payments to Al Bayoumi.

(P) was present at seven meetings in the United States related to the negotiations of the award of the default Avco overseas contracts. The first meeting was held at the Avco offices in Texas during the month of February 1995. (P) explained that the representatives for Avco had an unexplained interest in the awarding of the new contracts. (P) speculated that this was the result of the corrupt relationship that existed between Salih Kamel and the Avco representatives. The second was also held during the month of February 1995, at the offices of (P) in Newport Beach California. The third meeting was held at (P) during the month of April 1995, at this meeting (P) remembers a letter being issued by Mohammed Al-Salmi of PCA to (P) (P) Of (P) outlining the financial support of Omar Al Bayoumi by Ercan and guaranteed by PCA/AE ANSS project account. (note: this document, dated 2/5/95 is recovered from Al Bayoumi's effects during the search of his residence conducted by New Scotland Ya The additional four meetings all take place at the offices of (P) during the spring and summer of 1995. (P) usually traveled to these meetings in the U.S. with Hamid Al Rashid and Salaam Al Colie. During one of the summer meetings (P) met Al Bayoumi for the first time. (P) It is possible that Al Bayoumi could have picked up cash from (P) (P) at that meeting.

(P) believes Sheik Salih Kamel is a Saudi national with Pakistani origins, Kamel is also extremely wealthy and has many business interests around the world To include Dallah Al-Baraka Investment and Development. (P) was not aware of any Kamel connection to the non

July 16 2002 NYO/FBI

(F)

(S)

EO14040-000456-UPDATED

fit organization Sana-Bell Inc. located in Falls Church VA. (P) was not aware of other individuals who were involved in funding Al Bayoumi.

(P) indicated that (P) would have specific details with respect to the payments made to Al Bayoumi by PCA, Avco, (P) and at times (P) ed as the "bag man" for the PCA. (P) often comp o (P) his roll. (P) provided a phone number for (P) : (P)

(P) didn't possess any information relating to Al Bayoumi's connection to the Culver City or the purchase Madina Mosque other than that Al Bayoumi was involved with a Mosque in some manner.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG (S)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2025
DATE: 10-05-2021

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S)

OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI

(F)

Telephone Numbers:

(U) The following information was obtained from Telephone Applications (TA) and pertains to toll records loaded in connection with telephones subscribed or utilized by Omar Al-BAYOUMI or his wife, Manal BAGADER.

U.S.

(P)

Tolls	01/17/2000-06/23/2001
Tolls	01/09/2000-06/07/2000
Tolls	11/20/1998-09/20/2000
Tolls	12/30/1999-04/02/2001
No Tolls	
No Tolls	
No Tolls	
Tolls	09/13/2000-07/24/2001
Tolls	12/21/1999-01/09/2001

England

(G)

(U) A review of the following calls indicate a total of 141 calls made by telephone numbers associated with Omar Al-BAYOUMI to entities of the Saudi Arabian government in the Washington, D.C. Area.

(U) In connection with calls made to entities of the Saudi Arabian government in the Los Angeles, California area, there were 34 calls made.

Jan 2000

(S)

Area Code 202
Washington, D.C.

202-298-8722

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 7 times from (P) [REDACTED] subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 01/26/2000 to 03/20/2000. The average duration of calls was 2 minutes, with one exception of an 11 minute call.

(U) In addition, one call was made to telephone number from (P) [REDACTED], subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, DBA MASJEDALMADIANAH 20, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P) San Diego, California and billing address of 511 S. Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, California. This call was made on 08/08/1999 and was for a duration of one minute.

(P) [REDACTED]

UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and similarity in line number this telephone could possibly be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 3 times from (P) [REDACTED] subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 01/28/2000 to 03/09/2000. The average duration of calls was 1.6 minutes.

202-298-8806

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

USERS (P) [REDACTED] - 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 74009

[REDACTED]

(U) This number was called 4 times from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made during the period of 11/24/1999 to 12/07/1998. The average duration of calls was 2 minutes.

202-298-8809

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called once from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. This call was made on 07/08/1999 for a duration of 1 minute.

202-298-8813

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 28 times from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 03/09/2000 to 03/29/2000. The average duration of calls was 2 minutes.

(P)

UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and similarity in line number this telephone could possibly be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 5 times from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 02/03/2000 to 03/22/2000. The average duration of calls was 2minutes.

[REDACTED] (P)

UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and similarity in line number this telephone could possibly be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 3 times from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 01/28/2000 to 03/09/2000. The average duration of calls was 2.3 minutes.

[REDACTED] (P)

Based on A/C, prefix and similarity in line number this telephone could possibly be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called once from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California. This call was made on 08/24/2000 and was for a duration of 2 minutes.

[REDACTED] (P)

UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and similarity in line number this telephone could possibly be subscribed to:

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED]

(U) This number was called once from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. This call was made on 12/03/1998 for a duration of 1 minute.

202-298-8861

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 4 times from (619) 227-7623, subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 01/27/2000 to 03/21/2000. The average duration of calls was 1 minute.

202-298-8862

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called 8 times from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 01/27/2000 to 03/21/2000. The average duration of calls was 1 minute.

202-337-2978

SAUDI ARABIA EDUCATION MISSION
600 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) This number was called once from (619) 227-7623, subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California. This call was made on 03/21/2000 and was for a duration of 1 minute.

202-337-9450

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
2600 VIRGINIA AV NW STE 800
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number is the main billing number. One call was made from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. This call was made on 03/09/2000 and was for a duration of 1 minute.

[REDACTED]

(U) This number was called 10 times from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made during the period of 10/27/1998 to 12/01/1998. The average duration of calls was 2 minutes with the exception of a 24 minute call on 10/27/1998.

202-342-3700

EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA
601 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) This number was called 30 times from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment [REDACTED] (P) San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 01/19/2000 to 03/24/2000. The average duration of calls was 3.5 minutes.

(U) In addition, this number was called 21 times from [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P), also subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment [REDACTED] (P), San Diego, California. These calls were made from 07/21/1998 to 07/08/1999. The average duration of these calls was 5 minutes with the longest call being 32 minutes.

This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation of Abdulaziz ASSALEH. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

202-342-3800

EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA
601 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
SUITE 1000
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called once from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment [REDACTED] (P), San Diego, California. This call was made on 01/28/2000 and was for a duration of 7 minutes.

(U) In addition, this number was called 3 times from [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made from 07/15/1998 to 12/03/1998. The average duration of these calls were 2 minutes.

This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

202-494-2777

EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA
601 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) This number was called 2 times from (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P), San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 02/18/2000 to 02/19/2000. The average duration of calls was 4 minutes.

(U) In addition, 1 call was made to this number from (P) (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. This call was 14 minutes in duration.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation to Khalid ASSWAILEM (202) 944-3140 and C (202) 494-2777. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

202-944-3344

NATIONAL GUARD OF SAUDI
3050 K ST NW
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called two times from (P) subscribed by Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made on 07/21/1998 and 07/08/1999 and were for a duration of 13 and 2 minutes, respectfully.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation to Dr. Jameel Al-Shami. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

202-944-5982

EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA CHANCERY
601 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE NW
WASHINGTON, DC

(U) This number was called two times from (P) subscribed by Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made on 07/21/1998 and 07/27/1999 and were for a duration of 2 and 1 minute, respectfully.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a

[REDACTED]

notation to Abdulaziz ASSALEH. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

(P)

UNKNOWN SUBSCRIBER

Based on A/C, prefix and similarity in line number this telephone could possibly be subscribed to the Saudi Arabian Embassy

(U) This number was called once from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Al-BAYOUMI. This call was made on 12/18/1998 and was for a duration of 15 minutes.

Area Code 310

Los Angeles Area

310-479-2752

SAUDI ARABIA ROYAL CONSULATE
2045 SAWTELLE BLVD.
LOS ANGELES, CA

FACSIMILE LINE

(U) This number was called once from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Al-BAYOUMI. This call was made on 12/02/1998 and was for a duration of 2 minutes.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation to Saudi Consulate F. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

310-479-6000

SAUDI ARABIA ROYAL CONSULATE
2045 SAWTELLE BLVD.
LOS ANGELES, CA

USERS - Abdullah Ext 245

(P)

(U) This number was called 11 times from [REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI, 6333 Mount Ada, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. These calls were made during the period of 01/26/2000 to 02/10/2000. The average

[REDACTED]



duration of calls was 3.5 minutes.

(U) In addition, 13 calls were made from telephone number (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made during the period of 07/11/2000 to 12/20/2000. The average duration of calls was 3 minutes with the longest call being 7 minutes.

(U) This number was called 7 times from (P) subscribed by Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made from 11/08/1998 to 01/26/1999 and the average duration was 8 minutes with the longest call being 22 minutes.

(U) This telephone number was listed in a telephone book seized from Al-BAYOUMI's office on 09/27/2001 with a notation to Saudi Consulate. (source - 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332)

Islamic Affairs	X240
Abdullah AWAAD	X241
Sami ASSADHAN	X246
Saad Al-JEBREEN	

(P)
YOSEF M. AL-SUMAIRY
(P)
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

BILLING NEXTEL
SSN (P-1)
US DEPT OF STATE DIPLOMAT

USER (U) ~~(S)~~ Fahad

(U) There were 3 calls made to this telephone from (P) (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. The calls were each one minute in duration.

(U) According to ECF, Al-SUMAIRY is a Consular Officer in the office of the Consulate General of Saudi Arabia.



[REDACTED]
(P)

SALAH AL-HATLANI

(P)

LONG BEACH, CA

(U) There were 2 calls made to this telephone from [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) subscribed by Omar Al-BAYOUMI. These calls were made on 12/14/2000 and 12/20/2000 and were 1 minute and 2 minute calls. calls were each one minute in duration.

(U) ChoicePoint indicates Salah ALHATLANI, SSN [REDACTED] (P-1) works as the Vice Counsel for the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles, CA.

(U) For information, telephone number [REDACTED] (P) is subscribed by Faisal Al-MUHANA at the same address. This number was called 6 times from Al-BAYOUMI during the period of 12/19/1999 to 01/24/2000.

ECF Searches

(U) The following are chronological summaries of Electronic Case File (ECF) references regarding possible ties of Al-BAYOUMI to the Saudi Arabian Government, Embassies or Consulates.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 7792
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1103
FD302 dated 09/17/01

(U) (P) birth date (P-1) 58, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD) identified Omar Al-BAYOUMI as a person who may know Nawaf Al-HAZMI. (P) described Al-BAYOUMI as influential among Saudi Arabian members of the ICSD and provided needed assistance to various students and families who needed his help. He also advised Al-BAYOUMI was a frequent traveler to Saudi Arabia. Lastly, he stated Al-BAYOUMI had moved to England several months ago to attend school in England.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 7785
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1101
265A-NY-280350-302 serial 7790
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1102
FD302 dated 09/19/01

(U) On 09/18/2001, (P) birth date (P-1) 49, was interviewed by SA (S) (P) serves on the Board of Trustees at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD). (P) provided the following information on Omar Al-BAYOUMI. (P) stated Al-BAYOUMI lived in San Diego for approximately four or five years, and left to attend college in England. (P) stated some people at the ICSD believed Al-BAYOUMI was associated with the Saudi Arabian government. Al-BAYOUMI never had a steady job, though he may have worked a short time for the Saudi Arabian Airlines. (P) believed Al-BAYOUMI was well connected with the consulate, and seemed to get things done for others. Al-BAYOUMI was involved with funding Al Medina mosque in El Cajon. He acted as an intermediary between the Kurdish community and an

[REDACTED]

unknown wealthy Saudi Arabian man who donated funds to create the mosque. Some members of the ICSD believed there was always a covert employee of the Saudi Arabian government stationed at the mosque, no one has taken Al-BAYOUMI's place.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 10044
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1424
FD302 dated 09/19/2001

(U) On 09/18/2001, Mohdar M. Abdullah, (identity requested confidential) birth date [REDACTED] (P-1) 78, was interviewed by SA [REDACTED] (S) Abdullah advised that Omar Ahmed Al-BAYOUMI was the Manager/Leader of a Kurdish Mosque in El Cajon and was a member of the Aviation Board for Saudi Arabia. Omar introduced Abdullah to Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR at the Islam Mosque on Saranac Street, Lemon Grove, California. Abdullah stated Omar was now in London, England, pursuing a Doctorate degree from an unknown university.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1111
EC dated 09/19/2001

(U) An EC prepared by SA [REDACTED] (S) set leads for various field offices to interview former neighbors of Nawaf Al-HAZMI, Khalid Al-MIHDHAR and Omar Al-BAYOUMI. The EC stated that interviews of Muslims indicated that Al-BAYOUMI had been involved in aviation when he lived in Saudi Arabia and that he did not work while in the U.S., but had more money than he knew what to do with.

(U) The EC also provided information from an interview of a prominent Islamic leader in San Diego who identified Al-BAYOUMI as being employed by the Saudi government to monitor the activities of Saudi dissidents that resided in the U.S.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 24879
 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2302
 FD-302 dated 09/21/2001

(U) On 09/21/2001, SA [REDACTED] (S) interviewed [REDACTED] (P) (protect identity) who provided information regarding his knowledge of Omar Al-BAYOUMI. Information pertaining to his relationship with the Saudi Arabian government were that he often furnished the Islamic Center with copies of the Qu'ran which had been provided to him by the Saudi Arabian Consulate. He also stated that Al-BAYOUMI appeared to have regular contact with the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles, California. Al-BAYOUMI made frequent trips to the consulate during the six years he was known to live in San Diego.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 23351
 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2117
 FD302 dated 09/21/01

(U) On 09/20/2001, SA [REDACTED] (S) interviewed Dilek [REDACTED] (P) birth date [REDACTED] (P-1) (P) [REDACTED] (P) provided the following information regarding [REDACTED] (P) Hashin Moshen Alattas. When shown a photograph of Omar Al-BAYOUMI, [REDACTED] (P) recognized him and said she had seen him many times. Al-BAYOUMI attended USIU to get his master's degree and wanted to move to London to receive a PHD from a business school. Al-BAYOUMI and his family were from Saudi Arabia and possibly lived in the Clairemont Mesa area of San Diego, California. [REDACTED] (P) reported Alattas did not like Al-BAYOUMI and believed Al-BAYOUMI worked for the Saudi government to watch the actions of Saudis in the United States.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 28999
 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2546
 265A-SD-63930-302 serial 5
 FD302 dated 09/22/01

(U) On 09/20/01, [REDACTED] (P) birth date [REDACTED] (P-1) (P) was interviewed by SA [REDACTED] (S) and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

shown a photograph of Omar Al-BAYOUMI. [REDACTED] (P) recognized Al-BAYOUMI and said he knew him as "Abuemad", father of Emad. Previously, [REDACTED] (P) was living in an apartment off Balboa Avenue with Saudi Arabian students [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) believed the Saudi students received tuition money from the Saudi government. Al-BAYOUMI would visit the two students at their apartment. Al-BAYOUMI asked [REDACTED] (P) to be an Iman, at the mosque. When [REDACTED] (P) was alone Al-BAYOUMI would inquire about [REDACTED] (P).

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 18085
 FD-302 dated 09/22/2001
 Interview of [REDACTED] (P)
 (interviewing agent not identified in ECF)

(U) [REDACTED] (P) birth date [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P) owns two businesses [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) Approximately 1995, [REDACTED] (P) contracted with the Civil Aviation Administration (CAA) of Saudi Arabia, which according to [REDACTED] (P), has connections with Ministry of Defense. A company called Dallah of Saudi Arabia had the contract for operations maintenance and [REDACTED] (P) supplied the parts. The CAA asked [REDACTED] (P) to provide financial support to Al-BAYOUMI, when [REDACTED] (P) refused he was told his contract may be jeopardized. [REDACTED] (P) did write sponsor letters to universities for Al-BAYOUMI, but stated he never provided Al-BAYOUMI financial support. [REDACTED] (P) advised he wrote the last letter approximately two years ago.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 1663
 EC dated 09/22/2001

(U) In a EC prepared by SA [REDACTED] (S) a lead was sent to Legat Riyadh to obtain information regarding Omar Ahmed Al-BAYOUMI. The following information was furnished to the Legat:

- ▶ Al-BAYOUMI's claim that he was on a financial scholarship and received support from his government.
- ▶ Information pertaining to his employment in the aviation management/financial services of the [REDACTED]

lead to Saudi Arabia - Omar Bayoumi

[REDACTED]

Saudi government.

- Interviewees claims that Al-BAYOUMI as an employee of the Saudi Arabian Government that he traveled to mosques throughout the world to monitor and observe Saudi citizens for signs of dissident behavior.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1801
 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 16180
 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 1802
 FD302 dated 09/23/01 and 09/24/2001

(U) According to an EC prepared by SA [REDACTED] (S)
 [REDACTED] (P) birth date [REDACTED] (P-1) (P)
 [REDACTED] (P) California, was interviewed and provided information regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI. (P) had met Al-BAYOUMI at the Islamic Center mosque (ICSD) in the early 1990s.

(U) Approximately six months ago Al-BAYOUMI announced to members of the ICSD he was moving to the United Kingdom (UK) to pursue his PHD. (P) has not had any contact with Al-BAYOUMI subsequent to his departure for the UK. (P) recalled Al-BAYOUMI lived in an apartment on Beadnell Way in San Diego even though he never went to his home. Al-BAYOUMI indicated he was on a scholarship and was financially supported by the Saudi government. (P) did not know what form Al-BAYOUMI received his funding. Al-BAYOUMI maintained he had friends at the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, California. Because of Al-BAYOUMI's comments regarding his business, (P) believed he may have worked for Saudi princes. While living in San Diego Al-BAYOUMI attended the University of Phoenix. (P) remembered Al-BAYOUMI may have also received a scholarship from Saudi Airlines and worked for them as well.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 24631
 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2239
 FD302 dated 09/24/01

(U) On 09/24/01, Abdussattar Shaikh was interviewed by SA [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED]. Shaikh advised that he is one of the founders of the Islamic Center of San Diego, (ICSD). Shaikh identified a photo of Omar Al-BAYOUMI, whom he became acquainted with in 1994 when Shaikh was teaching at the American Commonwealth University. Shaikh described Al-BAYOUMI as follows: Al-BAYOUMI was in the U.S. using a Saudi Arabian passport, because of his facial features, he is possibly of Egyptian descent. Al-BAYOUMI appeared to be approximately 40 to 45 years old. Shaikh believed Al-BAYOUMI always had a significant source of supply of money and observed him driving a new Toyota. Al-BAYOUMI was charismatic, charming and didn't conceal his attempts to attain leadership roles within the San Diego Muslim community. Al-BAYOUMI had expressed an interest in becoming a citizen, which may have been just a ploy. Al-BAYOUMI socialized with Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR. Al-HAZMI disclosed to Shaikh, Al-BAYOUMI was a spy for the Saudi Government and directed Shaikh not to socialize too much with him. Al-BAYOUMI attended business classes at the United States International University and was believed to be President of a Saudi Arabian club at the university. Al-BAYOUMI had an office at the Kurish mosque in El Cajon, California, where the leadership neither liked or trusted him and asked him to leave approximately three years ago. Shaikh did not trust Al-BAYOUMI as well and believes he possibly was involved with 09/11/01.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 25718
 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 2396
 FD-302 dated 09/30/01

(U) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P) was interviewed by SA [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] on 09/28/2001. [REDACTED] (P) stated he first met Omar Al-BAYOUMI about two years ago at the mosque located near Balboa Avenue and the 805 freeway in San Diego, California. [REDACTED] (P) thought Al-BAYOUMI may be of Egyptian extraction but moved to Jeddeh, Saudi Arabia, prior to moving to the United States. [REDACTED] (P) believed

[REDACTED]

Al-BAYOUMI was deceptive and did not trust him. He described Al-BAYOUMI as lacking in formal education and lacking in intellectual capability. Al-BAYOUMI was well known at the mosque near Balboa Avenue and 805 freeway and frequently surrounded himself with men in their twenties. Al-BAYOUMI would promise to help visiting Islamic students, but his assistance never evolved. (P) [REDACTED] concluded Al-BAYOUMI was asked to leave his position at the Al Medina mosque after irregularities were found in association with his collection and distribution of funds.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3039
EC dated 10/03/01

(U) On 10/03/2001, SA [REDACTED] (S) prepared an EC providing information on [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) was the emergency contact listed on Omar Al-BAYOUMI's rental agreement for [REDACTED] (P-1) at the Parkwood Apartment Complex. Al-BAYOUMI moved into [REDACTED] (P-1) on approximately 09/01/99, and lived there with his wife Manal Bagader and their three children. Rental records indicated Al-BAYOUMI was a student and received financial support from his family.

(U) Al-BAYOUMI had co-signed for hijackers Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR when they rented an apartment at Parkwood and paid their rent occasionally as well. Al-HAZMI and Al-MIHDHAR lived with Omar Al-BAYOUMI prior to them renting their own apartment. (P) [REDACTED] did not like Al-BAYOUMI personally and was unaware he [REDACTED] (P) was listed as an emergency reference on Al-BAYOUMI's rental agreement. Al-BAYOUMI revealed to [REDACTED] (P) he received financial support the Saudi Arabian Government or Saudi Airlines. An individual who requested confidentiality (PC1) reported he believed Al-BAYOUMI worked for the Saudi Arabian Intelligence Service and reported on dissident Saudis in the United States.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-CD serial 8789
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3396
EC dated 10/05/2001

(U) An EC dated 10/05/2001, prepared by SA [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

provided a summary of information furnished by the Metropolitan Police Services of the United Kingdom. This information was obtained through their interviews of Al-BAYOUMI.

(U) Al-BAYOUMI stated that he was connected with a Saudi Arabian company that is equivalent to the Federal Aviation Administration. Al-BAYOUMI claimed that this company pays him \$5,000.00 per month to study for his PHD.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 64787
265A-NY-280350-SD serial 4763
FD-302 dated 10/07/01

(U) On 10/03/01, [REDACTED] (P) (protect identity) was interviewed by SA [REDACTED] (P-1), (S) and SA [REDACTED] (P-1), (S) [REDACTED] (P) described Omar Ahmed Al-BAYOUMI as a "braggart from a low status Egyptian family that migrated to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia." [REDACTED] (P) stated Al-BAYOUMI would videotape when he went to mosque which led individuals from the Muslim community to believe he was a Saudi Arabian intelligence officer. According to [REDACTED] (P), Al-BAYOUMI's social associates included the Minister of Islamic Affairs, the Saudi Consulate, and known criminals. Al-BAYOUMI has also hosted Saudi visitors. Al-BAYOUMI's character is suspect and he was accused of keeping a \$10,000 donation from a Saudi visitor intended for the Kurdish Mosque.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 55234
FD-302 dated 10/07/2001

(U) On 10/06/2001, SA [REDACTED] (P-1), (S) interviewed Isamu Alva DYSON, birth name Clayton [REDACTED] (P) MORGAN, date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P). DYSON stated he knew Khalid Al-MIHDHAR, Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Omar Ahmed Al-BAYOUMI during his period of residing in San Diego, approximately December 1999 to February 2000. DYSON stated he never heard Al-BAYOUMI speak about politics or against the U.S. DYSON and Al-BAYOUMI shared company often. Al-BAYOUMI had indicated to DYSON that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

he was some type of engineer for the Saudi Arabian government. He even showed DYSON some type of paperwork indicating same. Al-BAYOUMI indicated he was being paid to learn English. Al-BAYOUMI's company, or the Saudi government through his company, was paying for the education. DYSON did not know how much Al-BAYOUMI was being paid. DYSON understood that Al-BAYOUMI had to learn English or he was not going to be promoted any higher in his company.

(U) DYSON said that Al-BAYOUMI's student visa was expired, or ready to expire and was considering crossing into Tijuana, Mexico to get the paper work done. DYSON encouraged Al-BAYOUMI to call the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles. DYSON accompanied Al-BAYOUMI to the Saudi Consulate where Al-BAYOUMI got his visa paperwork straightened out.

(U) After the consulate, DYSON and Al-BAYOUMI proceeded to a Mediterranean restaurant near the Culver City mosque. Al-BAYOUMI stated that the Culver City mosque was built by the Saudi Government. DYSON stated that other than when Al-BAYOUMI was meeting behind closed doors at the consulate, Dyson was with Al-BAYOUMI the entire time during the trip.

(U) Information was also furnished regarding the building of the El Cajon mosque. A wealthy man from Saudi Arabia donated the money to build the Kurdish mosque. Al-BAYOUMI did all of the administrative work at the mosque and was the director.

(U) Al-BAYOUMI has introduced DYSON to Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR and that the resided in an apartment co-signed by Al-BAYOUMI.

(U) DYSON was told by Al-BAYOUMI that his wife was Saudi and came from a rich family.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3332
EC dated 10/09/2001

(U) In an EC prepared by SD [REDACTED] (S) a request was made to obtain information from officials

[REDACTED]

at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the Embassy in Washington, D.C. regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI.

(U) A summary of information extracted from this EC regarding Al-BAYOUMI's association with the Saudi Arabian government indicated [REDACTED] (P), President [REDACTED] (P) California wrote a letter on 01/22/1997, stating that [REDACTED] (P) was supporting Al-BAYOUMI by providing \$4,000.00 a month.

(U) [REDACTED] (P) was subsequently interviewed, and as a result of that interview advised that even though [REDACTED] (P) was requested by an unknown representative of the Civil Aviation Administration (CAA) of Saudi Arabia to provide a \$4,000 per month stipend, [REDACTED] (P) refused to do so. [REDACTED] (P) did, however, furnish letters to numerous schools, on Al-BAYOUMI's behalf, stating that he and his company were subsidizing Al-BAYOUMI. As a direct result of the above information, a Criminal Complaint was filed on or about 09/27/2001, in the Southern District of California, charging Al-BAYOUMI with Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1546, Visa Fraud.

(U) In May 1998, Al-BAYOUMI applied for an Executive Doctorate in the Management Program at the Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) in Cleveland, Ohio, which was subsequently declined. Through numerous interviews and by obtaining school records and resumes, it has been determined that Al-BAYOUMI stated that he has been employed by the CAA for at least 20 years and is also associated with Dallah/Avco Trans Arabia Company as the Assistant to the Director of Finance, in the Contracts and Finance Control Division, PCA, Airways Engineering.

(U) In reviewing the documents obtained from CWRU a letter, dated May 20, 1998 from Dr. Jamil Shami, Director, Academic Affairs, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, National Guard Office, 3050 K Street, N.W., Suite 207, Washington, D.C., was sent on Al-BAYOUMI's behalf. The letter stated that Al-BAYOUMI was a candidate for a full scholarship from the Government of Saudi Arabia.

(U) On September 21, 2001, a representative from United Parcel Service advised that their records indicate that

[REDACTED]

on January 18, 2001 a delivery was made to [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P-1) San Diego, California, where Al-BAYOUMI resided, from the Saudi Arabian Embassy, 601 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.

(U) On 09/25/2001, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) of the Kurdish Community Islamic Center, 2675 Fletcher Parkway, El Cajon, California, was interviewed and [REDACTED] (P) advised that he was shown a copy of a check Al-BAYOUMI provided for \$500 to the mosque drawn from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, dated December 14, 2000. Written on the check was a notation in Arabic that [REDACTED] (P) said indicted the check was for food. Al-Bayoumi stated he received the check from Los Angeles, California.

(U) On 09/27/2001, execution of a federal search warrant was conducted by the San Diego Division in a room utilized by Al-BAYOUMI as an office within the Kurdish Community Islamic Center (Masjid Al-Medina Al-Munawara), located at 511 S. Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, California. As a result of that search a copy of Al-BAYOUMI's phone book, dated October 4, 2000 was seized.

(U) Listed in Al-BAYOUMI's phone book were the following names and telephone numbers:

(U) Dr. Jameel Al-Shami (202) 944-3344;

(U) Saudi Embassy WA. (202) 342-3800, AbdulAziz Assaleh (202) 342-3700 and F (202) 944-5982; Khalid Asswailem (202) 944-3140 and C [REDACTED] (P-1) Saudi Consulate (310) 479-479-6000 F (310) 479-2752, Islamic Affairs x240, Abdullah Awaad x241, Sami Assadhan x246, and Saad Al Jebreen, 2045 Sawtelle Blv., LA, CA 90025.

(U) Additionally, seized during the search were various personal and business documents, business cards and scraps of paper with names and telephone numbers of individuals. Included in this information were names and telephone numbers associated with the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission, Washington, D.C. and are as follows: Mohammad Al-Sheik and Abed Al-Sulieman with the following telephone numbers (202) 298-8869, 8817, 8850 and 8738.

[REDACTED]

(U) Also obtained was a notation for the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, telephone number (310) 479-6000 and the name [REDACTED] (P). (U) From January 2000 through May 2000, two known cellular telephones associated with Al-BAYOUMI showed 32 calls placed to the Embassy, 24 calls placed to the Consulate in Los Angeles and 37 calls placed to the Cultural Mission.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3331
LHM dated 10/10/01
(Authoring agent not identified in ECF)

(U) Omar AHMED Al-BAYOUMI, aka Omar Al-BAYOUMI, Omar A. Al-BAYOUMI, ABUEMAD, Omar A. M. Al-BAYOUMI, Omar AL-BAYOUMI, birth date [REDACTED] (P-1) 57, had contact with the following individuals at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission, Washington, D.C., and the Saudi Arabian Consulate, Los Angeles, California.

Saudi Arabian Embassy, Washington, D.C.:
Adbulaziz Assaleh
Khalid Asswailem
Jamil Shami

Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission, Washington D.C.:
Mohammad Al-Sheik
Abed Al-Sulieman

Saudi Arabian Consulate, Los Angeles, California
[REDACTED] (P)
Abdullah Awaad
Sami Assadhan
Saad Al Jebreen

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3562
265A-NY-280350-BA serial 4557
EC dated 10/11/2001

(U) On 10/11/2001, SA [REDACTED] (S) prepared and EC regarding new information reported on Osama



Abouibakor Nooh. Telephone toll record analysis indicated Nooh was in contact with Omar Al-BAYOUMI, Osama Bassnan and (P) . It is believed Al-BAYOUMI was financially supported by the Saudi Arabian Government and was suspected to be an Intelligence Officer for the Saudi Government as well. It appears Osama Bassnan is to be the replacement for Al-BAYOUMI.

Reference: (S) 199N-SD-63929 serial 24
(S) 199N-SD-63949 serial 9
(S) FFI - (A), (J-1), (G)
EC dated 10/17/2001

On (A), (J-1), (G) information was provided to SA (S) regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI.

(A), (J-1), (G) Al-BAYOUMI almost daily taking telephone calls from Saudi Arabia. The Emir from the Ministry of Defense, who was in charge of the Air Traffic Control would frequently call Al-BAYOUMI. Al-BAYOUMI registered in school for immigration purposes and to meet new students from the Middle East.

Al-BAYOUMI (A), (J-1), (G) was going to Los Angeles to pickup some visitors. Within a day or two after returning from Los Angeles Al-BAYOUMI introduced (A), (J-1), (G) Nawaf Al-HAZMI and Khalid Al-MIHDHAR . (A), (J-1), (G)

(A), (J-1), (G) Al-BAYOUMI (A), (J-1), (G) he had met Al-HAZMI and Al-MIHDHAR in a restaurant on his way back from Los Angeles. Al-BAYOUMI invited the two to come to San Diego and they accepted. Al-BAYOUMI did not tell (A), (J-1), (G) if Al-HAZMI and Al-MIHDHAR were the visitors he was expecting. Subsequently, Al-BAYOUMI hosted a dinner to welcome Al-HAZMI and Al-MIHDHAR to the San Diego Muslim community, Al-BAYOUMI videotaped the event as well.



Reference 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 69403
 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 5616
 FD-302 dated 10/15/2001

(U) On 10/15/2001, SA [REDACTED] (S) interviewed Talal Al-HAMDAN, date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1) 1979, the brother of Faisal Al-HAMDAN. Talal stated that his family is from a bedouin tribe once located in Western Saudi Arabia and that the family is not part of the royal family. The family is fairly well known and wealthy. His father, Ahmed Abdul Azziz Suleiman Al-HAMDAN, is one of three Finance Ministry officials employed under the Deputy Finance Minister of Saudi Arabia and is responsible for the Western region of Saudi Arabia.

(U) Talal Al-HAMDAN is subsidized in the U.S. by his father and by scholarship money from the government of Saudi Arabia. While attending George Washington University in Washington, D.C. he resided with a sponsor who was an employee of the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C.

(U) In May 1999, Talal moved to San Diego where he resided in a hotel. During his stay he had an argument regarding his bill and an outstanding balance. Talal directed Al-BAYOUMI to pay the bill and Al-BAYOUMI paid the outstanding debt.

Analyst Note - During the period of ... telephone number [REDACTED] (P) was subscribed by Talal Al-HAMDAN, [REDACTED] (P) San Diego, California 92124.

Reference: [REDACTED] 199N-SD-63929 serial 23
 [REDACTED] 199N-SD-63949 serial 8
 FFI - [REDACTED] (A), (J-1), (G) (S)
 EC dated 10/17/2001 (S)

On [REDACTED] (A), (J-1), (G) information was provided to SA [REDACTED] (S) regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI. [REDACTED] (A), (J-1), (G) believed that Al-BAYOUMI made friends with [REDACTED] for the purpose of gaining control, rather than friendship's sake. Al-BAYOUMI was considered by most in the community some type of intelligence agent for the Saudi Arabian government reporting on the

activities of Muslims (particularly Saudis) in the San Diego area. The feeling that Al-BAYOUMI was an agent for the Saudi government was further reenforced by the fact that he held no regular job, but always had plenty of money to prepare lavish dinners at his apartment or apartments of friends. The purpose of the dinners was usually to introduce and welcome newcomers to the local Muslim community or to bid farewell to those leaving. AL-BAYOUMI would always videotape these dinners.

[REDACTED] (A), (J-1), (G) Al-BAYOUMI told [REDACTED] (A), (J-1), (G) that he had traveled up to Los Angeles to pick up someone coming into the country, when by chance he met Al-MIHDHAR and Al-HAZMI.

[REDACTED] Al-BAYOUMI frequently traveled to the Los Angeles airport to drop off or pickup Saudis visiting southern California.

[REDACTED] (A), (J-1), (G) [REDACTED] that Al-BAYOUMI was a person know to have connections with the Saudi government. Al-BAYOUMI would travel to Washington, D.C. every one to two months and had a contact in the Dawa (ph) who was related to the civil aviation office of the Saudi Arabian Consulate on Wyoming Street, in Washington D.C. Through this contact, Al-BAYOUMI would be able to items such as Qu'rans or robes much faster than if done through regular request.

(S) Al-BAYOUMI traveled back to Saudi Arabia approximately one a year for approximately two to three weeks. Al-BAYOUMI's stay in the U.S. seemed to be decided on a yearly basis. [REDACTED] (A), (J-1), (G) Al-BAYOUMI learned that he would be leaving San Diego, but did not know where he would go next. Approximately seven to eight months ago, he knew he would be moving to England (information dated [REDACTED] (A), (J-1), (G) [REDACTED])

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-302 serial 72758
 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 6477
 FD-302 dated 10/19/2001

(U) On 10/15/2001, SA [REDACTED] (S), interviewed Faisal Ahmed Al-HAMDAN, date of birth 12/12/1975, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Faisal's father is Ahmed Abdulazziz Suleiman Al-HAMDAN and is a high-ranking Saudi official who works as a Director within the Ministry of Finance.

(U) While attending school in San Diego, Faisal Al-HAMDAN listed Omar Al-BAYOUMI as the emergency point-of-contact on his ELS and ALI applications. Faisal identified Al-BAYOUMI as a business associate of his father.

Reference 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 3984
 EC dated 10/20/2001

(U) On 10/20/2001, SA [REDACTED] (S) requested (A), (J-1), (G) (A), (J-1), (G) to conduct an interview of Ahmed Abdul Azziz Suleiman Al-HAMDAN regarding his contact with and knowledge of Omar Al-BAYOUMI. Al-HAMDAN is an official under the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Finance in Saudi Arabia. This request was made as the result of San Diego interviews of Faisal and Talal Al-HAMDAN.

(U) The EC noted that Al-BAYOUMI is an employee of the Ministry of Finance, or works under a separate department which answers to the Ministry of Finance. Talal Al-HAMDAN described the relationship between Al-BAYOUMI and his father:

- ▶ Al-BAYOUMI had to get Al-HAMDAN's signature on various documents.
- ▶ On one of these documents, Al-BAYOUMI requested Al-HAMDAN to provide a reference sponsorship for Al-BAYOUMI's application to the Saudi Government to travel to the U.S. to pursue post graduate

[REDACTED]

studies. Al-HAMDAN's father provided this reference or sponsorship.

- ▶ At some point in 1998, Faisal and Talal's father instructed Talal to contact Al-BAYOUMI. The Al-HAMDAN brothers met with Al-BAYOUMI at the Abu Baker mosque on numerous occasions from late 1998 to July 2001.
- ▶ Al-BAYOUMI's bank records revealed that on 02/18/1999, a \$20,000.00 wire transfer was made from Ahmed Abdul Azziz Suleiman Al-HAMDAN to Al-BAYOUMI.
- ▶ On 12/16/1999, Al-BAYOUMI paid an outstanding hotel bill for Talal in the amount of \$1,349.00.
- ▶ On at least one other occasion Al-BAYOUMI generated a check to Talal in the amount of \$1,450.00.
- ▶ Faisal and Talal were in the process of selling Al-BAYOUMI's vehicle and were instructed to forward the sale proceeds to Al-BAYOUMI's address in England.

Reference

265A-NY-280350-302 serial 98127
 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 14097
 FD-302 dated 11/21/2001

265A-NY-280350-302 serial 36130
 FD-302 dated 10/02/2001

(U) On 11/19/2001, SA [REDACTED] (S) interviewed [REDACTED] (P), born in [REDACTED] (P). The EC provides extensive education and employment background on [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) was employed at PCA / Dallah and stated that Al-BAYOUMI was a representative that PCA personnel wished to keep in America. [REDACTED] (P) was requested to provide a stipend to Al-BAYOUMI in an amount of \$3,500.00 per month. According to [REDACTED] (P), Al-BAYOUMI was already drawing a salary from PCA / Dallah. The PCA person hinted that [REDACTED] (P) should pay for Al-

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

BAYOUMI because Al-BAYOUMI would be in a position to assist (P) in the future. In addition, (P) was requested to furnish Al-BAYOUMI with reference letters.

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-SD serial 12014
265A-NY-280350-302 serial 85936
FD-302 dated 11/27/01

(U) On 11/15/2001, (P) birth date (P) was interviewed by SA (S) and provided the following information. (P) once heard Omar Al-BAYOUMI disclosing to others at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD) he had friends or contacts at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California. (P) advised Al-BAYOUMI was extremely close to other ICSD Saudis. (P) believed Al-BAYOUMI was in the United States on scholarship from the Saudi Airport Authority of Saudi Airlines and Al-BAYOUMI would eventually return to his former job.

Reference (U) ~~(S)~~ 265A-NY-282573-SEC serial 28
EC dated 01/11/2002

(C-2)

[REDACTED]

(C-2)



Reference 265A-NY-280350-SD Serial 14812
LHM dated 04/15/2002

(U) An LHM dated 05/15/2002. from San Diego to New York furnished information regarding Omar Al-BAYOUMI and his employment with Dallah Al Baraka. The

[REDACTED]

information was received from an interview of [REDACTED] (P)

(U) [REDACTED] (P) identified Al-BAYOUMI as a "ghost employee" of AVCO Overseas. [REDACTED] (P) estimated that there were approximately fifty (50) individuals carried on the books and PCA or Dallah and being paid for doing nothing.

[REDACTED]

Reference [REDACTED] 199N-SD-64028 serial 23, 72

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/12/2009

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: (G) [redacted]
(S) [redacted]
(S) [redacted]

International Operations

Attn: (G) [redacted]

Riyadh

Attn: (G) [redacted]

San Diego

Attn: (S) [redacted]

New York

Attn: (S) [redacted]

From: New York

(G) [redacted]
Contact: (S) [redacted]

Approved By: (S) [redacted]

Drafted By: (S) [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (F) [redacted]

Title: [redacted] OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

[redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
(A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]

Synopsis: [redacted] Initiate a Full Investigation (FI) on OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI.

[redacted] (G) [redacted]

[redacted]

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Enclosure(s): [REDACTED] 1 - Opening LHM

Full Investigation Initiated: 08/12/2009

Reference: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] - OPERATION ENCORE, (F) [REDACTED]
(F) [REDACTED] - FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, (F) [REDACTED]

Details: [REDACTED] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case.

[REDACTED] Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened. Writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[REDACTED] Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[REDACTED] Results: Over the past two years, writers have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] /2009

plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

Exploitation of Muslim Community: (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A), (G), (J-1)
AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-providing individual, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see [REDACTED] (F)
[REDACTED] (F) At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-providing individual or to whom the tazkia would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] believed that it likely would have involved someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see [REDACTED] (F)). It is important to note that the individual to whom the tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[REDACTED] One individual meeting such description who is also reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, (F) [REDACTED] AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F) [REDACTED] Additional documentation [REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. AL-THUMARY was previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division based on his association with another individual believed to have provided assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI identified as OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. Telephone analysis shows a connection between AL-THUMAIRY, the two hijackers, and AL-BAYOUMI. A review of PENTTBOM case file does

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY or AL BAYOUMI as a potential "tazkia" contacts for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to have been unknown at such time.

[REDACTED] OMAR AHMED MUSTAFA AL-BAYOUMI, date of birth (P-1) 1957, place of birth Alhajra, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian passport (P-1) [REDACTED] social security account number (P-1) [REDACTED] first came to the attention of the FBI in 1998 when a complainant telephonically contacted FBI San Diego on 08/31/1998 to report information regarding AL-BAYOUMI and his wife MANAL BAGADER (reference (F) [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] The complainant advised that AL-BAYOUMI had received a suspicious package from the Middle East on 03/03/1998. In addition, the complainant advised that there had been large gatherings of males in the apartment of AL-BAYOUMI. As a result of these reports, a preliminary inquiry was initiated on AL-BAYOUMI on 09/08/1998.

[REDACTED] The preliminary inquiry did not uncover any information regarding AL-BAYOUMI to justify conversion into a full investigation. When interviewed, the local Postal Inspector advised that the package was listed as "suspicious" because it arrived without postage or paperwork. Therefore, upon completion of the preliminary inquiry, the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI was closed on 06/07/1999 (reference (F) [REDACTED]).

[REDACTED] Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that two of the hijackers aboard AA77, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, had resided at Parkwood Apartments, (P) [REDACTED], 6401 Mount Ada Road (also listed as 6333 Mount Ada Road), San Diego, California, between 02/2000 and 05/2000. Rental records obtained from Parkwood Apartments revealed that AL-BAYOUMI had co-signed the apartment lease agreement for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. Upon receipt of this information, efforts commenced to fully identify and locate AL-BAYOUMI. AL-BAYOUMI was located in Birmingham, England, where he was residing with his family and attending Aston University.

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY) on 09/20/2001 under United Kingdom (UK) Terrorism Act 2000, Prevention of Terrorism. From 09/22/2001 to 09/28/2001, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed by NSY. On 09/28/2001, AL-BAYOUMI was released from custody without charges, as NSY could not allege any criminal activity on his part that would substantiate a continuation of his detention beyond the period authorized. [REDACTED] (C-2)

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 08/12/2009

(C-2)

AL-BAYOUMI moved from England to Saudi Arabia in 08/2002 and was interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith in approximately 10/2002. In 08/2003, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed in Saudi Arabia by members of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team (reference (F)). AL-BAYOUMI was also interviewed in Saudi Arabia by representatives of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission"), in the presence of the FBI, in 10/2003.

FBI investigation has determined that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI possibly assisted NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) upon their arrival in the San Diego, California, area in early 02/2000. In response to interviews conducted and intelligence gathering, and to provide a comprehensive summary of the investigation to date, the following details of the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI are provided. These details include information garnered from the interviews of AL-BAYOUMI conducted by the FBI, the Saudi Mabahith, and New Scotland Yard (NSY), as well as independent investigation into the associations and activities of AL-BAYOUMI while residing in the United States.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

AL-BAYOUMI first traveled to the United States on 08/01/1993 using Saudi Arabian passport # (P-1). On 06/06/1995, AL-BAYOUMI returned to the United States at Los Angeles, California. AL-BAYOUMI entered at that time on a (J-3) using Saudi Arabian passport # (P-1) with an intended address of (P) Beadnell Way, Apartment (P), San Diego, California (reference (F)). AL-BAYOUMI and his family resided at this address until relocating to (P) Beadnell Way, Apartment (P) San Diego, California, in 02/1996. In the summer of 1999, AL-BAYOUMI and his family moved to Parkwood Apartments, (P) (P) Mount Ada Road, San Diego, California.

AL-BAYOUMI returned to Saudi Arabia from 03/21/2000 to 05/31/2000. AL-BAYOUMI then resided with his family in San Diego until the fall of 2000, at which time he relocated to England and enrolled at Aston University in Birmingham. AL-BAYOUMI's wife and children remained in San Diego until 06/2001 when they moved to join AL-BAYOUMI in England. AL-BAYOUMI again traveled to Saudi Arabia from 06/26/2001 to 07/16/2001, then returned to Birmingham, England,

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

where he and his family resided until moving to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 08/2002.

EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION OF AL-BAYOUMI

[REDACTED] Since approximately 1977, AL-BAYOUMI has been employed with the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA). Employment records indicate that AL-BAYOUMI was employed from 1977 to 1981 as an Aviation Fees Checker; from 1981 to 1982 as a Budget Clerk; from 1982 to 1986 as an Accounts Checker; from 1986 to 1992 as a Section Head; and from 1992 to 1995 as an Accountant (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). In 1995, AL-BAYOUMI traveled to the United States to attend English language school and graduate school in California. While in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI retained his employment with the PCA through a process known as "Saudization", a national initiative in Saudi Arabia to educate Saudi Arabian citizens in order for citizens to retain and/or assume positions within the workforce (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). Based on this program, AL-BAYOUMI was reassigned as a Senior Data Processing Technician at the Dallah Avco Trans Arabia Company (Dallah Avco), a contractor of the PCA.

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI had graduated from King Abdul Aziz University in 08/1988 with a Bachelor's degree in Administrative Science. Upon his arrival in the United States in 1995, AL-BAYOUMI attended English classes at the American Language Institute at San Diego State University and then enrolled at West Coast University (WCU). After WCU closed down, AL-BAYOUMI enrolled at United States International University (now known as Alliant International University) in 01/1997. AL-BAYOUMI graduated from United States International University in 12/1997 with a Master's degree in International Business Administration (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). [REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI subsequently enrolled in the Keller Graduate School/Becker CPA Review, where he attended CPA review classes in 1998 and 1999 (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). [REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI did not complete either of these classes and therefore did not receive any credits. In 03/2000, AL-BAYOUMI obtained a certificate for attendance at George Washington University, ESI International Project Management seminar.

[REDACTED] While attending school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive a salary. In addition to his base salary, AL-BAYOUMI also received an allowance for housing, transportation, and other expenses. In 04/2000, this allowance increased from 1,742 Saudi Riyals (USD 465) to 14,271 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,805), and stayed at that level until 12/2000. In 01/2001, the allowance was slightly reduced to 12,852 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,427),

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

and remained at this level until the allowance payments ceased in 08/2001 [Note: the time frame of increased payments to AL-BAYOUMI does not correspond to the dates that hijackers NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR resided in San Diego]. Review of employment records obtained from the PCA indicates that AL-BAYOUMI received a promotion in 04/2000, and his contract status also was changed from "single" to "married" at that time. As a result, his salary and allowance were both increased.

[REDACTED] When applying for school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI had provided a letter from [REDACTED] (P) stating that AL-BAYOUMI was being supported while in the United States. (P) [REDACTED] was also listed as "sponsor" on AL-BAYOUMI's Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Form I-20. When interviewed, [REDACTED] (P) owner of [REDACTED] (P), advised that [REDACTED] (P) had been a subcontractor of Dallah Avco and the PCA and that he was asked to provide the letter of support concerning AL-BAYOUMI. Review of employment records during the time that AL-BAYOUMI was in the United States indicated that AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive his salary and allowance through Dallah Avco.

[REDACTED] In addition to attending school in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI acted as the manager/facilities supervisor of the Al Medina Al-Munarawah Mosque, also known as the Kurdish Islamic Center, 511 South Magnolia, El Cajon, California. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he had been contacted by SAAD AL-HABIB regarding the local mosque used by the Kurdish population. AL-HABIB, a Saudi Arabian who had attended school in San Diego, informed AL-BAYOUMI that he was interested in funding a new mosque for the Kurdish community because the mosque was located in a small building without a parking lot. AL-HABIB asked AL-BAYOUMI to assist in acquiring a larger building to house the mosque, to which AL-BAYOUMI agreed. AL-BAYOUMI subsequently looked for and obtained a building in El Cajon, California, that included a parking lot. AL-HABIB provided all of the money to AL-BAYOUMI to purchase the building, to include the USD 10,000 for which AL-BAYOUMI then wrote a check for the initial down payment. As manager/facilities supervisor, AL-BAYOUMI kept an office at the mosque. AL-BAYOUMI advised that the position was on a volunteer basis and that he was not paid for his work at the mosque.

VISIT TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN CONSULATE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

[REDACTED] On approximately 02/01/2000, AL-BAYOUMI traveled by car from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles in order to renew his passport. AL-BAYOUMI was accompanied on this trip by KAYSAN BIN DON, an associate from San Diego. BIN DON, (P) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

(P) [REDACTED], was invited by AL-BAYOUMI on the previous day to travel with him to Los Angeles (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). A day or so before traveling to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI asked BIN DON if he wanted to accompany him, so that AL-BAYOUMI could take BIN DON to visit the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) (a well-known mosque, according to BIN DON). BIN DON stated that this trip would have been around the end of January as it was soon after the end of Ramadan (which ended in the middle of January in 2000) when they went to Los Angeles. Upon arriving at the Consulate, AL-BAYOUMI submitted his passport renewal documents and also obtained some Islamic books from the Islamic Affairs section to bring back to the mosque that he managed in San Diego. To date, the individual(s) with whom AL-BAYOUMI met at the Consulate are not known.

(C-1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reference [REDACTED]

(F) [REDACTED]

THE MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET RESTAURANT

[REDACTED] When inviting BIN DON to accompany him to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI told BIN DON of a halal restaurant at which they could eat lunch following their visit to the Consulate. After leaving the Consulate the following day, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON went to the restaurant where they discovered that the restaurant had been converted into a Middle Eastern butcher shop that no longer served meals. The butcher shop employees recommended another nearby halal restaurant, the Mediterranean Gourmet, to which AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON proceeded on foot.

[REDACTED] While eating lunch at this second restaurant, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON met AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he overheard two males speaking Arabic in the restaurant. Thinking that they sounded from the Gulf region, AL-BAYOUMI introduced himself and asked the two males where they were from. The two males introduced themselves as KHALID and NAWAF, and stated that they were from Saudi Arabia and were in the United States to learn English but did not like living in Los Angeles because they were having a difficult time and did not know anyone.

AL-BAYOUMI recommended San Diego as a nice place to live; he provided AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR with his telephone number and offered to help them if they ever traveled there. AL-BAYOUMI stated the meeting was approximately 5 minutes in length.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

[REDACTED] During an interview of KAYSAN BIN DON by the writer on 8/2/2007 he advised that he and AL-BAYOUMI did the first prayer of the day at the ICSD and then around 10am or so they left for Los Angeles. BIN DON stated that he is sure they didn't get to Los Angeles until after 12 because he remembers discussing with AL-BAYOUMI a special allowance for traveling Muslims, which allows them to combine the second prayer (which takes place after the apex of the sun, i.e. around noon) and third prayer (which takes place a few hours after that during the winter months) of the day. BIN DON stated that they assumed they would have to do this since they were still on the road when they should have performed their second prayer.

[REDACTED] BIN DON stated that when they arrived in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, AL-BAYOUMI first drove around Santa Monica looking for a halal restaurant AL-BAYOUMI had eaten at before with his son. After failing to locate it, AL-BAYOUMI drove to the Saudi Consulate. At the consulate AL-BAYOUMI met with a male individual unknown to BIN DON and spoke with him in Arabic. BIN DON described this individual as being in his 40s or 50s, bald, a Tunisian citizen, and at that time was giving lectures at the KFM. BIN DON stated this unknown individual and AL-BAYOUMI embraced and then went into a room and closed the door. After approximately twenty minutes, AL-BAYOUMI emerged from the room and he and BIN DON subsequently left. BIN DON did not recall seeing AL-BAYOUMI's passport at such time but assumes he had it as that was the stated purpose of their trip to Los Angeles.

[REDACTED] Writers queried BIN DON to give an honest assessment of his Arabic language skills at the time. BIN DON in response held up his hand in the shape of a "zero." BIN DON added that he had basically no understanding besides being able to exchange "hello's" and "good bye's."

(P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After visiting the consulate, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON proceeded to the KFM. BIN DON advised that they did not attend an organized prayer session but merely prayed alone for five or ten minutes. Writers queried if AL-BAYOUMI showed BIN DON around the KFM, as that was ostensibly the reason BIN DON came to Los Angeles. BIN DON commented that they were in "hurry" because it had taken

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

so long to drive up to Los Angeles, so there wasn't time. Writers queried if BIN DON or AL-BAYOUMI was in "hurry," to which BIN DON replied, "I guess AL-BAYOUMI." BIN DON could not fully explain why they were in a hurry since they had already taken care of the visa issue, but offered that they had not eaten yet so they needed to hurry. Before leaving the KFM, AL-BAYOUMI spoke with an unknown individual. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON, stating that AL-BAYOUMI was asking for a suggestion of where to eat. AL-BAYOUMI translated that AL-BAYOUMI had been told there was a restaurant on "Venice Boulevard right around here."

[REDACTED] BIN DON and AL-BAYOUMI left the KFM and parked off of Venice Boulevard, just to the east of the two restaurants they entered. The first restaurant they entered was named, "something like 'Mediterranean Deli.'" Upon entering, AL-BAYOUMI spoke to the proprietor of the establishment in Arabic, which AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON as "he said they 'don't serve sit down meals.'"

AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON then walked a "couple of store fronts" to another restaurant that BIN DON believed was "in the same building" as the first restaurant. This restaurant was named "Mediterranean Restaurant," according to BIN DON. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON entered, went up to the counter, ordered and then sat at a table next to the front window while they waited for their food to be prepared.

[REDACTED] After approximately five to ten minutes, two men, BIN DON now knows to be AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR entered the restaurant and proceeded to the front counter. BIN DON described the front counter as being about "30 to 40 feet" away from the table at which he and AL-BAYOUMI were sitting. BIN DON advised that neither he nor AL-BAYOUMI could hear AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR talking from where they were sitting. BIN DON indicated that AL-BAYOUMI was staring at them from the time they entered the restaurant. BIN DON stated that he believed that this was because AL-BAYOUMI could not tell if the two men were Arab or Hispanic. Writers queried whether AL-BAYOUMI ever stated this or gave any information to indicate that this is why he was staring. BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI did not give any such indication but added that "that must have been why he was staring."

[REDACTED] BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI then went up to the counter and began talking with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. The three of them then proceeded to the front table near the window and sat down with BIN DON. BIN DON indicated that the entire conversation was in Arabic and so he was dependent on AL-BAYOUMI for any information as to topics being discussed. The three talked for thirty minutes to an hour and then exchanged telephone numbers. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were currently

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED], 08/12/2009

living in an apartment nearby but that he had invited them to come to San Diego since AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR did not like Los Angeles.

BIN DON added that he believed that AL-BAYOUMI gave his cell phone number and AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR gave a land-line number. These assumptions are based on the fact that "most Muslim men only give their cell numbers out," because they don't want to risk someone calling their home and their wife answering and the fact that BIN DON did not believe AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR had time to get a cell phone as they had been in the U.S. "only a couple of days."

[REDACTED] After exchanging phone numbers, the four separated with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR walking off together and AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON returning to their car. BIN DON stated that he did not see where or which direction AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR went. However, before returning to the car, AL-BAYOUMI wanted to stop at a small grocery store that was about fifty yards from the car. They walked around inside for a few minutes and then without buying anything, returned to the car.

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI then drove back to the KFM, where he and BIN DON prayed for five to ten minutes. Again, this prayer was not part of an organized prayer session at the KFM. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON prayed alone and then left the KFM to return to San Diego. BIN DON guessed that it would have been after five o'clock and probably closer to six, as it was "fully dark" outside when they began the trip back to San Diego.

[REDACTED] These events are significant because it shows inconsistencies with AL-BAYOUMI'S account of the meeting between himself and the two hijackers. the most important of these is that during AL-BAYOUMI interview with the PENTTBOM team in Saudi Arabia, he states that he didn't know where the King Fahad Mosque was, and had never been there. The time of the meeting is in question also.

ARRIVAL OF AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR IN SAN DIEGO

[REDACTED] AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived in San Diego a few days after meeting AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON in the restaurant. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), 7050 Eckstrom Avenue, San Diego, California, and asked for him. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR informed AL-BAYOUMI that they were looking to obtain an apartment in the area. AL-BAYOUMI then directed them to the nearby Parkwood Apartment complex at which he resided with his family.

[REDACTED] Investigation has determined that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI initially attempted to obtain an apartment at Parkwood

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

Apartments on their own with cash, but could not because they did not have a credit history and because the leasing company did not accept cash payments. On 02/04/2000, AL-BAYOUMI signed as a guarantor and obtained a cashier's check drawn on his Bank of America checking account in the amount of USD 1,558 for their security deposit and first month's rent of Apartment #150. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR immediately provided him with the same amount of cash as the bank check and he then deposited the cash into his account. Financial records indicate that a cash deposit of the same amount as the cashier's check (USD 1,558) was made into AL-BAYOUMI's bank account on the same day, indicating the contemporaneous reimbursement from AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. While at the Bank of America, AL-MIHDHAR also opened bank account #09000-05839 with an initial deposit of USD 9,900. These three transactions - the cashier's check for USD 1,558, the cash deposit of USD 1,558, and the opening of AL-MIHDHAR's account - were all posted within a time period of seven minutes on 02/04/2000. When interviewed, the bank teller who assisted with these transactions was able to corroborate the same information as obtained from the financial records (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]).

[REDACTED] A review of rental records from Parkwood Apartments indicated that in addition to AL-BAYOUMI's signature as guarantor, both AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR listed AL-BAYOUMI's residence (Apartment [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]) as their last address; In addition, the review of rental records as well as bank records indicate that all rental payments (subsequent to the initial security deposit and first month's rent paid by cashier's check from AL-BAYOUMI's bank account.

INSTRUCTION RECEIVED BY AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR

[REDACTED] Information received from KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED (KSM) indicates that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were complying with the directions given to them prior to departing for the United States. According to KSM, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were instructed to make contacts at the local mosques and to request assistance from members of the Muslim community after their arrival in the United States. KSM advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were given such guidance because, unlike some of the other hijackers who spoke English and had spent time in western cultures, neither AL-HAZMI nor AL-MIHDHAR had such language skill and experience (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]).

DINNER PARTY HELD AT PARKWOOD APARTMENT #150

[REDACTED] A few days after arriving in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI had a "welcoming party," as described by BIN DON, for AL-HAZMI and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 08/12/2009

AL-MIHDHAR. BIN DON stated that this was the only party AL-BAYOUMI had even organized before and after. Around twenty guests in total attended the party, however, not all were present at the same time.

BIN DON video taped the party at AL-BAYOUMI's request. During the taping, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stayed behind BIN DON, as "they didn't want to be on film," NFI. However, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, talked and ate with the other guests. (P)

(P) however, the real purpose was for people "to meet AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR." BIN DON stated that through translation AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR told BIN DON that they were in the U.S. to attend flight school. (P)

(P)

(P)

(P)

If AL-THUMARY and AL-BAYOUMI played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY or AL-BAYOUMI and such unknown individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

<u>TO</u>	<u>PHONE #</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE)	(P)	12/27	12:40
SAE		12/27	12:42
(P)		12/27	14:26
SAE		12/27	14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/27	18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/27	23:36

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 08/12/2009

(P)	(P), (P-1)	12/27	23:36
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/28	11:43
(P)		12/28	13:57
		12/28	22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/28	23:02
ANWAR AULAQI		12/28	23:05
(P)		12/28	23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/29	00:20
(P)		12/29	00:35
		12/29	00:39
Unknown		12/29	12:54
(P)		12/29	13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque		12/29	13:07
ANWAR AULAQI		12/29	13:07
Unknown		12/29	13:48

Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

(P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number (P) which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while living at the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact with the telephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between (P) telephone

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[REDACTED] According to TA, AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999 there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMAIRY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMAIRY also worked at the Consulate (F) [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99 (possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM (F) [REDACTED]. In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE (F) [REDACTED]. In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[REDACTED] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F) [REDACTED]. The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] AL-JARRAH travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) [REDACTED] on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California"

(F) [REDACTED] .

[REDACTED] Moreover, AL-THUMAIRY and AL-BAYOUMI contact with AL-JARRAH did not end after the reported contact above. AL-THUMARY's land line of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] had five additional telephonic contacts with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's cell phone [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.

[REDACTED] However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED], reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government [REDACTED] (A), (G), [REDACTED] did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few items seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulates that distributed funds and support to extremists, and, it appears in some case, terrorist organizations; 2) there were inexplicable, at least currently, telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI particular OMAR AL-BAYOUMI ; 3) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[REDACTED] **Recruitment:** Although, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, may not have arrived in southern California with an active support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those individual's willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

[REDACTED] Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F) [REDACTED]

(F) [REDACTED] Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest.

During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

Predication for the Investigation

[REDACTED] As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) [REDACTED] established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia.

This methodology could possibly be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

[REDACTED] At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 08/12/2009

and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

Main Subject

Name -	
Last:	AL-BAYOUMI
First:	OMAR
Middle:	AHMED
Race:	W
Sex:	M
DOB:	(P-1) 1957
POB:	Saudi Arabia
SOC:	(P-1)
Alias(es) -	
Last:	AL-BAYOUMI
First:	O
Middle:	A
Current Location:	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Miscellaneous:	Subject is a non-USPER.
(G)	(G)

LEAD(s):

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Coordinate (G) [REDACTED] as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to process (G) [REDACTED] which is being submitted via email to the (G) [REDACTED] and appropriate supported systems.

♦♦

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/19/2009

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

International Operations

Attn: [Redacted] (G)

Riyadh

Attn: [Redacted] (G)

San Diego

Attn: [Redacted] (S)

New York

Attn: [Redacted] (S)

From: New York

[Redacted] (G)
Contact: [Redacted] (S)

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

OPERATION ENCORE
[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [Redacted] Initiate a Full Investigation (FI) on FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY

[Redacted] (G)

Enclosure(s): [Redacted] 1 - Opening LHM

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

Full Investigation Initiated: 02/12/2009

Reference: (F) -OPERATION ENCORE, (F)

Details: Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case.

Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened. Writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

Results: Over the past two years, writers have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

Exploitation of Muslim Community: Multiple (A)(G)(J-1) and other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A),(G),(J-1), AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-providing individual, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (F) (F). At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-providing individual or to whom the tazkia would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it likely would have involved someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F) serial). It is important to note that the individual to whom the tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, (A),(G),(J-1), the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

(G) One individual meeting such description who is also reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case# (F). AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F) Additional documentation from (C-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 02/19/2009

[REDACTED] (C-1)
[REDACTED] (F). AL-THUMARY was previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI through phone calls and AL-THUMARY's potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI [REDACTED] (F). According to the closing EC [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) and supplemental closing EC [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and practical intelligence collection methods". However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to have been unknown at such time.

[REDACTED] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and such unknown individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[REDACTED] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

<u>TO</u>	<u>PHONE #</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE)	[REDACTED] (P)	12/27	12:40
SAE	[REDACTED]	12/27	12:42
[REDACTED] (P)	[REDACTED]	12/27	14:26
SAE	[REDACTED]	12/27	14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[REDACTED]	12/27	18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[REDACTED]	12/27	23:36
[REDACTED] (P)	[REDACTED]	12/27	23:36

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

Islamic Affairs of SAE	(P), (P-1)	12/28	11:43
(P)		12/28	13:57
		12/28	22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/28	23:02
ANWAR AULAQI		12/28	23:05
(P)		12/28	23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/29	00:20
(P)		12/29	00:35
		12/29	00:39
Unknown		12/29	12:54
(P)		12/29	13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque		12/29	13:07
ANWAR AULAQI		12/29	13:07
Unknown		12/29	13:48

(P) Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

(P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

(P) Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number (P) which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while living at

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F),(G), 02/19/2009

the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact with the telephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between [REDACTED] (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[REDACTED] According to TA, AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999 there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ([REDACTED] (F)).

[REDACTED] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99 (possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY [REDACTED] (F).

[REDACTED] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM ([REDACTED] (F)). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F)). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. (O-1)

" (O-1), AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States

(A), (G), (J-1)

AL-JARRAH travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

" (O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1)

(O-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

(O-1)

On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

Moreover, AL-THUMARY's contact with AL-JARRAH did not end after the reported contact above. AL-THUMARY's land line of (P) had five additional telephonic contacts with (P) (P) the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone (P) had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's cell phone (P) from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.

(A), (G), (J-1) prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients" (F). (F) The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F). (F) During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P) (F), associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), an officer/owner of (P) and president of (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) on his person.

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

(A), (G), (J-1) indicated that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, a Somali extremist (O-1) case # (F) and was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. NOTE: "AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG)" (F) MOHAMMED, (A), (G), (J-1) received a stipend of approximately (A), (G), (J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F). This stipend was likely administered, because of his particular position by either AL-JARRAH, or one of his subordinates, possibly AL-THUMARY as MOHAMED was located in California.

However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1), "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F)

Finally, the Saudi Arabian telephone number 966-55-857311 is included merely because of its temporal proximity to the other telephone numbers called by AL-THUMARY. At this time the significance of the telephone number or of such contact is unknown.

The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few items seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulates that distributed funds and support to extremists, and, it appears in some case, terrorist organizations; 2) there were inexplicable, at least currently, telephonic connections between AL-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 02/19/2009

AL-HAZMI; 3) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

Recruitment: Although, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, may not have arrived in southern California with an active support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those individual's willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

Predication for the Investigation

As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) [REDACTED] established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia. This methodology could possible be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

Main Subject

Name -
Last: AL-THUMARY
First: FAHAD
Middle: I. A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P) 1971
POB: Saudi Arabia
PNO: (P) Official)
SOC: (P)
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-THUMAIRY
First: FN
Middle: MN
Phone #: (P)
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 02/19/2009

Miscellaneous:
[REDACTED] (G)

Subject is a non-USPER.
[REDACTED] (G)

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Coordinate [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 02/19/2009

AT WASHINGTON, DC

The [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G)
is requested to process the [REDACTED] (G) which is being submitted via
email to the [REDACTED] (G) mailbox at [REDACTED] (G)
[REDACTED] (G)
(G) and appropriate supported systems.

◆◆

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/27/2009

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

(G)

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

Intelligence Directorate

Attn:

Attn:

[Redacted]

From: New York

(G)

Contact:

(S)

[Redacted]

Approved By:

(S)

[Redacted]

Drafted By:

(S)

[Redacted]

Case ID #:

(F)

[Redacted]

Title:

MUSAED AL-JARRAH

(A)(G)(J-1)

(A)(G)(J-1)

Synopsis:

To open captioned Full Investigation, document

transmission of

(G)

and request a

(G)

(G)

(G)

[Redacted]

Enclosure(s):

(1)the electronic

(F)

[Redacted]

Full Investigation Initiated: 10/27/2009

Details:

New York Office opened captioned Full Investigation based on information that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, former director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian Embassy, is or was part of a group that may have provided support to two (2) of the 9/11 hijackers. Through NYO Operation Encore investigation, more information has surfaced indicating AL-JARRAH's connection to international terrorism.

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

[REDACTED] By way of background, over the past two years under Operation Encore, NYO sought to gain a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[REDACTED] As a result, NYO Agents interviewed multiple individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1) [REDACTED] other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. [REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1) [REDACTED] AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-provider, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-provider or to whom the tazkia-provider would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] believed that it was likely a person or multiple persons who had access to both the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). It is important to note that the individual to whom AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were directed, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1) [REDACTED], the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[REDACTED] One individual reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case # [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. Above captioned subject, AL-JARRAH, has multiple telephonic contacts, with AL-THUMARY. AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). Additional documentation from the [REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). AL-THUMARY was previously a main subject of an FI based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (through phone connectivity) and his (AL-THUMARY's) potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]).

[REDACTED] According to the closing EC for AL-THUMARY ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]) and supplemental closing EC [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and practical intelligence collection methods" and iii) the U.S. Attorney's Office conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute AL-THUMARY at such time. However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol, as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community, appears to have been unknown at such time.

[REDACTED] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another individual(s), there may have been telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and such individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY's known telephone records for the time period immediately

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/27/2009

prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

<u>TO</u>	<u>PHONE #</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE)	(P), (P-1)	12/27	12:40
SAE		12/27	12:42
(P)		12/27	14:26
SAE		12/27	14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/27	18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/27	23:36
(P)		12/27	23:36
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/28	11:43
(P)		12/28	13:57
		12/28	22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/28	23:02
ANWAR AULAQI		12/28	23:05
(P)		12/28	23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/29	00:20
(P)		12/29	00:35
		12/29	00:39
Unknown		12/29	12:54
(P)		12/29	13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque		12/29	13:07
ANWAR AULAQI		12/29	13:07
Unknown		12/29	13:48

Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (main subject of (F)). (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/27/2009

[REDACTED] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

[REDACTED] Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the main PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number [REDACTED] (P) which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while he lived at the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact with telephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between [REDACTED] (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[REDACTED] According to Telephone Applications (TA), AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999, there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ([REDACTED] (F)).

[REDACTED] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/27/2009

(possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY ((F)).

The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM (F) . In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ((F)). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F) . The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. AL-JARRAH currently believed to be residing in Malaysia. (O-1)

(O-1) AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States

(A), (G), (J-1)

AL-JARRAH

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/27/2009

travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1)

(O-1)

On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

Moreover, AL-THUMARY's contact with AL-JARRAH did not end after the reported contact above. AL-THUMARY's land line of (F) had five additional telephonic contacts with (F) (F), the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone (F) had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's cell phone (F) from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.

(A), (G), (J-1) prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/27/2009

Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients" (F)
(F) The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F)
(A), (G), (J-1) During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P)
(A), (G), (J-1) and the (P) owned by (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. (P) also the president of (P) had previously been associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI). At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) (P) on his person.

(A), (G), (J-1) indicated that MOHAMED, a Somali extremist who immigrated from Toronto, Canada to San Diego, California in 1995 (case # (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. MOHAMED was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F). NOTE: AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization which rose to power in the early 1990s (according to DHS's Terrorist Reference Guide from 2004) and is designated a (G) terrorist group on the FBI's (G) MOHAMMED (A), (G), (J-1) received a stipend of approximately (A), (G), (J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F) (F) Based on some of the above (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) it seems likely this stipend was administered by AL-THUMARY or AL-JARRAH.

However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F)

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

[REDACTED] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few things seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulate(s); 2) this network is reported to have had the purpose of distributing funds and support to sunni salafist extremists; 3) there were inexplicable telephonic connections between AL-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI; and 4) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[REDACTED] AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI do not appear to have arrived in southern California with an active local support network. However, it appears that once AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were vouched for, via tazkia, they may have begun to assess individual's suitability for recruitment. Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]).

Predication for the Investigation

[REDACTED] The above information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals, including AL-JARRAH, compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Suspected Foreign Power

[REDACTED] At this point in the investigation, there are a number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/27/2009

elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Pertinent Sensitive Investigative Matters:

Not Applicable

(G)

Number of Subjects: 1

(G) Code:

(G)

Descriptive Data:

Main Subject

Name -

Last: AL-JARRAH

First: MUSAED

Middle: A.

Race: W

Sex: M

DOB: (P-1) 1960

POB: Saudi Arabia

Phone #: Previous -

202-342-3700, 202-944-3192.

(P)

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

Current -

[REDACTED] (P-1)

Current Location: Malaysia
Miscellaneous -
[REDACTED] (G)

Subject is a non-USPER.

[REDACTED] (F)

E-mail Addresses:

[REDACTED] (P-1)

Additional Information/ Intelligence:

[REDACTED] Not Applicable

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] To notify of the initiation of captioned FI.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Coordinate [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] as required based on information in the Details above.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Action)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) Process the [REDACTED] (G) which is being submitted via email to the [REDACTED] (G) mailbox at [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] and appropriate supported systems.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) : Read and clear.

Set Lead 8: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) Read and clear.

◆◆



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 11/26/2001

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

(S)




From: San

(G)




(S)




Approved By:

(S)



Drafted By:

(S)



Case ID #:


(F)



Title:


OMAR ABDI MOHAME
OMAR KHADIB;

(A), (J-1), (G)



(A), (G), (J-1) : San Diego requests Experian for financial and credit records regarding captioned subject.

(A), (G), (J-1)




(G)



Full Field Investigation Instituted:

(A), (J-1), (G)



Details:

Request Of Bureau:



Bureau is requested

(A), (G), (J-1)



(A), (G), (J-1) Experian for financial and credit records regarding captioned subject.

On (A), (G), (J-1) 2000, (A), (G), (J-1), advised that Omar Mohamed of San Diego as selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States approximately six months ago. (A), (G), (J-1) stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. (A), (G), (J-1) that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia using (A), (G), (J-1).



To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F) 11/26/2001

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

On 09/14/2001 (C-2) advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes is in the U.S. The male was identified as OMAR KHATIB (phonetic spelling) and his phone number is (P). (C-2) advised that KHATIB is the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qa'idah movement. (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: (P-1) On January

[REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED] nt : San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 11/26/2001

25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[REDACTED] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community [REDACTED] ders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[REDACTED] San Diego appreciates FBIHQ's assistance in this matter.

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC.

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 11/26/2001

[REDACTED] FBIHQ is requested [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Experian for credit
informa aining to Omar Abdi Mohame ib, date of
birth, [REDACTED] (P-1) 1960, SSAN [REDACTED] (P-1), [REDACTED] (P-1) La Mesa, CA.
91941

◆◆



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/16/2001

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted] (S)
[redacted] (G)

From: San Diego

[redacted] (G)
Contact: [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, aka
[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] San Diego requests [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)
for toll records for captioned subject.

[redacted] (G)
[redacted]

Full Field Investigation Instituted: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) (USPER)

Administrative: [redacted] Bureau is requested to direct responses to
[redacted] (F)

Details: [redacted] Request of the Bureau:

[redacted] Bureau is requested to [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) requests for
telephone toll records for the following telephone numbers and
associated addresses for the period of 09/01/2000 to the present:

1. [redacted] (P)
Subject's residence: [redacted] (P)
La Mesa, CA. 91941

2. [redacted] (P)
Western Somali Relief Agency (WESRA)
4979 University Avenue, Suite C, San
Diego, CA. 92105. Subject is the

Director of WESRA.



To: Coun [redacted] m: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) [redacted] 11/16/2001

3. [redacted] (P)

Somali and East African Youth Center,
4979 University Avenue, Suite D, San Diego
CA. 92105. Subject is President of the
Youth Center.

[redacted] NOTE: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) and public source information indicates that KHADIB is in charge of both WESRA and the Youth Center. The request should include language which would request tolls for any and all telephone lines at the above addresses in anticipation of other telephone numbers being present at the addresses.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) request for the above numbers should be directed to :

[redacted] (P)

[redacted] Khadib's pager number is [redacted] (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) request for the pager number records from 09/01/2000 to the present should be directed to:

[redacted] (P)

[redacted] On [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) 2000, [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Omar Mohamed of San Diego, was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Is [redacted] (AIAI) leader in the United States approximately six months ago. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia using [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

To: [redacted] n : San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) [redacted] 11/16/2001

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] On 09/14/2001 [redacted] (C-2) advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes is in the U.S. The male was identified (phonetic spelling) and his phone number is [redacted] (P) [redacted] (C-2) advised that KHATIB is the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qa'idah movement. (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by [redacted] (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers [redacted] (P) and [redacted] (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, [redacted] (P) and [redacted] (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: [redacted] (P-1). On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to [redacted] (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings,

[REDACTED]
To: C uninterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 11/16/2001

insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[REDACTED] San Diego appreciates FBIHQ's assistance in this matter.

◆◆

[REDACTED]

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of

Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California 92123
February 10, 2004

OMAR ABDI MOHAMED,

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] Investigative Summary: (G)

(G) [REDACTED], advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, also known as Omar Abdi Mohamed AlKhadib, was born on [REDACTED] (P-1), in Mogadishu, Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident [REDACTED] is last known address in Canada was [REDACTED] (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was [REDACTED] (P-1) MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by [REDACTED] (P). On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that OMAR MOHAMED of San Diego, was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States in early 2000. (A), (G), (J-1) stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. A close friend of (A), (G), (J-1) advised that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] AIAI is an international terrorist organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

[REDACTED] AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia. (G) [REDACTED], has reported that

[REDACTED]

enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[REDACTED] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that a prominent Somali community leader, [REDACTED] (P) alleged that KHADIB was actively providing financial support to an unnamed terrorist organization outside the U.S. [REDACTED] (P) was astounded that the FBI had not arrested KHADIB and guessed that KHADIB must

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 09/14/2001 [REDACTED] (C-2) [REDACTED] (C-2) advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes is in the U.S. The male was identified as OMAR KHATIB (phonetic spelling) and his phone number is [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (C-2) advised that KHATIB is the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda movement (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by [REDACTED] (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

[REDACTED] (O-1) In [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[REDACTED] WALI, a Somali national, was described as 38 - 40 years old, tall, thin, bowlegged, strong hands and legs. He has a gray patch of hair in the front of his scalp, which was surrounded by dark hair. He is married and has five children. He has a Master's Degree and is working on his PhD in economics. He lives in the northeast section of Mecca, called Azizia.

[REDACTED] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year

[REDACTED]

in places such as Mecca and Nairobi Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to (O-1) and told (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, (O-1) and KADIB are from the Ogaden tribe.

(U-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) identified ABDIAZIZ LNU another AL-QAEDA member who lived in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. (O-1) met ABDIAZIZ at WALI's house in Mecca during the Hajj.

[REDACTED] Minneapolis FBI advised that the AIAI had a meeting of its United States leaders in Minneapolis, Minnesota over the September 2001, Labor Day weekend. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[REDACTED] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: (P). On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P), which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[REDACTED] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions. (A), (G), (J-1) advised that KHADIB received a monthly stipend (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown to (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1), (O-1)

[REDACTED] has indicated that KHADIB closed the Western Somali Relief Agency (WESRA), but still operates the East African Youth Center in San Diego, California. The closing of WESRA appeared to coincide with the shutdown of the Chicago-based Global Relief Foundation (GRF) by the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), Department of Treasury. [REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] Investigation at San Diego determined that MOHAMED has a wife and child in Australia. [REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] the possible name of MOHAMED's wife as Reisa Bannerman.

During a recent interview with MOHAMED, he admitted to having family in Australia. MOHAMED also stated that he often traveled to Australia, and most recently, used Australia as a stop-over point while he applied for travel Visa's to Africa. (MOHAMED did not state which African countries he was attempting to visit.)

[REDACTED] Financial investigation into any possible financial transactions between MOHAMED and Australia are currently ongoing and have not been fully analyzed.

[REDACTED] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name:	OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex:	[REDACTED]
Date of Birth:	(P-1) 1960
Place of Birth:	Somalia
SSN:	(P-1)
CADLN	(P-1)
INS A#:	(P-1)
Height:	5'11"
Weight:	180lbs.
Hair:	Black
Eyes:	[REDACTED]
Residence:	(P) [REDACTED], La Mesa, CA 91941 (P)
Occupation:	President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-

0711



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/17/2002

To: General Counsel
San Diego
Los Angeles

Attn:



From: San Diego

(S)
Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: OMAR ABDI MOHAM
OMAR KHADIB; (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: (A), (G), (J-1)

(G)

Full Investigation Instituted: (A), (G), (J-1) (USPER)

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for Los Angeles is an original and a copy of a letter dated 01/17/2002, addressed to (P) Regulatory Compliance, Experian, 505 City Parkway West, Orange,



[REDACTED]

To: General Counsel From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 01/17/2002

California, requesting consumer identifying information limited to name, address, former addresses, places of employment, or former places of employment and the names and addresses of all financial institutions at which the subject maintains or has maintained an account.

Details: [REDACTED] A full international terrorism investigation of subject, a U.S. person, was authorized in accordance with the Attorney General Guidelines because subject was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States in early 2000. The AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization closely linked to Usama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network.

[REDACTED] In September 2001, [REDACTED] (C-2) [REDACTED] (C-2) advised that it has identified a senior member of the terrorist group, AIAI, whom it believes was in the U.S. The male was identified as OMA [REDACTED] ATIB (phonetic spelling) and his phone number was [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (C-2) advised that KHATIB was the sort of person to have close ties with Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda movement. (Note: San Diego has identified the phone number provided by [REDACTED] (C-2) as being used by San Diego subject, OMAR KHADIB.)

[REDACTED] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000.

[REDACTED] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: [REDACTED] (P-1) On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to [REDACTED] (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[REDACTED] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

To: General Counsel From: San Diego
Re: (F) 01/17/2002

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

The consumer identifying information and identity of financial institutions information are being requested to determine subject's associates at current and former places of employment and determine subject's financial activity and his link to other terrorism subjects in the United States and overseas.

(A), (G), (J-1)

A representative of the Los Angeles office who has liaison with the consumer reporting agency should deliver (A), (G), (J-1) to (P)

(G)

Los Angeles should remind Experian that, (G) (G) it is prohibited from disclosing that the FBI has made this request. In addition, Experian is prohibited from including in any consumer report any information that would indicate that the FBI has sought or obtained such information.

[REDACTED]

To: General Counsel From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 01/17/2002

[REDACTED] Arrangements should be made with Experian to provide the records personally to a representative of your office. Experian should neither send the records through the mail nor utilize the name of the subject in any telephone calls to your office. Experian should not contact FBIHQ directly in any manner.

[REDACTED] Consumer reports received from a consumer reporting agency must be clearly identified when reported in any Bureau communication. Subsequent dissemination of such information is prohibited, except to other Federal agencies or military investigative entities as may be necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign counterintelligence investigation.

[REDACTED] Any questions regarding the above can be directed to San Diego Division, Attention: [REDACTED] (S) .

To: General Counsel From: San Diego
Re: (F), 01/17/2002

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1:

Los Angeles Division

AT SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

Deliver the attached (G) as indicated above. Upon receipt of information from the carrier, Los Angeles Division is requested to submit results to San Diego Division.

Set Lead 2:

GENERAL COUNSEL

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(G)

◆◆



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/23/2007

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (G)

Attn: [Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (G)

Attn: [Redacted] (G)

Riyadh

Attn: [Redacted] (G)

Sanaa

Attn: [Redacted] (G)





FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Ottawa

Attn: (G)

San Diego

Attn: (S)

Los Angeles

Attn: (S)

Washington Field

Attn: (G)

New York

Attn: (G)

From: New (G)

ct: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: OPERATION ENCORE (A),(G),(J-1)

Synopsis: Initiate a Full Investigation (FI) on the below-described group.

(G)

Enclosure(s): 1 - Opening LHM 1 - (G) submitted under separate cover



[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 10/23/2007

Full Investigation Initiated: 10/23/2007

Reference: [REDACTED] (F)

Details: [REDACTED] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case file.

[REDACTED] Background: On 06/28/2007, New York opened a subfile under the PENTTBOM investigation to contain information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, New York believed that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[REDACTED] Specifically, New York sought to gain a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[REDACTED] Results: Over the past two months, writers interviewed multiple individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[REDACTED] **Exploitation of Muslim Community:** Multiple San Diego sources and other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. According to such sources,

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-provider, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see (F)). At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-provider or to whom the tazkia-provider would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it was likely a person or multiple persons who had access to both the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F)). It is important to note that the individual to whom AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were directed, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, as the above sources described, the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

One individual reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in (F). AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F). Additional documentation (C-1)

(F)
AL-THUMARY was previously a main subject of an FI based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (through phone connectivity) and his (AL-THUMARY's) potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F). According to the closing EC (F) and supplemental closing EC (F), the FI was closed due to: (A), (G), (J-1)

the U.S. Attorney's Office conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute AL-THUMARY at such time. However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol, as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community, appears to have been unknown at such time.

If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another individual(s), there may have been telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and such individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY's known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

<u>TO</u>	<u>PHONE #</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE)	(P), (P-1)	12/27	12:40
SAE		12/27	12:42
(P)		12/27	14:26
SAE		12/27	14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/27	18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/27	23:36
(P)		12/27	23:36
(P) s of SAE		12/28	11:43
(P)		12/28	13:57
(P)		12/28	22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/28	23:02
ANWAR AULAQI		12/28	23:05
(P)		12/28	23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/29	00:20
(P)		12/29	00:35
(P)		12/29	00:39
Unknown		12/29	12:54
(P)		12/29	13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque		12/29	13:07
ANWAR AULAQI		12/29	13:07
Unknown		12/29	13:48

Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

with [REDACTED] (P) (main subject of [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from [REDACTED] (P) to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a [REDACTED] (P) student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[REDACTED] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

[REDACTED] Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the main PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number [REDACTED] (P), which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while he lived at the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact with telephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between [REDACTED] (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[REDACTED] According to Telephone Applications (TA), AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999, there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ([REDACTED] (F)).

[REDACTED] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99 (possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM ([REDACTED] (F)). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE [REDACTED] (F). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[REDACTED] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE [REDACTED] (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. [REDACTED] (O-1)

" [REDACTED] (O-1) AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States [REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1)

[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1)

AL-JARRAH

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 10/23/2007

travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1) [REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) [REDACTED] on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California"

(F) [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] Moreover, AL-THUMARY's contact with AL-JARRAH did not [REDACTED] e reported contact above. AL-THUMARY's land line of (P) [REDACTED] had five additional telephonic contacts with (P) [REDACTED] the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone (P) [REDACTED] had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's cell phone (P) [REDACTED] from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.

[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1) [REDACTED] prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients"

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

(F) . The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F)

During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P) (A), (G), (J-1) and the (P) owned by (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. (P) also the president of (P), had previously been associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI). At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) on his person.

(A), (G), (J-1) indicated that MOHAMED, a Somali extremist who immigrated from Toronto, Canada to San Diego, California in 1995 (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. MOHAMED was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F) (F). NOTE: AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization which rose to power in the early 1990s (according to DHS's Terrorist Reference Guide from 2004) and is designated a (G) terrorist group on the FBI's (G) MOHAMMED, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) received a stipend of approximately (A), (G), (J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F) Based on some of the above (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) it seems likely this stipend was administered by AL-THUMARY or AL-JARRAH.

However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F).

(P-1) Finally, the Saudi Arabian telephone number (P-1) is included merely because of its temporal proximity to the other telephone numbers called by AL-THUMARY. At this time

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 10/23/2007

the significance of the telephone number or of such contact is unknown.

[REDACTED] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few things seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulate(s); 2) this network is reported to have had the purpose of distributing funds and support to sunni salafist extremists; 3) there were inexplicable telephonic connections between AL-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI; and 4) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[REDACTED] **Recruitment:** AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI do not appear to have arrived in southern California with an active local support network. However, it appears that once AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were vouched for, via tazkia, they may have begun to assess individual's suitability for recruitment.

[REDACTED] Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F). Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

[REDACTED] **Newly Identified Additional Individuals:** Through the intelligence collection effort under the [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (F) as well as additional analysis of telephone and financial activity and source reporting, some additional individuals, who's involvement with the above described group is still not fully understood, have been identified:

[REDACTED] **MOHAMMED BIN SULEIMAN AL-MUHANNA** [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) - POB: Likely [REDACTED] (P-1) DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) 1974 or [REDACTED] (P-1) 1974; Currently located in Saudi Arabia. AL-MUHANNA was previously a Consular Official at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, and is reported to have founded, with AL-THUMARY, the KFM. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] "AL-MUHANNA is a Sunni Islamic extremist associated with a radical form of the Salafi ideology...and a graduate of the Ibn Mohammad Islamic University in Riyadh" [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. AL-MUHANNA had numerous [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

phone connections with AL-THUMARY, as would be expected, and with AL-JARRAH. In late March, 2003, FBI Los Angeles was directed to

(A)(G)(J-1)

plan

(A)(G)(J-1)(D)

(A)(G)(J-1)(D)

(A)(G)(J-1)(D)

he and his family left the United States for

gland.

(C-1)

(C-1)

(F)

FAISAL AL-MUHANNA

(F)

- POB: Likely (P-1) DOB: (P-1) 1976; Currently located in Saudi Arabia. FAISAL AL-MUHANNA is the brother of MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA. On 01/06/2000, telephone numbers bed to by FAISAL AL-MUHANNA placed calls to both AULAQI and (P-1) According to TA, between 01/01/2000 and 08/09/2001, FAISAL AL-MUHANNA placed 327 calls, an average of over one call per day to telephone numbers subscribed to by ALTHUMARY.

Predication for the Investigation

[REDACTED] As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia.

This methodology could possibly be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into" what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

At this point in the investigation, there are a number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Pertinent Sensitive National Security Matters

A sensitive national security matter exists as a number of individuals identified herein were or may currently hold diplomatic status in the Saudi Arabian government, including FAHAD AL-THUMARY, MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA and MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

Main Subject

Name -

Last: AL-THUMARY

First: FAHAD

Middle: I. A.

Race: W

Sex: M

DOB: (P-1) 1971

POB: (P-1)

PNO:

SOC:

Alias(es) -

Last: AL-THUMAIRY

First: FN

Middle:

Phone #: (P)

Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

(A)(G)(J-1)

(A)(G)(J-1)

Main Subject

Name -

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

Last: AL-BAYOUMI
First: OMAR
Middle: AHMED MUSTAFA
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1957
POB: (P-1)
PNO:
SOC:
Phone #: (P)
Miscellaneous - (P)
(A)(G)(J-1) Subject is a non-USPER.
(A)(G)(J-1)

Main Subject

Name -
Last: AL-MUHANNA
First: MOHAMMED
Middle: BIN SULEIMAN
Race: W
Sex:
DOB: (P-1) 1974, (P-1) 1974
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-MOHANNA
Middle: S.
Phone #: (P)
Miscellaneous - (P)
(A)(G)(J-1) Subject is a non-USPER and
brother of FAISAL AL-MUHANNA
(A)(G)(J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Name -
Last: AL-MUHANNA
First: FAISAL
Middle: A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1)
POB: (P-1)
PNO:
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-MOHANNA, ALMUHALKA
Phone #: (P)

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

Miscellaneous -
(A)(G)(J-1)

Subject is a non-USPER and
UHANNA
(A)(G)(J-1)

Main Subject

Name -
Last: AULAQI
First: ANWAR
Middle: NASSER
Current Case # (F)

Main Subject

Name -
Last: (P)
First:
Middle:
Race: B/W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1975
POB: Mogadishu, Somalia
ARN: (P-1)
PNO:
SOC:
Address(es) -
House #: (P-1)
Street Name:
City:
State:
Postal Code: (P-1)
Country: Canada
Phone #: (P)

Miscellaneous -

Subject is an USPER.

Main Subject

Name -
Last: AL-JARRAH
First: MUSAED
Middle: A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1960

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

POB:

[REDACTED] (P-1)

Phone #:

[REDACTED] (P)

Miscellaneous -
[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1)

Subject is a non-USPER.
[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1)

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Coordinate [REDACTED] (G) as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to process the [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] which is being submitted via email to the [REDACTED] (G) mailbox at [REDACTED] (G) case to the [REDACTED] (G) and appropriate supported systems.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

Investigation on

at

File #

Date dictated

by

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your

agency;

it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

01/29/2002

A Federal Grand Jury Subpoena, (D) from the United States District Court, Southern District of California, was served to Verizon Wireless, Cellco Partnership, 51 Chubb Way, Branchburg, NJ requesting subscriber and toll record information for cellular telephone (P)

Telephone billing records of Mohdar Abdullah reflected 105 phone calls to an unknown telephone number in Italy. Abdullah was arrested by agents of the San Diego Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on 9/26/01 and currently is held in custody as a Material Witness.

FBI San Diego Division requested the assistance of Italian law enforcement in identifying the subscriber to Italian telephone number (P-1) Investigation by Italian law enforcement determined that this Italian number had contacted San Diego telephone number (P)

The subscriber of cellular telephone (P) is (P) (P) is an (P) Mohdar Abdullah after his arrest.

1/29/02

San Diego, CA

(F)

n/a

SA (S)

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 10/22/2001

To: Counterterrorism
Investigative Services
Los Angeles
New York

Attn: [Redacted] (G)

From: San Diego

[Redacted] (G)
Contact: [Redacted] (S), [Redacted] (S)

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] PENTTBOMB;
MAJOR CASE 182;
ACTS OF TERRORISM

Synopsis: [Redacted] Lead for Los Angeles to conduct interview of [Redacted] (P)
[Redacted] (P) Reference FBI control number [Redacted] (F).

[Redacted] (G)

Enclosure(s): [Redacted] Enclosed for Los Angeles are the following:

- (1) One copy of FD-302 from interview of [Redacted] (P) on October 16, 2001.
- (2) One copy of FD-302 from interview of [Redacted] (P) on October 16, 2001.
- (3) One copy of insert regarding [Redacted] (P) and records checks.
- (4) One copy of 28 photographs; including 19 known hijackers and 9 San Diego associates.

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(5) One copy of California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) photograph of Soliman Ali Elay.

Details: [REDACTED] On October 14, 2001, a U-Haul rental truck number DC6639A, bearing Arizona license plate AA92718, was observed at the Islamic Center of San Diego, 7050 Eckstrom, San Diego, California. Due to the threat of possible terrorist attacks utilizing rental panel vans or trucks, San Diego initiated an investigation into the rented U-Haul truck.

[REDACTED] San Diego contacted [REDACTED] (P), U-Haul, who advised that [REDACTED] (P), date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1), Social Security Account Number [REDACTED] (P-1), [REDACTED] (P), apartment [REDACTED] (P) San Diego, California rented U-Haul truck number DC6639A, bearing Arizona license plate AA92718, on October 14, 2001 in San Diego, California and returned the truck in Inglewood, California on October 16, 2001.

[REDACTED] San Diego contacted [REDACTED] (P), Balboa Plaza Apartments, [REDACTED] (P) San Diego, California, who advised [REDACTED] (P) lived with her daughter, [REDACTED] (P) date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P-1), at [REDACTED] (P), apartment [REDACTED] (P), San Diego, California from September 21, 2000 to October 14, 2001. [REDACTED] (P) recently married an unknown male (UM) who resides in the Los Angeles, California area.

[REDACTED] (P) was previously employed as an [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), [REDACTED] (P) San Diego, California. [REDACTED] (P) supervisor was [REDACTED] (P). During the inception and construction of the ICSD it is believed that founding members embezzled funds for construction costs for personal gain.

[REDACTED] Records checks were conducted on [REDACTED] (P) which revealed [REDACTED] (P) is listed as a reference in [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F). Subsequent contact with Chicago determined that [REDACTED] (P) vehicle, Illinois license plate [REDACTED] (P-1), was observed on June 16, 1997 at a store in [REDACTED] (P), Illinois during a FBI surveillance. [REDACTED] (P) address at the time was [REDACTED] (P) Illinois.

[REDACTED] Choice Point records checks confirmed that [REDACTED] (P), Social Security Account Number [REDACTED] (P-1), previously resided at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Illinois.

[REDACTED] (P) currently resides at [REDACTED] (P), apartment [REDACTED] (P) Hawthorne, California, telephone [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 10/22/2001

[REDACTED] Investigation at San Diego has determined that subjects from Flight 77, Khalid M. Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf M. Al-Hazmi, lived at the Parkwood Apartments, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], San Diego, California, from approximately February 5, 2000 to May 31, 2000. Witnesses have placed subject Hani Hanjour, also from Flight 77, visiting the apartment of Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi. But, no residence has been identified for Hanjour in San Diego. Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi received flight training in San Diego and Hanjour received flight training in Phoenix.

[REDACTED] Rental records indicate that Omar Al-Bayoumi, a Saudi national, who lived at the Parkwood Apartments, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], (P) San Diego, California, had signed as a guarantor on Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi's apartment lease and he occasionally paid their rent. Interviews of Muslims have revealed that Al-Bayoumi had been involved in aviation when he lived in Saudi Arabia and he did not work while in the United States (U.S.), but he had "more money than he knew what to do with."

[REDACTED] An interview of a prominent Islamic leader in San Diego identified Al-Bayoumi as being employed by the Saudi government to monitor the activities of Saudi dissidents that resided in the U.S. According to the Parkwood Apartment [REDACTED] (P) Al-Bayoumi traveled out of the country on numerous occasions and sometimes he did not return for 2 to 5 months at a time.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi is known to have frequented the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), 7050 Eckstrom, San Diego, California.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi vacated his apartment on June 23, 2001, and is currently living in England with his wife, Manal Bagadar, and their four children. On September 20, 2001, at the request of the FBI, New Scotland Yard (NSY) detained Al-Bayoumi in England on suspicion of terrorist activities. [REDACTED] (C-2)

[REDACTED] San Diego is attempting to obtain information to produce an arrest warrant for Al-Bayoumi.

[REDACTED] Omar Al-Bayoumi is associated with Soliman Elay, date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] Elay wire transferred \$2,000 into Al-Bayoumi's bank account. Elay resided in both San Diego, California and Falls Church, Virginia and is now believed to be in Saudi Arabia.

[REDACTED] Elay is known to have received deposits into his bank account from two companies, Sana-Bell company and BMI Real Estate Development (BMI). Sana-Bell company has deposited approximately \$127,000 to Elay's bank account. BMI has deposited \$10,000 into Elay's bank account.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 10/22/2001

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] (F)
and Sana-Bell company is related to [REDACTED] (F) .

[REDACTED] Los Angeles is requested to determine [REDACTED] (P)
knowledge in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, illegal activities
at the ICSD, Omar Al-Bayoumi and Soliman Elay.

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 10/22/2001

LEAD (s) :

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

For information, read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Adm)

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

AT WASHINGTON, DC

To make [REDACTED] (G) aware of San Diego investigation and resulting leads set forth for other divisions.

Set Lead 3:

LOS ANGELES

AT HAWTHORNE, CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles will interview [REDACTED] (P) apartment [REDACTED] (P) Hawthorne, California, telephone [REDACTED] (P) date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1) Social Security Account Number [REDACTED] (P-1), regarding her knowledge of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Islamic Center of San Diego, Omar Al-Bayoumi and Soliman Elay.

Set Lead 4: (Adm)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK

For information, read and clear.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 10/22/2001

To: Counterterrorism
Investigative Services
New York
San Diego

Attn: (G), (S)

From: (G)

Contact: SSA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE #182

Synopsis: To report results of investigation in obtaining subscriber information at Legat, (G)

Reference: San Diego EC dated 10/04/2001 captioned as above.

Details: Referenced San Diego EC requested (G) obtain subscriber information for the following numbers, in conjunction with the San Diego investigation of Omar Al-Bayoumi. By letter dated 10/17/2001, the Philippine National Police, (C-2) provided the following subscriber information:

1. (P-1)

This number is subscribed to by International Synthetic Industry, 389 Quirino Hiway, Brgy. Baesa, Quezon City, Philippines.

2. (P)

This number is subscribed to by the Commission on Audit, 2/F COA Building, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines.

3. (P)

This number is subscribed to by Fiber Development Authority, Asiatruster Annex Building, 1424 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines.

4. (P)

To: Counterterrorism From: [REDACTED] (G)
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/22/2001

This number is subscribed to by Baynatel Telephone Booth, on
Roosevelt Street, Quezon City, Philippines.

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: (F) 10/22/2001

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1:

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Read and Clear.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 01/25/2002

To: Counterterrorism
Investigative Services
New York
New Haven

Attn: (G)
Attn: (G)
Attn: SSA (S)

From: (G)
Legat Office

Contact: (S) (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F) (Pending)

Title: PENTTBOM
MAJOR CASE 182

Synopsis: To set lead for (G) New York, and New Haven regarding (A),(G),(J-1) request for information on IYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MOUSTAFA ALRABABAH and to cover (F)

(G)

Reference: (F)

Enclosures: Enclosed for New York Division is the original cable from (O-1) Enclosed for (G) is a copy of New York enclosures.

Details: Referenced EC requested that Legat (G) conduct logical investigation with (A),(G),(J-1) to include determining if EYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MOUSTAFA ALRABABAH has ever been associated with extremist groups in Kuwait.

On November 5, 2001, Legat (G) submitted a request to the (A),(G),(J-1). On January 13, 2002, (O-1) advised that they had no security information regarding IYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MOUSTAFA AL-RABABAH. It was discovered that there was a similar name, IYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA AL-RABABAH, who is a Jordanian national, date of birth (P-1), holding a Jordanian passport number (P-1), issued on 05/11/1986, expiration date 05/11/1991.

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: [REDACTED] (G)
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 01/25/2002

[REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1) requests any security related information regarding IYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA AL-RABABAH.

[REDACTED] It should be noted that although [REDACTED] (O-1) query provided negative results regarding IYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA AL-RABABAH, AL-RABABAH's name was also queried spelling his first name as Eyad.

[REDACTED] Inasmuch as no further information is available through liaison contacts or [REDACTED] (O-1) Legat [REDACTED] (G) considers [REDACTED] (F) covered.

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: (F), 01/25/2002

LEAD (s):

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON D.C.

Request Counterterrorism to provide any security related information releasable to the (A) (G) (J-1) on (O-1) (O-1), (P-1)

Set Lead 2:

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

AT WASHINGTON D.C.

Read and clear

Set Lead 3:

NEW HAVEN

AT NEW HAVEN

Request New Haven provide any security related information releasable to the (A) (G) (J-1) on (O-1) (O-1), (P-1)

Set Lead 4:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK

Request New York provide any security related information releasable to the (A) (G) (J-1) on (O-1), (P-1) (O-1), (P-1)

◆◆



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 10/10/2001

To: Counterterrorism
Investigative Services

National Security

Attn: (G), (S)



From: San Diego

(G)
Contact:  (S)

Approved By:  (S)




Drafted By:  (S)


Case ID #:  (F)

Title:  PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE #182

Synopsis:  Request to pass  (O-1)
information to foreign and domestic intelligence and criminal sources.

  (G)

Administrative:  Re telcalls from Special Agent  (S)
San Diego Division, to Assistant General Counsel (AGC)  (S)
National Security Law Unit (NSLU), FBIHQ, dated October 4, 2001 and October
5, 2001.

Details:  As a result of the investigation being conducted at San
Diego it has been determined that Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi played an important
role in helping terrorists, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar assimilate
into San Diego. Al-Bayoumi allowed them to stay at his apartment at the
Parkwood Apartment Complex, prior to obtaining their apartment at the
same complex approximately two weeks after they entered into the United
States through Los Angeles, California. Since the terrorists did not
have credit history or bank accounts Al-Bayoumi was listed as the guarantor
and co-signer on their apartment, and on at least one occasion paid for
their rent. Additionally, he helped set up a bank account for Al-Mihdhar.



[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/10/2001

[REDACTED] While Al-Bayoumi resided in the United States he attended numerous schools and in December 1997 he graduated from Alliant International University (AIU), formerly United States International University, San Diego, California, with a Master's Degree in International Business Administration. In May 1998, Al-Bayoumi applied for an Executive Doctorate In Management Program at the Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) in Cleveland, Ohio, which was subsequently declined. Through numerous interviews and by obtaining school records and resumes, it has been determined that Al-Bayoumi stated that he has been employed by the Civil Aviation Administration of Saudi Arabia (CAA) for at least 20 years and is also associated with Dallah/Avco Trans Arabia Company (DATA) as the Assistant to the Director of Finance, in the Contracts and Finance Control Division, PCA, Airways Engineering. Additionally, a letter dated May 16, 1998, from Al-Bayoumi to Case Western Reserve University, disclosed that in 1995 (and it is understood through the present) that Al-Bayoumi is Assistant Director of CFC at DATA.

[REDACTED] As a result of reviewing the documents from AIU, a letter from [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Incorporated, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Newport Beach, California, dated January 22, 1997 was noted. The letter stated that [REDACTED] (P) was sponsoring Al-Bayoumi from January 1997 through the year 2000, by providing \$4,000 a month to support his educational program in the San Diego area. This information was incorporated on an Immigration and Naturalization (INS) Form I-20, Certificate of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant (F-1) Student Status - For Academic and Language Students. A subsequent lead was sent to the Los Angeles Division to interview [REDACTED] (P) (See Los Angeles FD-302s dated September 22, and October 1, 2001 sent under separate cover from the Los Angeles Division).

[REDACTED] During the September 22, 2001 interview, [REDACTED] (P) initially advised the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents that he had a contract, from 1995 through 1997, with the CAA to provide Dallah/Avco of Saudia Arabia, who allegedly has the operations maintenance contract with CAA, with parts used to equip control towers at airports, from radars to navigation, transistors, diodes, etc. [REDACTED] (P) alleges that he was asked by someone at CAA to provide a \$4,000 a month sponsorship to Al-Bayoumi while he was going to school. [REDACTED] (P) declined, but advised that he would provide a letter stating that he was furnishing \$4,000, however would not provide the money. As a direct result of that statement and the I-20 signed by Al-Bayoumi, on September 27, 2001, INS was able to file a Criminal Complaint, in the Southern District of California, and obtain a federal arrest warrant, charging Al-Bayoumi with Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1546, Visa Fraud.

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F) 10/10/2001

In a second interview of (P) on October 1, 2001, (P) alleges that (P) entered into formal contract with Dallah/Avco to supply parts to Airways Engineering, CAA, no date given, however (P) advised that negotiations between (P) Dallah/Avco and the CAA began in 1994.

(A), (G), (J-1)

(O-1)
(O-1)

On or about September 19, 2001, a request was made to (O-1) to conduct a trace on (P) (P) CAA and Dallah/Avco of Saudia Arabia. On October 10, 2001, a response was received advising of the following:

"We note that Avco and Dallah appear to be under the same umbrella company, (O-1) on a company, Avco Dallah Trans Arab, that was linked to UBL. (P) and (P) (P): as of December 1992, (P) was located in the U.S. and was reportedly attempting to purchase military equipment for shipment to Saudi Arabia without obtaining U.S. Export Licenses. He was described as possibly of Egyptian descent. (P) aka (P) (P) was located at (P) Newport Beach, CA. Avco Company/Dallah: As of 1998, Dallah Avco Trans Arabia Ltd was reportedly a subsidiary of the Al Baraka Investment and Development Company in Jeddah. It has reportedly held the contracts for the cleaning and maintenance of the three major airports in Saudi Arabia for a long period of time. Avco Dallah Trans Arab aka Avco Dallah Company aka Dallah Avco Company was linked to UBL. (O-1) UBL was instructed to contact the company in June of 1998." The above quoted paragraph is (P) according to the CIA.

It is requested that (O-1) provide specific information pertaining to the above reference to DATA, which would include type of reporting, location to location, identities of the parties involved, date(s), transcript, if it is a conversation and any additional pertinent information.

Due to the relationship of Al-Bayoumi and the terrorists, Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar, and the interviews and documentation showing

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F) 10/10/2001

the relationship between Al-Bayoumi, (P), DATA and CAA, it is critical to be able to determine if this is an actual link to the above mentioned terrorists, Al-Bayoumi, (P) DATA and the UBL or not. If it is determined that there is a direct link, it is essential that this information be used, in conjunction with the facts obtained to date, by the FBI and New Scotland Yard, to charge Al-Bayoumi in a criminal conspiracy and implicate (P)

Descriptive Data:

Reference

Name -

Last: (P)

First:

Middle:

Race:

W

Sex:

M

DOB:

(P-1)

POB:

DBA:

(P)

Newport Beach, California

92660

DBA:

(P)

(P)

(P)
(P-1)

SOC:

Address(es) -

House #:

(P)

Street Name:

City:

State:

California

Phone #:

(P)

Home

Phone #:

Cellular

Phone #:

Business

Miscellaneous -

(P-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F) 10/10/2001

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 2:

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

AT WASHINGTON, DC

For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 3:

NATIONAL SECURITY

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(O-1) to be able to pass specific information regarding links between
Dallah/Avco Trans Arabia Company and UBL to New Scotland Yard and utilize
same for the FBI prosecution of Al-Bayoumi.

◆◆



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 10/05/2001

To: Counterterrorism
Investigative Services
New York
(G)

Attn: (G)
[Redacted]

From: San Diego
(G)

Contact: (S)
[Redacted]

Approved By: (S)
[Redacted]

Drafted By: [Redacted]

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE #182

Synopsis: [Redacted] Information regarding [Redacted] (P), aka [Redacted] (P) [Redacted], currently residing in [Redacted] (G), Saudi Arabia. Request Legat [Redacted] (G) interview [Redacted] (P). Coverage of San Diego investigation set forth [Redacted] (G).

[Redacted] (G)
[Redacted]

Enclosure(s): [Redacted] Enclosed for receiving offices is: 1) A two (2) page (G) dated 10/04/2001 of [Redacted] (P). 2) (O-1) query history for [Redacted] (P) DOB [Redacted] (P-1) 3) Eleven (11) page photo spread numbered 1 through 28.

Details: [Redacted] Suspected hijacker Khalid Al-Mihdhar (listed as subject #15) and Nawaf Al-Hazmi (listed as subject #19) were passengers on Flight #77, which was used in the attack on the Pentagon. Additional description information regarding Al-Mihdhar (subject #15) and Al-Hazmi (subject #19) can be obtained from EC dated 09/27/2001 to all field offices from Counterterrorism, captioned as above, which provides extensive information regarding all nineteen hijackers.

[Redacted] Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi resided at the Parkwood Apartments located at [Redacted] (P), San Diego,



To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F) , 10/05/2001

California, from February 5, 2000 to May 31, 2000. Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi was a co-signer and guarantor on a lease agreement for this apartment.

Al-Bayoumi resided at the Parkwood Apartments, (P) Apartment (P) San Diego, California, from September 1, 1999 through June 23, 2001.

Al-Bayoumi relocated to the United Kingdom and is enrolled in a doctorate program at Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Wales, United Kingdom.

On 09/21/2001, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) detained Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi under the United Kingdom Prevention of Terrorist Act. Al-Bayoumi's residence, automobile, and office was searched incident to this detention. On 09/24/2001, Legat (G) with the assistance of Special Agent (SA) (S), New York Division, and SA (S) (San Diego Division) provided the MPS with background information to aid in the interview of Al-Bayoumi.

Between 09/23/2001 and 09/28/2001, Al-Bayoumi, in the presence of his solicitor, was interviewed by law enforcement officials of the MPS concerning Al-Bayoumi's activities in the United Kingdom and his association with subjects of this investigation. FBI agents were not allowed to be present during the interview. The MPS asked for, and was granted, an extension of the initial 48 hour period allowed by law for such detention.

During the course of the interviews, Al-Bayoumi stated that he traveled to Los Angeles, California, in January 2000 and had a chance meeting with Al-Mihdhar (subject #15) and Al-Hazmi (subject #19). During this chance meeting, Al-Bayoumi claims he was accompanied by an Islamic convert named (P). Investigation determined (P) is in fact (P) (P-1) residing in (P).

Al-Bayoumi confirmed that he assisted the hijackers Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi in renting an apartment and signing a lease as a guarantor and actually paying the hijacker's rent. Al-Bayoumi admitted facilitating the opening of a bank account for one of the hijackers. Al-Bayoumi stated he was connected with a Saudi Arabian company that is affiliated with the Saudi Arabian Government. Al-Bayoumi described this company as the equivalent of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Al-Bayoumi claims that this company pays him \$5,000.00 per month to study for his PhD.

On 10/04/2001, (P) San Diego, California, telephone (P) was contacted regarding her son (P) (P) is (P-1) who has resided in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia since 1996.

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F) , 10/05/2001

(A), (G), (J-1) (P) (A), (G), (J-1) a San Diego (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) his association with
Mohammad Anwar Zaky (deceased). Zaky was (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1) Zaky was identified as

an International Radical Fundamentalist (IRF) leader in the United States with significant regional, national, and international contacts. Zaky traveled extensively to Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s. Zaky was president of an organization entitled "Save Bosnia Now", and in this capacity he traveled extensively in the United States on fund raising missions. In the Spring of 1995, Zaky was killed in Chechnya fighting with the Mujahadeen.

On 08/24/1995, (P) was interviewed at the San Diego office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (G) this interview was based upon the recent death of Mohammad Zaky, and (P) as the (P) for the organization "Save Bosnia Now." (P) advised that (P) in approximately 1992 while attending the (P) From May 1993 to November 1993, (P) resided in Cairo, Egypt with (P). (P) became associated with (P) when he was a PhD candidate at (P). (P) stated the purpose of his trip to Egypt was to (P) and to learn to speak Arabic.

(P) stated that he met Mohammad Zaky in 1992 at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), 7050 Eckstrom Avenue, San Diego, California.

(P) advised that her son, (P) graduated from (P) in June 1996. In September 1996, (P) received a scholarship to attend a religious university in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. (P) receives free room and board and a stipend of approximately \$270.00 per month. (P) also receives free return trips to the United States paid for by the Saudi Government. Omar Al-Bayoumi was instrumental in (P) obtaining this scholarship in Saudi Arabia.

From 1993 through 1996, (P) to the Saudi Arabian community in San Diego at the Islamic Center of San Diego. Many of (P) were alleged to be Saudi Arabian military personnel. (P) was involved in a car accident, exact date unknown, in Saudi Arabia. (P) solicited the assistance of his former students in the United States, including Saudi military personnel, in order not to be prosecuted for this accident.

(P) main contact in Saudi Arabia is Saad Al-Habib, Al-Habib Investment Company, P.O. Box 9249, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 10/05/2001

(P) [REDACTED] can be reached at [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED]. (P) [REDACTED] mother could provide no further address for [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, except that he is enrolled in a religious university and the program is called the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] advised that her son, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] has returned to the United States approximately three or four times since relocating to Saudi Arabia in September 1996. A (O-1) [REDACTED] inquiry confirms that [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] has returned to the United States four times since 1997. The date of arrivals are 06/27/1997, 08/13/1998, 01/03/1999, and 06/25/2000 (copy attached). When [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] returned to the United States in June 2000, he spent about three or four weeks in the San Diego area. During this time, San Diego hijackers Khalid Al-Midhar (subject #15) and Nawaf Al-Hazmi (subject #19) prayed at the ICSD in San Diego, California. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] confirmed that [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] met with Al-Bayoumi and that it is possible [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] met the hijackers.

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F), 10/05/2001

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

For information only. Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Adm)

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

AT WASHINGTON, DC

For information only. Read and clear.

Set Lead 3:

(G)

AT (G)

1) Locate and interview (P)
(P) telephone (P-1) 2) Display enclosed eleven (11)
page photo spread which includes the nineteen (19) hijackers and nine
(9) San Diego associates. 3) Determine if (P) recalls hijacker
Al-Mihdhar (subject #15) and Al-Hamzi (subject #19) and the hijacker's
association with Al-Bayoumi (subject #20).

◆◆



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 09/22/2001

To: All Field Offices
All Legats

Attn: Personal Attention SACs
Personal Attention LEGATs

From: Counterterrorism

Contact: [Redacted] (G) [Redacted] (G), (S)

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted]

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE - 182
OO: NY

Synopsis: [Redacted] SUMMARY 11: This communication provides recipients with the current daily summary of information gleaned from the PENTTBOMB investigation.

[Redacted] (G)

Administrative: [Redacted] ALL OFFICES SHOULD MAINTAIN EVIDENCE, TO INCLUDE ORIGINAL NOTES, AT THEIR RESPECTIVE FIELD OFFICES/LEGATS UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED OTHERWISE. THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS ARE ITEMS WHICH REQUIRE LABORATORY PROCESSING.

Details: [Redacted] The following provides recipients with information obtained, to date, from the PENTTBOMB investigation. Recipients are advised that this communication contains information previously provided,



[REDACTED]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/22/2001

as well as information recently obtained, in the course of this investigation.

Headquarters Related Information

[REDACTED] Former Special Agent in Charge (SAC) John P. O'Neill has been positively identified among the victims found at the World Trade Center site. There has been no new developments pertaining to Special Agent Bomb Technician Leonard W. Hatton.

[REDACTED] (G) now has a mechanism to review credit cards. If there is a "hit" on the credit card, (G) will notify the affected field office where the credit card has been utilized.

[REDACTED] All field offices are requested to review parking lot and surveillance camera records for 9/10/2001. Some of the subjects or associates may have been at the airport on the day before the incidents.

Field Office Related Information

Atlanta

Investigative Efforts:

[REDACTED] As of 4:00 pm on 9/21/2001, the toll-free hotline has received 12,723 calls.

Baltimore

Investigative Efforts:

[REDACTED] AHMED EL-KHEIR [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) an Egyptian with [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] has been identified as an individual who abandoned his luggage at a College Park, MD, motel on 9/11/2001 and who had reportedly been seen in the company of ZIAD JARRAH (UA Flt. #93). On 9/18/2001, EL-KHEIR was arrested by Prince George's County PD for trespassing. During the initial interview with FBI Baltimore (FBI BA), EL-KHEIR denied knowing or ever having seen ZIAD JARRAH or any of the hijackers displayed to him in a photo array. On 9/20/2001, EL-KHEIR was re-interviewed and identified a photograph of ZIAD JARRAH as a Pakistani who had assisted him in the past. On 9/21/2001, FBI BA administered EL-KHEIR a polygraph examination. In response to being asked whether he played any part in the planning or execution of the events of 9/11/2001, EL-KHEIR showed strong deception. EL-KHEIR is currently incarcerated in the Prince George's County Jail for trespassing. EL-KHEIR has telephonically contacted the Egyptian Embassy, where he alleges his cousin is the Embassy's Third Secretary.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/22/2001

FBI BA expects that EL-KHEIR's cousin will arrive on 9/22/2001 to post bail for EL-KHEIR. FBI BA will interview the cousin if he appears. In the event that EL-KHEIR is released from jail on bond, the INS detainer is still in effect. Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] FBI BA consensually recorded a conversation between a Cooperating Witness and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) the Ayay Islamic Prayer Center in Laurel, MD, a location where it is known that KHALID ALMIHDHAR (AA Flt. #77) dropped off his personal belongings. [REDACTED] (P) and the CW had a conversation regarding [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) and the recent terrorist attacks. Computer hard drives provided by [REDACTED] (P) had been erased on or before 9/11/2001. Future consensually monitored calls will be attempted. Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] FBI BA has determined that [REDACTED] (P) may be traveling in the near future (NFI).

[REDACTED] FBI BA reported three incidents wherein males of Middle Eastern descent were in possession of, or attempting to gain possession of, vehicles bearing Department of Defense parking stickers. FBI BA will attempt to identify these individuals. Results will be provided to SIOC and appropriate field offices.

[REDACTED] Previous FBI BA investigation identified a female who was allegedly observed dining on two occasions with MOHAMMAD ATTA (AA Flt. #11) at the Olive Garden restaurant in Laurel, MD. Based on photo identification, FBI BA tentatively identified this female as [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) (DOB [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P), Silver Spring, MD, employed at the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) was further identified by employees at Caton Auto Body Shop in Laurel, MD, as the woman who accompanied several Middle Eastern males when they brought a 2001 Honda in for repairs. [REDACTED] (P) translated for the males and furnished the shop a telephone number for contact purposes. [REDACTED] (P) was also positively identified by a former employee of the ezStorage facility in Jessup, MD. That employee said that on or about 8/27/2001, [REDACTED] (P) appeared at the ezStorage location with three Middle Eastern males, and the employee identified one of the men as ZIAD JARRAH (UA Flt. #93). Investigation by Legat [REDACTED] (G) determined that, according to Israeli records, [REDACTED] (P) is a U. S. citizen who visited Israel from 5/15/2001 - 5/25/2001. FBI BA currently has [REDACTED] (P) under physical surveillance and will attempt to interview her on 9/22/2001 to determine any nexus to this investigation.

[REDACTED] FBI BA has placed [REDACTED] (P) under surveillance. On 9/21/2001, [REDACTED] (P) traveled to the Crystal City area in Northern Virginia and visited a Kinko's copy store there for two hours and 20 minutes. [REDACTED] (P) spent most of that time duplicating blank pages

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]
To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 09/22/2001

of a day planner book. (P) also met with several Middle Eastern individuals in the morning. On 9/21/2001 (P) was observed at a Dennys restaurant depositing a keyless remote vehicle entry device, which was wrapped in two plastic bags inside of a third bag, into a trash receptacle and then remaining in the vicinity of the receptacle for several hours.

The device was eventually recovered and transported to (G) for analysis. (P) is currently wanted for felony vehicle theft (local warrant) for the taking of a vehicle from Dar Cars, Rockville, MD, in January 2001. Previous investigation determined that (P) resided in various Laurel/College Park, MD, motels since June 2001, as well as being tentatively identified by a motel manager as a possible associate of HANI HANJOUR (AA Flt. #77). Due to the fact that (P) has been exhibiting unusual behavior (visiting Kinkos, performing ATM transactions, moving from motel to motel in the Laurel/College Park area, etc.) (P) is remaining under surveillance until thorough financial, cellular telephone and other records checks are completed. He will then be arrested and interviewed.

Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] On 9/21/2001, FBI BA was advised of suspicious activity in the vicinity of the Newcastle County (Delaware) Airport. Investigation was conducted that resulted in arrests by local law enforcement of four Middle Eastern males, identified as MUSTAFA CAMCI (DPOB [REDACTED] (P-1) in Turkey. out of status. counterfeit passport purported to be of exceptional quality. employed as painter. jumped ship in Houston, TX on 4/23/2000); SADULLAH SAKA (DPOB [REDACTED] (P-1) in Turkey. out of status. arrived on [REDACTED] (J-3) at New York City in 11/1996. Employed as painter); SEYKAN KEMAL (DPOB [REDACTED] (P-1) in Turkey. out of status arrived [REDACTED] (J-3) in 9/2000 through New York City. employed as pizza delivery man.); and ALI TUNC (DPOB [REDACTED] (P-1) in Turkey. out of status. arrived [REDACTED] (J-3). These individuals have been interviewed by FBI BA. Their stories appear to be legitimate and their employment has been corroborated by their employers. All four (G) are currently under detention by INS Philadelphia for being out of status. Investigation continuing.

Boston

Investigative Efforts:

[REDACTED] On 09/22/2001, INS Detroit advised that a Northwest Airlines Flight #345 en route to Logan International Airport (LIA) in Boston was deplaned because the cockpit door strike plate was missing.

Initial investigation determined that the strike plate was in place prior to landing in Detroit. One theory is that the plane was prepared for a terrorist takeover at some point on 9/22/2001 in Boston. That plane was scheduled on 9/22/2001 to fly to San Francisco via Detroit.

FBI Boston (FBI BS) is obtaining the manifest of the flight to review

[REDACTED]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 09/22/2001

it [REDACTED] (G) Results of investigation will be provided to [REDACTED] (G) and appropriate field offices.

[REDACTED] Investigation by FBI BS has determined that a photograph obtained from the vehicle of NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) appears to be identical with Flight 175 subject AHMED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #175). The photograph, which was obtained by FBI WFO, was superimposed over a known photograph of ALGHAMDI and it appears to be a positive match. Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] A maid at the Park Inn Hotel in Newton, MA, advised FBI BS that an Arabic male answered the door of the room at approximately 11:00 a.m. on the morning of 9/11/2001. The male asked her to come back later to clean because someone in the room was sleeping. This hotel is where WALEED ALSHEHRI (AA Flt. #11) and WAIL ALSHEHRI (AA Flt. #11) stayed the night before the attack. FBI BS has initiated logical investigation to identify the unknown Arab male. Results will be provided to [REDACTED] (G) and appropriate field offices.

[REDACTED] FBI BS tentatively identified the Charles Hotel as the place where AHMED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #175) and HAMZA ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #175) stayed while in Boston. This preliminary determination is based upon telephone records, ATM records, and a taxi driver who reportedly drove them from the Charles Hotel to the Days Inn Hotel. FBI BS is currently reviewing hotel records to confirm that these subjects stayed at this hotel. Results will be provided. Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] FBI BS has identified a credit card for MUSTAFA AHMED, who is believed to have been the person who received the Western Union wire transfers from the subjects in the week prior to 9/11/2001. This information was passed to the financial analysis team.

[REDACTED] On 9/21/2001, at approximately 6:00 pm, [REDACTED] (P), a travel agent from Providence, RI, reported that a customer named [REDACTED] (P) purchased a ticket on a Virgin Atlantic flight to Johannesburg via London. Following his purchase, he made several pro-terrorist statements. Since the initial purchase, [REDACTED] (P) has changed his flight two times. The flight now leaves from JFK on 9/24/2001. FBI NYO has been made aware of the potential threat and will interview [REDACTED] (P) prior to takeoff. Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] On 9/21/2001, FBI BS received information that Delta Flight #1479 will be hijacked on 9/22/2001. Information was originally provided by US Customs Service from a 9/17 interview of a walk-in source. This source was on Delta Flight #1479 on 9/6/2001 and claims to have observed Arab passengers allegedly conducting "pre-operational surveillance." FBI BS obtained a manifest for this flight. A review

[REDACTED]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/22/2001

[REDACTED] of this manifest showed a possible individual [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) on this flight. The manifest shows a [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) is [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (P) was interviewed and polygraphed by FBI BA with negative results. Based on these results, FBI BA recommends that [REDACTED] (P) be [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G). However, FBI BS will conduct all logical investigation to insure the safety of the FL #1479 passengers.

Chicago

Investigative Efforts:

[REDACTED] As previously reported, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (DOB [REDACTED] (P-1)) was identified as [REDACTED] (G) and was arrested by FBI Chicago (FBI CG) and local authorities. On 9/21/2001, [REDACTED] (P) failed a polygraph examination. He was deceptive for the two key questions: "Were you involved in the planning of the events on 9/11/2001?" and "Did you participate in the planning of the events on 9/11/2001?". After the failed polygraph, [REDACTED] (P) became cooperative and started providing information regarding his roles in training camps in Afghanistan and Sudan. Interviews of [REDACTED] (P) will continue on 9/22/2001. Analysis of cellular and home telephone records is continuing. It is anticipated that [REDACTED] (P) will be removed to New York upon [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED] (D). Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] FBI CG has identified an associate of [REDACTED] (P) that is currently in fugitive status. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) is being sought on an outstanding warrant for credit card fraud. Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] FBI CG has identified approximately 1,100 names of individuals who were scheduled to fly on United Airlines flights on 9/11/2001. Each name is being checked through appropriate databases and results will be provided to [REDACTED] (G) and appropriate offices.

Dallas

Investigative Efforts:

[REDACTED] FBI Dallas (FBI DL) investigation has determined that known terrorists may have been traveling under non-Arabic names to conduct reconnaissance runs in preparation for the attacks. Specifically, an American Airlines pilot has identified MARWAN AL-SHEHHI (UA Flt. #175) as a passenger of AA Flight #59 on 6/7/2001. Just prior to flight's departure, AL-SHEHHI requested a tour of the cockpit. AL-SHEHHI presented his pilot's license and boarding pass to the pilot

[REDACTED]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 09/22/2001

during this tour. AL-SHEHHI was seated in First Class and is believed to have been traveling with another party. An analysis of the flight manifest suggests that AL-SHEHHI may have been flying under the name of MATTHEW COHEN. Investigation continuing.

Detroit

Investigative Efforts:

[REDACTED] As previously reported, [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P), and [REDACTED] (P) were arrested in [REDACTED] (P) apartment on 9/18/2001 for identity fraud and fraudulent use of a visa. On 9/21/2001, these three individuals were ordered detained during a hearing before a United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan. The judge has subsequently received threatening telephone calls and is receiving protection from the U.S. Marshals. On 09/20/2001, a "JOHN DOE" (aka [REDACTED] (P)) arrest warrant was issued as possibly being the fourth occupant of [REDACTED] (P) apartment. This warrant charges identity fraud, fraud and misuse of visas, and misuse of social security card. Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] Federal Protective Service Officer (FPSO) [REDACTED] (P) while providing security at the U.S. Courthouse, Detroit, was shot and killed on 9/21/2001 by [REDACTED] (P) ([REDACTED] (P-1)). [REDACTED] (P) was providing security at the U.S. Courthouse in Detroit, MI. [REDACTED] (P) while waiting to pass through the metal-detector, was determined by FPSO [REDACTED] (P), to possess a bag containing a nickel-plated revolver. Before [REDACTED] (P) could be disarmed, he shot and killed FPSO [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) was shot and wounded by other officers present. He is currently in a hospital bed under guard by FBI Detroit (FBI DE). Based upon information and physical evidence found in his car, [REDACTED] (P) appears to be a mentally-deranged person who was under the influence of drugs at the time of the shooting. The shooting does not appear to be related to the investigation. When able, [REDACTED] (P) will be interviewed by FBI DE to determine if there is any nexus to the PENTTBOM investigation.

[REDACTED] FBIHQ received a [REDACTED] (G) # [REDACTED] (F) from the FBI Internet Tip Line. The report advised as follows: "I believe I have information on an attack on the Golden Gate Bridge on the 22nd of this month, which is tomorrow. Please have an official call me so that I can give this entire message to a person who can choose weather to act upon it or not,,,,.Thankyou Mrs [REDACTED] (P)" The report was furnished from Mrs. [REDACTED] (P) on 9/21/01 at 2:43:49 p.m. from e-mail [REDACTED] (P). The tipster was identified as [REDACTED] (P) ([REDACTED] (P)), MI 48881, telephone number [REDACTED] (P). A copy of the [REDACTED] (G) was provided to FBI DE, who will interview [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/22/2001

(P) [REDACTED] FBI SF also provided copy of (G) [REDACTED] Results will be provided to SIOC.

Houston

Investigative Efforts:

[REDACTED] FBI HO was contacted by an apartment manager who reported suspicious activity involving an apartment unit abandoned by AHMAD ABDUL AL-TURAYIF and AMMAR FARRAJ ALJUHANI, who recently completed flight engineer training in Houston. Pursuant to a consent search, FBI Houston (FBI HO) recovered a computer, unopened letters, a Rolodex, and miscellaneous items from the abandoned apartment. A mirror copy of the computer hard drive was forwarded to FBI WFO, with a request to conduct a forensic analysis. FBI HO (G) [REDACTED] analysis of the computer revealed JPEG images of the World Trade Towers and Usama Bin Laden, and other documents written in Arabic possibly using encryption. A hotmail email address for AL-TURURAYIF (P) [REDACTED] was identified. A 2703(f) preservation letter was sent to Hotmail to preserve all email records/content relevant to this account. FBI HO continues efforts to locate and interview ALTURAYIF and ALJUHANI. FBI HO requested that these two (2) individuals be (G) [REDACTED] (G) Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] FBI HO has (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]. This asset reported that Usama Bin Laden arrived in the Paktia Province of Afghanistan in a 12 car motorcade on 09/21/2001. This information was corroborated by the source through contact with a Tribal Chief within the Paktia Province region.

Louisville

Investigative Efforts:

[REDACTED] Information previously provided in Summary 10 indicated that HANI HANJOUR (AA Flt. #77) and KHALID ALMIHDHAR (AA Flt. #77) had resided in the Louisville area. FBI Louisville (FBI LS) investigation revealed no links between individuals in Kentucky and the suspected hijackers. However, it now appears the individuals identified were look-alikes. Six persons are in INS custody, including five Mauritians and one Syrian.

Miami

Investigative Efforts:

[REDACTED]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 09/22/2001

[REDACTED] Investigation has determined that a number of the hijackers attempted to obtain USAID identifications in the Summer of 2001. FBI MM interviewed [REDACTED] (P), the [REDACTED] (P) of USAID in Miami Beach, FL. [REDACTED] (P) conducted record queries and determined that the majority of these applications had been forwarded through [REDACTED] (P) at APPOLLO INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL in Patterson, NJ. [REDACTED] (P) was able to determine that the following hijackers attempted to acquire USAID identifications: SALEM ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) (on/about 7/7/2001); KHALID ALMIHDAR (AA Flt. #77) (on/about 7/7/2001); ABDULAZIZ ALOMARI (AA Flt. #11) (on/about 7/7/2001); MOHAMED ATTA (AA Flt. #11) (on/about 7/4/2001); NAWAF ALHAMZI (AA Flt. #77) (on/about 07/10/2001); MAJED MOQED (AA Flt. #77) (date unknown); and AHMAD ALHAZNAWI (UA Flt. #93) (date unknown). USAID card applications and color photocopies of the identifications are being disseminated to appropriate offices. Investigation being coordinated with FBI MM, FBI NK, and FBI WFO. Results will be forwarded to [REDACTED] (G) and all appropriate offices.

[REDACTED] Previous FBI MM investigation determined that, on 5/2/2001, MOHAMED ATTA (AA Flt. #11) and ZIAD SAMIR JARRAH (UA Flt. #93) obtained Florida drivers licenses at the same south Florida location. DMV queries revealed that five Arab individuals, including [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) also obtained Florida drivers licenses on that date. FBI MM located and interviewed [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) identified a photograph of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) (DOB [REDACTED] (P-1)) as the individual who assisted [REDACTED] (P) in obtaining his driver's license. [REDACTED] (P) was polygraphed on 9/18/2001 and determined to be inconclusive. He will be re-polygraphed on 9/21/2001. [REDACTED] (P) has been identified through INS records as a naturalized United States Citizen who was born in Haiti. Efforts by FBI MM are underway to fully identify [REDACTED] (P) and to determine his role, if any, in assisting ATTA, JARRAH, and others in obtaining fraudulent Florida driver's licenses. Results of investigation will be forwarded to [REDACTED] (G) and appropriate offices. Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] On 08/27/2001, six purported Pakistani nationals arrived in Miami from [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) This [REDACTED] (O-1) information was uncorroborated not only by the review of audio tapes by FBI Language Specialists, but also by a negative physical search from the hotel rooms of the individuals [REDACTED] (O-1) On 09/20/2001, three of the six individuals were polygraphed. Two subjects passed the polygraph, and one was found to be inconclusive. One requested an attorney and will not be polygraphed. The remaining two polygraphs are being conducted on 09/21/2001. Investigative results will be provided to [REDACTED] (G) and appropriate offices.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/22/2001

[REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1) [REDACTED] identified as (A), (G), (J-1), reported that, while at a mosque in Bronx, NY, in approximately August 2001, he prayed with a Pakistani lawyer/grocery store manager from Newark, NJ. This individual inquired about the willingness of (A), (G), (J-1) to engage in Jihad. FBI MM has obtained authorization to (A), (G), (J-1) and is coordinating with FBI NK to conduct consensually monitored calls between (A), (G), (J-1) and the Pakistani national. Results will be forwarded to SIOC and appropriate field offices.

Newark

Investigative Efforts:

[REDACTED] FBI NK investigation determined that (P) [REDACTED] (P) is an associate of MARWAN ALSHEHHI (UA Flt. #175). Reportedly, (P) [REDACTED] owns a gas station at which ALSHEHHI would "hang out." (P) [REDACTED] (P) has been identified as an associate of (P) [REDACTED]. Further investigation confirmed a relationship between ALSHEHHI and (P) [REDACTED]. Based on these associations and relationships, FBI NK intends to obtain a search warrant for (P) [REDACTED] residence. (P) [REDACTED] is currently under arrest on a Material Witness warrant based on his link to ALSHEHHI. Results will be provided to SIOC and appropriate field offices. Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] FBI NK initiated a pen register on the telephone of (P) [REDACTED] predicated on the possibility that (P) [REDACTED] may be the UNSUB in a photograph that FBI WFO secured from an abandoned rental vehicle at Dulles Airport linked to AA Flight #77. A consensual search of the digital information on a university computer used by (P) [REDACTED] continues. Investigation determined that both of (P) [REDACTED] email addresses both contained a reference to number "93."

Philadelphia

Investigative Efforts:

[REDACTED] FBI PH developed information that (P) [REDACTED] and (P) [REDACTED] are associated with an address in Jersey City, NJ, that has been used by (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED], (P) [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED] and (P) [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED]. (P) [REDACTED] are associates of (P) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED]. (P) [REDACTED] are students at a Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Truck Driver School in Allentown, PA. FBI PH is currently conducting surveillance on (P) [REDACTED]. (P) [REDACTED] has a Michigan issued HAZMAT trucker driver's license. It is anticipated

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/22/2001

that a [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED] will be issued for [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]
on 9/22/2001.

Pittsburgh

Recovery / Evidence Collection:

[REDACTED] FBI Pittsburgh (FBI PG) Evidence Response Team (ERT) activity at the Somerset crash site may be completed sometime on 9/22/2001 or 9/23/2001. The raking and sifting of the dirt has resulted in the recovery of a great deal of human remains. On 9/22/2001, it is anticipated that the pumping of the two acre pond near the crash site will be completed.

After the pumping of the pond, FBI PG ERT will man two boats to visually look for items of potential evidentiary value in the pond. Once this is completed, FBI PG ERT and other law enforcement personnel will conduct a final "walk through" the woods in the vicinity of the crash site in an effort to locate items of value that may have been missed. This "walk through" may take place as early as 9/23/2001 or 9/24/2001. Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] As of 4:00 pm on 9/21/2001, the morgue is in possession of [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] human remains, which are comprised of 914 separate items. The morgue has dental records for 37 individuals. Efforts are underway to identify the remains.

[REDACTED] Six specimens of human remains will be flown to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology at Dover Air Force Base to verify or rule out possible knife wounds. To date, all such submissions have been negative.

[REDACTED] Human remains not of evidentiary value and which are not being sent to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) at Dover Air Force Base, will be turned over to the Somerset County Coroner. Human remains sent to AFIP and returned thereafter will also be turned over to the Somerset County Coroner. Personal effects not of evidentiary value will be turned over to United Air Lines (UAL) for subsequent return to families of passengers and crew.

[REDACTED] All ante-mortem interview of family members have been completed, except for the four hijackers.

San Antonio

Investigative Efforts:

[REDACTED] FBI SA continues to conduct investigation into [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] who has been detained by INS in Fort Worth, TX, and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/22/2001

who may be related to NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) and SALEM ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77).

- * Investigation determined that [REDACTED] (P) utilized the Internet account of [REDACTED] (P), whom FBI DL believes to be NAWAF ALHAZMI.
- * A cellular phone utilized by [REDACTED] (P) (AT&T Wireless # [REDACTED] (P-1) FBI DL is [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED] (D). Results will be provided to [REDACTED] (G) and other field offices upon receipt and analysis.
- * FBI SA continues to document [REDACTED] (P) activities through research and analysis of financial, email, travel, telephone, etc. and his associates. A review of [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)
- * Investigation continuing regarding items from search of residence and vehicle.
- * FBI SA investigating an unconfirmed report that [REDACTED] (P) children did not report for school on 9/11/2001.
- * This search disclosed two passports, neither of which were damaged. (Previous investigation indicated that [REDACTED] (P) reported to ARAMCO that his passport had been damaged and ARAMCO arranged for a new one to issued to him.)

[REDACTED] (P) FBI DL identified [REDACTED] (P) as an associate of [REDACTED] (P) in 6/1997 or 7/1997, [REDACTED] (P) received a \$10,000 wire transfer from [REDACTED] (P) who opened an account but closed it in November 1997. [REDACTED] (P) made at trip to Boston in August of 2001 and made two telephone calls to [REDACTED] (P) in Boston. FBI DL is working to fully identify [REDACTED] (P).

San Diego

Investigative Efforts:

[REDACTED] On 9/21/2001, British authorities arrested OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI, who is linked to KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (AA Flt. #77) and NAWAF AL-HAZMI (AA Flt. #77) via lease agreement. AL-BAYOUMI is a close associate of [REDACTED] (P). A computer was seized from AL-BAYOUMI at the time of his arrest. [REDACTED] (P) received an email response from AL-BAYOUMI which contained an address for AL-BAYOUMI in Birmingham, United Kingdom. FBI San Diego (SD) is preparing a [REDACTED] (D) and is investigating financial transactions to support a criminal complaint for extradition. Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F), 09/22/2001

As previously reported, (P)'s telephone number was found in NAWAF ALHAZMI's (AA Flt. #77) car, which was left at Washington-Dulles Airport. (P) has admitted to being the roommate of OMAR BAKARBASHAT and that he knew ALHAZMI. On 09/21/2001, (P) failed a polygraph. (P) was found deceptive on two key questions: "Did you know beforehand of any specific plans to destroy any of those U.S. targets on September 11, 2001?" and, "Did you participate in any way in any of those attacks on U.S. targets on September 11, 2001?" (P) was subsequently (D) Investigation continuing.

During interview, (P) (supra) stated that NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) lived with YAZID SALMI. SALMI was interviewed on 9/20/2001 and 9/21/2001. On 9/22/2001, he will be polygraphed and his car searched pursuant to consent being granted. SALMI was reportedly one of ALHAZMI's closest friends in San Diego. Interview, polygraph, and search results will be provided to (G) and appropriate field offices. Investigation continuing.

FBI SD investigation identified OSAMA BASSNAN as an associate OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI (supra) and voiced his support of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. A source met with BASSNAN (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). During the meeting, BASSNAN indicated he knew AL-BAYOUMI very well and also knew NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) and KHALID ALMIHDHAR (AA Flt. #77) when they lived in San Diego. BASSNAN told the source that he knew of terrorist attack in advance, but source says that BASSNAN implied he had inside information. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Investigation continuing.

San Francisco

Investigative Efforts:

On 5/21/2001, INS Officials arrested (P) (P) (aka (P), upon his arrival in San Francisco. At the time of his arrest, (P) (O-1) (O-1) (P) has been in the custody of the INS since 05/21/2001. On 5/24/2001 and 9/20/2001, FBI SF interviewed (P) (P) arrived in the US during the same time frame as many of the hijackers. When (P) boarded a plane bound for San Francisco, he identified himself as (P). A review of the manifest revealed that there was a (P) on the flight, but no one on the flight who used the name (P) (P) is a military pilot, trained in Iran and the U.S. San Francisco, (D)

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) , 09/22/2001

(D) Investigation
continuing.

On 9/21/2001, FBI SF received information from FBI DL regarding (P) (P) , Danville, CA). Investigation determined that (P) applied \$200 of time towards a prepaid calling card on 9/9/2001 to a calling card that was subsequently used by WALEED SHEHRI (AA Flt. #11). FBI SF has begun preliminary surveillance of (P) as well as initiating extensive background and database checks on (P) and any associates identified within the San Francisco Bay Area. Investigation on-going.

FBI SF has been contacted by three local financial institutions with information that account holders at their businesses may be the same as individuals (G) The Bank of the West advised that they have three accounts matching names (G) (G) furnished to them on 9/17/2001. FBI SF has requested a (D) (D) World Savings Bank noted one account in the name of (P) , which was opened in their Mission Viejo, CA, branch. This is believed to be a different name, and identifying information, than that on the (G) (MOHAMAD G. ATTA). However, FBI SF investigation continues to fully identify (P) . Charles Schwab reported that a (P) from Florida had placed "Put Options" on airline stock, in an account he opened in July, 2001. Additional information is forthcoming and a subpoena will be issued. SIOC and appropriate offices will be advised of investigative results. Investigations continuing.

FBI SF received information from the US Postal Service (USPS) that the Daly City Post Office (2650 Bayshore Blvd, Daly City, CA) has in its possession approximately 200 suspicious-looking letters. One letter is addressed to SAEED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #93), and a second addressed to (P) (possibly related to ABDULAZIZ ALOMARI - AA Flt. #11). Both letters are date-stamped 9/11/2001. FBI SF is assisting the USPS with the examination of these parcels. Results will be provided to SIOC and appropriate offices.

Washington Field

Recovery / Evidence Collection:

As of 12:21 pm on 9/22/2001, (P-1) and (P-1) have been recovered at the Pentagon.

FBI WFO has recovered the Virginia DMV identification of HANI HANJOUR from the Pentagon crime scene. Also

SECRET//X1

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/22/2001

recovered was a wallet from SALEM ALHAZMI. This wallet contained a couple of addresses, including one for [REDACTED] (P) LNU (last name was illegible) with an address of ??? [REDACTED] (P) Wayne, New Jersey, phone number [REDACTED] (P). FBI WFO coordinating investigation with FBI NK and results will be provided to SIOC. Investigation continuing.

Investigative Efforts:

[REDACTED] FBI Washington Field Office (FBI WFO) reported on a situation involving a Saudi Arabian pilot aboard a United Airlines flight from Dulles to Heathrow. Prior to take-off, the flight crew became suspicious of one passenger. This passenger claimed to be a Saudi Arabian pilot, and asked to ride in the jump seat. The crew asked the FBI to interview him, and two other Middle Eastern travelers. These individuals were interviewed by the FBI, US Customs Service (USCS) and INS. They were cleared to fly, but the pilot refused to fly with them on board. No further investigation.

[REDACTED] (P) was interviewed by FBI WFO concerning his assistance to AHMED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #175) in obtaining a Virginia ID card. [REDACTED] (P) described himself as a "Professional ID Provider." He identified three of the hijackers and is being detained by INS on immigration charges. According to [REDACTED] (P) HANI HANJOUR (AA Flt. #77), NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) and AHMED ALGHAMDI followed [REDACTED] (P) and another ID broker to lawyer [REDACTED] (P)'S office. [REDACTED] (P) secretary provided DMV forms presigned by [REDACTED] (P) Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] FBI WFO investigation identified EYAD M. ALRABABAH and [REDACTED] (P) (DOB [REDACTED] (P-1)) as possible associates of the hijackers. These identifications were made through FBI WFO's analysis of Virginia Driver's Licenses with addresses provided by [REDACTED] (P) (supra). ALRABABAH and [REDACTED] (P) are currently located in FBI NK's territory. FBI WFO is coordinating with FBI NK to arrest both subjects on INS charges. The association of ALRABABAH and [REDACTED] (P) has been further strengthened by [REDACTED] (P) purchase of ALRABABAH's vehicle, and their arrival in the WFO area within the year 2000. Investigation continuing and being coordinated with FBI NK.

[REDACTED] A continuing review of Dulles security camera videos indicates that two of the hijackers may have visited Dulles on 9/10/2001. It appears that they passed through the security checkpoints and baggage claim areas. Review of security cameras on-going.

[REDACTED] American Airlines reports that only five victim families have not contacted AA concerning victims on Flight #77, and

[REDACTED]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/22/2001

are those of the suspected hijackers. This lends credence to other information that there appears to be only five hijackers on Flight #77, and not six as previously considered.

[REDACTED] Investigation by FBI WFO of associates and employers of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] have discerned no ties to any of the hijackers. No links have been developed from the address book of 75 phone numbers seized as part of a consensual search of his residence. However, he will be arrested on 9/23/2001 on forgery charges that were uncovered incidental to this investigation. This warrant is being pursued out of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia (USAO EDVA).

[REDACTED] On 9/21/2001, FBI WFO arrested [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) on Title 18, Section 1028 (False Identity Documentation) on 9/21/01. A consensual search was conducted of his residence ([REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], Washington, D.C.) with negative results. [REDACTED] (P) was identified as assisting ABDULAZIZ ALOMARI (AA Flt. #11) obtain a VA Identification card. Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] On 9/20/2001, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (DOB [REDACTED] (P-1)), [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED], was contacted by FBI WFO and agreed to be interviewed. [REDACTED] (P) was subsequently arrested by the INS [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (P) had reportedly been scheduled to return to Saudi Arabia by air on 09/20/01. Investigation continuing.

[REDACTED] On 9/21/2001, the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center advised that they had received a threat of an impending release of anthrax on Washington D.C., on 9/22/2001. Although FBI WFO does not consider this a credible threat, appropriate notifications have been made.

[REDACTED]

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/22/2001

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1:

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[REDACTED] Receiving offices are requested to continue to conduct all logical investigations. Relay any pertinent information back to FBIHQ, SIOC, FBI NY CP, FBI WFO, and other relevant field offices. LEGATs are requested to share new information [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED].

◆◆

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 06/03/2002

To: Counterterrorism
New York

Attn: (G), (S)
Attn:

[Redacted]

Minneapolis

Attn:

Washington Field
Phoenix
San Diego

Attn:
Attn:

From: Newark

(G)

Contact: SA [Redacted] (S)
SA
SA

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted]

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] PENTTBOM;
MAJOR CASE 182

[Redacted] **GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(e)**

Synopsis: [Redacted] To provide investigative summary information and set leads.

(G)

Reference:

(F)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[REDACTED] (F)

Enclosure(s) : [REDACTED] Enclosed for the Minneapolis Division is a copy of the toll records for the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] cellular telephone, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]. Enclosed for the Washington Field Office is a copy of the toll records for the cellular telephone used by FAYEZ ABUTALEB, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] subscriber name [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]

Details: [REDACTED] Previous investigation has revealed that EYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MOUSTAFA ALRABABAH, also known as EYAD ALRABABAH, and his former roommate, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], also known as [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] were associated with known hijackers, MOJED MOQED, HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAZMI, and AHMED ALGHAMDI. ALRABABAH and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] lived at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], Apartment [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Falls Church, Virginia from approximately 03/2001 to 06/2001. The aforementioned hijackers visited ALRABABAH and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] at this apartment during 04/2001-05/2001.

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and ALRABABAH rented this apartment from a woman by the name of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and the lease was in her name. The telephone number for [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], Apartment [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and was listed to [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]. Investigation has revealed that [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and ALRABABAH both utilized telephone number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] during their stay in Virginia.

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 06/03/2002

[REDACTED] On 05/07/2001, ALRABABAH drove the four hijackers from Falls Church, Virginia to the FAIRFIELD INN, Fairfield, Connecticut. On 05/09/2001, ALRABABAH drove the four hijackers to Paterson, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Prior to living in the aforementioned apartment in Falls Church, Virginia, [REDACTED] (P) resided at [REDACTED] (P), Paterson, New Jersey, telephone number [REDACTED] (P). While [REDACTED] (P) resided in Paterson, he met ALRABABAH and eventually left New Jersey to [REDACTED] (P) in Falls Church, Virginia, with ALRABABAH. [REDACTED] (P) met the four hijackers in Virginia while he resided there. [REDACTED] (P) was evicted from the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) apartment in 06/2001 and returned to reside at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Paterson, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Upon his return to [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P) lived with two men named [REDACTED] (P), date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1), and FAYEZ IBRAHIM ALI ABUTALEB, also known as FAYEZ ABU-TALEB, date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1). [REDACTED] (P) maintained contact with ALRABABAH who was working and residing in Connecticut.

[REDACTED] The past activities of [REDACTED] (P) and FAYEZ IBRAHIM ALI ABUTALEB have raised questions as to whether they were associated with the known hijackers, as well as [REDACTED] (P). FBI Phoenix had conducted an investigation into the automatic teller transactions of known hijacker HANI HANJOUR and the investigation revealed the following:

[REDACTED] On 06/19/2001, at 23:03:29 hours, HANI HANJOUR conducted an automatic teller machine (ATM) transaction at the PNC Bank, 1152 Main Street, Paterson, New Jersey. A review conducted by the Phoenix Division of all transactions conducted 30 minutes before and after HANJOUR'S transaction revealed four individuals who made transactions at the same ATM just prior to HANJOUR. Two of the four individuals identified were FAYEZ I.A. ABUTALEB, date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1) and [REDACTED] (P) date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1). At present, it has not been determined if ABUTALEB and [REDACTED] (P) knew HANJOUR or made some financial transaction for him, but the aforementioned transaction illustrates the possibility.

[REDACTED] Additionally, [REDACTED] (P) had two telephones in his name; a VOICESTREAM cellular telephone, [REDACTED] (P), and the main hardline number for his residence at [REDACTED] (P), Paterson, New Jersey, [REDACTED] (P). Investigation by the Newark Division revealed that ABUTALEB was in possession of the aforementioned VOICESTREAM cellular telephone, [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] The Newark Division has reviewed the toll records for these two telephone numbers. The review produced the following:

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 06/03/2002

A review of the toll records pertaining to the telephone number [REDACTED] (P) revealed contact with a telephone number, [REDACTED] (P). The telephone number [REDACTED] (P) is subscribed to by [REDACTED] (P) SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1), [REDACTED] (P), Brigantine, NJ 08203. This cellular telephone is referred to hereafter as the [REDACTED] (P) cell phone.

During the time period of 07/14/2001 to 10/17/2001, the [REDACTED] (P) cellular telephone contacted the [REDACTED] (P) number, [REDACTED] (P), a 5 times as well as the telephone utilized by FAYEZ ABUTALEB, [REDACTED] (P), 1 time. [REDACTED] (P) currently resides at [REDACTED] (P) Atlantic City, New Jersey. While most of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) call activity is in the southern New Jersey area, the following calls are to be noted:

ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI was arrested on 08/16/2001 in Minnesota and held in federal custody at the Sherburne County Jail in Elk River, Minnesota. A review of the telephone calls on the tolls records of the [REDACTED] (P) cell phone reveal that, subsequent 08/16/2001, [REDACTED] (P) was attempting to locate and speak with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) also known as [REDACTED] (P), date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1), (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). The aforementioned call activity was confirmed by [REDACTED] (P) in a interview of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) conducted by the Newark Division on 06/05/2002.

In the aforementioned interview, [REDACTED] (P) advised that he lived with his friend, [REDACTED] (P), sometime during 1991 or 1992 at a location on [REDACTED] (P) in Paterson, New Jersey. [REDACTED] (P) also advised the interviewing agents that he has a single engine pilot's license and that some point in time in the 1980's he had taken flight lessons in New Jersey. [REDACTED] (P) advised that he had taken flight lessons at AIR FLEET TRAINING SYSTEMS, TETERBORO AIRPORT, Teterboro, New Jersey, and CALDWELL FLIGHT ACADEMY, Essex County Airport, Fairfield, New Jersey. It should be noted that known hijackers HANI HANJOUR and SAEED ALGHAMDI took flight lessons at FLEET TRAINING SYSTEMS and HANI HANJOUR took flight lessons at CALDWELL FLIGHT ACADEMY. ([REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F)

On 08/16/2001, the [REDACTED] (P) cellular telephone contacted the telephone number 973-483-2464 twice. The telephone number 973-483-2464 is subscribed to the MIDTOWN EXXON, 481 Central Avenue, Newark, NJ. [REDACTED] (J-2), (P)

[REDACTED] (J-2), (P)

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: (F), 06/03/2002

(J-2), (P)

On 08/17/2001, the (P) cellular telephone contacted the telephone number 973-256-7033 once. The telephone number 973-256-7033 is listed to the GREAT NOTCH EXXON, 1299 Route 46 East, Little Falls, NJ. The GREAT NOTCH EXXON was previously owned by (P) (P) (P) and (P). (P) provided information about the prior ownership of the GREAT NOTCH EXXON during his interview with the FBI on 05/21/2002. (F), Serial (F) The GREAT NOTCH EXXON was also a location where a number of the hijackers were observed in the past. (F) Serial (F)

The (P) cellular telephone also contacted the telephone number 201-567-7276 on 08/17/2001. The telephone number 201-567-7276 is listed to GETTY, Route 4 East, Englewood, New Jersey. (P) is also part owner in the aforementioned GETTY gas station with (P) and (P). (F), Serial (F)

On 08/18/2001, the (P) cellular telephone contacted the MIDTOWN EXXON, 973-483-2464, twice. The (P) cellular telephone also contacted the telephone number (P) twice. The telephone number (P) is the number of (P) cellular telephone. During 09/2001 (P) was interviewed by the Minneapolis Division and he advised the interviewing agents that his VOICESTREAM cellular telephone number was (P). (F) Serial (F)

On 08/18/2001, the (P) cellular telephone also contacted the telephone number (P) once. (P) listed (P) as his home telephone number on his VOICESTREAM subscriber paperwork. (F) Serial (F)

On 08/19/2001, the (P) cellular telephone contacted the telephone number (P) once and the telephone number (P) once. In the aforementioned interview of (P), (P) had advised the interviewing agents that his home telephone number was (P) and his cellular telephone number was (P). The aforementioned call to (P) home number, (P), was approximately 25 minutes in duration. It should be noted that (P) resided in Minnesota when (P) was arrested and that the aforementioned attempts to reach him were in the time period of 08/16/2001 to 08/19/2001.

(P) was (A), (G), (J-1) the Newark Division, in the past, for (A), (G), (J-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 06/03/2002

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (F) During the aforementioned interview of [REDACTED] (P) by the Minneapolis Division, [REDACTED] (P) advised that he currently lives at [REDACTED] (P), Brooklyn Park, Minnesota. telephone number [REDACTED] (P), cell phone number [REDACTED] (P).
[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] In the referenced full field investigation [REDACTED] (F), [REDACTED] (P) was found to be an associate of [REDACTED] (P) is a [REDACTED] (P) for [REDACTED] (P) and the [REDACTED] (P) for the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) was the [REDACTED] (P) of the [REDACTED] (P) when he resided in New Jersey. [REDACTED] (P) presently resides in San Diego, California and he is the subject of an investigation by the San Diego Division, [REDACTED] (F). [REDACTED] (A), (D), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (D), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI was held in federal custody in the Sherburne County Jail in Elk River, Minnesota, subsequent his arrest on 08/16/2001. Toll analysis of calls placed from the Sherburne Jail during the time period of 09/11/2001 to 09/14/2001 revealed numerous calls from the S2 and S2-A locations in the jail to the AL-ALMAL ISLAMIC SCHOOL, also known as, ISLAMIC CENTER OF MINNESOTA, 1401 Gardena Avenue, N.E., Fridley, MN 55432, at telephone [REDACTED] (P). It should be noted, the Minneapolis Division has directly linked [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) in Minneapolis, MN. (referenced in [REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F)) The Newark Division has not yet determined if [REDACTED] (P) has any ties to the [REDACTED] (P), even though both [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1).

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] (P) cellular telephone was also in contact with the main telephone number to [REDACTED] (P), Paterson, NJ, [REDACTED] (P). As previously indicated, [REDACTED] (P) lived at this address and was associated with four of the known hijackers. In his interview with the FBI on 06/05/2001, [REDACTED] (P) advised the writer that he is the cousin of [REDACTED] (P), who also resided at the 1 Montclair Avenue address.

[REDACTED] (A), (D), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (U), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (P) is an avid supporter of convicted terrorist, SHEIKH OMAR ABDUL RAHMAN, and RAHMAN's terrorist organization, AL GAMA

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: (F), 06/03/2002

AL ISLAMIYYA (AGAI). (P) holds a key position in AGAI, whereby he willingly has acted as a communications conduit between AGAI leaders overseas and in the U.S. (F) Serial (F)

(S) The BEACH EXXON is associated with (P)
DOB (P-1) (P) DOB (P-1) (P)
(P) 26 years old, (P) and (P) spouse, (P)
(P) who is believed to be the owner/operator of (P)
(P) owned or operated the (P) prior to (P)
(F)

(P) was born in (P-1) and entered the United States on (P-1), on a (J-3) to attend the ACADEMIC OF FLIGHT SCHOOL, 46-12 Queens Boulevard, STE 204, Sunnyside, New York, telephone (P). A reveal of the Telephone Application of ACS revealed that the ACADEMIC OF FLIGHT SCHOOL was contacted by known hijacker MOHAMMED ATTA, cell phone number (P), on 06/21/2000. (P) (P) denied knowing how to fly an aircraft during an interview conducted by the Newark Division. (F) Serial (F)

During the aforementioned interview, (P) advised that in late 1996 to early 1997, he became business partners with (P), place of birth, (P-1) and purchased the (P) (P), Toms River, New Jersey.

The Newark Division has not yet ascertained if (P) (P) partner, (P), was in fact (P) who was (A), (G), (J-1) by the Newark Division, (F). (P) was a Palestinian businessman and the (P) of the (P) in 1996. (P) was also an active HAMAS leader and the close friend of (P).

(P) brother, (P), lives at (P) (P) Clifton, New Jersey, telephone number (P). A query of the Telephone Application of ACS, revealed that (P) telephone number, (P), has had past contact with the ICPC, telephone number 973-223-5211, and (P), telephone numbers (P) and (P).

Previous investigation by the Newark Division has identified the (P) as a place where, among legitimate Islamic worship, HAMAS supporters meet to raise funds and conduct business. (referenced in (F)) As stated previously, (P) was the (P) of (P) at one time. (F)

(S) (P), (P), (P) and (P) are currently under investigation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) due to the fact that they currently appear

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: (F), 06/03/2002

to be illegal aliens. Additionally, Special Agents of the INS believe that (P) and (P) may have entered into a fraudulent marriage to obtain U.S. citizenship for (P) (F) Serial (F)

The (P) cellular telephone was also in contact with (P) which was utilized by FAYEZ ABUTALEB. As stated previously, ABUTALEB conducted an ATM transaction in close proximity to known hijacker HANI HANJOUR. ABUTALEB is currently in custody due to the fact that he was in the U.S. illegally. ABUTALEB has been previously interviewed by the Newark Division. (F) Serial (F)

In the aforementioned interview conducted by the Newark Division, ABUTALEB advised that he attended a mosque located in Falls Church, Virginia while he was staying with a friend named (P) in Maryland. The mosque that ABUTALEB referred to could possibly be the DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE, 3159 Row Street, Falls Church, Virginia.

It should be noted that ALRABABAH and (P) advised that they had met the four known hijackers at the DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE in Falls Church, Virginia. The DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE is known to be attended by members of HAMAS. (referenced in (F) (F) Also, a telephone number associated with the DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE was found during a search of the belongings of ZAKARIYA ESSABAR and RAMZI BINALSHIBH in Germany. (F) (F)

As indicated previously, ABUTALEB utilized a cellular telephone, (P) subscribed to by (P) who left the United States and has recently returned from Jordan. The telephone assigned telephone number (P) will be hereafter referred to as the ABUTALEB cellular telephone. A review of the toll records for this cellular telephone revealed the following:

The ABUTALEB cellular telephone was in contact with (P) (P) which is probably due to the fact that ABUTALEB (P) (P) and (P).

The ABUTALEB cellular telephone was also in contact with (P) which, as previously indicated, was the number of (P) (P), Apartment (P) where ALRABABAH and (P) (P) (P). Additionally, it should be noted that four known hijackers visited (P), Apartment (P) Falls Church, Virginia. (F) Serial (F)

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 06/03/2002

[REDACTED] The ABUTALEB cellular telephone has contacted telephone number 201-612-8414, listed to EXXON, Route 17, Paramus, New Jersey. The [REDACTED] (P) is currently owned by [REDACTED] (P), date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1). [REDACTED] (P) is possibly linked to RAMZI BINALSHIBH in that the telephone number [REDACTED] (P) was found during a search of the belongings of ZAKARIYA ESSABAR and RAMZI BINALSHIBH by the authorities in Germany. The telephone number [REDACTED] (P) was subscribed to by [REDACTED] (P) at [REDACTED] (P), Clifton, New Jersey. ([REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] The ABUTALEB cellular telephone has contacted the telephone numbers [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P). The telephone number [REDACTED] (P) is the home telephone number of [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P), Arlington, Virginia. The telephone number [REDACTED] (P) is subscribed to [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Hyattsville, Maryland 20783, but the telephone is utilized by [REDACTED] (P) Apartment [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Virginia. ABUTALEB contacted [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) numerous times, but there are two dates that should be noted. On 09/10/2001, ABUTALEB contacted [REDACTED] (P) at [REDACTED] (P) and on 09/13/2001 ABUTALEB contacted [REDACTED] (P) home number [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] (P) was interviewed by the Washington Field Office in 10/2001. [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) lived at [REDACTED] (P), Apartment [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Virginia, which was next door to the apartment of ALRABABAH and [REDACTED] (P) when they lived in Virginia. In fact, [REDACTED] (P) claimed to have met ALRABABAH and [REDACTED] (P) in the street and brought them to [REDACTED] (P) to rent her apartment that was next door to his. [REDACTED] (P) then claimed to not have had any other interaction with ALRABABAH and/or [REDACTED] (P) ([REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (P) claimed that a friend of his, [REDACTED] (P) knew that ALRABABAH lived in New Jersey. The call activity from ABUTALEB to [REDACTED] (P) would suggest that [REDACTED] (P) may not have been truthful when discussing his knowledge of ALRABABAH and/or [REDACTED] (P). It should also be noted that he lived next door to where several of the known hijackers are known to have visited.

[REDACTED] (P) was a friend of [REDACTED] (P) and his family and lived with his family for a period of time. The facts surrounding [REDACTED] (P) association with [REDACTED] (P) would also suggest that [REDACTED] (P) would have known the individuals that he brought to [REDACTED] (P) apartment. Additionally, [REDACTED] (P) advised in her interview by the Washington Field Office, that [REDACTED] (P) told [REDACTED] (P) that ALRABABAH and [REDACTED] (P) were friends of his when he brought them to her apartment. ([REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 06/03/2002

[REDACTED] (P) friend and former roommate, [REDACTED] (P), currently lives with his wife in a house located at [REDACTED] (P), Clifton, New Jersey. [REDACTED] (P) has been interviewed by the Washington Field Office and advised that he splits his time between Clifton, New Jersey and Langley Park, Maryland, where he stays with a friend. [REDACTED] (P) advised the interviewing agents that he met ALRABABAH in the Paterson, New Jersey area and that he never saw ALRABABAH in Virginia or Maryland.

[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] Due to the fact that ALRABABAH and [REDACTED] (P) knew each other from the Paterson area and lived in addresses that were next door to each other in Falls Church, Virginia, it is possible that [REDACTED] (P) has not been truthful with the FBI when he discussed his knowledge of ALRABABAH.

It should be noted that ALRABABAH, [REDACTED] (P) and several of the known hijackers have all been in, Falls Church, Virginia, and Paterson, New Jersey, at one time or another. ALRABABAH, [REDACTED] (P) and several of the known hijackers were in Falls Church, Virginia basically during the time period of 03/2001 to 07/2001.

[REDACTED] (P) resided at [REDACTED] (P), Paterson, New Jersey, before and after he resided at [REDACTED] (P), apt. (P) Falls Church, Virginia. ALRABABAH visited [REDACTED] (P) at the [REDACTED] (P) Avenue address. ([REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F)) Previous investigation has placed the hijackers in Paterson, New Jersey at various times during 2001, such as the confirmed sighting of 7 of the hijackers at APOLLO INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL, 1009 Main Street, 2nd floor, Paterson, New Jersey in 07/2001. ([REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) The Newark Division has not ascertained whether [REDACTED] (P) has come into contact with any of the known hijackers.

[REDACTED] The Newark Division has not ascertained why [REDACTED] (P) is utilizing a VOICESTREAM cellular telephone subscribed to the name [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) However, there are calls from [REDACTED] (P) to [REDACTED] (P), which is the home telephone number listed by [REDACTED] (P) on the VOICESTREAM paperwork. A [REDACTED] (G) check revealed a [REDACTED] (P), SSN [REDACTED] (P-1), current address of [REDACTED] (P), Apartment [REDACTED] (P) Clinton, New Jersey, and a past address of [REDACTED] (P), Paterson, New Jersey. An Internet search on the telephone number [REDACTED] (P) revealed a listing of [REDACTED] (P), Paterson, New Jersey.

The telephone facility assigned the number 3 [REDACTED] (P) will hereafter be referred to as the [REDACTED] (P) cellular telephone. Additional analysis of the toll records of the [REDACTED] (P) cellular telephone, [REDACTED] (P), revealed the following:

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] (P) cellular phone contacted [REDACTED] (P) home telephone, [REDACTED] (P), numerous times, but it should be noted that [REDACTED] (P) contacted [REDACTED] (P) number on [REDACTED] (P) and on [REDACTED] (P).

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 06/03/2002

The Newark Division has not ascertained the significance of the contact between [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] (P) cellular telephone contacted 7 [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) 8. The telephone number [REDACTED] (P) is the cellular telephone number utilized by [REDACTED] (P), who is the [REDACTED] (P) of the [REDACTED] (P), N.W., Washington, D.C. The telephone number [REDACTED] (P) is the main telephone number of the [REDACTED] (P). ([REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] As documented in [REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (P) came to the attention of the FBI due to his purchase of the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Washington, D.C. Apparently, the former owner, [REDACTED] (P), was offered a large sum of money to get him to sell the [REDACTED] (P). The FAYEZ ABUTALEB cell phone has also contacted the [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] A [REDACTED] (G) check on the name [REDACTED] (P) revealed a [REDACTED] (P), date of birth [REDACTED] (F-1), Social Security Number (SSN) [REDACTED] (F-1), [REDACTED] (P) Washington, D.C. The address [REDACTED] (P) Washington, D.C. is also listed as the address of an [REDACTED] (P) gas station. The employer of [REDACTED] (P) was listed as [REDACTED] (P) Arlington, Virginia. [REDACTED] (G) listed [REDACTED] (P) Annandale, Virginia, as the [REDACTED] (P) of [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) as the [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (P) appears to be the same person as [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) of the aforementioned [REDACTED] (P), due to the fact that [REDACTED] (P) contacts the [REDACTED] (P), on his cellular telephone, [REDACTED] (P). ([REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) The [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P), is also contacted by the FAYEZ ABUTALEB cellular telephone and, as indicated previously, the [REDACTED] (P) cellular telephone. (review of the toll records of ABUTALEB and [REDACTED] (P) cellular telephones)

[REDACTED] As documented in the [REDACTED] (G), [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) appear to be [REDACTED] (P) of a number of [REDACTED] (P) located in the Virginia and Washington, D.C. area. The following gas stations appear to be associated with [REDACTED] (P) and/or [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (P)
Arlington, Virginia
[REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P)

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 06/03/2002

Arlington, Virginia

(P) [REDACTED]
contacted by: [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (secure case);
and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (payphone); all three of these numbers were in contact
with hijacker phone [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], believed to have been used by known
hijackers HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAMZI, and SALEM ALHAMZI.

(P) [REDACTED]
Washington, D.C.

(P) [REDACTED]
contacted by: FAYEZ ABUTALEB and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED].

(P) [REDACTED]
Falls Church, Virginia

(P) [REDACTED]
contacted by: [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (secure case).

(P) [REDACTED]
Fairfax, Virginia

(P) [REDACTED]
Washington, D.C.

(P) [REDACTED]
Washington, D.C.

(P) [REDACTED]
contacted by: [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (secure case); this number contacted hijacker
cellular telephone [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] believed to have been used by known
hijackers HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAMZI, and SALEM ALHAMZI.
([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] came to the attention of the FBI in
captioned case concerning [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] involvement with his nephew, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], the known hijackers, and the HOLIDAY INN, Route
46 West, Totowa, New Jersey. Known hijacker KHALID M. AL-MIDHAR was
positively identified by a hotel housekeeper who worked for the
aforementioned HOLIDAY INN. ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AL-MIDHAR was registered under [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] nephew's name,
[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Apt. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Fairfax,

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 06/03/2002

Virginia, during the first week of 09/2001. A number of the known hijackers were in Totowa, New Jersey at this time. ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED])
Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 10/11/2001, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], date of birth, [REDACTED] (F-1) [REDACTED] was interviewed by the Washington Field Office concerning his stay at the aforementioned HOLIDAY INN. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] advised the interviewing agents that [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] drove him to New Jersey to visit his wife, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], and he had stayed at the HOLIDAY INN during the first week of 09/2001. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] made two calls from the HOLIDAY INN to [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] cellular telephone, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] denied seeing or knowing any of the known hijackers. ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED])
Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It should be noted that the hijackers were in Totowa, New Jersey, at the same time as [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]. There is contact between [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and FAYEZ ABUTALEB, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], and telephones that were in contact with the known hijackers. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] is employed at the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] which is in FALLS CHURCH, Virginia, where known hijackers resided for a period of time.

[REDACTED] Along with the aforementioned telephonic contact, the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] cellular telephone and the ABUTALEB cellular telephone both contacted telephone number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]. (review of toll records of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and ABUTALEB cellular telephones) The subscriber for the telephone number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] is [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED], [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], Heightsville, Maryland. The telephone facility assigned number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] will hereafter be referred to as the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] cellular telephone.

[REDACTED] There are significant contacts in the toll records pertaining to [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]. A preliminary review of the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] cellular telephone toll records revealed the following:

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] cellular telephone contacted [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] on 09/11/2001, at approximately 11:44pm, for a 4 minute time period. The telephone number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] has also been in contact with the telephone number 972-680-0761, which is subscribed to the HLF RD, 525 International Parkway, Richardson, Texas.

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] cellular telephone contacted the telephone number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]. The telephone number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] is the main number of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Jamaica Queens, New York. (referenced in [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED])

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 06/03/2002

[REDACTED] The number to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED], has appeared in a number of investigations to include the [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] investigations. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] is owned or co-owned by [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] a New York Division investigation [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] has a number of relatives in the New York area that are involved in the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] business with him. (referenced in [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] an employee of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], participated in shotgun and rifle target practice with three people associated with the WORLD TRADE CENTER bombing case, [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] was also a subject in the [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] investigation. (referenced in [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] The telephone number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] also appeared in the telephone records of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] was 1 of 4 individuals convicted in the [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] investigation. (referenced in [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] The telephone number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] appeared on a pen register conducted on the telephone associated with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]. The telephone number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] was the home telephone number of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], also known as, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]. In 1992, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] arranged for firearms and explosives training in Pennsylvania for [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], aka [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] was convicted and sentenced to life in the TERRSTOP investigation. (referenced in [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] has been in contact with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], who was the subject of a HAMAS investigation by FBI New York, [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] teaches at the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] in Jersey City, New Jersey, and was linked to TRADEBOM subjects [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]. The address for the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] was utilized by [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] for various bank accounts and insurance policies. ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] The ALGHAZALY SCHOOL is located at 17 Park Street in Jersey City, New Jersey. The telephone number 201-433-5002 is subscribed to the ALGHAZALY SCHOOL and was contacted by [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]. (review of ACS Telephone Application) As stated previously, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] telephone number for EYAD ALRABABAH and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Apartment [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Falls Church, Virginia. Several of the known hijackers visited ALRABABAH and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], Apartment [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Falls Church, Virginia.

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 06/03/2002

[REDACTED] The writer recommends that EYAD ALRABABAH, (P) [REDACTED] (P) FAYEZ ABUTALEB, (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], and (P) [REDACTED] be interviewed concerning the aforementioned information. The interviews should involve the following topics:

[REDACTED] Interviewees should be questioned about their association with or knowledge of HAMAS, HLF RD, ICPC, DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE, (P) [REDACTED] (P) ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, and RAMZI BINALSHIBH.

[REDACTED] ALRABABAH, (P) [REDACTED] and (P) [REDACTED] should be questioned at length about their knowledge of each other, the known hijackers, the DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE, the (P) [REDACTED], overseas travel, e-mail addresses, and HAMAS.

[REDACTED] ALRABABAH and (P) [REDACTED] should be questioned about the (P) [REDACTED] and the (P) [REDACTED] and who they have been in contact with at these locations.

[REDACTED] ZAKARIA, (P) [REDACTED], and (P) [REDACTED] should be questioned about any knowledge of the known hijackers when they resided in Falls Church or overseas, the aforementioned (P) [REDACTED] ABUTALEB, and (P) [REDACTED] possible contact with the known hijackers in Totowa, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] should be questioned at length on his knowledge and/or involvement with HAMAS, HLF RD, AL-ALMAL SCHOOL, (P) [REDACTED] (P) GREAT NOTCH EXXON, (P) [REDACTED] any of the aforementioned (P) [REDACTED] family members, and the MIDTOWN EXXON.

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 06/03/2002

LEAD (s) :

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 2:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

[REDACTED] Provide copies of this communication to SA [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] (S) and SA [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED]. Newark Division requests that New York Division review the content of this communication and facilitate logical investigation as appropriate.

Set Lead 3:

MINNEAPOLIS

AT BROOKLYN PARK, MINNESOTA

([REDACTED] Locate and re-interview [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Brooklyn Park, Minnesota. telephone number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], cell phone number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], concerning his knowledge of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], HAMAS, and the rest of the information provided in this communication.

Set Lead 4:

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

[REDACTED] Locate and re-interview [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Arlington, Virginia, telephone [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], concerning his knowledge of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], FAYEZ ABUTALEB, DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE, the known hijackers and his previous residence, ALRABABAH, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and the rest of the information provided in this communication.

Set Lead 5:

NEWARK

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 06/03/2002

AT NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

[REDACTED] Locate and interview [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P-1)
FAYEZ ABUTALEB, and the [REDACTED] (P-1) family members mentioned in this
communication.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY


Date: 11/05/2001

To: Counterterrorism
Investigative Services

Attn: (G), (S)

New York

San Diego
Legat (G)



From: San Diego (G)

Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOMB
MC 182

Synopsis: Details of a liaison meeting of New Scotland Yard detectives and FBI special agents in San Diego, October 21 through October 28, 2001, concerning **OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI**. Lead set to Legat (G) for dissemination of enclosed FD-302s to New Scotland Yard.

Reference: (F)

Administrative: Information concerning **OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI** is carried by Legat (G) as (F). This communication is referenced to (F).

Enclosure(s): For New York, copies of FD-302s prepared by San Diego concerning the investigation of **OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI** for review by SA (S) for Legat (G) a duplicate set of FD-302s for dissemination to New Scotland Yard.

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) , 11/05/2001

Details: Referenced serial was a lead set to [REDACTED] (G) by San Diego to locate and interview **OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI**. The subject was located and interviewed on September 21, 2001, by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS,) also known as New Scotland Yard in London. Legat [REDACTED] (G) provided liaison service between the FBI and the MPS, arranging for Special Agents from New York and San Diego to travel to [REDACTED] (G) while Omar Al-Bayoumi was in the custody of NSY.

Subsequent to this, NSY detectives familiar with the captioned investigation traveled to San Diego with New York SA [REDACTED] (S) on October 21, 2001. The purpose of the travel was to provide FBI special agents with evidence obtained in the course of the New Scotland Yard (NSY) interview and attendant investigation of **OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI**.

The following is a summary of the detention and interview of **OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI** in [REDACTED] (G)

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) detained **OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI** under the United Kingdom Prevention of Terrorism Act on Friday, 09/21/2001. **AL-BAYOUMI**'s residence, automobile and office were searched incident to his detention. On 09/24/2001, Legat [REDACTED] (G), with the assistance of SA [REDACTED] (S) (New York Division, TDY to Legat [REDACTED] (G) and SA [REDACTED] (S) (San Diego Field Office, TDY to Legat [REDACTED] (G)) provided the MPS with background information to aid in an interview of **AL-BAYOUMI**. SA [REDACTED] (S) and SA [REDACTED] (S) were assigned TDY to [REDACTED] (G) Legat from 09/23/2001 to 09/30/2001. The purpose of the travel was to provide the MPS with information concerning what was known about the relationship between **OMAR AHMAD AL-BAYOUMI** and **KHALID M. AL-MIHDHAR**, **NAWAF AL-HAMZI** and other subjects of this investigation. The MPS did not allege any criminal activity on the part of **OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI** carried out in the U.K. that would substantiate a continuation of his detention beyond the period authorized. For these reasons, **AL-BAYOUMI** was released from custody without charges on Friday, September 28, 2001.

Search results of **AL-BAYOUMI**'s home and office were previously furnished to San Diego and the receiving offices. Original documents and electronic data files are maintained by FBI New York.

The following is a summary of evidence items seized during the search of **OMAR AL-BAYOUMI**'s home, office and vehicle in London by the MPS:

A number of banking documents and evidence of travel between the United States, United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia. A business card was found linking him to the Al-Medina mosque located in El Cajon, California.

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 11/05/2001

- Several videos were recovered from the search of AL-BAYOUMI's residence. One video revealed the party at the hijackers' apartment.
- Computers and diskettes were recovered from his residence.

The following is a summary of investigative steps taken during the visit by MPS detectives to San Diego FBI, October 21, 2001 to October 28, 2001:

(C-2)

- Between 10/19/2001 and 10/28/2001, the MPS officers attended various briefings of aspects of the Omar Al-Bayoumi investigation. The briefings were overseen by San Diego SA [REDACTED] (S). Individual briefings were given by SA [REDACTED] (S) financial matters; SA [REDACTED] (S), telephone records; SA [REDACTED] (S), [REDACTED] (P) Isamu Dyson; SA [REDACTED] (S) computer evidence; SA [REDACTED] (S), Al-Bayoumi's affiliation with various university enrollment and alleged employment.
- [REDACTED] (S) and [REDACTED] (S) disseminated information and evidence that had been collected as a result of the arrest of Omar Al-Bayoumi and the subsequent searches conducted in England.
- [REDACTED] (S) and [REDACTED] (S) participated in investigative strategy meetings conducted by SA [REDACTED] (S) and attended by SA [REDACTED] (S) and other San Diego agents involved in the investigation. These strategy meetings proved valuable for both the FBI and the Anti-Terrorist Branch of NSY.
- As a result of the meetings, developments have been made in the following areas:

Financial

New Scotland Yard was made aware of financial dealings that Omar Al-Bayoumi had with the Al-Medina Mosque, El Cajon, California, and Al-Bayoumi's association with Soliman Elay and Elay's

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) , 11/05/2001

association with Sana Bell and BMI Real Estate companies. (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) The FBI is now examining documentation relating to this Mosque that was seized from Al-Bayoumi's Birmingham address and from Bayoumi's office in the Mosque. Additionally, an arrest warrant has been issued for Al-Bayoumi for visa fraud in connection with financial false statements made on documents relating to his education status and his alleged employment by ERCAN Engineering, Newport Beach, California. An interview with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P), revealed that Al-Bayoumi coerced him into writing a letter indicating his company would be supporting Al-Bayoumi financially.

The FBI has been made aware of Al-Bayoumi's stated employer in Saudi Arabia, Dallah/Avco. New Scotland Yard was made aware that in most financial documents in the U.S., Al-Bayoumi did not divulge any employment with Dallah/Avco. This is significant because Dallah/Avco is suspected of having links with UBL. FBI is currently trying to verify these alleged links. The investigation has revealed that Al-Bayoumi routinely failed to list Dallah/Avco or the CAA as a source of income or financial support. NSY has reported that during their interview of Al-Bayoumi, Al-Bayoumi stated that he was receiving \$4,000.00 per month from Dallah/Avco while in the U.S.

FBI provided NSY with schedules of U.S. financial accounts of Al-Bayoumi, Manal Bagader, Soliman Elay and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). Additionally, link charts of significant financial activity that has occurred were provided to NSY.

Computer/Telephone

New Scotland Yard provided FBI with e-mail addresses recovered from Al-Bayoumi's computer. This lead to the FBI resulted in a link with Osama Bassnan in September 2001 being produced. The link chart of significant e-mail activity has been provided to NSY. FBI has linked Bassnan via telephone analysis with Al-Bayoumi and Bayoumi's wife, Manal Bagader, on at least 200 occasions while living in the U.S. FBI has provided NSY with link charts of telephone toll records for related individuals. The significance of Bassnan is that he hosted a party for Sheik Omar Rahman, who was later convicted for masterminding the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Bassnan is also a known supporter of UBL and he is opposed to the Israeli/Palestinian peace efforts. FBI is currently conducting further investigation into the links between Al-Bayoumi and Bassnan.

Interview-Isamu [REDACTED] (P) Dyson

As a result of Al-Bayoumi's interview, Bayoumi had stated that he had a chance meeting with Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F) , 11/05/2001

while in the company of a Caucasian Muslim named Ossma LNU. The meeting took place in Los Angeles, California.

Investigative efforts on the part of San Diego FBI resulted in locating and correctly identifying Ossma LNU as Isamu (P) Dyson who was now living in (P). Dyson was interviewed by SA (S). That interview is covered under a separate FD-302. Dyson provided a statement confirming his association with Al-Bayoumi. As a result of a meeting between (S), the interviewer of Al-Bayoumi in London, and SA (S) it became apparent that inconsistencies existed between Al-Bayoumi's and Dyson's account of the chance meeting with the hijackers.

The inconsistencies in the statements of (P) and Al-Bayoumi are of importance to the investigation. For that reason, the FBI arranged for Dyson (P) (P) to retrace the events of the February 01, 2000, which is the presumed date that Al-Bayoumi and Dyson had the alleged chance meeting with the hijackers. (P) (P) Dyson was interviewed regarding his knowledge of other meetings/social functions hosted by Al-Bayoumi in which the hijackers may have been present as there are several witnesses that have placed Al-Bayoumi with the hijackers. NSY advised that Al-Bayoumi did not disclose additional meetings with the hijackers during their interview.

NSY requested copies of all FD-302's related to the investigation of Omar Al-Bayoumi. NSY agreed to provide San Diego FBI with a copy of a particular video tape which was obtained in their search of Omar Al-Bayoumi's property in London. NSY maintained a copy of that tape which was made an item of evidence at FBI New York. The copy will be sent to San Diego FBI by NSY for review. The video, as described by NSY, has images of Omar Al-Bayoumi at a party he hosted in San Diego. San Diego will review this tape when it is made available. It is anticipated that a review of the tape will help investigating agents develop other leads to be carried out in San Diego.

On October 28, 2001, (S) and SA (S) left the San Diego Division.

On November 03, 2001, SA (S) copied San Diego's FD-302 reports known to concern the investigation of OMAR EMHED AL-BAYOUMI. Two sets of copies were produced. One set was sent to Legat (G) under the cover of this electronic communication for dissemination to NSY. The

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 11/05/2001

second copy was sent under this communication to New York FBI for review
by SA [REDACTED] (S).

San Diego's investigation of **OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI** continues.

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 11/05/2001

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

Counterterrorism

Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Adm)

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

AT WASHINGTON, DC

Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Adm)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK

Read and clear, provide SA [REDACTED] (S) with enclosed
FD-302s.

Set Lead 4: (Adm)

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO

Read and Clear.

Set Lead 5: (Adm)

[REDACTED] (G)

AT [REDACTED] (G)

Read, clear, and disseminate enclosed FD-302s to New Scotland
Yard in a manner prescribed by the Bureau.

◆◆



[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
Connections to the Attacks of September 11,
2001

Date: 07/23/2021

From: [REDACTED] (G)
Contact: [REDACTED] (S)

Approved By: [REDACTED] (S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED] (S)

Case ID #: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
PENTTBOMB [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] PENTTBOMB [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) MAJOR
CASE (MC) 182 [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 07/23/2021

[REDACTED]

(F)

Synopsis: [REDACTED] To file. To provide summary and historical information
for subsequent agents of [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED]

(G)

Administrative Notes: [REDACTED] Attached to this EC is a document summarizing
the connections between the 9/11 investigation and elements affiliated
with the Saudi Arabian government in the U.S.
Thos replaces Serial [REDACTED] (F) which was intended as a draft for review but
was serialized. Serial [REDACTED] (F) will be removed at a later date.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. [REDACTED] Saudi 9/11 Connections

Details:

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information related to the involvement of personnel and entities controlled by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and its affiliates within the United States with the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks / PENTTBOMB). Such an analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to understand the origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted, this document only discusses entities that are part of or closely tied to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001 investigation are only noted if related to this purpose. This report should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not intended as such.

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 07/23/2021

An additional purpose of this communication is to document investigations and supporting documentation regarding the Saudi(Wahhabi)/Salafi/militant network that was created, funded, directed and supported by the KSA and its affiliated organizations and diplomatic personnel within the U.S. As Saudi government officials and intelligence officers were directly operating and supporting the entities involved with this network, their involvement with the activities of these organizations/individuals would logically be supposed to have the knowledge or concurrence of the KSA government. This knowledge and/or concurrence by the SAG is related to the 9/11 investigation not only be the direct involvement of some personnel but also via the creation of a larger network for such activities.

In addition, the below analysis will update information available on the ties of some of these entities to Saudi Arabian intelligence services. Much of the publically known information regarding the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks was documented in the 9/11 Commission Report which was published in 2004. Thus much available information from subsequent and ongoing investigations was not noted in the Commission's Report. In addition, the classified "28 pages" was subsequently de-classified and investigations since 2004 shed additional light on the information that was contained within these 28 pages which were created in 2004 as part of the original Commission Report.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] there was located within the EKSA the offices of the Islamic Affairs Department and the office of Dawa (or Propagation). Investigation of the 9/11 hijackers and their support networks identified significant connections to these offices either directly or via the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. As such, a primary portion of this communication will focus on these offices and connections to the 9/11 hijackers. In addition, the SAG/EKSA was also involved with the funding and creation of a multitude of Islamic organizations, offices, imams and other religious figures within the US – many of which were involved with militant ideology. Several of these were known to be tied directly to Prince Bandar and/or were involved with the collection of information on US based Islamic entities. As the propagation of militant ideology would naturally provide justification for those who were in the hijacker's support network – these organizations will also be listed below (below is not an all-inclusive list as this would be too large.)

Administration:

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] was originally formed as [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] in 2002 as a result of the PENTTBOMB investigation identifying connections between the 9/11 hijackers, their support network and individuals associated with the SAG. As is well known, 15 of the deceased 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia with a possible 20th - Mohammed Alqahtani - subsequently captured in Afghanistan and confined at Guantanamo Bay after unsuccessfully attempting to enter the US. At the time of creation of [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] there was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] a few investigations of some Saudi Arabian

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 07/23/2021

government personnel and organizations had been previously established. [REDACTED] (G) was quickly transferred to the new [REDACTED] (G) and changed to [REDACTED] (G) and then subsequently [REDACTED] (G). During a portion of this time the squad's FBIHQ oversight was within the [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) and much of the squad investigative efforts were focused on Saudi Arabian charities in the [REDACTED] (G) AOR as well as individual subjects with established or alleged AQ or militant connections. After approximately ten years in [REDACTED] (G) the program was again transferred to [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) before returning to [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G).

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] of Saudi Arabian entities before and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under the [REDACTED] (F) classification. Later this designation was changed to [REDACTED] (F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations prior to and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under [REDACTED] (F) and [REDACTED] (F). These were later combined under [REDACTED] (F) and then [REDACTED] (F) classifications. For the most part, serials noted within this document utilize the case caption of the relevant time period.

[REDACTED] As the purpose of this document is to highlight and encapsulate the connections between the Saudi Arabian establishments and government entities in the U.S. with the 9/11 hijacker support network writer is not investigating or re-investigating the 9/11 investigation. This is particularly relevant due to a lack of resources and analytical assistance. As such, writer has located relevant serials and have copied that information directly within this communication. **The language, spelling, source symbol numbers, grammar, formatting and emphasis of the original serials is retained.**

[REDACTED] As the original language of the referenced serials is retained, a note on how sources were referenced is necessary. During the 9/11/2001 time period, Letter Head Memorandums (LHMs) were necessary for dissemination to DOJ. The LHMs removed the standard source number [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) replaced by a non-standard [REDACTED] (G) designation that was created entirely by the writing agent. Thus research is necessary in order to locate and identify the original source. During this time period, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

◆◆

(F)

The Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and their affiliated offices within the U.S.; their connections to the support network for the attacks of September 11, 2001; and the SAG creation of and support and direction for a network of offices and personnel involved with militant Salafi Islamic activities and proselytization within the United States.

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information related to the involvement of personnel and entities controlled by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and its affiliates within the United States with the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks / PENTTBOMB). Such an analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to understand the origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted, this document only discusses entities that are part of or closely tied to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001 investigation are only noted if related to this purpose. This report should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not intended as such.

An additional purpose of this communication is to document investigations and supporting documentation regarding the Saudi(Wahhabi)/Salafi/militant network that was created, funded, directed and supported by the KSA and its affiliated organizations and diplomatic personnel within the U.S. As Saudi government officials and intelligence officers were directly operating and supporting the entities involved with this network, their involvement with the activities of these organizations/individuals would logically be supposed to have the knowledge or concurrence of the KSA government. This knowledge and/or concurrence by the SAG is related to the 9/11 investigation not only be the direct involvement of some personnel but also via the creation of a larger network for such activities.

[REDACTED]

In addition, the below analysis will update information available on the ties of some of these entities to Saudi Arabian intelligence services. Much of the publically known information regarding the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks was documented in the 9/11 Commission Report which was published in 2004. Thus much available information from subsequent and ongoing investigations was not noted in the Commission's Report. In addition, the classified "28 pages" was subsequently de-classified and investigations since 2004 shed additional light on the information that was contained within these 28 pages which were created in 2004 as part of the original Commission Report.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] there was located within the EKSA the offices of the Islamic Affairs Department and the office of Dawa (or Propagation). Investigation of the 9/11 hijackers and their support networks identified significant connections to these offices either directly or via the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. As such, a primary portion of this communication will focus on these offices and connections to the 9/11 hijackers. In addition, the SAG/EKSA was also involved with the funding and creation of a multitude of Islamic organizations, offices, imams and other religious figures within the US - many of which were involved with militant ideology. Several of these were known to be tied directly to Prince Bandar and/or were involved with the collection of information on US based Islamic entities. As the propagation of militant ideology would naturally provide justification for those who were in the hijacker's support network - these organizations will also be listed below (below is not an all-inclusive list as this would be too large.)

Administration:

(G) [REDACTED] was originally formed as (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] in 2002 as a result of the PENTTBOMB investigation identifying connections between the 9/11 hijackers, their support network and individuals associated with the SAG. As is well known, 15 of the deceased 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia with a possible 20th - Mohammed Alqahtani - subsequently captured in Afghanistan and confined at Guantanamo Bay after unsuccessfully attempting to enter the US. At the time of creation of (G) [REDACTED] there was (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] a few investigations of some Saudi Arabian government personnel and organizations had been previously established. Squad (G) [REDACTED] was quickly transferred to the new (G) [REDACTED] and changed to (G) [REDACTED] and then subsequently (G) [REDACTED]. During a portion of this time the squad's FBIHQ oversight was within the (G) [REDACTED] and much of the squad investigative efforts were focused on Saudi Arabian charities in the (G) [REDACTED] AOR as well as individual subjects with established or alleged AQ or militant connections. After approximately ten years in (G) [REDACTED] the program was again transferred to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(G)

before returning to

(G)
[REDACTED]

(F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations of Saudi Arabian entities before and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under the (F) classification. Later this designation was changed to (F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations prior to and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under (F) [REDACTED]. These were later combined under (F) and then (F) classifications. For the most part, serials noted within this document utilize the case caption of the relevant time period.

[REDACTED] As the purpose of this document is to highlight and encapsulate the connections between the Saudi Arabian establishments and government entities in the U.S. with the 9/11 hijacker support network writer is not investigating or re-investigating the 9/11 investigation. This is particularly relevant due to a lack of resources and analytical assistance. As such, writer has located relevant serials and have copied that information directly within this communication. **The language, spelling, source symbol numbers and emphasis of the original serials is retained.**

[REDACTED] As the original language of the referenced serials is retained, a note on how sources were referenced is necessary. During the 9/11/2001 time period, Letter Head Memorandums (LHMs) were necessary for dissemination to DOJ. The LHMs removed the standard source number [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

standard (G) designation that was created entirely by the writing agent. Thus research is necessary in order to locate and identify the original source. During this time period, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]

Background of Movement of 9/11 Hijacking Team

According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the 9/11 planning and recruitment of personnel for the operation was being developed through 2000 and early 2001. The pilots who were selected were the first to enter the U.S. and the "muscle hijackers", although recruited in 2000, were the last - not arriving until the Spring/Summer of 2001.

According to the 9/11 Commission Report and open source information, Khalid Almihdar and Nawaf Alhazmi (described by the report as the 2nd in command after Mohammed Atta) were two original hijackers involved in the attack planning and, although other known hijackers had prior entries into the US, appeared to be the first to enter the U.S. as an operational component of the 9/11 plan. According to investigation and the 9/11 Commission report, Almihdar and Alhazmi first entered the U.S. via Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. Per the 9/11 Commission Report, neither Almihdar nor Alhazmi were well prepared for the operation, spoke little English and their only qualifications appeared to be their support of UBL and their ability to obtain visas. Although the initial plan may have been for Alhazmi and Almihdar to have been pilots for the plot, neither passed initial flight training and both had problems acclimating to the U.S. Almihdar's difficulties may have resulted in his sudden return to Yemen on June 10, 2000 (or he was possibly working on logistics overseas) that would have left Alhazmi alone in California except for elements of his support network. Almihdar would not return to the US as a "muscle hijacker" until July 2001. Both Alhazmi and Almihdar arrived in the U.S. after having attended what is presumed to be the planning meeting for the attacks that were held in Kuala Lumpur.

It is important to note that both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known AQ operatives. Both were Saudi nationals who had traveled together to Bosnia in 1995. Alhazmi conducted training with KSM in Pakistan in late 1999 and both Alhazmi and Almihdar were present in the planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur in December 1999. Alhazmi was reportedly personally selected by UBL for the operation. Almihdar was from a prominent family and married into a family with extensive AQ connections. Both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known to Saudi and U.S. intelligence as being AQ members. After Almihdar departed the U.S. Alhazmi was left alone until Hani Hanjour was sent in December 2000. The second primary group of hijackers were the "Hamburg Group"

[REDACTED]

(Mohammed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi and Ziad Jarrah (along with Ramzi Binalshibh) who arrived in Afghanistan in November 1999 and began to be selected for the operation. Unlike Alhazmi and Almihdar, these four spoke English and were acclimated for living in the West. Their need for a support network would be minimal.

Due to the lack of preparedness of Alhazmi and Almihdar for the operation and residing in the West without arousing suspicion the existence of a support network would make operational sense. Investigation determined that a significant portion of the network assisting these two hijackers centered on offices affiliated with the KSA to include the Saudi Arabian Los Angeles Consulate, the King Fahd Mosque as well as multiple individuals associated with these locations and/or the Saudi Arabian government.

[REDACTED]

Islamic Affairs Department (IAD) Islamic Affairs Office (IAO)
(Ministry of Islamic Affairs)(MIA) / Dawa Office Connections to Saudi
Arabian Intelligence

[REDACTED] Summary: Within the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C. (as in other Saudi Arabian Embassies throughout the world) was located an Islamic Affairs Office and a Dawa Office (Dawa means proselytizing). The D.C. offices were staffed with both Saudi Arabian diplomats and local hires and their roles were often mixed. The Islamic Affairs Offices worldwide and in the U.S. played a key role in supporting the Saudi Arabian Government's objective to be perceived as the leader of the Islamic world and also played a key role in Saudi Arabia's religious and political competition with Shia Iran. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1), the key personnel within the Islamic Affairs office (A), (G), (J-1) and one of the roles of the Islamic Affairs Office was to provide intelligence on local Islamic populations and to provide cover for the movement of (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). Saudi Arabian "non-governmental organizations" (NGO), ie. "charities", supplemented this activity with large funding streams as well as cover for personnel.

One of the primary speculative questions regarding the PENTTBOMB investigation is whether the SAG was significantly connected to, had prior knowledge of or supported the attacks of September 11, 2001. Due to the involvement of the Islamic Affairs/Dawa Office personnel within the support network of the hijackers it is of possible significance to identify the connections of these offices to Saudi Arabian intelligence.

Relevant Serials:

(O-1) [REDACTED] FBI Serial (F) (F) [REDACTED] reported that as of early 2001 the EKSA had one of the largest Ministry of Islamic Affairs sections in the world with approximately 50 MIA officers. (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] Many Saudi Embassy officials believed that the chief of the MIA section, Majid Aljashaihan (SA (S) NOTE: This would be **Majed Algheshey**), was either a GIP officer or had some type of special connection to the GIP. The same opinions were held about **Khalil Khalil**, the deputy

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

chief of the MIA section. Musaid Aljarrah (**Musaed Aljarrah**) was one of the known GIP officers in the MIA section.

[SA (S) note: Presumably the above number of "approximately 50" would include both Saudi and non-Saudi personnel (non-diplomatic) in both Islamic Affairs and Dawa. It is unknown if personnel assigned to other offices such as **Muslim World League (MWL)**, **World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)** and the **Institute of Islamic Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)** would be included (G) [The large number of employees in a national not pre-dominantly Muslim signaled the significance of the activities of this office in the U.S. to overall Saudi Arabian policies and objectives.]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(F) On (A), (G), 2009
(O-1) Sahal Ergesous (J-1) was the head of the Islamic Affairs office at the EKSA. (O-1) the Islamic Affairs Office is active and is charged with monitoring Indian, Iranian and Egyptian Islamic societies primarily. Ergesous is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs employee (O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(F)

On 08/20/2010

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

Various serials in indices notes that (A), (G), (J-1) worked at the EKSA as the (A), (G), (J-1) the (A), (G), (J-1) Office and that Musaed Aljarrah was assigned to work (A), (G), (J-1) (see (F) Serial (F)). According to (F) Serial (F) that in February 2005 Aljarrah met with (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1). Aljarrah stated that (A), (G), (J-1); however, (A), (G), (J-1) insisted that Aljarrah return to head the Islamic Affairs Office and Aljarrah returned in March 2005.

Per the above and information on visas noted below it is known that (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1)

(O-1) (O-1) (J-3)

(J-3) (A), (G), (J-1) Aljarrah was (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) Aljarrah's replacement was Abdullah Alajroush (F) (F). Alajroush was a suspected Intelligence Officer (SIO) who had previously served in Pakistan (O-1)

(O-1) (A), (G), (J-1) and had attempted to (A), (G), (J-1)

Alajroush's replacement was Sahal Ergesous (Sahl Ergesous) (G) (G) (A), (G), (J-1)

discussed (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) (F) Serial (F).

[REDACTED]

The above information helps verify the involvement of the GIP within the MIA offices. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and Aljarrah's subsequent replacement by Alajroush is classic intelligence officer [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). This is significant considering the MIA/Dawa office's involvement, and Aljarrah's in particular, with the support network of the 9/11 hijackers as well as with the creation, funding, direction and support of the extensive Salafi proselytizing network that extended throughout the U.S.

[REDACTED]

Use of MIA/Dawa Offices to Obtain Intelligence

The purpose of the MIA/Dawa offices is also of relevance. The information below clearly indicates that one of the purposes of the offices was to obtain intelligence on individuals and communities of value to Saudi Arabian intelligence or government purposes. Thus at least some individuals assigned to these offices would be working at least partially for Saudi Arabian intelligence.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] This serial provided excellent information related to one of the purposes of the Dawa/MIA offices and is particularly interesting as it provides information regarding taskings as well as names of personnel during the crucial years before 9/11.

[REDACTED] The communication reported the arrest of Omar Abdi Mohammed (aka Omar Alkhatib) (F) [REDACTED] in San Diego, California on 01/20/2004 and documents obtained during a subsequent search. Omar Abdi Mohamed had been identified (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] as the leader of the Al-Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI) in the United States. Mohamed was selected as the AIAI leader of the U.S. approximately nine months ago. AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). WFO had previously obtained a list of 50 US based clerics who were supported by the EKSA IFTA (Dawa) office. Alkhatib was one of those listed. On January 20, 2004, he was arrested for immigration fraud. Investigation by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) determined that Mohamed was in charge of the of the "Western Somali Relief Agency" which was a fund raising entity that allegedly provided drought and humanitarian relief to the people of Somalia and Ethiopia. During a US naturalization

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

interview, Mohamed lied about receiving approximately \$350,000 from the Global Relief Foundation (GRF). The United States Treasury Department has frozen the assets of the Global Relief Foundation and accused it of providing financial support to terrorism.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
(O-1)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Documents located during searches of Muslim World League identified efforts to recruit within the U.S. military.

[REDACTED] The above documents (there are others within FBI indices) help confirm [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] reporting regarding the functions of the MIA/Dawa offices.

[REDACTED]

Personnel Assigned to the MIA/Dawa Offices:

Multiple individuals were employed inside the MIA/Dawa offices within the EKSA. The following is summary information on the most pertinent individuals within these offices that are associated with the 9/11 support network.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

Passport: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Memo on [REDACTED] (J-3)

Employer: **Prince Bandar bin Sultan**

Telephone: [REDACTED] (P-1)

POC: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Possible USPER [REDACTED] (P) DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) / [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Summary: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was an official diplomat assigned to the EKSA and was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) has been

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] known to have been employed by Bandar bin Sultan's National Security Council. (O-1) [REDACTED]

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] As noted above, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) to be a GIP [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) at the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) .

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (J-3), (O-1) [REDACTED] (J-3), (O-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3), (O-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Musaed A Al Jarrah (Musaed Aljarrah)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Occupation: Accountant

Address: [REDACTED] (P) McLean, Va

Telephone: [REDACTED] (P) (home) [REDACTED] (P) (cell)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Aljarrah was a Saudi diplomat assigned to the EKSA and was a high level employee in the Islamic Affairs Office. Aljarrah was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and was heavily involved with the movement and support of the Saudi Salafi network within the U.S. to include those members of the 9/11 hijacker support network in Southern California. Aljarrah had numerous contacts with terrorism subjects throughout the U.S. Aljarrah was closely associated with Bandar bin Sultan.

[REDACTED] Aljarrah, an EKSA employee, is one of the key figures of the 9/11 investigation as it pertains to Saudi Arabian government involvement. Per investigation and subsequent affidavits Aljarrah had a "controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sunni extremist activity in Southern California." Moreover, Aljarrah directed and controlled and funded the activities of **Almuhanna** (herein) and **Althumairy** (herein) who had served as Imams at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA. After Almuhanna and Althumairy were expelled for from the King Fahd Mosque, they and their followers created an "underground" mosque near the King Fahd Mosque. After their departure, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Communication dated November 2000 requesting [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) reported that [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] dated 11/14/2003] [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Musaed Aljarrah was the MIA (officer) at the EKSA and had a similar "Wahhabi line of thinking" as Mohammed Almohanna (see herein). [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Aljarrah was last in LA two years prior.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 2009] [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) MUSSAED AL-JARRAH was at the EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA (EKSA) starting in the early 1990s. He was assigned to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. Originally AL-JARRAH started at the EKSA as an administrative person [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) In 1995, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). It was at this point that AL-JARRAH became very engaged with U.S. Islamic centers throughout the U.S. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and also became very involved in the dealing of the **ISLAMIC INSTITUTE OF ARABIC AND ISLAMIC STUDIES (IIASA)**, (see herein) a Saudi university in Falls Church, VA that was sponsored by the EKSA, but was owned and managed by IMAM UNIVESITY in Riyadh. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

of the Islamic Affairs department. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 2007] According to multiple sources, Al-Jarrah returned to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia where he works for Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., in the Saudi National Security Ministry. However, Al-Jarrah returned to the U.S. on July 11, 2006 using [REDACTED] (J-3) departed on September 19, 2006, and has not returned since. Al-Jarrah reportedly traveled to several U.S. cities and has been associating with [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) assigned to the EKSA. Over the past several months, Al-Jarrah has traveled to Cairo, Egypt; San Paulo, Brazil; Beirut, Lebanon; Demascus, Syria; Tokyo, Japan; and Hong Kong, China. It is unknown what Al-Jarrah is doing during his travel. (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (G) that Al-Jarrah [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) actually works for Prince Bandar's National Security Ministry in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Southern California Based Investigations

[REDACTED] A portion of the PENTTBOMB investigation focused on the support network for 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi and this was also a focus of the subsequent New York investigation Operation Encore. During the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) as well as the King Fahd Mosque were noted to be involved. The individuals in these locations were known to have contact with individuals assigned to the MIA/Dawa offices in the EKSA. As noted above, Fahad Althumairy was employed at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA in addition to being listed as employed in the EKSA Dawa office. The following additional persons of interest were working at the Consulate:

[REDACTED]

Fahad bin Ibrahim Al Thumairy

Fahad I A Al Thumairy (Fahad Althumairy)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

Abdullah Fahad Althumairy DOB: (P-1), believed to be Althumairy's son, was initially (J-3) to visit California (google was listed) in 2013 but was later revoked.

(F)

[REDACTED]

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

Summary: Fahad Althumairy was a Saudi Arabian diplomat assigned to EKSA as well as the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. Althumairy was a representative of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and FBI queries were of interest to the highest levels of the Saudi government. Althumairy was a close contact of the 9/11 hijackers support network and may have known Alhazmi and Almihdar and/or arranged for their meeting key members of the support network. Althumairy was an imam at the King Fahad mosque.

[REDACTED] Investigation was opened on Althumairy by LA in 2002 under (F) [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] This investigation was originally predicated on information that ALTHUMAIRY was associated with an individual who had extensive contacts with two of the September 11th hijackers.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FBI investigation determined that ALTHUMAIRY had contact with OMAR ALBAYOUMI, who had substantial contact with 9/11 hijackers NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIDHAR. Further, ALTHUMAIRY was identified [REDACTED] (O-1) as a "hard core extremist" whose sermons at the King Fahad Mosque appealed to the extremist and militant attendees of the mosque.

[REDACTED] ALTHUMAIRY departed Los Angeles on 02/06/2003 and returned to Saudi Arabia for his brother's wedding. On 05/06/2003, ALTHUMAIRY re-entered the U.S., [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3)

ALTHUMAIRY was interviewed by the FBI at the Los Angeles International Airport. ALTHUMAIRY was refused entry into the U.S. and was returned to Saudi Arabia on 05/08/2003. Subject was interviewed in February 2004 [REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED] (C-1) in Riyadh, [REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] ALTHUMAIRY's [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) because he was no longer in the United States, although he [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED].

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] A communication from Legat [REDACTED] (G) to Counterterrorism and Los Angeles [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] dated 12/17/2001 [REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] On 03/10/2020 Operation Encore agents interviewed [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] regarding any knowledge that he may have regarding the relationship between [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and the two 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Al-Mihdhar (Al-Mihdhar) and Nawaf Al-Hazmi (Al-Hazmi). [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] stated that he was told by [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] that Fahad Al-Thumairy, the Imam of the King Fahad Mosque, had asked him to look after two very "significant" people. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] did not inquire into the word "significant" or why he referred to them this way, other than to say, that if Thumairy assigned him to look after someone it meant that they were important. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] did request [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] to meet the two men, (Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi), whenever they came across each other at the mosque. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] would see [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] with the two men at the mosque almost every day, even sometimes in the company of Al-Thumairy in the library of the mosque.

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] states he was told by [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] that the two men were living at his house on [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] stated to [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] that he had asked his sister, who was living there at the time, to move out and stay with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] other sister for a couple of weeks, that he was having visitors stay with him and needed the space in the house. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] was unaware when [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] had requested that of his sister.

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] recalls a conversation that he had with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] shortly after the Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi arrived in L.A. regarding the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. He states that [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] that he needed to take the two men to the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] asked why he was taking them to that restaurant because the food was not very good, and the service was poor. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] stated to [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] that he just needed to take them there. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] did not question him any further about this topic, but advised the interviewing agents that people would go to that restaurant to have private meetings. [See **Bayoumi**]

[REDACTED]

Mohammed S Almuhanha (Mohammed Almuhanha / Mohammed Almohanna)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Phone #: [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P),
[REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Almuhanha was a Saudi diplomat and employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. Almuhanha was known to be a leader and spiritual guide amongst a militant group that separated from the King Fahd Mosque. Almuhanha was a close associate of Althumairy.

[REDACTED] Investigation was predicated on MOHAMMED ALMUHANNA's direct ties to FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, a Sunni Salafi extremist with ties to 9/11 (subject of [REDACTED] (F)).

ALMUHANNA was previously a consular official at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, and is reported to have founded, with ALTHUMAIRY, the King Fahad Mosque. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) "ALMUHANNA is a Sunni Islamic extremist associated with a radical form of the Salafi ideology...and a graduate of the Ibn Mohammad Islamic University in Riyadh" [REDACTED] (F)
[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Almuhanha is the son of prominent Saudi judge - Sulaiman Almuhanha (DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED]).

[REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) A brother is most likely Abdulmajed Almohna (DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED]).

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] dated 11/13/2003] [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] that Almuhanha had made an inflammatory speech at the King Fahd Mosque on 01/11/2002 calling for jihad.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Per interview of **Mohammed Alqudhaieen** (see herein) Almuhanhad was invited by Alqudhaieen to provide sermons while in Tucson. [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Interviewee stated that al-Muhanna was a virulent critic of America and American society. According to [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] al-Muhanna was disdainful of Western values and was openly hostile to non-Muslims and Muslims who did not meet al-Muhannas religious standards. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] stated that many people in the Muslim community were surprised when al-Thumairy was not allowed to re-enter the United States, but no one was surprised that al-Muhanna was excluded.

[REDACTED]

Sultan Mehmas Sultan Alkahtani (Sultan Alkahtani)

[REDACTED] (F)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Alkahtani was a Saudi Arabian diplomat and employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. Alkahtani was a close associate of Almuhanha. Alkahtani's brother was identified as having been killed fighting for ISIS.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F)

:

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Al-Muhanna is the subject of Los Angeles [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (F) based on the extremist ideology which he has preached at the King Fahd Mosque in Los Angeles and a smaller mosque/madrassa school Al-Muhanna helped create known as the Dar Al Quran Education Center. Al-Muhanna has been associated with **Fahad Althumairy**, another religious mullah from the Consulate, who is the subject of Los Angeles FFI [REDACTED] (G). Al-Muhanna also gives religious guidance to the Islamic Center of Long Beach where he is in

[REDACTED]

contact with Hamad Al-Badr, [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G).

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Prior FBI investigation has determined that Alkahtani's brother - Fahad Mihmas Alqahtani - [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) prior to traveling to Syria to join ISIS where he subsequently was killed. [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Mutaib Alsudairi (Mutaib Alsudairy)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] Asudairi's Virginia DMV photo that lists place of residence of [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va in September 1999.

[REDACTED] Summary: Mutaib Alsudairy and Adel Alsadhan were two Saudi clerics and Saudi Arabian officials who entered the U.S. in 1999 and met with Omar Albayoumi. These individuals later attempted to reenter the U.S. Alsudairy is known to have lived with AQ facilitator Ziyad Khaleel.

[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

DC and had [REDACTED] (J-3). (FBI Comment: This was the same arrival date as al-Sadhan and both men listed [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3). Al-Sudairy was an administrative officer at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC. He assumed duty on 14 June 1999. Al-Sudairy's position was terminated on 11 April 2001. Prior to this he worked at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia from March 1998 to June 1999. Al-Sudairy was reported to be the nephew of Doctor Abdullah bin Turki, former head of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Muslim World League president.

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] FBI TA shows that al-Bayoumi called al-Sudairy five (5) times while the hijackers were in San Diego with al-Bayoumi. The dates

of the calls are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January, 26 January, and 30 January 2000 - on these particular days al-Bayoumi met the hijackers in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming to San Diego. The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4 February 2000 al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment he obtained for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America to assist them in opening a bank account. The last call occurred on 7 February 2000. A "welcoming party" for the hijackers was coordinated by al-Bayoumi and likely held on 17 February 2000.

[REDACTED] Al-Sudairy subsequently moved to Columbus, Missouri and al-Sadhan moved to Lawrence, Kansas. While in Missouri, al-Sudairy lived with **Ziyad Khaleel** (see herein) for about four months in 2000. Khaleel was a known key communications equipment procurement officer for Usama bin Laden and provided satellite phones used in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa. The two men opened a joint Post Office Box in Columbus, Missouri. Following al-Sudairy's return to Saudi Arabia he met with Khaleel twice. (FBI Comment: Khaleel was reportedly killed in a car accident in Saudi Arabia in March 2002)

[REDACTED]

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

SA (S) note: Mutaib Alsudairy is the brother of long term LA Saudi Consulate employee Faisal Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) (confirmed via review of applications that confirmed same father and mother). (J-3)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) Faisal Alsudairy was the subject of an LHM to (J-3) as well as (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)
(J-3)

(J-3) Another brother, Saud Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) was a brother assigned as a diplomat at the EKSA. Another brother, Turki Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) is noted in early New York Saudi investigative file and in PENTTBOMB files for unknown reasons.

Another brother Ahmad Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)), an MOI officer, (J-3) Ahmad was the

(G) communication is unclear.

Another brother Mishaal Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) appears to have been (G) (G). Another brother Bandar Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) is an MOD police officer.

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

Faisal Alsudairy, Mutaib Alsudairy's possible brother, (J-3)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Adel Alsadhan

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1) Captioned investigation was opened based on [REDACTED] (O-1) AL SADHAN works under WFO FI subject **MUSAED AL-JARRAH** [REDACTED] (F)) at the Islamic Affairs Section of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (RESA) and helps AL-JARRAH coordinate/direct all Saudi Imams assigned to and/or financially supported by the Saudi government in the United States. AL SADHAN is believed to help AL-JARRAH support extremist Saudi Sunnis in the United States. AL SADHAN [REDACTED] (O-1) a believer in a radical form of Sunni Salafiyism and reportedly travels frequently within the United States.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) dated 09/26/2001] Interview of Doctor Abdussattar Shaikh: **Omar Albayoumi** introduced Shaikh to Mat'Ab Alsudairy and Adil Al'Sadhan, two scholars visiting from Saudi Arabia. They did not seem to know Albayoumi very well. Albayoumi was looking for somewhere for these two visitors to stay. Shaikh allowed them to stay with him. They stayed with him for approximately six or seven

[REDACTED]

weeks. [NOTE: Alhazmi and Almihdar also lived at Shaikh's residence at a later date. (F) This serial also noted that both Alsudairy and Alsadhan were imams at the Kurdish Mosque in El Cajon (San Diego) (See Albayoumi).

(J-3) [REDACTED] Attempted to enter the US in 2013 as (J-3) [REDACTED] but was refused. (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(P)

(P)

DOB: (P-1)

SSN: (P-1)

Possible phone prior to 9/11/2001: (P) (LA) / (P)

Possible present address:

(P)

Anaheim, CA

May be USPER of (P) origin

Summary: (P) was a local hire as an employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. (P) was a close associate of Alhtumairy and may have met Albayoumi prior to his supposed chance encounter with Alhazmi and Almihdar. A phone associated with (P) later had contact with the support network of the hijackers in Virginia.

Relevant Serials:

(F) Listed employees of the Saudi Arabian Consulate as of 09/1999 which listed (P) as a translator with a US arrival date of 10/23/1991 although the biographical section noted he was an employee of the Saudi Cultural Attache in LA from 1979-1983.

[REDACTED] In February of 2000, **Omar Al-Bayoumi** and Kaysan Bindon, aka Isamu Dyson, traveled from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate where Al-Bayoumi handled paperwork for passports for his family and picked up some religious materials. Afterwards they went to a restaurant near the King Fahd mosque where they met 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hamzi. When later interviewed, Al-Bayoumi and Bindon characterized this initial meeting as a chance encounter. On 08/03/2004, Bindon identified a photograph of (P) as the person at the Consulate who gave religious materials to Al-Bayoumi.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During the investigation of the 9/11 attacks by FBI personnel an associate of the hijackers identified as Isamu Dyson was interviewed and advised that he knew Omar Albayoumi from 1999. Dyson indicated that he once visited the Saudi Consulate in LA with Albayoumi and while there Albayoumi met separately with an unknown individual. [During an interview on 08/18/2003 Albayoumi described this person as follows: a tall individual, heavier than AL-BAYOUMI, with a long black/gray beard and not from Saudi Arabia. After this meeting they traveled to a cafe in Culver City where Albayoumi met with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdar. At the time, investigators believed this meeting occurred in February 2000.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 04/2016] This serial details investigation of [REDACTED] (P) as part of Operation Encore. Contrary to [REDACTED] (P) claims of not discussing 9/11, a source reported that after the attacks [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (O-1) stated "Isn't it great that our brothers are fighting?"

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 04/2016] [REDACTED] (P) known telephone number ([REDACTED] (P)) was also known to have one contact (06/14/2001) with telephone [REDACTED] (P) which was registered to an apartment used by Eyad Alrababah and [REDACTED] (P) who both also provided significant logistic support to Mihdar, Hanjour and two additional hijackers. According to Alrababah, he met Hanjour and Hamzi at a 7-11 store "by chance" (similar to the story made by Albayoumi). In May 2001, Alrababah drove four of the hijackers to Connecticut and New Jersey. [REDACTED] (D)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 04/2016] [REDACTED] (P) was a close associate of **Althumairy** and led prayers and handled administration at the King Fahad Mosque. Althumairy also served as an admin officer at the Saudi LA Consulate and held an office at that location.

[REDACTED]

Omar Albayoumi

Alternate names found: Omar Al Bayoumi / Omar A M Al Bayoumi / Omer Bayoumi / Omar Bayoumi / Omar Bayayoomi / Umar Albayoumi

Omar Abu Emad)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

(J-3) It is known that Albayoumi, a Saudi national, had entered the US in the decade before 9/11 and remained.

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: [REDACTED] Omar Albayoumi was directly involved with day to day support of the Alhazmi and Almihdar. (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

Albayoumi was known to be paid by a Saudi affiliated company as a "ghost employee" while in the U.S. After Almihdar departed the U.S. in June 2000, a nephew of Albayoumi's supposed employer moved into the home.

Relevant Serials:

Omar Albayoumi was originally opened as [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) Provided synopsis of Saudi official links to Albayoumi:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Omar Albayoumi was a major subject of interest due to his close and confirmed contact with several of the 9/11 hijackers. The 9/11 Commission report speculated that Albayoumi worked for Saudi intelligence; however, [REDACTED] could not locate any evidence and Albayoumi claimed his association with the two hijackers was based on a chance meeting. Information contained herein, [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) This is significant as Albayoumi (as well as others) was almost immediately available to Hazmi and Mihdar upon entry into the U.S. during a time period that both of these ill-prepared operatives were most vulnerable to possible detection. Albayoumi was being paid as a "ghost employee" of a Saudi company during his time in California. A relative of Albayoumi's boss within this company would later move in to the same apartment with Alhazmi after Mihdar's departure.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] The earliest reference to Albayoumi in electronic indices noted by writer were from 1998.

[REDACTED] [(F) Serial (F)] On (A), (G), (J-1) 1998, [REDACTED] (F) (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) new property has been purchased for a mosque, located at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) in El Cajon. The mosque will cater mainly to the Kurdish people. The person in charge is a Saudi (Egyptian descent), Omar Bayoumi, aka Abu Emad. The mosque number is [REDACTED] (P), Bayoumi's residential number is [REDACTED] (P) and his cellular phone is [REDACTED] (P). The property cost \$580,000.00 and is going to be renovated. Saudi financing appears to be the means by which the property was bought and renovated.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Date 04/01/1999] In this communication an interviewee advised that Omar Bayayoomi (phonetic), user of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) had delivered \$400,000 to the Islamic Kurdish community in El Cajon, CA for the purpose of building the Al Medina Mosque. The money originated from the neighbors of Sheikh Al Zamel, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interviewee also opined that Bayayoomi must be an agent of a foreign power or of Saudi Arabia. Omar Al-Bayoumi, pdob [REDACTED] (P-1), [REDACTED] (P-1) address [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] San Diego, CA (Villa Balboa Apt. Complex), wife Manal Bagader, telephone [REDACTED] (P), may be identical to the "Omar Bayayoomi"

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]] An interview of an employee of Dallah Al Baraka in Saudi Arabia noted that Albayoumi first appeared to his knowledge in early 1995 as a result of AVCO Overseas Services dropping its contract with the Saudi Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA) in part for the presence of "ghost employees" which AVCO was forced to pay for under the contract. The employee stated that the Director General of PCA at that time, [REDACTED] (P) (DOB [REDACTED] (P-1) , had "side deals" regarding some of the ghost employees with AVCO whereby AVCO paid the expenses related to these individuals. Omar Albayoumi was one of the ghost employees. The interviewee estimated that there were approximately 50 such individuals on the books who were being paid for doing no work (for AVCO). When the contract was moved to ERCAN [REDACTED] (P) assured the interviewee that he [REDACTED] (P) wanted to Albayoumi to stay in the US and that the interviewee should not pry for information. The interviewee thought that Albayoumi was a huge financial drain on the program. The interviewee advised that whenever Albayoumi needed additional money beyond his salary that a purchase order would appear which was devoid of information on the item to be purchased but was already approved by [REDACTED] (P). These purchase orders were controlled by Mohammed Basharil (Mohamed Basharahil)(PCA). Basharil and a Hamid Alrashid (PCA) would take the payment and wire transfer the money to Albayoumi's account.

[REDACTED] [9/11 Commission Report] Saudi student Yazeed Alsalmi moved into the home in which Alhazmi resided after the previously noted departure of Almihdar. Yazeed Alsalmi (Yazeed S A Alsalmi) DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] .

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]] [REDACTED] Anwar AULAQI and BAYOUMI clearly knew each other, as would be expected since each was a well-known member of the local Muslim community. While they may not have liked each other, they appear to have had an instrumental relationship in regard to the

[REDACTED]

hijackers, with phone calls between them becoming necessary for the support network's functioning and effectiveness. [Anwar Aulaqi, Yemeni-American AQ operative, was associated with the hijackers while in San Diego and later moved to Northern Virginia (Dar Alhijra mosque) at the time that the hijackers were in Northern Virginia. Aulaqi allegedly later met with several hijackers to include Alhazmi while working at the Dar Alhijra. Aulaqi was later killed by U.S. forces in Yemen while a part of AQAP.] [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) dated 10/03/2001 Interview of [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G)] [REDACTED] (G) noted that Khadib has a "tight" connection to Omad Ahmed Albayoumi. Albayoumi is a braggart from a low status Egyptian family that migrated to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Albayoumi has access to Saudi money, more than \$800,000, to build Mosques and Islamic schools. Albayoumi is considered by many in the Muslim community to be a Saudi Arabian intelligence officer, as he would come to the Mosque and video tape everything. [REDACTED] (G) noted that Albayoumi is described as a social animal who has connections everywhere including the Minister of Islamic Affairs, the Saudi Consulate and even with known crooks.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) Dated 04/2016] Operation Encore analysis: [REDACTED] (P) described Bayoumi as a Saudi citizen with great respect inside the Saudi Consulate, well regarded by Consulate personnel who held a "very high status" when he entered the building. Bayoumi's status was higher than many of the Saudi persons in charge of the Consulate.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F)] On September 27, 2001, execution of a federal search warrant was conducted by the San Diego Division in a room utilized by Al-Bayoumi as an office within the Kurdish Community Islamic Center (Masjid Al-Madina Al-Munawara), located at 511 S. Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, California. As a result of that search a copy of Al-Bayoumi's phone book, dated October 4, 2000 was seized.

[REDACTED] Listed in Al-Bayoumi's phone book were the following names and telephone numbers:

[REDACTED] Dr. Jameel Alshami [REDACTED] (P) ; Saudi Embassy WA. [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) , AbdulAziz Assaleh
[REDACTED] (P) and F [REDACTED] (P) **Khalid Asswailem** [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) and C [REDACTED] (P) . **Saudi Consulate** [REDACTED] (P) F
[REDACTED] (P) , **Islamic Affairs** [REDACTED] (P) Abdullah Awaad [REDACTED] (P) Sami
Assadhan [REDACTED] (P) and Saad Al Jebreen, [REDACTED] (P) LA, CA

[REDACTED]

90025. [REDACTED] From January 2000 through May 2000, two known cellular telephones associated with Al-Bayoumi showed 32 calls placed to the Embassy, 24 calls placed to the Consulate in Los Angeles and 37 calls placed to the Cultural Mission.

[(F) [REDACTED] Serial (F) [REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi is also linked to **Abdolrahman Barzanjee**. Barzanjee is a possible Al-Oaida associate, [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

[SA (S) [REDACTED] Note: Bayoumi's association with the Kurdish Mosque, reportedly paid for with Saudi money, and his association with Barzanjee may be of interest. According to open source reporting, AQ was exploring its associations with Iraq during this same time period which resulted in the organization of Ansar Al Islam in Northern Iraq's Kurdish areas. See [REDACTED] (F)

[SA (S) [REDACTED] note: Possible brother Ahmed Albayoumi has a more recent [REDACTED] (J-3) .]

[REDACTED]

Osama Basnan (Osama Bassnan / Osama Yousef Bassnan / Usama Basnan)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Osama Basnan was also a known associate of the hijackers in Southern California. A prior Saudi Arabian employee, Basnan was also known to have connections to the "Blind Sheikh." Basnan and his wife were close friends of Bayoumi. Basnan's wife, who was known to have sympathy for Hamas, was paid money by Saudi Ambassador Bandar's wife.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) This serial noted (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) This investigation was predicated based on interviews conducted during the PENTTBOMB investigation. Information was developed that identified Osama Basnan as having a very close relationship with Omar Al-Bayoumi, who provided support to hijackers Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar in San Diego. Basnan was also reported to be the "Omad," or informal

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

mayor, of the Saudi Arabian Community in San Diego. Individuals in the Middle Eastern community opined that Al-Bayoumi was a Saudi Intelligence Officer and that Basnan came to San Diego to take his place. Basnan was living in the same apartment complex on 09/11/2001 where Al-Bayoumi and the hijackers had resided and Al-Bayoumi's mail was being forwarded to Basnan's apartment. Basnan harbors anti-American sentiments and espouses pro-UBL opinions.

Basnan entered the U.S. in 1980 [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] believed to be associated with the Saudi Embassy. Also in 1992, he hosted a party for the blind Sheik Omar Rahman in Washington, D.C. prior to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. In 1998, he moved to San Diego and became the Omad. In January of 1999, he began to receive \$2,000 per month in his wife's name from the Princess Haifa Bint Faisal, the wife of Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar. The checks were endorsed by Basnan and Al-Bayoumi's wife. In April of 2001, Al-Bayoumi's wife and Basnan's wife were arrested together for shoplifting. In June of 2001, Al-Bayoumi and his wife claimed to leave the U.S. to return to Saudi, but actually went to London.

[REDACTED] In July of 2001, Basnan moved into the same apartment complex where Al-Bayoumi and the hijackers lived. In August of 2001, the U.S. Post Office began to forward Al-Bayoumi's mail to Basnan's residence. On [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) who has provided extensive [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) of Basnan and his associates [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] According to a witness, on October 17, 1992,

BASNAN hosted a party at the [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) Washington D.C. for the blind Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman. The party was hosted in a common area party room located in the [REDACTED] (P) complex where BASNAN lived. BASNAN's name was the tenant name on the reservation sheet for the party room the night the party was held. The witness identified Sheik Rahman from television photos. Sheikh Rahman attended the party along with a large entourage.

On [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) he hosted a party at his house for Sheik Omar Rahman. After Rahman was jailed, Rahman dispatched a

[REDACTED]

messenger to Basnan to instruct him not to contact Rahman in jail. Basnan stated [REDACTED (O-1)] came to interview Basnan regarding his association with Rahman. Basnan lied to [REDACTED (O-1)] about his association with Rahman and acted like he didn't speak any English.

[REDACTED (A), (G), (J-1)]
[REDACTED (A), (G), (J-1)] 2001, [REDACTED (A), (G), (J-1)] Basnan [REDACTED (A), (G), (J-1)] was questioned about Omar Abdel Rahman and the first World Trade Center bombing. Basnan acted like he did not understand the questions by [REDACTED (O-1)] and the he played stupid putting on a production. Basnan stated .. [REDACTED (A), (G), (J-1)]
[REDACTED (A), (G), (J-1)] Basnan was told by another [REDACTED (A), (G), (J-1)]
[REDACTED (A), (G), (J-1)]

[[REDACTED (F)] Serial [REDACTED (F)]] In 1980, BASSNAN, a Saudi Arabian citizen, enters the United States [REDACTED (J-3)] BASSNAN may be an operative for Saudi Arabian government and is in the United States illegally.

2. [REDACTED] On October 17, 1992, BASSNAN hosts party for Sheik Omar Rahman, mastermind of 1993 bombing of World Trade Towers. [SA [REDACTED (S)]
Note: [REDACTED (F)] noted the specific date to be 10/17/1992]

3. [REDACTED] Since 1998, BASSNAN is considered the "Omad," or informal mayor of Saudi Arabian's living in San Diego, California.

Payments from Princess Haifa to Majeda Dweikat (Basnans wife), 1999-2001. Manal Bagader (Al-Bayoumis wife) co-endorsed three of the checks. Of the three co-endorsed checks, one check was deposited by Yasser Hijazi (Basnans associate) in Maryland; an attempt was made to deposit one check into Bagaders account, but the check was returned as payee not verified; and one check was deposited into an unknown account. FBI information indicated that from at least April 1999 through at least September 2001 Princess Haifa, the wife of Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar, provided \$2,000 monthly payments totaling \$40,000 in checks and wire transfers to the wives of al-Bayumi and Basnan. Note: There is no indication of direct payments to Manal Bagader, the wife of Al-Bayoumi.

[REDACTED (F)] [REDACTED] On February 10, 2002, ABDULRAZAQ ALI A. ALTURKI, Managing Director, Namma Cargo Services was interviewed in Riyadh. ALTURKI worked as an assistant to Ambassador PRINCE BANDAR at the Saudi Embassy in DC and while working there in

[REDACTED]

about 1991 he met OSAMA BASSNAN. ALTURKI established numerous contacts at the Embassy which led him to his current professional status. ALTURKI's relationship with the Saudi government is very strong. ALTURKI is friendly with Saudi government officials and members of the Royal Family, particularly PRINCE BANDAR. ALTURKI travels to Houston, Texas where [REDACTED] (P-1)

(P-1) In August 2001, ALTURKI departed the United States somewhat hastily, but because of pressure from work. ALTURKI did make stops in Washington DC and Boston on his return trip to Saudi Arabia, visiting friends in the Saudi Embassy. ALTURKI stated he has not provided money to BASSNAN. [REDACTED] (F), Serial (F) and [REDACTED] (F), Serial (F)

[REDACTED] On May 14, 1992, [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED] For financial activity: [REDACTED] (F) Serial (F). For summary see [REDACTED] (F) Serial (F)

[REDACTED] (F) Serial (F) [REDACTED] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2002, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (F), [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) BASNAN recently obtained a large unspecified amount of money during his recent travel to Houston, Texas. BASNAN's friend, ABDULRAZAQ ALTURKI introduced BASNAN to MOHAMMED TURKI AL SAUD, a member of the Saudi Royal Family and part of the Saudi Arabian government delegation that was in Houston for a summit meeting with President Bush. AL SAUD was the person who gave BASNAN a large sum of money. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) BASNAN received money in excess of \$10,000. BASNAN (A), (G), (J-1) gave a large portion of the money to his wife to give to her family who lives in the West Bank area of Israel. [REDACTED] (F), Serial (F). [SA (S) note: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) Mohammed Alsaud [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) may have been Turki bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Alsaud (NFI).]

[REDACTED]

(F) [REDACTED] On (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] 2001, Basnan asked (G) [REDACTED] specific questions about how Anthrax and Small Pox are transmitted and what affects infection has on the human body. On (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] 2001, Basnan asked (G) [REDACTED] specific questions about how Small Pox infection advances through the human body. Basnan (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] was true that just prior to dying a Small Pox victim suffers extreme abdominal pain. On (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] 2001, (G) (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Basnan's wife, Majeda Dweikat, in possession of a book titled "Chemical and Biological Weapons: Anthrax and Sarin." The book was in Basnan's residence. (G) (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Dweikat had tabbed a section of the book that showed the skin coming off the body.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Abdullah A S Al Jraithen (Abdullah Aljraithen)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] As outlined by writer in referenced serial, ABDULLAH ALJRAITHEN registered at the Travelodge Hotel in Culver City, California with **OMAR AHMED ALBAYOUMI** on 12/20/1999 and checked out the following day. Little additional information was located regarding ALJRAITHEN at the time referenced serial was written.

[REDACTED] After the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, ALBAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY), his apartment was searched and documents were seized. A recent review by NYPD Intelligence Research Specialist (IRS) [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] (S) of documents obtained by NYO-JTTF from NSY yielded further information regarding ALJRAITHEN (this information is also described on [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] ALBAYOUMI's telephone book contained an entry for Dr. ABDULLAH ALJOAITHEN, with the numbers [REDACTED] (P-1) and C (cell) [REDACTED] (P-1). (Analyst note: the first number is presumed to be a Saudi number, the second number appears to be a Saudi cell phone number given the code "5" followed by a 7-digit number; neither number was found in the Telephone Application.)

[REDACTED] ECF searches on [REDACTED] (P-1) and [REDACTED] (P-1) both yielded a hit on [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1), which describes reporting from a foreign government service regarding "names and telephone numbers

[REDACTED]

appearing on a laminated card retrieved from the villa in Madinah, Saudi Arabia, where SHAYKH 'ALI KHUDAYR FAHD ALKHUDAYR AND SHAYKH AHMAD HAMUD MUFARRIJ ALKHALIDI were arrested during a raid conducted in late May 2003. The relevant entry on this contact list was for ABDALLAH BIN 'ALI AL-J'AYTHAN (P-1) and cell (P-1). An IDW search on (P-1) yielded additional other government service information (O-1): "DR. 'ABDALLAH AL-JUHAYN (P-1)" was found on a confiscated hard-drive from an October 6, 2001 raid on the Al-Haramayn offices in (O-1)

[REDACTED] According to a (G) report on ABDALLAH BIN ALI ALJAYTHAN: (G) Intelligence Assessment: Shaykh Ali KHUDAIR is a probable terrorist supporter (Financier). KHUDAIR was believed to be the source of weapons, passports, money and supplies for ANSAR AL-ISLAM operations in Iraq. Ali KHUDAIR is believed to be detained in Saudi Arabia.

[REDACTED] Also according to the (G) report, a 22-page Arabic language document containing instructions for making a variety of improvised explosives devices (IEDs) was found on a hard drive seized during the 05/27/2003 arrests of radical clerics and extremist shaykhs Ali KHUDAIR and Ahmad Humud AL-KHALIDI in Medinah, Saudi Arabia. Much of the material in the document closely parallels that in an explosives manual handwritten by Abu Khabab AL-MASRI, the former explosives and poisons trainer at the AL-QAIDA associated DERUNTA TRAINING CAMP in Afghanistan. (Source: (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) AITHREAT@00001 NON-RELEASABLE)

[REDACTED]

Islamic Foundation of Sheikh Ibn Taimmiyyah

11004 Washington Blvd, Culver City, CA

(King Fahd Mosque)

10980 Washington Blvd, Culver City, CA

[REDACTED] Ibn Taimmiyyah was a medieval Islamic jurist who's teachings formed the basis of Wahhabi doctrine (Ibn Al Wahhab). Ibn Taimmiyyah's teachings included the believe that Muslims could kill other Muslims (Takfir) which is utilized by AQ to justify attacks. The Saudi Arabian foundation that supports the King Fahd Mosque is named for Ibn Taimmiyyah.

[REDACTED] The associations between Saudi Arabian diplomats who worked at the King Fahd Mosque and the hijacker support group are otherwise noted above. An additional person of interest is listed Chairman of the Ibn Taimiyyah Foundation Khalil Alkhalil.

Khalil Alkhalil (aka Khalil Khalil / Khalil Alkhaleel)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED]

[(F) Serial (F) For the information of Los Angeles, (O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1) KHALIL al-KHALIL, who was head of the Islamic
Affairs Section at the EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
(SAEMB), Washington, D.C. about ten years ago, resides in
California (O-1) al-KHALIL set up the BIN (possibly
IBN) TAIMIYAH mosque in Los Angeles. (O-1) al-
KHALIL had access to a lot of money.

(F) Serial (F) On December 6, 1999, (P)
(ALTHUMAIRY)
called (P-1) at 22:05:00 for 2 minutes. (This number is KHALIL
ALKHALIL's cell phone according to an FBI interview with FAHAD
ALQAHTANI.) At 22:58:00, (P) (ALTHUMAIRY) called (P)
(ALBAYOUMI), duration 1 minute (note: this is believed to be the
first call between ALTHUMAIRY and ALBAYOUMI since the previous
year).


(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

Other Offices Associated with EKSA

[REDACTED] Investigation of [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) activities within the US prior to and especially after 9/11 identified numerous "charities" and "non-governmental organizations" (NGO). Several of these organizations were [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) prior to 9/11. Although the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) as an element many were [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) due to suspected funding of association with HAMAS. The connections of these "charities" and "NGOs" to terrorism is well documented both in open source and within [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) communications.

[REDACTED] The primary NGO of Saudi Arabia was MWL under which operated the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), Sana Bell (Sanabel Alkheer "Seeds of Charity") (an investment arm), Alharamain and World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). The Saudi charities such as MWL and IIRO were also affiliated with the Virginia based offices of the "Herndon charities" of which Sanabell (Sana Bell Alkheer) was a part as well as the SAAR Foundation. These were collectively run out of of offices at [REDACTED] (P) in Herndon, Va. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[See [REDACTED] (F)] This serial documents the extensive ties to the Saudi Arabian government as well as extensive ties to terrorism - specifically AQ. AQ members were employed within these organizations and utilized funding for terrorism support and used the offices for cover for movement of personnel. Extensive open source information and court documents are also available detailing this same information.

[REDACTED] (F) A telephone directory obtained by the FBI in 2002 listed the following additional offices under the title " Saudi Arabian Offices":

International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)

[REDACTED] (P)

Falls Church

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Muslim World League (MWL)

134 West 26th Street

New York, NY

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

4516 Old Columbia Pike

PO Box 8096

Falls Church, Va

Telephone: [REDACTED] (P)

The Islamic Center

2551 Massachusetts Avenue NW

Washington, DC

Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)

8500 Hilltop Road

Fairfax, Va

Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)

(F)

Summary: Per above, the IIASA, located at 8500 Hilltop Road, Fairfax, Va., was affiliated with the EKSA. The school was a U.S. subsidiary of the Imam Mohammed bin Saud University in Saudi Arabia. The EKSA was known to finance the IIASA and its primary administrators and teachers were Saudi Arabian diplomats. The IIASA was one of the many pieces of Saudi proselytizing activity in the U.S.



Mohammed Alsaud is believed to be on left. Bandar Bin Sultan Alsaud on right (seated).



Seated in front row of the above noted opening ceremony (left to right): Abdullah Alsaif (Saudi (J-3) (A), (G), (J-1) as hating

[REDACTED]

America); Abdullah Alnoشان (see herein) and Salah Albakhit (Saleh Albakheet - PhD student).

[REDACTED] (F) Serial (F)]According to its website, IIASA is a non-profit educational institution affiliated with the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. IIASA is one of six overseas institutions affiliated with the IMSIU. IIASA was established in 1988 in Fairfax, Virginia. The stated goals of IIASA are; to introduce the Arab-Islamic civilization to America and encourage the fruitful exchange between the two sides; to coordinate the efforts of scholarly exchange between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United States of America; to offer workshops, undergraduate and graduate degrees in the fields of Islamic education and Arabic language teaching; to cooperate with North American universities and educational centers in teaching Islamic studies and Arabic language; to conduct and publish research; and to hold a series of annual academic and educational seminars.

[REDACTED] (F) Serial (F)] [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was initiated in October 2002 based on information indicating that the IIASA was one of seven "Saudi Arabian Offices" located in the United States and on information indicating that an address found during a 05/30/2002 joint CIA/FBI [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) raid of an Al-Qaeda safe-house in [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) included an address utilized by an individual that listed their employer as the IIASA and their supervisor as being ABDULLAH BIN LADEN.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) the IIASA was associated with the WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH (WAMY), in Alexandria, Virginia and [REDACTED] (P) with the ISLAMIC ASSEMBLY OF NORTH AMERICA (IANA) in Michigan, which are also funded by the Saudi Government. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) not aware if IIASA provided any monetary support to terrorist organizations or groups; however, the individuals that worked at the IIASA were obviously recruiting individuals into extremist views.

[REDACTED] (D)
[REDACTED] (D)

(D) Information provided by [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1) [REDACTED] NADWI was involved in facilitating the movement of Al Qaeda operatives involved in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa.

[REDACTED] In 2003, NADWI's [REDACTED] (P-1) in Mombasa, was linked to telephone numbers connected to 2002 Mombasa bombing suspect SALAH ALI SALAH NABHAN. (O-1)
(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Another individual associated with IIASA, ABDULLAH ALNOSHAN (A), (G), (J-1), (D) and financially to (A), (G), (J-1) subject MUTAIB AL-SUDAIRY (F) (F)). ALNOSHAN was "employed at the IIASA as (J-3) " with the SAE and at the end of 1998 became the head of MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE (MWL) (F)

[REDACTED] During January 2004, [REDACTED] (J-3) (J-3)

(J-3) Ten of those individuals returned to Saudi Arabia. The six that remained in the United States claim to have the legal status to do so. The Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement was notified that these six remain in the United States.

(D)

(D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

Below are some observations supporting the above:

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] According to its website, IIASA is a non-profit educational institution affiliated with the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. IIASA is one of six overseas institutions affiliated with the IMSIU. IIASA was established in 1988 in Fairfax, Virginia. The stated goals of IIASA are; to introduce the Arab-Islamic civilization to America and encourage the fruitful exchange between the two sides; to coordinate the efforts of scholarly exchange between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United States of America; to offer workshops, undergraduate and graduate degrees in the fields of Islamic education and Arabic language teaching; to cooperate with North American

[REDACTED]

universities and educational centers in teaching Islamic studies and Arabic language; to conduct and publish research; and to hold a series of annual academic and educational seminars.

[REDACTED] During January 2004, [REDACTED] (J-3)
[REDACTED] (J-3)

(J-3) Ten of those individuals returned to Saudi Arabia. The six that remained in the United States claim to have the legal status to do so. The Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement has been notified that these six remain in the United States.

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(D)

(O-1)

(D)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that between
(A), (G), (J-1) and
(A), (G), (J-1) 2003 the IIASA deposited approximately \$23,318,623 into
its accounts. The primary source of these funds was the Saudi Embassy
and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Association (SAMA).

(O-1)

A review of Virginia Corporation and Limited Partnership Records indicates that the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America was incorporated on 10/26/1993 and voluntarily terminated on 08/18/1995. According to public source information, the President of this corporation was listed as His Excellency PRINCE BANDAR BIN SULTAN and the Executive Director was SULAIMAN ALJARALLAH.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Those requested to be removed from the U.S. by USDS were the following who were listed as Saudi Arabian diplomats:

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(O-1), (J-3)



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Muslim World League (MWL)

[REDACTED] (F)

Abdullah Alnoshan (Abdullah Alnushan / Alnoashan)

(Director) [REDACTED] (G)



[REDACTED] The Muslim World League (MWL) was created by the Saudi Arabian government in 1962 in order to combat the influence of Egyptian President Gamal Nasser's nationalist influence in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia has used this organization to spread the Wahhabist faith throughout the Islamic world as well as spread Islam in areas that were not known to be heavily Islamic. Saudi Arabia has financed many charity projects through MWL and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) in order to gain leadership over the Islamic community. Many of these charities were known to have supported AQ and related groups both financially and operationally throughout the world. MWL was the organization under which the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and other such as World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) operated at an international level.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] The US based office(s) of MWL and its director, Abdullah Alnoshan, were extensively connected to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) See [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

(F) [REDACTED] for connections to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) - the connections being too extensive to summarize herein. Alnoshan was known to have been a "purchasing agent" for the EKSA (see [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Alnoshan was an associate of Musaed Aljarrah.

[REDACTED] The address listed for MWL within the phone roster noted above, the New York address, was formed into a sub-office by the time of the creation of [REDACTED] (F). The main office had been moved to 360 South Washington Street, Suite 300, Falls Church, Va. This address is listed as the office of IIRO on the phone roster - however, by this same time IIRO had relocated to another office (see below). The South Washington address was owned by Sanabal Alkheir (a "Herndon Charity") and was also, subsequent to 9/11, the location of the Dar Al Arqum mosque which hosted many of the convicted "Northern Virginia Jihad Group." (see more below)

(F) [REDACTED] During the search of MWL's office space in New York in 2005 the FBI found a document titled "First Annual Ijtima of Mujahideen and Jihaad Conference" dated 1991. This document was from Tehreek-E-Jihaad, Sherpur House, Karachi, Pakistan, and included sign-up sheets. The conference was: "To publicize Jihad on an international and inter-Islamic level."

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) connections with MWL are extensive and are best viewed within [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

[REDACTED] (F)

Abdullah Bin Laden

[REDACTED] (G)

Related: [REDACTED] (G)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

Relevant Serials:

[(F) [REDACTED] Serial (F)]: [REDACTED] Analysis revealed that the WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH, aka al-Nadwa al-'Alamiyya lil Shabab al-Islami, is headquartered out of Mecca, Saudi Arabia. WAMY's U.S. headquarters is located at POB 8096, Falls Church, VA 22041, telephone number [REDACTED] (P) WAMY's U.S. business address is 4300 Evergreen Lane, Annadale, Virginia 22003. Further analysis revealed that WAMY presents itself as an individual and family services organization and youth center. Additional analysis revealed that WAMY's U.S. director is a member of the BIN LADIN family, nfi.

Also, analysis has revealed that [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAMY is believed to be a subsidiary or affiliate of the MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE, aka Rabitat al'Alam al-Islami, headquartered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia; the INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC RELIEF ORGANIZATION, aka Hay'at al-Igathat al-Islamiyya al-'Alamiyah, headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC STUDENTS ORGANIZATION, headquartered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC CHARITY COMMITTEE, aka Lajnat al-Birr al-Islami, headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC CENTER SOCIETY, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; AL-WAIF FOUNDATION, aka al-Waif al-Islami, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; the SAUDI HIGH COMMISSION FOR RELIEF, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; and, the KUWAITI JOINT RELIEF COMMITTEE, headquartered in Kuwait.

WAMY first appears in FBI electronic indices as a lead to FBI from Legat [REDACTED] (G) from 1995/1996:

[REDACTED] (F) : [REDACTED] The French National Police Renseignements Generaux (RG) has established that Mokhtar Jaballah, a Tunisian national residing in France, member of the Ennahda, and president of the G.I.F.--an association RG describes as supporting the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood--has been in contact with the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. This organization has an office in the U.S., at the address: WAMY Regional Office in VA--America, P.O. Box 8096, Falls Church, VA 22041-8096; telephone [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P); fax [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (F) (4) The translation of a publication entitled "WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH", which gives information of the methods and teachings on terrorism.

[REDACTED] The publication entitled "WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH" lays out in great detail the fundamentals, tactics, and logistics of waging a war on ones enemies through acts of terrorism.

[REDACTED] In particular, the publication lists duties, requirements, and responsibilities including: (1) collecting information on the enemy and his neighborhood, (2) removing soldiers from the enemy; taking its documents, secrets and weapons, (3) killing the enemy's personnel as well as foreign tourists, (4) releasing our brothers imprisoned by the enemy, (5) spreading rumors and communiques to turn the population against the enemy, and (6) causing the explosion, the destruction and the

[REDACTED]

sabotage of entertainment spots, immoral and debauched areas.

[REDACTED] Other sections in the document refer to members' essential and typical qualities, methods of communication, travel, security measures, meetings, and the purchase and transport of weapons.

[REDACTED] (A),(G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] . According to ACS/TA, BINLADEN has been in contact with the telephone number for [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] . One of the telephone numbers used by [REDACTED] (P) at his current address is registered to the AOU. THE AOU is a correspondence school for Islamic studies which may be connected to the Muslim Brotherhood.

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] that the AOU allegedly arranges paramilitary training in Pakistan and is partially funded by the Saudi Club [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[SA (S) Note: [REDACTED] (G) ([REDACTED] (G)) . [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(see

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (G)

Mohammed Harunani]

[See page 432 of 9/11 Commission Report - " 28 pages "]

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED] FBI toll records indicate that on June 21, 2000, TRANSCOM INTERNATIONAL was in telephonic with a telephone number in Hamburg, Germany. This German telephone number was listed in FBI telephone applications (ACS) from toll records taken from the PENTTBOMB investigation. [REDACTED] (C-1)

(C-1)

(C-1)

(O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED] On 10/12/2001, [REDACTED] (P) who is a Teacher's Assistant at [REDACTED] (P) School, told the FBI she recognized one of the 09/11/2001 hijackers after his picture was displayed on television. [REDACTED] (P) was introduced (in early June 2001) to Marwan Al-Shehhi by Harunani. Harunani's children had been enrolled at the school. MARWAN Al-Shehhi had accompanied Harunani as he was picking his children up from school. [REDACTED] (P) stated she remembered the name because the name was so unusual.

[REDACTED] On 10/15/2001, [REDACTED] (P) was shown a photographic lineup which consisted of only the photographs of MARWAN AL-SHEHHI, HAMZA S. ALGHAMDI, MOHAND AL-SHERRI, and AHMED AL-GHAMDI from United Flight 175 with no names or any other identifying data. [REDACTED] (P) immediately, and without hesitation, pointed to the photograph of MARWAN AL-SHEHHI as being with the man she saw with Mohammed Harunani at the [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Virginia in early June 2001.

[REDACTED]

International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)

(G)

[REDACTED]

Summary: The IIRO office (G) [REDACTED] morphed into an (G) [REDACTED] into the Success Foundation (Mohammed Salem Omeish) which did not note a confirmed tie to the EKSA. It is believed that this organization was originally created as IIRO within the same offices of MWL but then some of the personnel moved and created a separate organization. Listed herein as it was originally listed as an office of the EKSA (G) [REDACTED]. The history of IIRO related to the purpose of this document focuses more on the time period prior to the 9/11 attacks.

[REDACTED] IIRO was established in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1978. The IIRO has been identified as the "social arm" or "operating arm" of the Muslim World League. The Secretary General of the Muslim World League said it provides "humanitarian assistance" through the IIRO. (FTAT-G)

[REDACTED] As noted above (see under MWL), the IIRO was originally listed as being located at the (P) [REDACTED] address which was later assumed by MWL. Although listed herein, the relevance of the IIRO office to the 9/11 investigation would most likely be from the 1990s and prior to its move to the (P) [REDACTED] address (G) [REDACTED] Mohamed Salem Omeish (G) [REDACTED] appeared to alter IIRO into the Success Foundation (G) [REDACTED]. Thereafter it appeared to be primarily associated with HAMAS/MB support. Its alienation away from Saudi Arabia is highlighted by the fact that Omeish shared office space with Abdulrahman Alamoudi who was convicted of attempting to assassinate then Crown Prince (later King) Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in coordination with Libya. Prior to the Omeish, the director of the IIRO office appeared to be Kuwaiti Tariq Alsuwaidan.

Tareq AlSuwaidan - per Wikipedia, Tareq Al-Suwaidan is a Kuwaiti writer, historian, businessman, and Muslim scholar. Al-Suwaidan is believed to be the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and has "extremist inclinations." Al-Suwaidan was banned from the US in 2000 following his comments "Palestine will not be liberated but through Jihad. Nothing can be achieved without sacrificing blood. The Jews

[REDACTED]

will meet their end at our hands." In 2007, Al-Suwaidan was listed by the U.S. federal prosecutors, along with a group of U.S. Muslim Brotherhood members, as an unindicted co-conspirator in the terrorism financing case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development which was convicted along with its leaders of financing Hamas. Al-Suwaidan is known for his anti-Semitic remarks, hate for Jews, and push for electronic Jihad among youth.

[REDACTED] AlSuwaidan is listed in Public Records as the Secretary/Treasurer for the International Relief Organization' (IRO) [REDACTED] (G) located in Falls Church, VA, (with the President listed as Sulaiman AlAli and the Vice President as Abdullah M. AlMahdi). Chicago provided information in [REDACTED] (F) (an ec dated 11/7/96 to OKC) that AlSuwaidan is known to have received at least \$11,000 from the IRO and that ABRAR Investments, of which AlSuwaidan was once an officer, provided \$60,000 to the IRO.

[REDACTED] Finally, [REDACTED] (F) indicates potential ties by AlSuwaidan to Mohammed Saleh [REDACTED] (G) incarcerated in Leavenworth, KS for his part in the TERRSTOP case which involved plans to bomb the United Nations building and other targets in New York. "Umar Al-Utaibah / Tariq Suwaidan" (believed to be a reference to Tareq AlSuwaidan) was found (during the period March 14 - May 8, 1997) on a document in Saleh's cell written in Arabic with telephone number [REDACTED] (P) beside the entry. Saleh also had ABRAR Investment Inc.', (for which AlSuwaidan was alleged to be an officer) listed in the documents with telephone number [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] Tareq Mohammad AlSuwaidan, aka Tariq Mohamed AlSuwaidain; Tariq Swidan; DOB [REDACTED] (P-1) is of Kuwaitian nationality and is a non-US person. His SSAN is [REDACTED] (P-1). According to the address book of Marzook, AlSuwaidan "heads a group of gulf companies that belong to the Muslim Brotherhood." He was formerly affiliated with the Islamic Relief Organization (IRO), Falls Church, VA; Abrar Investments; and Solidarity International for Kuwait. He allegedly has a cousin who was the Deputy Head of the Kuwaiti Air Force in 1990. AlSuwaidan is credited with providing the money for the land purchase on which the Tulsa mosque and school now stand. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) AlSuwaidan currently provides \$50,000 per month to the Tulsa mosque, 20% of which is taken off the top for the benefit of HAMAS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is known from [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that IIRO was located for a period of time at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Washington, D.C. During this time it was co-located with the organization Solidarity International for Kuwait that was started by Tareq Al-Suwaidan.

1. Incorporation Records:

[REDACTED] A 1992 Annual Report for IRO [REDACTED] (P-1) listed the following:

Sulaiman Al Ali President [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi VP [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Tareq M. Al-Swaidan S/T [REDACTED] (P) Alex, Va.

Principal Address: [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

[REDACTED] A 1993 Annual Report for IRO [REDACTED] (P-1) listed the following:

Sulaiman Al-Ali President [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Tareq M. Al-Swaiden S/T [REDACTED] (P) Alex, Va.

Abdul Al-Moslah Officer [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Freed Qurash Officer [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Salah Badahdh Officer [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

[REDACTED] A 1994 Annual report for IRO was similar to the 1993 report except listing all addresses as [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P), Falls Church, Va.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A 1995 Annual Report for IRO [REDACTED] (P-1) listed the following:

Sulaiman Al-Ali President [REDACTED] (P)
Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President

Tareq M. Al-Mahdi S/T

Abdul Al-Moslah Director

Salah Badahdh Director

Freed Qurashdi Director

Principal Address: [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

[REDACTED] In 1998, IRO offices were searched in relation to Chicago FBI's [REDACTED] (G) with which IRO had invested. Shortly afterward, Sulaiman Al-Ali suddenly returned to Saudi Arabia in August 1998.

[REDACTED] The IRO was ordered dissolved on 08/19/1998. All asset and liabilities were transferred to the Success Foundation, Inc.

[REDACTED] On 03/23/1999, IRO (corporate ID [REDACTED] (P-1), primary address [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va., was ordered re-instated. The new officers were listed as follows:

Sulaiman Al Ali Removed [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Mohamed S. Omeish President [REDACTED] (P)
Alexandria, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) Falls Church,
Va.

Tareq M. Al-Suwaiden S/T [REDACTED] (P)

Abdul Al-Moslah Director [REDACTED] (P)

Salah Badahdah Director [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A filing dated 07/22/2000 for IRO [REDACTED] (P-1) listed the primary address as [REDACTED] (P) and the only officer as Mohamed S. Omeish, [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sulaiman Alali (Soliman Ali Elay / Sulaiman Ali Alali / Sulaiman Kabbala / Sulaiman Kabrara / Soliman Elay)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3) Va ID and two SSNs.

Per PPT entered the US as Elay on 09/03/1998 on Saudi Airlines and last departed as Elay on 08/08/1999 on Malaysian Airlines.

Va Drivers license was issued in 1995 under Sulaiman Alali

Associated with Sanabell, IIRO, Global Chemical and Albayoumi.

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Sulaiman Alali was associated with IIRO and other "charities" and global investment entities such as Global Chemical [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G). Alali was paid by Sanabell and had a physical and financial connection to Omar Albayoumi. Alali returned to Saudi

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Arabia prior to 9/11 but has at least one son, Amro, who joined Al Qaeda. According to open source, Alali was the president of IRO and a major shareholder of Global Chemical. Alali's son Amro is a known AQAP member.

[(F) [REDACTED] dated 05/23/1997] [REDACTED] Reference Butel advised of the possible location of Suleiman Al-Ali, who is the Director of the International Islamic Relief Organization's (IIRO) in the United States. Al-Ali is believed to be a friend of Al-Gama al-Islamiyya supporter Zahir 'Abd Al-'Aziz, who reportedly has ties to Islamic extremist circles throughout the Balkans. Al-Ali reportedly maintains a telephone number of [REDACTED] (P), which is subscribed to by the "International Relief Organization," [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, VA 22046-4417.

[(F) [REDACTED]] [REDACTED] A corporate record for INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATION INC., at [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, VA 22041 with [REDACTED] (G) (Alali) listed as President. Incorporated 7/22/91 in Virginia, status is active. Enclosed is a D & B report for INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATION INC., [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, VA 22046, Telephone number [REDACTED] (P) This organization provides humanitarian aid.

[(F) [REDACTED] Serial (F) [REDACTED] Dated 11/02/2001] [REDACTED] Alali used an address associated with Albayoumi on banking information in 1998. At a business in La Jolla, CA Alali listed Albayoumi (Omar Baymi) as his emergency POC. While residing in California at one address Albayoumi was listed on Alali's rental application as a co-tenant/friend. During this time Albayoumi and Alali listed their employment with Dalla Company, Saudi Arabia.

[(F) [REDACTED] Serial (F) [REDACTED] dated 11/21/2002 as well as above serial] [REDACTED] Banking records from 10/21/1998 to 08/05/1999 noted that Alali deposited 32 checks from Sanabell totaling over \$128,000. Sanabell also directly paid rent and other expenses. During same period Alali paid Albayoumi almost \$7000.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Alali has multiple children who were [REDACTED] (J-3) Alali's son Amro Syliman Alali (Amro Alali) was a known AQAP member (see [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). After a short incarceration, Amro Aalali was released by Saudi authorities.

(J-3)



Amro Alali - AQAP Member / Son of Sulaiman Alali

[REDACTED]

U.S. Based Clerics Paid by Saudi Arabia

Summary: As part of Saudi proselytizing efforts, Saudi Arabia supported many U.S. based clerics either directly via training and funding (via the EKSA) or via charities and schools (IIASA).

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] dated 2003] The original list provided the following names:

[REDACTED] Names Salary

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] At the time this list was provided [REDACTED] (G) had [REDACTED] (G) Abuelgasim Osman Ramadan [REDACTED] (G), KHALED I. Al-SOWEILEM [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) Abdel-Moniem M. El-Hillali [REDACTED] (G), Abdullah Arafa [REDACTED] (G), Nasser F. Almogbel [REDACTED] (G), and Fareed S. Ajlan [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) were identified as employees at the EKSAB in the Islamic Affairs Office. Preliminary Inquiries were conducted on [REDACTED] (G) to better identify their function at the EKSAB. All were confirmed as employees at the SAEMB by the United State Department of State list of Embassy employees. [REDACTED] (G) has [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) will continue with [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] The list of individuals were all queried through ACS revealing [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G). The following are possible matches with individuals [REDACTED] (G): Ali Sulaiman Ali [REDACTED] (G), Jamal Mohammad Abdellatif [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G), Tajuddin Bin Shu'aib [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(G) [REDACTED], Omar Abdi Mohamed (G) [REDACTED] Nizam
A. Rouf Zaman (G) [REDACTED] Salah Al-Rashood (G) [REDACTED]
Monir Yasin Al Farra (G) [REDACTED] Jameel A. Ahmen (G) [REDACTED]
Mohammed Al Mohanna (G) [REDACTED] and Abdulaziz Ahmed (G) [REDACTED]
(G) [REDACTED] Omar Al-Khatab (G) [REDACTED] Ridwan Aremu
Yussuf (G) [REDACTED] Mohamed Munaf Mohamed (G) [REDACTED]
(G) [REDACTED] Sulaiman Al-Bali (G) [REDACTED]

(G) [REDACTED] revealed the following additional names of interest as receiving a stipend from the EKSA (only relevant individuals are noted herein):

[REDACTED] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY departed the USA for Saudi Arabia on 02/14/2002. While in the USA he resided at (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Culver City, CA. In 1998, per direction of the Da'wa Office of EKSA, AL-THUMAIRY owned and operated a bookstore near the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, CA, in an effort to oversee Islamic propagators in California. AL-THUMAIRY was also a member of the KFM.

Name: FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
Aliases: Fahd Ibrahim Abdullah Althumairy,
Sheikh Fahd Bin Ibrahim Al Thumairy
SSN: (P-1) [REDACTED]
DOB: (P-1) [REDACTED]
POB: SAUDI ARABIA
INS Status: (J-3) [REDACTED];
(J-3) [REDACTED]
Case #: (F) [REDACTED]
IFTA funds: \$4,837.31 (2002)
\$4,305.13 (2003)

(P) [REDACTED], (P) [REDACTED] San Diego, CA, (P) [REDACTED] Islamic Center of San Diego and (P) [REDACTED] the Islamic Services Foundation. (P) [REDACTED] is a member (P) [REDACTED] of the Muslim Brotherhood in the USA, and (P) [REDACTED] the HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT (HLF). The HLF was shut down by the US government on 12/04/2001 due to its fund-raising connections to Harakat Al-Mugawamat Al-Islamayya (HAMAS). (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] for HLF, traveling throughout the US for this purpose. (P) [REDACTED] was interviewed on 7/8/04, prior to the arrest of several HLF leaders for material support to terrorism ((F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). (P) [REDACTED] has received various checks from FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, and is (P) [REDACTED] in the San Diego (P) [REDACTED] system.

[REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED] (P)
Aliases: [REDACTED] (P)
SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)
DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
[REDACTED] (P-1)
POB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
INS Status: USPER since 1991
Case #: [REDACTED] (F)
IFTA funds: \$533.33 (2002)

[REDACTED] ADEL M. AL-SADHAN departed the USA on 10/25/01. While in the USA, AL-SADHAN resided at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) LAWRENCE, KS; and shared a post office box address with MUTAIB AL-SUDAIRY, [REDACTED] (P) Columbia, MO. AL-SADHAN was employed at the EKSA until [REDACTED] (J-3) Choicepoint now shows a possible new address, as of 1/1/05, as [REDACTED] (P) JERSEY CITY, NJ.

Name: ADEL M. AL-SADHAN
SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)
DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
POB: SAUDI ARABIA
INS Status: [REDACTED] (J-3) Departed USA (?)
Case #: [REDACTED] (F)
IFTA funds: \$100.55 (2002)

[REDACTED] MUTAIB A. AL-SUDAIRY resided at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Fairfax, VA, and was employed as an Administrative Officer for EKSA until [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) AL-SUDAIRY departed the USA on 5/1/01 and re-entered on 6/6/01. AL-SUDAIRY was detained and charged as an immigrant without documents subject to deportation. AL-SUDAIRY departed the USA on 10/25/01. [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) and has since been linked to suspected Al-Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia.

Name: Mutaib A. Al-Sudairy
Alias: Mutaib A. Al-Sudairi
Muteb Al-Sudairy
Moteb Al-Sudairy
Motaib Alsudairy
SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)
DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Other Saudi Arabian entities and personnel who formed the core of the Saudi proselytizing and intelligence gathering community during the time period leading to 9/11.

Islamic Foundation of America (IFA)

Ibrahim Binkulaib (Ibrahim Almogherah)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

(F)

[REDACTED]

Abdullah Alkhwyter

(G)

[REDACTED]

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The IFA was first known as the GLORIOUS KORAN, originally located on George Mason Drive, Falls Church, VA, was established in 1996 in order to teach the Koran in the

[REDACTED]

Northern VA area. The school subsequently relocated and began to rent a space located at 6606 Electronic Drive, Springfield, VA 22151. This building was later purchased by the EKSA for \$6,000,000 and taken over by ZAM ZAM INTERNATIONAL INC. which is synonymous with the IFA. Source further reported that the IFA had routinely received funding from the EKSA.

[REDACTED] The IFA was operated by Ibrahim Almogherah (aka Ibrahim Binkulaib) who also operated alongside of [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Saudi Naval Attache Abdullah Alkhwyter. Alkhwyter was known to be associated with the address of Alelm (Al Elm Research and Development) in Norfolk, Virginia - [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). [NOTE: Alajroush (herein) was also listed as an officer of Alelm. (The uses [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) may be similar to Albayoumi's use of a [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) for his expenses/payments during his time in California.) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] IBRAHIM A. ALMOGHERAH, DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1), was listed under the Administrative and Technical Staff as an Administrative Officer of the Embassy of the Government of Saudi Arabia (EKSA), who assumed his duties on 05/13/1991, but was named (by the names of AL-KULAIB, BINKULAIB and AL-MOGHERAH) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) the primary Saudi based financier of the IFA was Abdulaziz bin Fahad Alsaud. [REDACTED] (F) Abdulaziz bin Fahad was known to support the funding of students at the IIASA.

[REDACTED] In March, 2006, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) BINKULAIB and AL SAWY are still in negotiations regarding the future of IFA, however, AL-SAWY is losing faith in the possibility that it will work out. iIn the meantime, the IFA is being run by GAMAL HELMY and MOHAMED AFIFI (aka HUSSEIN AFEEFY). SAUD AL-SUWELIM, head of Islamic:Affairs at the EKSA, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) who runs Friday

[REDACTED]

prayers, was in Sudan caring for his sick father, MOHAMED IBRAHIM was still teaching the small kids Quranic Studies, and SAEED AL HURAIISHI (aka SAID AL-HURCHI) was active behind the scenes during prayers. AL-HURAIISHI is Syrian and owns an Islamic publishing company on Edsall Road in Springfield, VA.: A-HURAIISHI is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] On 01/08/2013 [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) tweets for Alsaud (using [REDACTED] (G) account) in which he spoke with Sulaiman Ahmed Aldweesh during which Alsaud stated that the death penalty should be applied to the arrested Saudi writer Turki Alhamad. In another tweet Alsaud stated that jihad was the greatest pinnacle of Islam. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Ayed Alqarni is a personal sheikh of Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahad Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud.

[REDACTED]

American Open University (AOU)

[REDACTED] (G)

Jaafar Sheikh Idris

[REDACTED] (G)

Jaafar Sheikh Idris (Jaafar Idris / Gafar Idris)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

Under Gafar Idris and Jaafar Idris, Idris had [REDACTED] (J-3)

Sons Yousef Idris [REDACTED] (G) and Abdulrahman Idris and Abdulmoneim Idris.

Associated with MWL and Ali Altimimi.

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Jaafar Idris is the father of Yousef Idris (an associate of the Northern Virginia Jihad group) and Abdulrahman and Abdulmoneim Idris. Abdulrahman was utilized to teach Arabic culture/language to US Special Forces in Limerick, Maine. Jaafar Idris, [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) was a close associate of jihadi groups operating within the U.S. such as Ali Altamimi and the "Northern Virginia Jihad Group."

[REDACTED]

(S)

(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

according to an

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

American Open University, 3400 Payne Street, Suite 200, Falls Church, Virginia, 22041; telephone [REDACTED]

(P)

(P)

[REDACTED], fax [REDACTED], is connected to the Moslem Brotherhood and arranges for paramilitary training in Pakistan. At the time, Salah El-Sawi, PHD, was the President of American Open University.

[REDACTED] In 1998, a group of individuals began attending lectures provided by Sheikh Jaafar Idris (hereinafter Sheikh Jaafar). These lectures were typically provided at the residence of Sheikh Jaafar and occasionally featured a guest lecturer named Sheikh Ali Al-Timimi (Al-Timimi). Over time these lectures attracted large crowds and were eventually moved to a more accommodating location, American Open University (AOU), located in Falls Church, Virginia. After the lectures were moved to AOU, Sheikh Al-Timimi started offering more frequent and regular lectures. Sheikh Al-Timimi's lectures became so popular and so well attended that in 1999, some of Al-Timimi's followers opened the Dar al Arqam Islamic Center. Once at the Dar al Arqam, Sheikh Al-Timimi assumed the role of the primary lecturer. Al-Timimi became very popular and was well-respected for his knowledge about the topic of jihad and his outspoken views. Al-Timimi was willing to discuss the topic of jihad openly while other speakers were not. Once the lectures were moved to the Dar al Arqam, a smaller core group of followers emerged. After Al-Timimi's lectures, typically delivered on Friday nights at the Dar al Arqam, this small group of individuals would meet for hours into the night to discuss various topics with Sheikh Al-Timimi.

During these closed discussions, Sheikh Al-Timimi frequently would provide his personal opinions on the topic of jihad, particularly the need for his followers to prepare themselves so that they would be ready for the day when their service in support of jihad would be needed.

In response to Sheikh Al-Timimi's guidance on the topic of jihad, a few members from the core group decided to organize regular paramilitary training using the cover of apparently innocuous endeavor, recreational paint-ball activities. The organizers of the jihad training group (Yong Kwon, Nabil Gharbieh, Ibrahim Hamdi, and Hammad Abdur-Raheem) established rules and procedures to ensure operational security and secrecy. Members of the group were

[REDACTED]

well versed on the rules, and new members were required to acknowledge their acceptance of such rules. Weekly jihad training sessions were organized and conducted on private land owned by the uncle of Abdullah Zikria, one of the jihad training group members. The weekly training consisted of physical para-military training using paint-ball as a means of instruction and religious instruction on the topics of jihad, typically through the readings of certain hadith related to jihad. The jihad training sessions were led primarily by those with prior United States military experience, such as Idris Surratt (USMC), Saif Chapman (USMC), and Hammad Abdur-Raheem (U.S. Army), and those with prior jihad military training, such as Ismail Royer and Ibrahim Hamdi. In addition to the weekly jihad training sessions, many of the group's members purchased AK-47 type rifles, the primary weapon used by mujahideen throughout the world, and began to practice their firearms proficiency and marksmanship. The group also kept abreast of the current events related to ongoing jihad, in areas such as Chechnya or Kashmir, and discussed these events during their weekly training sessions.

Interviews have revealed that the core group of participants in the jihad training group had aspirations of eventually fighting in actual jihad and dying shaheed (a martyr). The lectures at Dar al Arqam became a common meeting place for those participating in the jihad training. Members of the group would meet at the Dar al Arqam on Friday night and would discuss their plans for meeting the next morning and traveling to the jihad training. Members of the jihad training group would often meet at members' homes and watch video tapes depicting jihad in regions such as Kashmir and Chechnya. Soon after Sheikh Al-Timimi's lectures moved to the Dar al Arqam, many member's of the core group became acquainted with an individual named Ismail Royer (aka Randall Todd Royer). Royer would attend Al-Timimi's lectures and would sometimes stay for the closed discussions with Al-Timimi. Royer became well known for his experiences fighting jihad in Bosnia. In April 2000, believed to be prior to the initiation of the weekly jihad training activities, Royer traveled to Pakistan to attend an Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) training camp. As of the current date, it is unclear who facilitated Royer's travel to the LET camp. Investigation indicates that Royer may have used his own contacts, possibly developed through his past experiences in Bosnia; may have used contacts provided by Shiekh Al-Timimi; or may have used others, yet unknown, to facilitate his travels. Sometime around July 2001, Saif Chapman embarked on his own trip to the same LET training camp that Royer had attended. It is unclear at this time who facilitated Chapman's travel to the camp. Chapman is believed to have been at the LET camp on September 11, 2001. Travel records indicate that Chapman returned to the United States on September 19, 2001. Upon his return to the United States, Chapman discussed his travels with

[REDACTED]

several others from the jihad training group. Chapman indicated to some that he had purchased some land near the camp so that he and his family could move there. In August, 2002, Chapman left the United States for Saudi Arabia, apparently at the guidance of Sheikh Al-Timimi. Chapman is a current resident of Saudi Arabia and is believed to be working for the Saudi Ministry of Education as an English teacher. As a result of his activities in this investigation, Chapman was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury of the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on June 25, 2003. Chapman has been detained by the Saudi government. During the year 2000, the paint-ball group used to meet in the parking lot of the **INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC AND ARABIC STUDIES IN AMERICA (IIASA), aka THE MAHAD.**

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

IDRIS is of Sudanese origin who came to the U.S. in the 1980's as a student when Dr. HASSAN TURABI, an Islamic fundamentalist, became Minister of Justice in Sudan. Sudan was proclaimed an Islamic state abolishing the Constitution and implementing Sharia (Islamic) laws. He was sent to the U.S. along with 14 other individuals for post-graduate studies in Islam. They joined the Islamic center in Houston, Texas, which later was transferred to Fairfax, Virginia [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) this is the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America). These students were a back-up for TURABI who had dreams of becoming a leader in the Islamic world. The 15 obeyed TURABI blindly as he gave them the scholarships in the U.S. Many of the 15 worked in the Saudi embassy as the Saudis trusted the Sudanese.

[REDACTED] (G) had contact with OMAR AHMED ALI ABDEL RAHMAN (aka: the blind Sheikh) who was found guilty of being involved with the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993.

(G) [REDACTED] was in contact with a Sudanese intelligence officer under [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

NOTE: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that revealed that several [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) were involved with the first attack on the World Trade Center as well as a plot to bomb several prominent New York City landmarks [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] IDRIS and ALI AL-TIMIMI [REDACTED] (G)

(G) [REDACTED] co founded the DAR AL-ARQAM mosque which grew out of Muslim Student's Association at George Mason University and Northern Virginia Community College. This mosque now operates out of 360 South Washington Street, Falls Church,

[REDACTED]

Virginia which is also the home of several Hamas front organizations as well as the Muslim World League (MWL) the subject of another FBI full investigation. This building is also owned by Sanabel Al-Kheer which is the investment arm of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) AL-TIMIMI is a known radical Islamist [REDACTED] (G) supporting several individuals who are believed to have left the U.S. shortly after 09/11/2001 to fight for the Taliban against the U.S.

[REDACTED] Al-Timimi started weekly Islamic study sessions Friday evenings after general prayer at Dar Al Archem. The study sessions evolved into in depth discussions of jihad, or holy war, against unbelievers. The sessions, were originally held at the Dar al Arqam, 360 South Washington Street, Falls Church, VA (a two-story office building) and began around 8:00 PM. The study session would meet after the general session, after most of the congregation had left, around 11:30 PM. The study sessions were not open to the public and only certain members were invited. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) The meetings are now even more private and held at the individual residences of the members, not at the mosque.

[REDACTED] This group/study session identify themselves as "wahabi's", though they do not state that publically. The 'wahabi" group is lead by Ali Al-Timimi, Yousef Idris and Mohamed Al-Kahtani. Other members of the group include: [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (P)

Select members of this group have also participated in Jihad training exercises. On [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) chart depicting the primary leadership and participants in jihad training exercises which included the following:

ADMINISTRATORS:

[REDACTED] (P)

VISITOR:

[REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Alharamain)

Suliman Al Buthe (aka Soliman Albuthe / Suliman Albuthe / Soliman Albutti)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (G)

Related: [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F) herein)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Alharamain foundation is a Saudi Arabian Islamic "NGO" or "charity" who had multiple offices worldwide designated as terrorist supporting entities by the United States for their support of AQ related groups. Within the U.S. the Alharamain office was located in Portlan, Oregon and was later specifically designated along with its primary operator Suliman Albuthe.

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] The Al Haramayn or Al Haramain Islamic Foundation(AIF) has been reported as a Saudi Arabian funded Islamic charitable organization that distributes books, video/cassette tapes and leaflets which espouse radical Islamic thoughts. AIF has been utilized as a front organization for supporting and facilitating

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the movement of Islamic Mujahadin into areas of Kosovo, Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bosnia. A French National Police report about Islamic humanitarian organizations described the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation as having ties to the members of extremist Islamic organizations (Gamaa Islamiya in Egypt and I.S.F. in Algeria) and as serving as a cover/point of logistical support for the Arab Mujahadin in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bosnia.

In [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) is identified as [REDACTED] (P) of the Al Haramain Foundation. It is further stated in [REDACTED] (P) that "an African chapter of the Jedda, based group was identified in a 1999 State Department report as one of the suspect terrorist groups operating in Nairobi, Kenya, before the bombing of the U.S. Embassy there in 1998." [REDACTED] (P) also states the group has a chapter in Ashland, Oregon and has an account at the Bank of America.

[REDACTED] An inquiry through the Oregon Secretary of State Corporate Records database revealed the Al Haramain Foundation, 1257 Siskiyou Blvd, #224, Ashland, Oregon, Business Identification Number, 60062388, is an assumed business name with an active status. The original filing date for the entity was 10/22/97. The business license was renewed on 10/18/99 and changed with renewal on 10/27/99. [REDACTED] (P) is listed as [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) using the same address as the foundation. Soliman H. Albut'he was [REDACTED] (P) as a [REDACTED] (P) using the same address.

[REDACTED] On 12/31/97, the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation purchased the residence at [REDACTED] (P) Ashland, Oregon, for \$190,162 in cash. Review of documents obtained from Jackson County Title pursuant to the issuance of a grand jury subpoena revealed the registered agent signing on behalf of the foundation was Soliman Al Buthe.

[REDACTED] For information, as described in referenced [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) Soliman H. Albut'he is further identified in [REDACTED] (F) as being Soliman Albut'he, aka Soliman H. S. Albut'he, date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1) citizen of Saudi Arabia, passport number [REDACTED] (P-1) using [REDACTED] (P) 's mail drop address of [REDACTED] (P) and the address of [REDACTED] (P) 's residence and local mosque at [REDACTED] (P). This serial referenced a [REDACTED] (O-1) document identifying Albut'he as a Saudi national entering the United States with \$200,000 in U.S. Currency in 1997.

[REDACTED] Soliman H. Albut'he is believed to currently be in Saudi

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Arabia and in daily telephonic contact with (P) Based on source information, it is believed that Albut'he is utilizing Saudi Arabia cellular telephone number (P-1) and is associated with (P-1) (P-1) Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. It is further believed that Albut'he is the money supply for the Al Haramain Foundation, (P) (P) Albut'he is further believed to be involved with (P) an ISP with access to a high speed data line. Albut'he has been identified with website (P-1) Reportedly, Albut'he is the source of income related to (P) (P) which was co-owned by (P) and Ferhad Erdogan. Erdogan indicated in a recent interview that (P) is now in complete control of (P).

[REDACTED]

Other Individuals Associated with Saudi Arabia as well as the 9/11 Investigation:

Saleh Alhussayen (Saleh A A Al Husayen / Saleh Alhusayen)

DOB: (P-1)

[REDACTED]
(J-3)

[REDACTED]
(J-3)

Summary: Saudi cleric and Saudi government official Saleh Alhussayen entered the U.S. prior to the 9/11 attacks. According to statements by he and his wife, Alhussayen was in the U.S. to visit mosques and Islamic organizations who were provided funding from Saudi Arabia. According to an interview of Alhussayen's wife, Alhussayen was invited by and visited Mohammed Alahmari. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1)

Alhussayen was staying at the same Northern Virginia hotel as Nawaf Alhazmi on the evening prior to the attacks. Alhussayen's nephew, Sami Alhussayen, was a Saudi Arabian student arrested for providing material support to AQ.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] dated 2002] [REDACTED] As a matter of background, FBI Seattle has identified

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SALEH ALHUSSAYEN as an official or employee of the Saudi (government). SALEH ALHUSSAYEN and his wife, FADDIAH PETERSEN, traveled to the United States from Saudi Arabia in August, 2001 and remained in the U.S. until mid-September. On 9/17/2001, both ALHUSSAYEN and his wife were interviewed by FBI WFO. This interview and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was prompted by the fact that hijacker NAWAF AL-HAZMI had checked into the same Marriott Residence Inn in Herndon, Virginia on 9/10/2001 in which SALEH ALHUSSAYEN was staying. During said interview, SALEH ALHUSSAYEN advised that he had only traveled to the U.S. on one other occasion approximately twenty two (22) years ago. **He claimed no knowledge of the hijackers and stated that he had come to the U.S. via JFK IA on 8/20/2001 at the request of his friend IANA leader MOHAMMED AL-AHMARI. (See below Salah Alrashood)**

[REDACTED] As part of our investigation into the attacks of September 11, 2001 FBI Agents from Washington Field Office interviewed SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN. The interview was conducted due to the fact that he was a registered guest in the same hotel the hijackers from Flight 77 stayed in on September 10, 2001, the night before the attacks. SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN informed the Agents he was a retired Saudi Government Official and currently worked at fund raising for charity organizations. SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN informed the Agents he was in the United States to visit some Mosques that had been built with charity funds. He stated he did not know the hijackers and was only staying at that hotel because it had a kitchen which allowed him to make his own food.

(F) [REDACTED] An interview was conducted of Alhussayan's wife (Faddiah Peterson) after Alhussayan experienced the medical emergency. Peterson advised that Alhussaysn had visited while in the US the offices/personnel of IANA, Global Relief Foundation and IIIT. Peterson advised that they visited Michigan, Chicago, Pittsburgh and Canada prior to Virginia.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (The above mentioned) Mohamed Al-Ahmari, the leader of the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) in Ypsilanti Twp., Michigan, is a leading Salafi figure and Saudi dissident. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

Of interest is that Saleh Alhussayen is the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) a Saudi student living in the U.S.

Sami Alhussayen

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Related: islamtoday

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] FBI Seattle identifies Sami Al-Hussayen as a citizen of Saudi Arabia and a non-USPER currently enrolled in the College of Graduate Studies, Department of Computer Science at the University of Idaho (U of I) in Moscow, Idaho. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is also important to note that a connection between Al-Timimi and **Mohammed Al-Ahmari** has been established (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). Al-Ahmari is a close associate of Al-Hussayen. Al-Ahmari is a leading Salafist and former president of the IANA. Al-Ahmari is very supportive of USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that actively support Jihad against the United States. AL-AHMARI (recently departed the United States for Qatar in an effort to start an IANA branch there.

[REDACTED] On September 24, 2001, the Washington Field Office (WFO) received documents from a search related to a visit to the U.S. of Saleh Al-Husayen. The documents indicate that Al-Husayen is promoting the use of the media to present the Arab world in a favorable view. He is also promoting the formation of Islamic organizations in the U.S. to pursue political agendas.

[REDACTED] On page 1 of the document, under Page 3, the name Saleh Al Husayen appears. A review of ACS indicates one reference to Al Husayen, indexed on 9/27/01. He was born on 1/1/31 in Sharqua, Saudi Arabia and has Saudi Arabian passport number [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P-1) Special/Official passport. A review of serial [REDACTED] (F), an FD-302, indicates Al-Husayen was interviewed by the FBI in Herndon, Vi(S) The next name on the document is Shaikh Khalid Al-Swailim, Washington, D.C., work telephone [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) and fax number [REDACTED] (P). A review of ACS was negative on Al-Swailim. A review of Telephone FOIMS indicates [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The second name on page 78 of the document is [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) Springfield, Virginia, work telephone [REDACTED] (P), fax
number [REDACTED] (P) and mobile number [REDACTED] (P). A review of
ACS indicates an [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (G)
[REDACTED] (G) indexed on 10/13/98.

[REDACTED]

Salah Alrashood

Name: Salah Alrashood

SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Phone: [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Per above, Alrashood is a Saudi Arabian diplomat and paid cleric who operated in the Pittsburgh area. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (G) SALAH AL-RASHOOD, dob [REDACTED] (P-1), the

Executive Manager of the ATTAWHEED FOUNDATION (AF), revealed his association with many individuals who have been the subjects of FBI full field terrorism investigations in the US including

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) After the September 11, 2001, attacks, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SALAH AL-RASHOOD departed the USA on 12/15/2002; he later attempted to return but was denied re-entry into the USA. While in the USA, AL-RASHOOD resided at [REDACTED] (P) Pittsburgh, PA, and was the head of the AL-TAWHEED ISLAMIC CENTER, a/k/a ATTAWHEED FOUNDATION, which provided financial support to the Mujhadeen in Chechnya. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] Alrashood was paid approximately \$55,000 in 2002 by the EKSA.

[REDACTED] The number [REDACTED] (P) is subscribed to Salah AL-RASHOOD, [REDACTED] (P) Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. AL-RASHOOD is [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] The word "marriage" is a word used by terrorists to denote martyrdom or attack. FBIHQ

[REDACTED]

reported that an [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(F) [REDACTED] ALRASHOOD [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1) which has had [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Ahmed Kattan (Ahmed Qattan / Ahmad Kattan / Ahmed Khattan)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Summary: Ahmed Kattan was [REDACTED] (J-3) and high level official at the EKSA. Presently he is the Minister of African Affairs. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] : [REDACTED] KATTAN has been identified as a [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) who works closely with Ambassador Prince BANDAR. KATTAN, [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] : Kattan was from a poor family but had been with Prince Bandar for 20 years (as of 2003). [REDACTED] (O-1) Kattan was responsible for the departure of the Bin Laden family members following 9/11.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[(F)] (O-1)
(A), (G), (J-1) (O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(D)

(D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(F)

[REDACTED] Hassan Noor

Malim Kumbi was involved sometime around 09/10/1998 with planning a terrorist attack against U.S. interests in Kampala. Kumbi was arrested after KENBOMB and had explosive residue at his residence.

[REDACTED] (C-1)

(C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1)

According to [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] a Ali

Humeid, brother in law of 2002 bombing suspect Hassan Said Omar, is a teacher at Kisauni Islamic Institute.

According to [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] a Shaykh

Siraj Rahman Nadwi Al-Qadhi - a principal at the Kisauni Islamic Institute - helped facilitate the movement of students to Afghanistan.

According to [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Shaykh

Rahman Nadwi Al-Qadhi assisted in the placement of a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) - Shaykh Ahmad LNU - as the director of the Tawhid Islamic Center. Prior to his arrival, Ahmad reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan. Based on recommendations from Saudi financiers of the Al-Haramain organization.

The above is deemed important as it shows a direct transfer of funds from a Ministry of the Government of Saudi Arabia, through the EKSA, to the IIASA for forwarding to a foreign entity associated with terrorism. It should also be

[REDACTED]

noted that the Ministry of Defense and Aviation has been associated with the financing of other "charities" such as MWL and IIRO (see [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] which provides more evidence against the Saudi claim that these organizations are NON-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

[REDACTED]

Khaled Alsowailem (Khaled Al Sowailem)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Memo: works at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs

Telephone: [REDACTED] (P-1)

Email: [REDACTED] (P-1) [NOTE: In the past writer has noted the use of 911 in various emails of [REDACTED] (J-3) Writer cannot confirm if this is a reference to the 9/11 attacks.]

Wife: Bushra Alkhamais

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Telephone [REDACTED] (P) Mobile [REDACTED] (P) Fax [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Alsowailem was a high level employee of the Saudi Dawa office as a diplomat at the EKSA.

[REDACTED] Alsowailem was interviewed by FBI on 10/08/2001 but claimed diplomatic immunity.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In November, 2004 FBIHQ requested that a [REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

AL-SOWAILEM left

Washington, DC in June 2003

to take a position as the General Director of Da'wa Abroad in Saudi Arabia effective 8/30/2003.

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] detail that DA'WA is an Arabic word which means "the calling" as in the preaching of Islam, in this case, Wahhabi Islam. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) head of the DA'WA office at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a posting which he held until June 2003 at which time he departed for Saudi Arabia. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

the DA'WA office, one of their responsibilities was to handle the logistics for the annual Muslim pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. DA'WA was also responsible for the salaries of Islamic preachers in the United States and for the shipment of religious books and copies of the Koran to those that request them. The majority of those requesting copies of the Koran were affiliated with the prison chaplain program. Investigation has shown that the DA'WA responsibilities are now handled by the Islamic Affairs office at the EKSA.

[REDACTED] From the time AL-SOWAILEM left the EKSA until March 2005, he kept in contact with MUSAED AL-JARRAH [REDACTED] (G) who began handling the business previously handled by AL-SOWAILEM at the EKSA.

[REDACTED]

Possible Pre 9/11 Test of Airline Security

Muhammad Alqudhiien

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Hamdan Alshalawi

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Summary: Mohammed Alqudhaieen and Hamdan Alshalawi were Saudi nationals and [REDACTED] (J-3) who conducted activities on a U.S. based flight that were deemed by FBI Phoenix as being potential case activity for the 9/11 attacks. Alshalawi is a known AQ operative.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Muhammad Abdullah Ibrahim Al-Qudhaieen, DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1), [REDACTED] (P) Tucson, Arizona; [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Al-Qudhaieen at that time utilized a slightly different DOB of [REDACTED] (P-1). Al-Qudhaieen is [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) on 11/19/1999, Al-Qudhaieen and his associate Hamdan Ghareeb Al-Shalawi, address [REDACTED] (P) Tempe, Arizona

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

85283, telephone [REDACTED] (P), were aboard America West Airlines flight #90 from Phoenix to Washington D.C. with one stop in Port Columbus, Ohio. During the flight, Al-Qudhaieen, according to the flight crew, acted agitated, spoke very loudly in Arabic and asked repeated specific questions about flight times, stop times on the flight and the plane causing the flight crew to become suspicious of him. Flight Attendant [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) advised Al-Qudhaieen tried to open the cockpit door "on two occasions." The pilot, Captain [REDACTED] (P) ordered an emergency runway evacuation, notifying ground personnel of two suspicious men on board, before they reached the Columbus airport. In accordance with the pilot's wishes, security teams and the local police removed the two men in handcuffs from the plane and swept the plane with bomb sniffing dogs. Both men were interviewed separately by Cincinnati FBI. Al-Qudhaieen said he believed he never touched the pilot's cockpit door but that he was searching for a bathroom and he might have inadvertently touched the pilot's cockpit door. In a separate interview, Al-Shalawi advised Cincinnati FBI that Al-Qudhaieen did ask him where the bathroom was and Al-Shalawi related that he told Al-Qudhaieen to go to the rear of the aircraft to use the bathroom. However, Al-Qudhaieen disappeared from Al-Shalawi's view toward the front of the plane and was gone for several minutes.

[REDACTED] U.S. District Court transcripts revealed the following information: Al-Qudhaieen and Al-Shalawi were traveling to Washington D.C. to a reception being hosted by the President of Imam University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Both men are alumni of Imam Mohammed Bin Saud Islamic University, [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P-1) Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, telephone: [REDACTED] (P-1). Al-Qudhaieen graduated with a B.A. in English and then spent several years on staff there as a teacher's assistant.

[REDACTED] On 10/22/2001, the [REDACTED] (O-1) following information: In late 2000, Hamdan Bin Ghareeb Abdullah Al-Shalawi, DOB [REDACTED] (P-1), POB [REDACTED] (P-1) Saudi Arabia, married with five children; was traveling to Saudi Arabia through Pakistan. **Al-Shalawi is known to have received training in Afghan terrorist camps and intended to conduct Al-Khobar type bombings.** No further specifics were available [REDACTED] (O-1) Al-Shalawi left the U.S. to return to Saudi Arabia in August 2001. [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3) Based upon this information received on Al-Shalawi, he was designated [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) In light of the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, this incident is being re-examined to determine whether Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were conducting a dry run and/or test of

[REDACTED]

America West Airlines in-flight security procedures.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] Based on analysis of reporting that AL-QAEDA operatives do extensive research and testing prior to actual terrorist attacks, and Al-Shalawi's terrorist training, Phoenix believes this represented a test or trial run in preparation for 09/11/2001.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Militant proselytizing within the U.S., the movement of individuals involved in such activity into the U.S. and the existence of AQ members amongst identified Saudi Arabian government personnel [REDACTED] (J-3) continued post 9/11.

[REDACTED] (G) identified extremist Saudi clerics attempting to or having entered the U.S. and were involved with Saudi Arabian student gatherings in the United States. Despite open social media posts advocating jihadi activity [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (G) were forwarded to [REDACTED] (J-3) - thus eliminating the threat posed by these individuals to the U.S.

Mohammed Mousa

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] WFO identified Mousa based [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and subsequent review of open source social media information identifying Mousa as a pro-AQ Saudi Airlines pilot. Mousa also appeared to be entering the U.S. for training and to visit Saudi Arabian students. WFO [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) and forwarded requests for information to various foreign governments.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] One of the attendees to the ABAAD organized event was Mohammed Hassan Mousa (who uses the name Alshareef to denote a possible relation to Mohammed). Mousa is a Saudi Arabian airlines pilot but also a religious scholar who has openly advocated jihad in Mali/Israel/Iraq and has eulogized UBL. [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

(F)

[REDACTED] Saudi cleric named Mohammed Hassan Mousa (who utilizes Internet name Mohammed Musa Aqeel Alshareef) (NOTE: Alshareef is a term utilized by descendants of Mohammed and may or may not be an official last name utilized on a passport) (DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)), a Saudi airlines pilot who had studied in Florida (according to article "Days in America"), had entered the US and had attended the Dar Alhijra as well as a Saudi student meeting in Chicago. Mousa supports jihad in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Mali and other countries against "Crusaders" and claimed to have wanted to go to fight in Iraq but was persuaded by Iraqi fighters not to go but to raise money in Saudi Arabia instead. Mousa was once in WAMY magazine stating that he would not return to the US as the US was an enemy of Islam. [NOTE: Based on an initial review of the websites [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) identified Mousa as Mohammed Musa Aqeel Alshareef but writer was able to later determine that name Mohammed Mousa and DOB of [REDACTED] (P-1) .]

[REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

INFORMATION

INDICATING A DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TRAINING OF THE
TERRORIST AIRPLANE HIJACKERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 11 SEPTEMBER

[REDACTED]

ATTACKS IN THE U.S. AND A CERTAIN MOHAMED MOUSSA. MOUSSA, AGE 35-38, DOB [REDACTED] (P-1), A SAUDI, DOCTOR OF ISLAMIC RELIGION AND IMAM OF A MOSQUE IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHO [REDACTED] (O-1) COMPLETED HIS STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF RIYADH, WAS A PILOT INSTRUCTOR WITH SAUDIA AIRLINES. MOUSSA WAS A CONVINCED FUNDAMENTALIST WHO PARTICIPATED IN 2000 IN A SAUDI TELEVISION PROGRAM ON WHICH HE HOSTED DEBATES (A SORT OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE/DEBATE). HE REFUSED TO FLY HEAVY AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO REMAIN ON AIRBUS TYPES. THIS ALLOWED HIM TO REMAIN IN SAUDI ARABIA AND AVOID CONTACT WITH "IMPIOUS" WESTERNERS. AT THE SAME TIME THIS ALLOWED HIM TO DEVOTE HIMSELF TO HIS RELIGION AND TO THE MOSQUE OF WHICH HE WAS THE IMAM.

PROBABLY IN THE MONTH OF JULY 2000, MOUSSA WAS AN INSTRUCTOR ON FLIGHT SIMULATORS IN JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA. SEVERAL MONTHS LATER, (NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2000), [REDACTED] (O-1) MOUSSA LEFT FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR TRAINING ON HEAVY AIRCRAFT (747-400) AT BOEING IN SEATTLE.

[REDACTED] A review of travel noted that Mousa was reportedly encountered entering the U.S. as airline crew from 1998 to 2001 with the last encounter as inbound on 08/27/2001.

[REDACTED]

Ayid Alqarni

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F) On [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) 2012 [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) a known extremist Saudi cleric named

Ayid Abdullah Alqarni (ph) would be traveling to the US to attend the ICNA/MSA Conference in Chicago in December 2012. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Alqarni had a DOB [REDACTED] (P-1) On 12/12/2012 [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Alqarni could be located on the following youtube videos:

<http://youtu.be/wrEEu-Fjzqk>

<http://youtu.be/L2Q3A5XaTxE>

[REDACTED] The first video is titled "Ayid Alqarni - Jihad the Path to Victory" and is dated 2004. In this video Alqarni - recognizable as the individual [REDACTED] (J-3) - laments the death of Abdalaziz Alrantisi and Ahmad Yassin and praises jihad in Iraq against the "occupiers".

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) open source information found on the ICNA website, exact matches of biographical information as well as a review of the available video writer concludes that the Ayid Abdullah Alqarni who [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(J-3) [REDACTED] is the same as the Ayid Abdullah Alqarni who is noted in the videos calling for jihad against American soldiers in Iraq and the "slitting of throats". In addition, the confirmed telephone numbers of Alqarni are described as having Alqaeda connections and have contacts with multiple FBI terrorism investigations.

[REDACTED] According to (G) [REDACTED] Alqarni is a personal sheikh of Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahad Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud. [Noted herein]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Other Saudi Arabian Government Officials - Known or Suspected AQ Members

[REDACTED] Summary: The influence of militant AQ ideology within Saudi government personnel can also be demonstrated by the identification of AQ members within Saudi Arabian military members who entered the U.S. for military training. Among these are Faisal Alshehri, Mohammad Alkahtani, Naif Alfallaj and the recent student Mohammed Alshamrani (Pensacola). [This is in addition to the known 120 or more Saudi Arabian (J-3) who departed the U.S. to join ISIS.] Saudi naval officers lafi Alharbi (DOB: (P-1)) and Osama Nooh (possible DOB: (P-1))((F)) were in contact were in contact with Alhazmi and Almihdar.

Mustafa Alshehri

(aka Mustafa Mohammed Mubarak Alshehri / aka Mustafa Aljubairi)

DOB: (P-1)

Entered US on (J-3) July 2001

(G)

(J-3)

[REDACTED] Summary: Mustafa Alshehri was a Saudi Arabian national and government official in the Saudi Ministry of Interior passport office.

(C-1)

(C-1) Alshehri entered the U.S. just prior to the 9/11 attacks and visited New York along with other individuals of the Saudi Embassy.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] and other serials] Mustafa Alshehri was a Ministry of Interior employee in the passport section and [REDACTED] (C-1)

Subsequently he was utilized to transfer large sums of money to other AQ members. [REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1) Yousef was subsequently released and became a leader of AQAP before being killed in 2009.) According to records and Alshehri's statements he traveled to the US for medical reasons [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3) and actually entered on 09/01/2001 with intended stay [REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] (C-1)

(C-1) Alshehri had several associates in the EKSA to include Yousef Zakri [REDACTED] (G) who was a long term EKSA

employee who had a close relationship with known AQI member Shawki Omar [REDACTED] (G) who was subsequently arrested in Iraq. Another

associate was believed to be Fahad Alotaibi (DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)) of the Military Attache office. While in the DC area Alshehri lived with

Mohammed Ali Alqahtani [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Mohammed Amer Alshehri [REDACTED] (G) a diplomat at the EKSA, is a known

relative and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) noted his association with multiple [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and that he was involved with retrieving Yousef Alshehri's body. Ali Al Nafisah [REDACTED] (G), another EKSA diplomat, was a close associate of both Omar, Zakri and Alshehri.

[REDACTED]

Faisal Ahmed Alshehri

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] On May 9, 2003, FBIHQ notified the Dallas Division
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Initial investigation revealed that the user of the email address was located at Sheppard Air force Base, Wichita Falls, Texas. Soon thereafter, this individual was identified as Faisal Ahmed Al-Shehri. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] At approximately 6:00 p.m., Al-Shehri was approached by Dallas FBI agents. The agents advised Al-Shehri that there was a possible security issue with his luggage and wanted to talk to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

him for a couple of minutes. Al-Shehri and the interviewing agents went to the business lounge area and began to question Al-Shehri. After a short time, the interviewing agents questioned Al-Shehri regarding his knowledge of Al-Yari. Al-Shehri denied any knowledge of Al-Yari and advised the interviewing agents that he had never met or seen him before. Al-Shehri was told by the interviewing agents that his phone number had been found on Al-Yari's body after he had been killed in a shootout with Saudi authorities. Al-Shehri continued to deny his knowledge of Al-Yari. During this time, Al-Shehri provided biographical information and consented to a search of all his carry-on items. After approximately six hours, Al-Shehri finally admitted that he had designed and built a computer for Al-Yari several years ago. Also, Al-Shehri advised that he had a long standing and close relationship with Al-Yari. Al-Shehri explained how he was recruited by Al-Qa'ida and eventually became a financial supporter and recruiter for the organization. Also, Al-Shehri explained how he frequently communicated with Al-Yari and had traveled to meet him on many occasions. Al-Shehri was debriefed from June 5, 2003 until July 8, 2003. During this time, Al-Shehri provided invaluable intelligence information regarding Al-Qa'ida members, Al-Qa'ida trade craft, and Al-Qa'ida recruitment within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] On December 8, 2001 a search was conducted of AlMari's apartment which revealed photocopies of what appeared to be valid passports assigned to many different individuals. The passports were issued in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Also discovered during the search was flight training literature, literature detailing seating capacities and fuel capacities for large jetliners, several photographs of the World Trade Center towers, an aerial photo of the Pentagon, and overdue video tapes borrowed from the Boston Public Library. One of the video tapes was entitled "Major Air Disasters" and another was entitled "Major Water Disasters". Many documents were discovered during the search of the apartment

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

to include telephone bills, bank statements, shipping receipts, hotel receipts, airline receipts, and many handwritten notes. [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] noted some secondary connections between phone numbers within this case and phone numbers in contact with Albayoumi.]

[REDACTED]

Mohammad Alkahtani

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

that AL-KAHTANI indicated he has friends in Saudi Arabia with connections to AL-QAEDA.

Furthermore AL-KAHTANI has indicated he has TALIBAN contacts in Saudi Arabia who came from Afghanistan. In private settings, AL-KAHTANI has expressed his support of violent jihad for the propagation of Islam. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Virginia home, AL-KAHTANI has been vocal about his support for AL-QAEDA and UBL.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Investigation has revealed Al-Kahtani, a citizen of Saudi Arabia, is in the United States [REDACTED] (J-3) and is working on his PhD in Information Technology at George Mason University (GMU). He teaches a Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) class at GMU and is a prominent lecturer and leader at the Center For Islamic Information and Education (CIIE), aka Dar al Arqam Islamic Center, in Annandale, Virginia. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Al-Kahtani has indicated he is planning on returning to Saudi Arabia as soon as he completes his PhD, probably sometime before the end of this year.

[REDACTED] Several regular attendees of Dar al Arqam conducted paintball training in Northern Virginia in preparation for participation in jihad and/or jihad training overseas. Several members of the group traveled to Pakistan prior to, and after 09/11/2001, to attend Lashkar-E Taiba jihad training camp. Among those involved in the jihad group are [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Ali Al-Timimi, a former lecturer at Dar al Arqam, has been a spiritual advisor to many in this group and has publically advocated violent jihad. The activities of [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) . [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G) two of Al-Kahtani's sons attended the paintball training, however they were not part of the core jihad group. Additionally, after 09/11/2001 Al-Timimi was asked to leave Dar al Arqam by the Dar al Arqam leadership (Haythem Abu Hantash, Jaf'far Idris and AL-Kahtani) because Al-Timimi openly supported the 09/11/2001 terrorist attacks against the U.S. As a result, Al-Kahtani took a greater leadership/lecturer role at Dar al Arqam.

[REDACTED] Alkahtani [REDACTED] (J-3) despite the above information. Alkahtani noted that he was traveling with a "prince" and was working for Saudi Military Industries. Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) is a state owned [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3) defense company launched in May 2017 by Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF). SAMI is lead by Ahmed Alkhateeb and Walid Abukhaled. Its subsidiaries is Advanced Electronics Company and Military Industries Corporation (MIC) per Wiki which is lead by Mohamed Almaday. [REDACTED] (J-3) .

[REDACTED]

Abdullah Mohamed Alshehri

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Alshehri is mentioned herein due to the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) officer being affiliated with Islamic militants and also being utilized as a local POC for the Saudi population. Alshehri was conducting this business while a student.

[REDACTED] (G)

(G) ALSHEHRI was favorable toward USAMA BIN LADEN and upon his documented connection to MULHIM ELTAYEB [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G). While in Pittsburgh, ALSHEHRI apparently acted as liaison between the Saudi Arabian embassy and the Saudi community in Pittsburgh.

[REDACTED] On 03/18/2002, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) a young Yemeni immigrant to Pittsburgh had recently been invited to an apartment with a group of Saudi Arabians. The immigrant had been invited by "ABO NORA" (or ABU NORA) (determined [REDACTED] (G) to be [REDACTED] (G) ABDULLAH ALSHEHRI). While at this gathering, the Saudis were speaking favorably about USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL). When the Yemeni immigrant voiced his opinion that the events of September 11th were murder, "ABO NORA" indicated to the group to

[REDACTED]

change the subject and not speak further about it in front of the Yemeni.

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G)

Investigation at the CARRIAGE PARK APARTMENTS determined that MULHIM ELTAYEB, a Sudanese national, departed Pittsburgh in January 1999, allegedly to return to the Sudan. On his exit papers with CARRIAGE PARK APARTMENTS, ELTAYEB gave a forwarding address of [REDACTED] (P) Pittsburgh, telephone [REDACTED] (P). Follow-up investigation at the GREENBRIAR APARTMENTS determined that, at the time of ELTAYEB's departure, [REDACTED] (P) was leased by ABDULLAH MOHAMMED ALSHEHRI, with the same telephone number. ELTAYEB was obviously using ALSHEHRI's address as a mail forwarding point. MULHIM ELTAYEB re-surfaced on 09/09/2001 at Timber, OR, where he was found engaged in paramilitary training with other Arab males. Portland believes that ELTAYEB is part of a suspected Al Qaeda cell operating in the Portland area.

[REDACTED]

Islamic Saudi Academy (ISA)

King Abdullah Academy

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] The Islamic Saudi Academy, now known as the King Abdullah Academy, is a K-12 school located in Northern Virginia that provides education for the children of Saudi Arabian diplomats as well as other individuals. The school is supported by the Saudi Arabian government and the Embassy and the SACM Director and Saudi Ambassador are known to sit on the board of directors. The school has faced charges of teaching hatred within its Islamic education department and one of its students, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, was convicted of being an AQ operative planning to assassinate President George Bush. [REDACTED] (P) was a teacher at the Islamic education department.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Since 2001 there have been many independent analysis conducted of the teaching curriculum in Saudi Arabia and at the ISA. These reports include the Freedom House report and the recent report from the United States Commission of International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). In addition, reports have been written on similar schools in foreign nations such as a report in Britain on the King Fahd Academy in London (a school similar to the ISA) titled "The Hijacking of British Islam".

[REDACTED] All of the reports by independent scholars and linguists have arrived at similar conclusions. The specific statements listed in these reports have been well documented in the press and need not be mentioned in this memorandum. However, these multiple and independent analysis have been confirmed via translations done by the FBI. Many of the passages in question were Saudi interpretations of Koranic passages or of the Hadith and were similar to the interpretation provided by Elyacoubi mentioned above.

[REDACTED] According to open source reporting, in 2002, Saudi Foreign

[REDACTED]

Minister Prince Saud

Al-Faisal stated that "our schools and our faith teach peace and tolerance." In March 2006, Prince

Turki Al-Faisal stated that the Saudis had removed all of the inflammatory content in their school

textbooks but quickly backed off and stated they needed more time after the Freedom House report.

Recent open source reporting noted that Saudi Embassy officials have denied the existence of

derogatory material in the ISA's present curriculum.

■ The 2007/2008 USCIRF study revealed that the changes have not been completed. An FBI review of the 2007 curriculum textbooks also revealed the continuing use of passages that are considered to be defamatory to other religions and that could be construed to encourage violence.

[REDACTED]

Saudi Arabian Student Population

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F)

Serials with LHMS to USDS:

[REDACTED] (F) (2014/2017/2018)

[REDACTED] (F)

Summary: The effect of the Saudi Arabian education system is evident within high number of terrorism investigations related to the Saudi Arabian student population. This population has fluctuated over the years but increased greatly after 2005 but has recently sharply declined. Various AQ related terrorism investigation was opened prior to and following the 9/11 attacks such as (A), (G), (J-1) ([REDACTED] (F) and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (F). Following the creation and growth of ISIS there were at least 120 Saudi students who traveled to Syria from the U.S. to join AQ and/or ISIS forces.

(J-3)
[REDACTED]

Homaidan Alturki Saudi [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] As is known, the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 individuals - 15 of them being of Saudi nationality (the possible 20th - Alqahtani who is held in GTMO - is also of Saudi origin). Saudi Arabian

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

perception management campaigns have worked to convince Americans that UBL used the 15 Saudis in order to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia - thus presenting the case for closer bonds and more lax requirements for entry into the U.S. Per the 9/11 Commission Report, the interrogations of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed revealed that the true reason for the use of so many young Saudi males for the 9/11 attacks was due to the large numbers of willing participants amongst the Saudi population as well as the easy visa requirements then in place for Saudi Arabian citizens to obtain visas to travel to the U.S. Prior to 9/11 it was much harder for a citizen of Yemen or Sudan to obtain a visa whereas citizens of Saudi Arabia were not viewed as a "security risk" and obtained their visas under the Visa Express program. (See 9/11 Commission Report - Pages 232-233 and 9/11 and Terrorist Travel Pages 116-130.)

[REDACTED] Shortly after 9/11 a spotlight was shown on the teaching material utilized in Saudi K-12 schooling as well as within Saudi schools and Saudi funded and run mosques in the U.S. and elsewhere. Facing strong criticism the Saudis launched various public relations campaigns to discredit these reports. Despite repeated promises and claims to the contrary, within the U.S. the teaching material at the Saudi funded Islamic Saudi Academy (ISA) was not altered until approximately eight years after 9/11. An unclassified report [REDACTED] (O-1) regarding Saudi education and textbooks utilized within Saudi Arabia (elementary and middle school curriculum 2009-2010) revealed that - despite claims to the contrary - that the Saudi Arabian Government had not removed or altered the offensive material found in previous editions. According to the CIA report "the monotheism texts teach hatred as part of the doctrine of disavowal which promotes hostility toward non-Muslims. This doctrine, which jihadists often advocate, is included throughout many other books in the curriculum." The report continues: "The monotheism textbooks for all five grades also stress the theme of religious violence". The report concludes "Even if the Saudis moderate some of the offending passages in the higher-grade textbooks, the youngest and most impressionable segment of Saudi society will still have been exposed to this incitement to religious hatred and violence, and many will have already internalized these teachings." This analysis as well as more recent open source reports regarding the Saudi clerical establishment highlight that the extremist nature of Saudi society is still prevalent. For example, in December 2013 a large group of Saudi clerics publicly endorsed the Islamist Front in Syria. These clerics are increasingly using social media to reach out to Saudi society - in Saudi Arabia or overseas. The recent edict by King Abdullah to criminalize the participation of Saudi citizens in fighting with the jihadi groups in Syria is believed to have little effect on those individuals who are motivated by the AQ element within these clerical establishments.

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) This was highlighted by the recent death in Saudi Arabia of an ISIS bomb maker who was a student in New Zealand. Additional Saudi Arabian students are voicing encouragement and support and multiple Saudi Arabian students are under terrorism investigation by the FBI. In addition, it is known via FBI investigation, that radical Saudi based clerics and religious authorities are traveling to the U.S. to visit with the U.S. based Saudi population. In December 2012 a Saudi cleric who had openly called for jihad against the U.S. was granted a visa to enter the U.S. FBI investigation prevented his entry and his intended destination was an Islamic conference in Chicago. In December 2013 investigation revealed a large student gathering in Chicago that included a presentation by a Saudi cleric who has openly supported jihad activities and who eulogized Osama Bin Laden. This cleric is also a Saudi Airlines pilot and wrote of meeting Saudi Arabian students in various locations in the United States. In December 2016 a Saudi Arabian national who was a professor for a Saudi military academy and a supporter of militant ideology was granted a visa to the U.S. [REDACTED] (J-3).

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Homaidan Alturki is noted above due to his operating an Islamic bookstore (Albasheer Publications) while on [REDACTED] (J-3) status; his connections to Anwar Aulaqi (aka Abu Attiq) ([REDACTED] (F) (see [REDACTED] (F) (see herein)' Mohammed Alahmari (IANA) (see herein); and the EKSA's/SAG's attempts to obtain his release from prison despite his being convicted of abuse of an [REDACTED] (J-3) holder.

[REDACTED] (A),(G), (J-1) is noted herein due to the [REDACTED] (A),(G), (J-1) centering on a group of Saudi Arabian students who were committing [REDACTED] (J-3) fraud. During a search of their apartment photocopies of what appeared to be valid passports assigned to many different individuals. The passports were issued in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Also discovered during the search was flight training literature, literature detailing seating capacities and fuel capacities for large jetliners, several photographs of the World Trade Center towers, an aerial photo of the Pentagon, and overdue video tapes borrowed from the Boston Public Library. One of the video tapes was entitled "Major Air Disasters" and another was entitled "Major Water Disasters".

[REDACTED]

Ziyad Khaleel (Ziyad Sadaqa)

(G) [REDACTED]

Summary: Noted herein due to references above.

(A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The above referenced serial

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1) Investigation by Phoenix has indicated that all of these individuals may have a current or former association with Michigan State University (MSU).

[REDACTED] Al-Shalawi [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(G) [REDACTED] and is believed by Phoenix to be an operative of Al Qaeda. Al-Shalawi obtained a PhD in Linguistics from Arizona State University (ASU).

[REDACTED] Al-Shalawi and Muhammad Al-Qudhaieen (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] were involved in an incident aboard an America West airlines flight on November 19, 1999. Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were traveling from Phoenix to Washington, DC via Columbus, Ohio. During the flight, Al-Qudhaieen was observed by the flight crew attempting to access the cockpit. When the flight landed in Columbus, Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were detained by FBI Cincinnati and interviewed (F) [REDACTED]. No charges were filed against Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen.

[REDACTED] Based on (G) [REDACTED] regarding the association of Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen with Al Qaeda subjects and the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001, Phoenix has developed an investigative theory that this incident was an intelligence gathering mission for use in future terrorist operations.

(O-1) [REDACTED] Al-Shalawi obtained training at an Afghanistan terror camp in late 2000.