

REDACTION KEY

- A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.
- C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING ONGOING CONSULTATION.
- C-2. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THAT GOVERNMENT'S DIRECTION FOLLOWING CONSULTATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.
- D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED WILL BE RELEASED.
- F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR HANDLING INFORMATION.
- G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.
- J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).
- J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT (BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.
- J-3. INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).
- O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.
- P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.
- P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.
- S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.

NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted without a code throughout the release.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 04/20/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED] (G), (S)

Los Angeles

Attn: [REDACTED]

From: New York

PENTTBOM Investigative Team / FBIHQ

Contact: SA [REDACTED] (S)

Approved By: [REDACTED] (S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED] (S)

Case ID #: [REDACTED] (F)

Title: PENTTBOM

MC 182

FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Synopsis: Request Los Angeles conduct investigation in regards to information obtained during the interview of FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY.

Reference:

(F)



Details: On 02/23-24/2004, FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY was interviewed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, by (P) and (P) of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission (reference (F) (F)). The interview was conducted in the presence of writer and NYPD (S) of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team, as well as representatives of the Saudi Mabathith. Later in the day on 02/24/2004, AL-THUMAIRY telephonically contacted the Saudi Mabathith and advised that he had recalled additional information regarding his rental of apartments at the Avalon Westside Terrace Apartments, 3636 Sepulveda Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, 90034, about which he had been questioned. AL-THUMAIRY then returned for a second interview on the night of 02/24/2004, again conducted in the presence of the representatives of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team and the Saudi Mabathith.

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Re: (F) [REDACTED], 04/20/2004

As FBI Los Angeles is aware, investigation is ongoing in order to determine the location of residence and activities of KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) during their apparent stay in the Los Angeles area from 01/15/2000 to approximately 02/04/2000. Of predominant interest throughout this investigation are the "two Saudi males" that were introduced to OUALID MONCEF BENOMRANE by AL-THUMAIRY ((F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]).

For background information, BENOMRANE advised that he had heard that the two Saudi males had arrived at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and were taken to an apartment that already had been rented for them. The apartment was identified by BENOMRANE as having been at the Avalon Westside Terrace Apartments. According to BENOMRANE, AL-THUMAIRY asked BENOMRANE to assist the two Saudi males during their time in Los Angeles because they could not speak English. BENOMRANE agreed and gave his taxicab business card to the two Saudi males. BENOMRANE advised that over the next few days after meeting the two Saudi males, he drove them on two separate occasions around the Los Angeles area and to Sea World in San Diego. BENOMRANE was not able to provide a specific date or time period of when he met the two Saudi males, other than advising that it happened before 09/11/2001. BENOMRANE also advised that the two Saudi males spent approximately one month in Los Angeles.

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BENOMRANE advised that he had been told by AL-THUMAIRY that the two Saudi males were in Los Angeles to visit their sick father. BENOMRANE first advised that their father was in a local hospital; BENOMRANE later stated that their father stayed in their apartment and that their father had accompanied them on the day that BENOMRANE drove the two Saudi males around the Los Angeles area. [Note: To date, there is no evidence or intelligence indicating that the father of either KHALID AL-MIHDHAR or NAWAF AL-HAZMI, or another elder male individual, accompanied AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to Los Angeles].

In order to assist in the identification of the two Saudi Arabian males who reportedly were introduced to BENOMRANE by AL-THUMAIRY, and to confirm or deny if they were in fact KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI, additional investigation was conducted in Los Angeles. Due to BENOMRANE's reporting that the Saudi males were taken to an apartment that already had been rented for them, there has been speculation that AL-THUMAIRY had been the individual responsible for having rented their apartment at the Avalon Terrace Westside. Investigation thus determined that AL-THUMAIRY simultaneously rented two apartments at the Avalon Terrace Westside during the summer of 2001; specifically, AL-THUMAIRY rented apartment (P) from 07/03/2001 to 08/15/2001 and also rented apartment (P) from 07/10/2001 to 08/14/2001.

When interviewed by the 9/11 Commission, among other areas of questioning, AL-THUMAIRY was asked about any

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individuals whom he knew to have traveled to Los Angeles to obtain medical treatment and any individuals whom he may have assisted with lodging or other necessities while in Los Angeles. AL-THUMAIRY advised that as a result of his positions at the Saudi Arabian Consulate and at the King Fahad Mosque, he sometimes was asked for guidance in such matters (i.e. lodging) for visiting Saudi Arabian citizens. AL-THUMAIRY recalled that (P-1) [phonetic] traveled with his ill father [NFI] from Saudi Arabia to Los Angeles in approximately 1999 to receive treatment at the UCLA Medical Center. (P-1) and his father had visited the King Fahad Mosque and had asked AL-THUMAIRY for advice regarding where to reside while in Los Angeles. AL-THUMAIRY made recommendations to (P-1) and his father regarding geographic areas in which they could reside. AL-THUMAIRY did not know where (P-1) and his father ultimately resided, but knew that they had stayed near UCLA Medical Center. AL-THUMAIRY advised that (P-1) and his father stayed in Los Angeles for approximately three months.

AL-THUMAIRY also recalled that (P-1) [phonetic] traveled to Los Angeles to obtain medical treatment at UCLA Medical Center, although AL-THUMAIRY could not provide any date of (P-1)'s visit. (P-1) resided at the Avalon Terrace Westside with his family, to include his four or five children. AL-THUMAIRY advised that he did not assist (P-1) in obtaining the apartment lease at Avalon Terrace Westside.

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Re: [REDACTED] (F) 04/20/2004

AL-THUMAIRY was asked about any individuals for whom he rented apartments at Avalon Terrace Westside, specifically, during the summer of 2001 when AL-THUMAIRY rented apartment 135 from 07/03/2001 to 08/15/2001 and apartment 120 from 07/10/2001 to 08/14/2001. AL-THUMAIRY initially did not recall having arranged the rental of an apartment at Avalon Terrace Westside for anyone other than himself during the summer of 2001; however, AL-THUMAIRY telephonically contacted the Saudi Mabahith on the day following his interview and advised that he had recalled more information regarding his rental of apartments during the summer of 2001. AL-THUMAIRY was asked to return in order to provide this information, which he did on the night of 02/24/2004.

AL-THUMAIRY advised that he received a telephone call during the summer of 2001 from [REDACTED] (P-1) [phonetic] in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. [REDACTED] (P-1) informed AL-THUMAIRY that he was traveling to Los Angeles to receive a liver transplant at UCLA Medical Center and needed a place to stay, preferably with a kitchen, with his son. AL-THUMAIRY recalled the name of [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P-1)'s son to be either [REDACTED] (P-1) or [REDACTED] (P-1). [REDACTED] (P-1) and his son arrived in Los Angeles approximately one week after the telephone call.

AL-THUMAIRY stated that he arranged the rental of an apartment at Avalon Terrace Westside for [REDACTED] (P-1) and his son [Writer's Note: as stated above, AL-THUMAIRY rented apartment 135 from 07/03/2001 to 08/15/2001 and also rented apartment 120

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from 07/10/2001 to 08/14/2001]. AL-THUMAIRY signed the rental contract and wrote a check to pay for the initial rent payment, and informed the leasing office that someone else would be residing in the apartment. (P-1) and his son reimbursed AL-THUMAIRY by depositing either cash or traveler's check into AL-THUMAIRY's Wells Fargo Bank account.

A search of ACS, conducted by writer, revealed two accounts held by AL-THUMAIRY at Wells Fargo Bank. A summary of Wells Fargo Bank account number (P-1) for the period 06/10/1999 through 11/15/2002 did not appear to reflect any transactions that could be attributed to either the rental check paid by AL-THUMAIRY to Avalon Terrace Westside Apartments or the reimbursement by (P-1) and his son ((F) (F)). A financial analysis chart for Wells Fargo bank account number 0372-419960 was submitted to the case file as an attachment and could not be viewed through ACS ((F) (F)).

(P-1) visited UCLA Medical Center and was told by the medical staff to return to Saudi Arabia because he was not ready for the liver transplant. (P-1) and his son resided in the apartment at Avalon Terrace Westside for approximately one and one-half months. Before they returned to Saudi Arabia, (P-1) and his son accompanied AL-THUMAIRY to the leasing office to terminate the lease. AL-THUMAIRY advised that he also returned to Saudi Arabia soon after, on approximately 08/20/2001. He subsequently learned that (P-1) passed away

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before returning to UCLA Medical Center for the liver transplant.

While the above information is being forwarded for the information of recipients, there is certain information that necessitates follow-up investigation to determine the veracity of AL-THUMAIRY, as well as to determine the identity of the Saudi males who reportedly were introduced to BENOMRANE and any association between the Saudi males and AL-THUMAIRY.

To: From: New York
Re: (F) 04/20/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

For information.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Conduct all appropriate investigation at Avalon Terrace Westside Apartments, 3636 Sepulveda Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, 90034, to include a review of rental records and interviews of leasing office personnel, to determine if an individual named (P-1) [phonetic] resided there with his family of four or five children.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

LOS ANGELES

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 04/20/2004

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Conduct all appropriate investigation at Avalon Terrace Westside Apartments, 3636 Sepulveda Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, 90034, to include a review of rental records and interviews of leasing office personnel, to determine if FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY rented an apartment for (P-1) [phonetic] and his son during the summer of 2001 (specifically, determine if AL-THUMAIRY's rental of either apartment (P-1) from 07/03/2001 to 08/15/2001 or apartment (P-1) from 07/10/2001 to 08/14/2001 was actually for (P-1) and his son).

Set Lead 4: (Action)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Conduct all appropriate investigation at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) Medical Center to determine if (P-1) [phonetic] visited from Saudi Arabia in the summer of 2001 for a liver transplant consultation.

Set Lead 5: (Action)

LOS ANGELES

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 04/20/2004

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Conduct a review of the records of Wells Fargo Bank account # (P-1) to determine if FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY paid the rental fees of (P-1) and his son via check to the Avalon Terrace Westside Apartments in the summer of 2001, and to determine if (P-1) and his son reimbursed AL-THUMAIRY via deposit of cash or traveler's check to the same bank account ((F) which includes a financial analysis chart for Wells Fargo bank account # (P-1) .

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/12/2009

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

(G), (S)

International Operations

Attn:

(G)

Riyadh

Attn:

(G)

San Diego

Attn:

(S)

New York

Attn:

(S)

From: New York

(G)

Contact:

(S)

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

(S)

Case ID #:

(F)

Title:

OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI

(A), (G), (J-1)

FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY

(A), (G), (J-1)

OPERATION ENCORE

(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis:

Initiate a Full Investigation (FI) on OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI.

(G)

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Enclosure(s): [REDACTED] 1 - Opening LHM

Full Investigation Initiated: 08/12/2009

Reference: [REDACTED] (F) OPERATION ENCORE, [REDACTED] (F)
[REDACTED] (F) FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, [REDACTED] (F)

Details: [REDACTED] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case.

[REDACTED] Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened.

Writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[REDACTED] Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[REDACTED] Results: Over the past two years, writers have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

Exploitation of Muslim Community: (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A), (G), (J-1)
AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-providing individual, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see (F)
(F) [REDACTED] At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-providing individual or to whom the tazkia would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P)
[REDACTED] believed that it likely would have involved someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F)
(F) [REDACTED]). It is important to note that the individual to whom the tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[REDACTED] One individual meeting such description who is also reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, (F) [REDACTED] AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F) [REDACTED] Additional documentation from the Saudi Mabahith, however, described AL-THUMARY as "a Saudi National and representative of the KSA'S Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and Religious Guidance" (F) [REDACTED]. AL-THUMARY was previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division based on his association with another individual believed to have provided assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI identified as OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. Telephone analysis shows a connection between AL-THUMAIRY, the two hijackers, and AL-BAYOUMI. A review of PENTTBOM case file does

[REDACTED]

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not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY or AL BAYOUMI as a potential "tazkia" contacts for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to have been unknown at such time.

[REDACTED] OMAR AHMED MUSTAFA AL-BAYOUMI, date of birth (P-1) 1957, place of birth Alhajra, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian passport (P-1) social security account number (P-1) first came to the attention of the FBI in 1998 when a complainant telephonically contacted FBI San Diego on 08/31/1998 to report information regarding AL-BAYOUMI and his wife MANAL BAGADER (reference (F) [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] The complainant advised that AL-BAYOUMI had received a suspicious package from the Middle East on 03/03/1998. In addition, the complainant advised that there had been large gatherings of males in the apartment of AL-BAYOUMI. As a result of these reports, a preliminary inquiry was initiated on AL-BAYOUMI on 09/08/1998.

[REDACTED] The preliminary inquiry did not uncover any information regarding AL-BAYOUMI to justify conversion into a full investigation. When interviewed, the local Postal Inspector advised that the package was listed as "suspicious" because it arrived without postage or paperwork. Therefore, upon completion of the preliminary inquiry, the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI was closed on 06/07/1999 (reference (F) [REDACTED]).

[REDACTED] Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that two of the hijackers aboard AA77, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, had resided at Parkwood Apartments, (P) [REDACTED], 6401 Mount Ada Road (also listed as 6333 Mount Ada Road), San Diego, California, between 02/2000 and 05/2000. Rental records obtained from Parkwood Apartments revealed that AL-BAYOUMI had co-signed the apartment lease agreement for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR.

Upon receipt of this information, efforts commenced to fully identify and locate AL-BAYOUMI. AL-BAYOUMI was located in Birmingham, England, where he was residing with his family and attending Aston University.

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY) on 09/20/2001 under United Kingdom (UK) Terrorism Act 2000, Prevention of Terrorism. From 09/22/2001 to 09/28/2001, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed by NSY. On 09/28/2001, AL-BAYOUMI was released from custody without charges, as NSY could not allege any criminal activity on his part that would substantiate a continuation of his detention beyond the period authorized. (C-2) [REDACTED]

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(C-2)

AL-BAYOUMI moved from England to Saudi Arabia in 08/2002 and was interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith in approximately 10/2002. In 08/2003, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed in Saudi Arabia by members of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team (reference (F)). AL-BAYOUMI was also interviewed in Saudi Arabia by representatives of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission"), in the presence of the FBI, in 10/2003.

FBI investigation has determined that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI possibly assisted NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) upon their arrival in the San Diego, California, area in early 02/2000. In response to interviews conducted and intelligence gathering, and to provide a comprehensive summary of the investigation to date, the following details of the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI are provided. These details include information garnered from the interviews of AL-BAYOUMI conducted by the FBI, the Saudi Mabahith, and New Scotland Yard (NSY), as well as independent investigation into the associations and activities of AL-BAYOUMI while residing in the United States.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

AL-BAYOUMI first traveled to the United States on 08/01/1993 using Saudi Arabian passport # (P-1). On 06/06/1995, AL-BAYOUMI returned to the United States at Los Angeles, California. AL-BAYOUMI entered at that time on a (J-3) using Saudi Arabian passport # (P-1) with an intended address of (P) Beadnell Way, Apartment (P), San Diego, California (reference (F)). AL-BAYOUMI and his family resided at this address until relocating to (P) Beadnell Way, Apartment (P) San Diego, California, in 02/1996. In the summer of 1999, AL-BAYOUMI and his family moved to Parkwood Apartments, (P) (P) Mount Ada Road, San Diego, California.

AL-BAYOUMI returned to Saudi Arabia from 03/21/2000 to 05/31/2000. AL-BAYOUMI then resided with his family in San Diego until the fall of 2000, at which time he relocated to England and enrolled at Aston University in Birmingham. AL-BAYOUMI's wife and children remained in San Diego until 06/2001 when they moved to join AL-BAYOUMI in England. AL-BAYOUMI again traveled to Saudi Arabia from 06/26/2001 to 07/16/2001, then returned to Birmingham, England,

[REDACTED]

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where he and his family resided until moving to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 08/2002.

EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION OF AL-BAYOUMI

[REDACTED] Since approximately 1977, AL-BAYOUMI has been employed with the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA). Employment records indicate that AL-BAYOUMI was employed from 1977 to 1981 as an Aviation Fees Checker; from 1981 to 1982 as a Budget Clerk; from 1982 to 1986 as an Accounts Checker; from 1986 to 1992 as a Section Head; and from 1992 to 1995 as an Accountant (reference (F) [REDACTED]). In 1995, AL-BAYOUMI traveled to the United States to attend English language school and graduate school in California. While in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI retained his employment with the PCA through a process known as "Saudization", a national initiative in Saudi Arabia to educate Saudi Arabian citizens in order for citizens to retain and/or assume positions within the workforce (reference (F) [REDACTED]). Based on this program, AL-BAYOUMI was reassigned as a Senior Data Processing Technician at the Dallah Avco Trans Arabia Company (Dallah Avco), a contractor of the PCA.

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI had graduated from King Abdul Aziz University in 08/1988 with a Bachelor's degree in Administrative Science. Upon his arrival in the United States in 1995, AL-BAYOUMI attended English classes at the American Language Institute at San Diego State University and then enrolled at West Coast University (WCU). After WCU closed down, AL-BAYOUMI enrolled at United States International University (now known as Alliant International University) in 01/1997. AL-BAYOUMI graduated from United States International University in 12/1997 with a Master's degree in International Business Administration (reference (F) [REDACTED]). [REDACTED] (F) AL-BAYOUMI subsequently enrolled in the Keller Graduate School/Becker CPA Review, where he attended CPA review classes in 1998 and 1999 (reference (F) [REDACTED]). [REDACTED] (F) AL-BAYOUMI did not complete either of these classes and therefore did not receive any credits. In 03/2000, AL-BAYOUMI obtained a certificate for attendance at George Washington University, ESI International Project Management seminar.

[REDACTED] While attending school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive a salary. In addition to his base salary, AL-BAYOUMI also received an allowance for housing, transportation, and other expenses. In 04/2000, this allowance increased from 1,742 Saudi Riyals (USD 465) to 14,271 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,805), and stayed at that level until 12/2000. In 01/2001, the allowance was slightly reduced to 12,852 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,427),

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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and remained at this level until the allowance payments ceased in 08/2001 [Note: the time frame of increased payments to AL-BAYOUMI does not correspond to the dates that hijackers NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR resided in San Diego]. Review of employment records obtained from the PCA indicates that AL-BAYOUMI received a promotion in 04/2000, and his contract status also was changed from "single" to "married" at that time. As a result, his salary and allowance were both increased.

[REDACTED] When applying for school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI had provided a letter from [REDACTED] (P) stating that AL-BAYOUMI was being supported while in the United States. (P) [REDACTED] was also listed as "sponsor" on AL-BAYOUMI's Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Form I-20. When interviewed, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], owner of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], advised that [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] had been a subcontractor of Dallah Avco and the PCA and that he was asked to provide the letter of support concerning AL-BAYOUMI. Review of employment records during the time that AL-BAYOUMI was in the United States indicated that AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive his salary and allowance through Dallah Avco.

[REDACTED] In addition to attending school in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI acted as the manager/facilities supervisor of the Al Medina Al-Munarawah Mosque, also known as the Kurdish Islamic Center, 511 South Magnolia, El Cajon, California. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he had been contacted by SAAD AL-HABIB regarding the local mosque used by the Kurdish population. AL-HABIB, a Saudi Arabian who had attended school in San Diego, informed AL-BAYOUMI that he was interested in funding a new mosque for the Kurdish community because the mosque was located in a small building without a parking lot. AL-HABIB asked AL-BAYOUMI to assist in acquiring a larger building to house the mosque, to which AL-BAYOUMI agreed. AL-BAYOUMI subsequently looked for and obtained a building in El Cajon, California, that included a parking lot. AL-HABIB provided all of the money to AL-BAYOUMI to purchase the building, to include the USD 10,000 for which AL-BAYOUMI then wrote a check for the initial down payment. As manager/facilities supervisor, AL-BAYOUMI kept an office at the mosque. AL-BAYOUMI advised that the position was on a volunteer basis and that he was not paid for his work at the mosque.

VISIT TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN CONSULATE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

[REDACTED] On approximately 02/01/2000, AL-BAYOUMI traveled by car from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles in order to renew his passport. AL-BAYOUMI was accompanied on this trip by KAYSAN BIN DON, an associate from San Diego. BIN DON, (P) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(P) [REDACTED], was invited by AL-BAYOUMI on the previous day to travel with him to Los Angeles (reference (F) [REDACTED]). A day or so before traveling to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI asked BIN DON if he wanted to accompany him, so that AL-BAYOUMI could take BIN DON to visit the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) (a well-known mosque, according to BIN DON). BIN DON stated that this trip would have been around the end of January as it was soon after the end of Ramadan (which ended in the middle of January in 2000) when they went to Los Angeles. Upon arriving at the Consulate, AL-BAYOUMI submitted his passport renewal documents and also obtained some Islamic books from the Islamic Affairs section to bring back to the mosque that he managed in San Diego. To date, the individual(s) with whom AL-BAYOUMI met at the Consulate are not known.

(P-1) [REDACTED] A copy of AL-BAYOUMI's Saudi Arabian passport, recovered during the search of his residence in England, revealed that the passport was issued on 02/01/2000 in Los Angeles, California (reference (F) [REDACTED]).

THE MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET RESTAURANT

[REDACTED] When inviting BIN DON to accompany him to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI told BIN DON of a halal restaurant at which they could eat lunch following their visit to the Consulate. After leaving the Consulate the following day, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON went to the restaurant where they discovered that the restaurant had been converted into a Middle Eastern butcher shop that no longer served meals. The butcher shop employees recommended another nearby halal restaurant, the Mediterranean Gourmet, to which AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON proceeded on foot.

[REDACTED] While eating lunch at this second restaurant, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON met AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he overheard two males speaking Arabic in the restaurant. Thinking that they sounded from the Gulf region, AL-BAYOUMI introduced himself and asked the two males where they were from. The two males introduced themselves as KHALID and NAWAF, and stated that they were from Saudi Arabia and were in the United States to learn English but did not like living in Los Angeles because they were having a difficult time and did not know anyone.

AL-BAYOUMI recommended San Diego as a nice place to live; he provided AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR with his telephone number and offered to help them if they ever traveled there. AL-BAYOUMI stated the meeting was approximately 5 minutes in length.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] During an interview of KAYSAN BIN DON by the writer on 8/2/2007 he advised that he and AL-BAYOUMI did the first prayer of the day at the ICSD and then around 10am or so they left for Los Angeles. BIN DON stated that he is sure they didn't get to Los Angeles until after 12 because he remembers discussing with AL-BAYOUMI a special allowance for traveling Muslims, which allows them to combine the second prayer (which takes place after the apex of the sun, i.e. around noon) and third prayer (which takes place a few hours after that during the winter months) of the day. BIN DON stated that they assumed they would have to do this since they were still on the road when they should have performed their second prayer.

[REDACTED] BIN DON stated that when they arrived in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, AL-BAYOUMI first drove around Santa Monica looking for a halal restaurant AL-BAYOUMI had eaten at before with his son. After failing to locate it, AL-BAYOUMI drove to the Saudi Consulate. At the consulate AL-BAYOUMI met with a male individual unknown to BIN DON and spoke with him in Arabic. BIN DON described this individual as being in his 40s or 50s, bald, a Tunisian citizen, and at that time was giving lectures at the KFM. BIN DON stated this unknown individual and AL-BAYOUMI embraced and then went into a room and closed the door. After approximately twenty minutes, AL-BAYOUMI emerged from the room and he and BIN DON subsequently left. BIN DON did not recall seeing AL-BAYOUMI's passport at such time but assumes he had it as that was the stated purpose of their trip to Los Angeles.

[REDACTED] Writers queried BIN DON to give an honest assessment of his Arabic language skills at the time. BIN DON in response held up his hand in the shape of a "zero." BIN DON added that he had basically no understanding besides being able to exchange "hello's" and "good bye's."

[REDACTED]

(P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After visiting the consulate, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON proceeded to the KFM. BIN DON advised that they did not attend an organized prayer session but merely prayed alone for five or ten minutes. Writers queried if AL-BAYOUMI showed BIN DON around the KFM, as that was ostensibly the reason BIN DON came to Los Angeles. BIN DON commented that they were in "hurry" because it had taken

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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so long to drive up to Los Angeles, so there wasn't time. Writers queried if BIN DON or AL-BAYOUMI was in "hurry," to which BIN DON replied, "I guess AL-BAYOUMI." BIN DON could not fully explain why they were in a hurry since they had already taken care of the visa issue, but offered that they had not eaten yet so they needed to hurry. Before leaving the KFM, AL-BAYOUMI spoke with an unknown individual. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON, stating that AL-BAYOUMI was asking for a suggestion of where to eat. AL-BAYOUMI translated that AL-BAYOUMI had been told there was a restaurant on "Venice Boulevard right around here."

[REDACTED] BIN DON and AL-BAYOUMI left the KFM and parked off of Venice Boulevard, just to the east of the two restaurants they entered. The first restaurant they entered was named, "something like 'Mediterranean Deli.'" Upon entering, AL-BAYOUMI spoke to the proprietor of the establishment in Arabic, which AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON as "he said they 'don't serve sit down meals.'"

AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON then walked a "couple of store fronts" to another restaurant that BIN DON believed was "in the same building" as the first restaurant. This restaurant was named "Mediterranean Restaurant," according to BIN DON. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON entered, went up to the counter, ordered and then sat at a table next to the front window while they waited for their food to be prepared.

[REDACTED] After approximately five to ten minutes, two men, BIN DON now knows to be AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR entered the restaurant and proceeded to the front counter. BIN DON described the front counter as being about "30 to 40 feet" away from the table at which he and AL-BAYOUMI were sitting. BIN DON advised that neither he nor AL-BAYOUMI could hear AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR talking from where they were sitting. BIN DON indicated that AL-BAYOUMI was staring at them from the time they entered the restaurant. BIN DON stated that he believed that this was because AL-BAYOUMI could not tell if the two men were Arab or Hispanic. Writers queried whether AL-BAYOUMI ever stated this or gave any information to indicate that this is why he was staring. BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI did not give any such indication but added that "that must have been why he was staring."

[REDACTED] BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI then went up to the counter and began talking with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. The three of them then proceeded to the front table near the window and sat down with BIN DON. BIN DON indicated that the entire conversation was in Arabic and so he was dependent on AL-BAYOUMI for any information as to topics being discussed. The three talked for thirty minutes to an hour and then exchanged telephone numbers. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were currently

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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living in an apartment nearby but that he had invited them to come to San Diego since AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR did not like Los Angeles.

BIN DON added that he believed that AL-BAYOUMI gave his cell phone number and AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR gave a land-line number. These assumptions are based on the fact that "most Muslim men only give their cell numbers out," because they don't want to risk someone calling their home and their wife answering and the fact that BIN DON did not believe AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR had time to get a cell phone as they had been in the U.S. "only a couple of days."

[REDACTED] After exchanging phone numbers, the four separated with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR walking off together and AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON returning to their car. BIN DON stated that he did not see where or which direction AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR went. However, before returning to the car, AL-BAYOUMI wanted to stop at a small grocery store that was about fifty yards from the car. They walked around inside for a few minutes and then without buying anything, returned to the car.

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI then drove back to the KFM, where he and BIN DON prayed for five to ten minutes. Again, this prayer was not part of an organized prayer session at the KFM. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON prayed alone and then left the KFM to return to San Diego. BIN DON guessed that it would have been after five o'clock and probably closer to six, as it was "fully dark" outside when they began the trip back to San Diego.

[REDACTED] These events are significant because it shows inconsistencies with AL-BAYOUMI'S account of the meeting between himself and the two hijackers. the most important of these is that during AL-BAYOUMI interview with the PENTTBOM team in Saudi Arabia, he states that he didn't know where the King Fahad Mosque was, and had never been there. The time of the meeting is in question also.

ARRIVAL OF AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR IN SAN DIEGO

[REDACTED] AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived in San Diego a few days after meeting AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON in the restaurant. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), 7050 Eckstrom Avenue, San Diego, California, and asked for him. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR informed AL-BAYOUMI that they were looking to obtain an apartment in the area. AL-BAYOUMI then directed them to the nearby Parkwood Apartment complex at which he resided with his family.

[REDACTED] Investigation has determined that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI initially attempted to obtain an apartment at Parkwood

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Apartments on their own with cash, but could not because they did not have a credit history and because the leasing company did not accept cash payments. On 02/04/2000, AL-BAYOUMI signed as a guarantor and obtained a cashier's check drawn on his Bank of America checking account in the amount of USD 1,558 for their security deposit and first month's rent of Apartment #150. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR immediately provided him with the same amount of cash as the bank check and he then deposited the cash into his account. Financial records indicate that a cash deposit of the same amount as the cashier's check (USD 1,558) was made into AL-BAYOUMI's bank account on the same day, indicating the contemporaneous reimbursement from AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. While at the Bank of America, AL-MIHDHAR also opened bank account #09000-05839 with an initial deposit of USD 9,900. These three transactions - the cashier's check for USD 1,558, the cash deposit of USD 1,558, and the opening of AL-MIHDHAR's account - were all posted within a time period of seven minutes on 02/04/2000. When interviewed, the bank teller who assisted with these transactions was able to corroborate the same information as obtained from the financial records (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]).

[REDACTED] A review of rental records from Parkwood Apartments indicated that in addition to AL-BAYOUMI's signature as guarantor, both AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR listed AL-BAYOUMI's residence (Apartment [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]) as their last address; In addition, the review of rental records as well as bank records indicate that all rental payments (subsequent to the initial security deposit and first month's rent paid by cashier's check from AL-BAYOUMI's bank account.

INSTRUCTION RECEIVED BY AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR

[REDACTED] Information received from KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED (KSM) indicates that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were complying with the directions given to them prior to departing for the United States. According to KSM, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were instructed to make contacts at the local mosques and to request assistance from members of the Muslim community after their arrival in the United States. KSM advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were given such guidance because, unlike some of the other hijackers who spoke English and had spent time in western cultures, neither AL-HAZMI nor AL-MIHDHAR had such language skill and experience (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]).

DINNER PARTY HELD AT PARKWOOD APARTMENT #150

[REDACTED] A few days after arriving in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI had a "welcoming party," as described by BIN DON, for AL-HAZMI and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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AL-MIHDHAR. BIN DON stated that this was the only party AL-BAYOUMI had even organized before and after. Around twenty guests in total attended the party, however, not all were present at the same time. BIN DON video taped the party at AL-BAYOUMI's request. During the taping, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stayed behind BIN DON, as "they didn't want to be on film," NFI. However, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, talked and ate with the other guests. (P)

(P) however, the real purpose was for people "to meet AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR." BIN DON stated that through translation AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR told BIN DON that they were in the U.S. to attend flight school. (P)

(P)

(P)

(P)

If AL-THUMARY and AL-BAYOUMI played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY or AL-BAYOUMI and such unknown individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

<u>TO</u>	<u>PHONE #</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE)	(P)	12/27	12:40
SAE		12/27	12:42
(P)		12/27	14:26
SAE		12/27	14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/27	18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/27	23:36

(P)

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(P)	(P), (P-1)	12/27	23:36
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/28	11:43
(P)		12/28	13:57
		12/28	22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/28	23:02
ANWAR AULAQI		12/28	23:05
(P)		12/28	23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/29	00:20
(P)		12/29	00:35
		12/29	00:39
Unknown		12/29	12:54
(P)		12/29	13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque		12/29	13:07
ANWAR AULAQI		12/29	13:07
Unknown		12/29	13:48

(P) Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

(P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number (P) which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while living at the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact with the telephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between (P) telephone

[REDACTED]

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number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[REDACTED] According to TA, AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999 there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMAIRY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMAIRY also worked at the Consulate (F) [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99 (possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM (F) [REDACTED]. In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE (F) [REDACTED]. In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[REDACTED] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F) [REDACTED]. The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. (O-1)

(O-1)

(O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] AL-JARRAH travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) [REDACTED] on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several

[REDACTED]

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documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California"

(F) [REDACTED] .

[REDACTED] Moreover, AL-THUMAIRY and AL-BAYOUMI contact with AL-JARRAH did not end after the reported contact above. AL-THUMARY's land line of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] had five additional telephonic contacts with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's cell phone [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.

[REDACTED] However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED], reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few items seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulates that distributed funds and support to extremists, and, it appears in some case, terrorist organizations; 2) there were inexplicable, at least currently, telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI particular OMAR AL-BAYOUMI ; 3) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[REDACTED] **Recruitment:** Although, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, may not have arrived in southern California with an active support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those individual's willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F) [REDACTED]

(F) [REDACTED] Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest.

During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

Predication for the Investigation

[REDACTED] As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) [REDACTED] established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia.

This methodology could possibly be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

[REDACTED] At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 08/12/2009

and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

[REDACTED] Main Subject

Name -	
Last:	AL-BAYOUMI
First:	OMAR
Middle:	AHMED
Race:	W
Sex:	M
DOB:	(P-1) 1957
POB:	Saudi Arabia
SOC:	(P-1)
Alias(es) -	
Last:	AL-BAYOUMI
First:	O
Middle:	A
Current Location:	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Miscellaneous:	Subject is a non-USPER.
[REDACTED] (G)	[REDACTED] (G)

LEAD(s):

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(G) [REDACTED] is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(G) [REDACTED] Coordinate (G) [REDACTED] as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(G) [REDACTED] is requested to process (G) [REDACTED] which is being submitted via email to the (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] and appropriate supported systems.

◆◆

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/19/2009

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

International Operations

Attn: [Redacted] (G)

Riyadh

Attn: [Redacted] (G)

San Diego

Attn: [Redacted] (S)

New York

Attn: [Redacted] (S)

From: New York

[Redacted] (G)
Contact: [Redacted] (S)

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

OPERATION ENCORE
[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [Redacted] Initiate a Full Investigation (FI) on FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY

[Redacted] (G)

Enclosure(s): [Redacted] 1 - Opening LHM

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

Full Investigation Initiated: 02/12/2009

Reference: (F) -OPERATION ENCORE, (F)

Details: Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case.

Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened. Writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

Results: Over the past two years, writers have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

Exploitation of Muslim Community: Multiple (A), (G), (J-1) and other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A), (G), (J-1), AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-providing individual, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (F) (F). At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-providing individual or to whom the tazkia would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it likely would have involved someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F) serial). It is important to note that the individual to whom the tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, (A), (G), (J-1), the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

(G) One individual meeting such description who is also reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case# (F). AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F) Additional documentation from the Saudi Mabahith, however, described AL-THUMARY as "a Saudi National and representative of the KSA'S

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Re: [REDACTED] (F), 02/19/2009

Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and Religious Guidance" ([REDACTED] (F)). AL-THUMARY was previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI through phone calls and AL-THUMARY's potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ([REDACTED] (F)). According to the closing EC ([REDACTED] (F)) and supplemental closing EC ([REDACTED] (F)) the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and practical intelligence collection methods". However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to have been unknown at such time.

[REDACTED] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and such unknown individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[REDACTED] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

<u>TO</u>	<u>PHONE #</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE)	(P)	12/27	12:40
SAE	[REDACTED]	12/27	12:42
[REDACTED] (P)	[REDACTED]	12/27	14:26
SAE	[REDACTED]	12/27	14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[REDACTED]	12/27	18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI	[REDACTED]	12/27	23:36
[REDACTED] (P)	[REDACTED]	12/27	23:36

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Re: (F) 02/19/2009

Islamic Affairs of SAE	(P), (P-1)	12/28	11:43
(P)		12/28	13:57
		12/28	22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/28	23:02
ANWAR AULAQI		12/28	23:05
(P)		12/28	23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/29	00:20
(P)		12/29	00:35
		12/29	00:39
Unknown		12/29	12:54
(P)		12/29	13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque		12/29	13:07
ANWAR AULAQI		12/29	13:07
Unknown		12/29	13:48

(P) Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

(P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

(P) Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number (P) which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while living at

[REDACTED]

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Re: [REDACTED] (F),(G), 02/19/2009

the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact with the telephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between [REDACTED] (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[REDACTED] According to TA, AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999 there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ([REDACTED] (F)).

[REDACTED] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99 (possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY [REDACTED] (F).

[REDACTED] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM ([REDACTED] (F)). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F)). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[REDACTED]

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The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. (O-1)

" (O-1), AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States

(A), (G), (J-1)

AL-JARRAH travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

" (O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1)

(O-1)

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Re: (F) 02/19/2009

(O-1)

On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

Moreover, AL-THUMARY's contact with AL-JARRAH did not end after the reported contact above. AL-THUMARY's land line of (P) had five additional telephonic contacts with (P) (P) the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone (P) had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's cell phone (P) from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.

(A), (G), (J-1) prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients" (F). (F) The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F). (F) During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P) (F), associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), an officer/owner of (P) and president of (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) on his person.

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Re: (F) 02/19/2009

(A), (G), (J-1) indicated that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, a Somali extremist (O-1) case # (F) and was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. NOTE: "AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG)" (F) MOHAMMED, (A), (G), (J-1) received a stipend of approximately (A), (G), (J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F). This stipend was likely administered, because of his particular position by either AL-JARRAH, or one of his subordinates, possibly AL-THUMARY as MOHAMED was located in California.

However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1), "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F)

Finally, the Saudi Arabian telephone number 966-55-857311 is included merely because of its temporal proximity to the other telephone numbers called by AL-THUMARY. At this time the significance of the telephone number or of such contact is unknown.

The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few items seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulates that distributed funds and support to extremists, and, it appears in some case, terrorist organizations; 2) there were inexplicable, at least currently, telephonic connections between AL-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and

[REDACTED]

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Re: (F) [REDACTED] 02/19/2009

AL-HAZMI; 3) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

Recruitment: Although, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, may not have arrived in southern California with an active support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those individual's willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

Predication for the Investigation

As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) [REDACTED] established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia. This methodology could possible be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

Main Subject

Name -
Last: AL-THUMARY
First: FAHAD
Middle: I. A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P) 1971
POB: Saudi Arabia
PNO: (P) Official)
SOC: (P)
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-THUMAIRY
First: FN
Middle: MN
Phone #: (P)
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 02/19/2009

Miscellaneous:
[REDACTED] (G)

Subject is a non-USPER.
[REDACTED] (G)

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Coordinate [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 02/19/2009

AT WASHINGTON, DC

The [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to process the [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] which is being submitted via email to the [REDACTED] (G) mailbox at [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] and appropriate supported systems.

◆◆

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/27/2009

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: (G)

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

Intelligence Directorate

Attn:

Attn:

From: New York

(G)

Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: MUSAED AL-JARRAH (A)(G)(J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: To open captioned Full Investigation, document transmission of (G) and request a (G)

(G)

Enclosure(s): (1)the electronic (F)

Full Investigation Initiated: 10/27/2009

Details: New York Office opened captioned Full Investigation based on information that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, former director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian Embassy, is or was part of a group that may have provided support to two (2) of the 9/11 hijackers. Through NYO Operation Encore investigation, more information has surfaced indicating AL-JARRAH's connection to international terrorism.

[Redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/27/2009

By way of background, over the past two years under Operation Encore, NYO sought to gain a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

As a result, NYO Agents interviewed multiple individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

(A), (G), (J-1) other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A), (G), (J-1) AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-provider, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see (F) (F))

At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-provider or to whom the tazkia-provider would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it was likely a person or multiple persons who had access to both the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F) (F)). It is important to note that the individual to whom AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were directed, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact,

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED], the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[REDACTED] One individual reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case # [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. Above captioned subject, AL-JARRAH, has multiple telephonic contacts, with AL-THUMARY. AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). Additional documentation from the Saudi Mabahith, however, described AL-THUMARY as "a Saudi National and representative of the KSA'S Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and Religious Guidance" ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). AL-THUMARY was previously a main subject of an FI based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (through phone connectivity) and his (AL-THUMARY's) potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]).

[REDACTED] According to the closing EC for AL-THUMARY ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]) and supplemental closing EC [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and practical intelligence collection methods" and iii) the U.S. Attorney's Office conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute AL-THUMARY at such time. However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol, as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community, appears to have been unknown at such time.

[REDACTED] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another individual(s), there may have been telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and such individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY's known telephone records for the time period immediately

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/27/2009

prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

<u>TO</u>	<u>PHONE #</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE)	(P), (P-1)	12/27	12:40
SAE		12/27	12:42
(P)		12/27	14:26
SAE		12/27	14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/27	18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/27	23:36
(P)		12/27	23:36
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/28	11:43
(P)		12/28	13:57
		12/28	22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI		12/28	23:02
ANWAR AULAQI		12/28	23:05
(P)		12/28	23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE		12/29	00:20
(P)		12/29	00:35
		12/29	00:39
Unknown		12/29	12:54
(P)		12/29	13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque		12/29	13:07
ANWAR AULAQI		12/29	13:07
Unknown		12/29	13:48

Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (main subject of (F)). (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/27/2009

[REDACTED] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

[REDACTED] Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the main PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number [REDACTED] (P) which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while he lived at the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact with telephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between [REDACTED] (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[REDACTED] According to Telephone Applications (TA), AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999, there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ([REDACTED] (F)).

[REDACTED] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
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(possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY (F).

The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM (F). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE (F). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. AL-JARRAH currently believed to be residing in Malaysia. (O-1)

(O-1) AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States

(A), (G), (J-1)

AL-JARRAH

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/27/2009

travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1)

(O-1)

On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

Moreover, AL-THUMARY's contact with AL-JARRAH did not end after the reported contact above. AL-THUMARY's land line of (P) had five additional telephonic contacts with (P) (P), the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell phone (P) had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's cell phone (P) from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.

(A), (G), (J-1) prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/27/2009

Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients" (F)
(F) The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F)
(A), (G), (J-1) During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P)
(A), (G), (J-1) and the (P) owned by (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. (P) also the president of (P) had previously been associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI). At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) (P) on his person.

(A), (G), (J-1) indicated that MOHAMED, a Somali extremist who immigrated from Toronto, Canada to San Diego, California in 1995 (case # (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. MOHAMED was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F). NOTE: AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization which rose to power in the early 1990s (according to DHS's Terrorist Reference Guide from 2004) and is designated a (G) terrorist group on the FBI's (G) MOHAMMED (A), (G), (J-1) received a stipend of approximately (A), (G), (J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F) (F) Based on some of the above (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) it seems likely this stipend was administered by AL-THUMARY or AL-JARRAH.

However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F)

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

[REDACTED] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few things seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulate(s); 2) this network is reported to have had the purpose of distributing funds and support to sunni salafist extremists; 3) there were inexplicable telephonic connections between AL-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI; and 4) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[REDACTED] AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI do not appear to have arrived in southern California with an active local support network. However, it appears that once AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were vouched for, via tazkia, they may have begun to assess individual's suitability for recruitment. Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]).

Predication for the Investigation

[REDACTED] The above information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals, including AL-JARRAH, compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Suspected Foreign Power

[REDACTED] At this point in the investigation, there are a number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Pertinent Sensitive Investigative Matters:

[REDACTED] Not Applicable


(G)



Number of Subjects: 1

(G) Code:

(G)



Descriptive Data:

[REDACTED] Main Subject

Name -

Last: AL-JARRAH

First: MUSAED

Middle: A.

Race: W

Sex: M

DOB: (P-1) 1960

POB: Saudi Arabia

Phone #: Previous -

202-342-3700, 202-944-3192.

(P)

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

Current -

[REDACTED] (P-1)

Current Location: Malaysia
Miscellaneous - [REDACTED]
(G)

Subject is a non-USPER.

[REDACTED] (F)

E-mail Addresses:

[REDACTED] (P-1)

Additional Information/ Intelligence:

[REDACTED] Not Applicable

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] To notify of the initiation of captioned FI.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Coordinate [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] as required based on information in the Details above.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Action)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) Process the [REDACTED] (G) which is being
submitted via email to the [REDACTED] (G) mailbox at [REDACTED] (G)
[REDACTED] and appropriate supported systems.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) : Read and clear.

Set Lead 8: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) Read and clear.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/24/2007

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: (G) [redacted]
SSA (S) [redacted]
IA (S) [redacted]

Denver

Attn: Colorado Springs RA
(G) [redacted]
SSA (S) [redacted]
SA (S) [redacted]

From: Los Angeles

(G) [redacted]
Contact: SA [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: (G) PENTTBOM LEADS AND RELATED INVESTIGATION

Synopsis: To request Denver SAC Concurrence for two Los Angeles agents to travel to Colorado Springs and interview [redacted] (P) on 10/15/2007.

[redacted] (G) [redacted]

Administrative: 08/24/2007 Email between SA [redacted] (S) and SA [redacted] (S) on the procedures to interview [redacted] (P) 09/18/2007 Telcal with [redacted] (P).

Details: By way of background, in 2004, in order to determine if FBI-San Diego subject MOHDAR ABDULLAH's [redacted] (F) immigration cell mates' allegations that ABDULLAH had advance knowledge of 9/11, FBI-LA began reviewing ABDULLAH's connections in Los Angeles, because 1) it was known that he had driven 9/11 hijacker's Khaled AL-MIHDHAR and Nawaf AL-HAZMI (American Airlines #77 that crashed into the Pentagon) to Los Angeles on

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 09/24/2007

06/09/2000 and 2) AL-MIHDHAR's and ALHAZMI's whereabouts in Los Angeles for a two week period between 01/15/2000 and 02/04/2000 were still unknown.

[REDACTED] During the investigation, FBI-LA identified video surveillance footage from Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) security cameras for 06/10/2000. The video surveillance footage is believed to show ABDULLAH and AL-HAZMI walking with AL-MIHDHAR at LAX before AL-MIHDHAR's return trip to Yemen to visit his family. More importantly, this footage also shows one additional unknown male subject (UNSUB) who appears to be accompanying ABDULLAH, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR through LAX security. The UNSUB appears to be holding a camera and may have been conducting reconnaissance of LAX. To date, FBI-LA investigation has not identified the UNSUB.

[REDACTED] 09/11/2006, NBC Today and MSNBC ran a news story on ABDULLAH that stated, "the FBI has now renewed its investigation of a man the 9/11 Commission said was perfectly suited to help the hijackers with their mission. . .NBC News has learned that the renewed FBI investigation was triggered in part by surveillance videotapes inside the Los Angeles Airport shot in June 2000 - a year before 9/11. Law Enforcement officials tell NBC the grainy tapes show terrorist Nawaf al-Hazmi with Abdullah and an unidentified man. Sources say the men appear to be scouting out the airport. Some FBI agents believe that one of the men may be holding a video camera and rotates in a circle while secretly videotaping the security area. . . Why didn't they find these tapes until 2004 isn't known - especially since the FBI knew that on the day the tapes were shot in June 2000, one of the hijackers went to Los Angeles Airport for a flight home to Yemen. Critics are certain to questions whether the FBI again missed an important clue, and let a possible accomplice get away."

[REDACTED] Per [REDACTED] (F), on approximately 09/29/2006, San Diego AUSA [REDACTED] (S) advised he received an unsolicited telephone call from [REDACTED] (P), a reporter for the San Diego Union Tribune. During their conversation, which centered on the upcoming sentencing of an individual convicted of a terrorism hoax, [REDACTED] (P) advised she had recently been in e-mail contact with ABDULLAH (currently believed to be in Yemen.) [REDACTED] (P) advised she asked ABDULLAH about the recent NBC news article published on 09/11/2006 regarding ABDULLAH's role in helping 9/11 hijackers Nawaf AL-HAZMI and Khalid AL-MIHDHAR. (Note - [REDACTED] (P) has reported extensively on San Diego 9/11 subjects and associates.)

[REDACTED] (P) advised that ABDULLAH did not answer any of her specific questions but related the following points:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 09/24/2007

- the video corroborates what he has told the FBI from the beginning.

- [REDACTED] (P) should contact [REDACTED] (P) if she wants to interview him (ABDULLAH.)

[REDACTED] (P) On 10/03/2006, AUSA [REDACTED] (S) was again contacted by [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) advised that she had received a second e-mail from ABDULLAH. [REDACTED] (P) advised that ABUDALLAH related the following points:

- regarding this notorious story, the video corroborates what he has told the FBI from the beginning.

- the other individual in the video was either a friend of AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR and was residing in Los Angeles at the time (06/10/2000).

- ABDULLAH was introduced to this individual on a previous occasion when this individual traveled down to San Diego to visit.

- this individual was residing in Los Angeles and the two hijackers knew the individual prior to going to San Diego.

[REDACTED] Los Angeles initiated the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) investigation to determine if there was a possible Yemeni cell in Los Angeles that assisted the 9/11 hijackers while they were in California. Los Angeles identified Yemeni students were holding meetings during 2000/2001 on Friday evenings in Long Beach, California. 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Al-Hazmi had attended at least one of these meetings, as well as MOHDAR ABDULLAH, RAMEZ NOAMAN [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), WALID ALHUSSAINI [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1).

[REDACTED] The 9/11 investigation and related investigations have identified many Yemeni nationals with links to known Al-Qaeda operatives or individuals who are suspected of being associated with terrorists and/or terrorist activities, including: AL-MIHDHAR (a Saudi of Yemeni descent); Ramzi Binalshib (Binalshib); Tawfiz Mohammed Bin Saleh Bin Rasyayd Bin Attash aka Khallad (Bin Atash); Abu Bara Al-Taizi aka Suhail Shurabi aka Baraka; and Anwar Aulaqi (AULAQI) [REDACTED] (F). Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) stated during interviews that at

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 09/24/2007

least 20% of the people in Al-Qaeda training camps were Yemeni.

[REDACTED] As the LAX UNSUB is still unidentified, FBI-Los Angeles wishes to show the LAX "still" photographs of the UNSUB to [REDACTED] (P), in the hopes he can identify the subject. This belief is based on the following:

- [REDACTED] (P) traveled to [REDACTED] (P) on a couple of occasions to attend various Islamic schools. During his studies in [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P) became acquainted with individuals who had fought with the mujahideen in Afghanistan during the 1980's conflict with the Soviets.

- [REDACTED] (P) was a close associate of KHALID JBAlHI, aka KHALID AL-BULUWI aka ABU MU'AZ. JBAlHI is currently in Saudi Arabian custody for his participation in the 2003 Riyadh bombings. Investigations have determined that JBAlHI, while in the United States, was an Al-Qaeda recruiter. JBAlHI attempted to recruit at least one individual in Los Angeles to attend the AL-FAROOQ terrorist training camp. In addition, JBAlHI attended the AL-FAROOQ terrorist training camp.

- [REDACTED] (P) attended the [REDACTED] (P) terrorist training camp and assisted DoD [REDACTED] (O-1) in identifying many other terrorist members. It has been documented that [REDACTED] (P) has a [REDACTED] (P).

- [REDACTED] (P) is originally from [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P). To date, he has never been questioned on his associates in Southern California nor questioned on individuals that he has come across overseas that have connections to Southern California.

[REDACTED] (P) was contacted on 09/18/2007 and a date was scheduled to conduct an interview with [REDACTED] (P) on 10/15/2007. Request Denver SAC provide concurrence for two Los Angeles Agents (SA [REDACTED] (S) and LAPD Detective [REDACTED] (S)) to travel to Colorado Springs [REDACTED] (P) and interview [REDACTED] (P) on 10/15/2007.

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 09/24/2007

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

DENVER

AT COLORADO SPRINGS RA

[REDACTED] Provide SAC concurrence for two Los Angeles Agents (SA [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] and LAPD Detective [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED]) to travel [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] and interview [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] on 10/15/2007.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 11/22/2002

To: International Operations
Counterterrorism
(G)
New York

San Diego

Attn: (S), (G)



From: (G)

Contact: SA (S)




Approved By: (S)



Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F)



Title: PENTTBOM;
MAJOR CASE 182
OO: NY

Synopsis: Cover lead (F). Mabahith provided information re Omar Ahmad Al-Bayoumi.

Reference: (F)



(F)

(F)



(F)



Administrative: Lead (F) covered.

Reference Mabahith letter M/B/88/261F/423, dated 11/03/2002, providing information to (G).

It should be noted that the statement (F) (F) on the response received from the Mabahith is an internal classification system used by the Mabahith and has no significance for FBI classification purposes.

Enclosure (s): Enclosed for New York and San Diego:

(1) one copy of original response from the Saudi Mabahith (in Arabic) bearing number M/B/88/261F/423, dated 11/03/2002; and

To: International Operations From: (G)
Re: (F) 11/22/2002

(2) one English translation of same.

Details: Per referenced serial (F) San Diego requested (G) to locate and interview Ahmed Abdul Azziz Suleiman AL-HAMDAN re his contact with Omar Ahmad AL-BAYOUMI. (F) dated 12/02/2001 is (G) initial request of the Mabahith. (F) dated 06/09/2002, is (G) second request. (F) dated 06/05/2002, is the Mabahith's response to (F) and (F)

On 11/3/2002, the Mabahith provided further information re Omar Ahmad Al-Bayoumi, via the enclosed letter (written in Arabic). That response was translated in (G) by a FBI Language Specialist. The English translation of the response is provided below, in pertinent part, for recipients:

-----Begin Translation-----

(F)

LS. Note: All the following names are spelled phonetically.
Number: M/B/88/261F/423
Date: 8/28/1423H 11/3/2002
Subject: **Omar Ahmed Mostafa El-Bayomi**- Saudi National
Reference: Our Memo Number M/B/88/148F/423 Dated 5/25/1423H and Your Memo (F) Dated 3/23/2002

(G) This memo is addressed to Mr. (S) Legal Attache at US Embassy in

Greetings,

In addition to what we provided to you before about the above mentioned individual, We would like to inform you that he stated the following during his interview:

First- Statistical Information:

Name: **Omar Ahmed El-Bayomi**
Nationality: **Saudi**
Place and Date of Birth: (P-1) **Al-Hijra village**
Marital Status: **Married**
Passport Number: (P-1) **on 10/25/1420H (Feb 1, 2000) Issued in (Los Angeles)**

Second/ Interview:

1. He (El-Bayomi) stated that he was born in 1377H (1957) - Al-Hijra village where he grew up and went AlTabari Elementary school...After he finished elementary school...Then he moved to Jeddah where he finished middle school and high school...Then he joined The Financial Studies Institute...After graduation, he joined King Abd El-Aziz University in Jeddah where he obtained a Bachelor degree in General Management...He joined The Civil Aviation Administration in 1397H where he currently works.

To: International Operations From: (G)
Re: (F) 11/22/2002

2. He stated that he traveled to several arab and foreign countries...He traveled to Egypt and Turkey almost twenty years ago for tourism...He traveled to Britain approximately three times to study English...He resided in Birmingham, Britain with his family from 10/5/2000 till 7/31/2002 where he obtained a master degree (Market efficiency in Management) from Austin University in Birmingham...He's currently working on his PH.D in the subject of (International Companies and Ethics)...He previously traveled to The United States of America to study English...He visited America approximately five times with his family between 93-94 where he stayed in California.

3. **As for what happened to him in Britain:** He stated that on Friday 9/21/2001 and while he was watching a match between the Saudi team and Bahraini team, The Britain police raided his house...They asked him about his name and he told them (**Omar Bayomi**)...One of the officers (S) told him that he has some questions about September 11th incident in America...They asked him to go with them to the main center in London where they asked him about his autobiography and why did he study in Britain...They also showed him photographs of Saudi individuals and Arabs from different nationalities as well as their names and aliases but he denied knowing any of them...They asked him if he traveled before to Afghanistan, Indonesia and Malaysia but he denied ever traveling to any of these countries.

4. He stated that he was detained for almost seven days at the main center in London...His interrogation usually lasted from one and half hour to two hours...He asked the British authorities to contact the Saudi Ambassador in London to notify him of his arrest, but the British police apologized to him saying that they tried to contact the Embassy and the ambassador but they didn't get any respond.

5. He asked one of his friends in London (P) to contact the Saudi Embassy and notify them about the situation he was in. (P) informed him that he contacted (C-2) (C-2) an embassy employee, who told him to let the investigation continue specially since an attorney was appointed to him by the British police...He continued answering all the questions till one of the officers told him that he was not guilty of anything and he asked him to wait outside, in a special car, to take him back to his house...He then contacted (C-2) to let him that the matter has ended...

6. He also stated that some of the Saudi individuals that the British police were asking about: (**Khaled Al-Mehdar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi**) and he told them that he met them in the complex where he stayed in America...He added that: they came from Saudi Arabia to study English in one of San Diego's institute, they attended the mosque there and they were looking for a place to stay because the complex was very expensive and they couldn't afford it...He also said that the house was a student housing for the institute's students and since the new students have to write their name in an acquaintance list, so he put his name on the same list with Khaled Al-Mehdar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi and he introduced them as new students.

7. He persistently denied any previous knowledge of, or having any connection with, Khaled Al-Mehdar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi and that he only introduced them as new students.

8. He denied being arrested by any government authority whether inside or outside The Kingdom even when he was in America or Britain for study except for that time when he was arrested by the British police...He also denied being deported by the British police and he said that he was treated well during his detention.

This is for your information and we are interested in your comments about the truthfulness of the above mentioned individual.

To: International Operations From: (G)
Re: (F) 11/22/2002

(LS. Note: **Khaled Al-Mehdar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi** were among the hijackers of flight AA # 77 (Pentagon)...The spelling of an Arabic name can vary...However, the above mentioned spelling seems more likely than what's listed in the hijackers list).

(F)

-----End Translation-----

Based on the foregoing, (G) considers lead (F) covered. (G) will forward any further information provided by the Mabahith upon receipt.

To: International Operations From: (G)
Re: (F) 11/22/2002

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Read and clear.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/21/2002

To: International Operations
Criminal Investigative

Attn:

(G),(S)

New York
San Diego
Counterterrorism
Washington Field

Pittsburgh

Newark

From: (G)

Contact: SA

(S)

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

(F)

Title: PENTTBOM;
MAJOR CASE 182
OO: NY

Synopsis: Cover lead (F) re Saudi bank accounts for Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi. Enclose translated Mabahith response.

Reference:

(F)

Administrative: Lead (F) covered.

(F) Reference English translation of the Mabahith response to M/B/88/148F/423, dated 08/04/2002.

Note that the statement (F) on the response received from the Mabahith is an internal classification system used by the Mabahith and has no significance for FBI classification purposes.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for FBIHQ and New York is one copy of the English translated Mabahith response, M/B/88/148F/423, dated 08/04/2002, to referenced (F)

To: International Operations From: (G)
Re: (F) 11/21/2002

Details: Referenced serial (F) set a lead for (G) to:

(1) Identify and obtain any and all records for Saudi American Bank account numbers (P-1) and (P-1) in the name of Omar Ahmed AL-BAYOUMI;

(2) Obtain account information re AL-BAYOUMI's Saudi American Bank card number (P-1); and

(3) Obtain Saudi American Bank records for AL-BAYOUMI's wife, Manal A. BAGADER.

Per referenced (F) letter dated 12/16/2001, (G) forwarded lead (F) to the Mabahith. On 08/04/2002, the Saudi Mabahith provided its response. That response was translated in (G) by a FBI Language Specialist. The English translation of the response is provided below, in pertinent part, for recipients:

-----Begin Translation-----

1. Account No. (P-1) is with the Saudi American Bank. [Attached is a copy of account statements + a copy of the documents for establishing the account].

· Date of starting the account is 5/28/2000, with a customer's direct cash deposit of (53,273.67), fifty-three thousand, two hundred, seventy-three dollars and sixty cents.

· The last transaction on this account had occurred on 9/18/2001.

· The total credit transactions are (54,281/69), fifty-four thousand, two hundred, eighty-one American dollars, and sixty-nine cents. It was conducted through two transactions.

· The total debit transactions are (40,563/07), forty thousand, five hundred, sixty-three dollars, and seven cents.

· The balance on 9/18/2001 is a credit of (13,718/62), thirteen thousand, seven hundred, eighteen dollars, and sixty-two cents.

2. Account No. (P-1) with the Saudi American Bank in Jeddah / Al-Andalus Branch. [Attached is a copy of account statements + a copy of the documents for establishing the account].

· This account was opened on 11/13/1999 by transferring the amount of (66,456/45), sixty-six thousand, four hundred, fifty-six riyal, and forty-five hilleh, to the above-mentioned individual's account.

To: International Operations From: (G)
Re: (F) 11/21/2002

The last transaction on this account had occurred on 3/27/2002, which was represented by transferring the amount of (11,967), eleven thousand, nine hundred, and sixty-seven riyal, into this account.

Account balance on 7/03/2002 had reached (300,611/58), three hundred thousand, six hundred, eleven riyal, and fifty-eight hilleh. [Credit]

In regards to the credit card No. (P-1) we observed that it is connected with account No. (P-1) which was mentioned above.

In regards to the above-mentioned individual's wife / MANAL AHMAD BAQDAR - Saudi citizen, we determined that she didn't have any accounts in our local banks.

-----End Translation-----

Based on the foregoing, (G) considers lead (F) covered. Reporting agent notes there were no attachments enclosed with this letter.

To: International Operations From: (G)
Re: (F) 11/21/2002

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Read and clear.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/28/2003

To: International Operations

Attn: (G), (S)

Counterterrorism

Attn:

From: (G)

Contact: (G), (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOMB
MC 182

Synopsis: Lead #2 and #3 covered in referenced serial.

Reference: (F)

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for Counterterrorism is the original and one copy of the FD-302 documenting the interview of Omar Al-Bayoumi on 10/16/2003.

Details: On October 9, 2003, (G) prepared a letter for passage to the Mabahith to request interviews be arranged and documents obtained in reference to Omar Al-Bayoumi's allowance and salary.

(G) has sent the original request to the Mabahith via a letter dated 10/09/2003. Reference (F) for details.

On 10/16/2003, Omar Al-Bayoumi was interviewed by (S) Executive Director, and (S) Senior Counsel, both of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 301 7th Street SW, Room 5125, Washington, DC, 20407, (S) Present during the interview was (S)

Following the interview of Omar Al-Bayoumi, the Saudi Mabahith, members of the National Commission, and representatives of the FBI discussed

To: International Operations From: (G)
Re: (F) 10/12/2003

the investigation concerning Al-Bayoumi. In light of the recent interview, results of past PENTTBOM interviews of Al-Bayoumi, and investigation regarding Al-Bayoumi, Counterterrorism is advised that unless additional information is developed involving Al-Bayoumi, the Saudi Mabath are inclined not to pursue contact with Al-Bayoumi's employer or request documentation as requested in referenced serial. Legat (G) will show referenced lead covered. If additional information is developed by the PENTTBOM Team, and the documents and interviews previously requested are necessary, it is requested that a new lead be set to Legat (G)

To: International Operations From: (G)
Re: (F) 10/12/2003

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Read and clear.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 07/15/2003

To: International Operations
 (G)

Attn: (G)
Attn: LEGAT

From: Counterterrorism
 PENTTBOM Investigative Team

Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOM
 MC 182

Synopsis: To request that Legat (G) coordinate with the Saudi Mabahith to make available OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI for an interview by PENTTBOM Team personnel.

Reference: (F)

Details: Investigation has determined that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI assisted hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI after their arrival in San Diego in approximately 02/2000. Specifically, AL-BAYOUMI assisted the hijackers in securing an apartment by obtaining a cashier's check for them and by signing as a guarantor on the lease application. AL-BAYOUMI also assisted AL-MIHDHAR in opening a bank account.

AL-BAYOUMI has been charged in San Diego with visa fraud. AL-BAYOUMI was detained in 09/2001 by authorities in the United Kingdom, but was released due to the lack of an extraditable charge against him. AL-BAYOUMI relocated to Saudi Arabia in the summer of 2002 and currently remains in Saudi Arabia with his wife MANAL BAGADER and their children.

In approximately 10/2002, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith (F), as detailed in Mabahith memo number M/B/88/261F/423. During the interview, AL-BAYOUMI discussed his detention in the United Kingdom as a result of his association with 09/11/2001 hijackers NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR.

Present in the statements made by AL-BAYOUMI to the Mabaith are some discrepancies, such as the fact that he had met

To: International Operations From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) [REDACTED], 07/15/2003

the hijackers in the apartment complex in San Diego in which he resided. However, FBI investigation, to include interviews of other individuals present at the time, has determined that AL-BAYOUMI met the hijackers for the first time in a restaurant in Los Angeles, California. Furthermore, AL-BAYOUMI stated during his interview with the Mabahith that the complex was student housing for a local school. AL-BAYOUMI advised that he listed his name as an acquaintance of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI in order for them to obtain housing as new students. To the contrary, the apartment complex in which AL-BAYOUMI resided is a privately owned residential property in which individual units are available for rent. AL-BAYOUMI signed the lease of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI as a guarantor because neither had a credit history.

With the concurrence of FBI Director Robert Mueller, the PENTTBOM Team therefore requests to interview AL-BAYOUMI in Saudi Arabia in order to clarify any discrepancies apparent in his interview.

Descriptive Data:

Reference

Name -	
Last:	Al-Bayoumi
First:	Omar
Middle:	Ahmed
Sex:	M
DOB:	[REDACTED] (P-1)
PNO:	[REDACTED]

The information set forth above can be disseminated to the Mabahith.

To: International Operations From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) 07/15/2003

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT (G) , WASHINGTON, DC

For information.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

(G)

AT (G)

The PENTTBOM Team respectfully requests that Legat (G) coordinate with the Saudi Mabahith to make available OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI for an interview by FBI PENTTBOM Team personnel.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 07/17/2003

To: International Operations
(G)

Attn: (G)
Attn: Legat

From: Counterterrorism
PENTTBOM Investigative Team

Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOM
MC 182

Synopsis: To request Legat (G) to obtain further information regarding the father of SAUD AL-RASHEED, and to confirm the employment of HAMID AL-RASHID at the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation.

Reference: (F)

Details: Investigation has determined that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI assisted hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI after their arrival in San Diego in approximately 02/2000. Specifically, AL-BAYOUMI assisted the hijackers in securing an apartment by obtaining a cashier's check for them and by signing as a guarantor on the lease application. AL-BAYOUMI also assisted AL-MIHDHAR in opening a bank account.

Further investigation into AL-BAYOUMI determined that AL-BAYOUMI has been employed by the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA) since 1975. An individual interviewed by the FBI advised that PCA employee HAMID AL-RASHID, business telephone number (P-1), was involved in the payment of salary to AL-BAYOUMI (reference (F)). Furthermore, this individual identified HAMID AL-RASHID as the father of SAUD ABDULAZIZ SAUD AL-RASHEED (reference (F)). At the time of this identification, the photograph of SAUD AL-RASHEED was being broadcast in the news media as a result of the issuance of an international Be On The Lookout (BOLO). The BOLO had been issued

To: International Operations From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 07/17/2003

for SAUD AL-RASHEED after an image of his passport had been found on a CD-ROM along with images of the passports of 09/11/2001 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, SALEM AL-HAZMI, and ABDULAZIZ AL-OMARI.

Since that time, SAUD AL-RASHEED has been located and interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F)). Media reports regarding SAUD AL-RASHEED have identified his father to be ABDULAZIZ SAUD AL-RASHEED, an employee of Saudi Red Crescent in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

This information clearly differs than the information previously obtained by the FBI. In order to clarify that the father of SAUD AL-RASHEED is not the same individual who was associated with AL-BAYOUMI, it is requested that Legat [REDACTED] (G) confirm the identity of the father of SAUD AL-RASHEED and determine if he was ever employed at PCA. Additionally, it is requested that Legat [REDACTED] (G) confirm the employment of HAMID AL-RASHID at PCA.

To: International Operations From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 07/17/2003

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT [REDACTED] (G), WASHINGTON, DC

For information.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

[REDACTED] (G)

AT [REDACTED] (G)

The PENTTBOM Team requests that Legat [REDACTED] (G) confirm the identity of the father of SAUD ABDULAZIZ SAUD AL-RASHEED, date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1), Saudi passport [REDACTED] (P-1), and determine if the father was ever employed at the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

[REDACTED] (G)

AT [REDACTED] (G)

The PENTTBOM Team requests that Legat [REDACTED] (G) confirm the employment of HAMID AL-RASHID at the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA).

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/21/2001

To: Counterterrorism
Investigative Services
San Diego

Attn: (G), (S)
Attn:
Attn:

From: (G)
Legat

Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTBOMB;
MAJOR CASE 182

Synopsis: To report coverage of SD (F)

Reference: (F)

Administrative: The attached Mabath memo (M/B/88/247F/247), dated 11/13/2001, is noted (F) Such notation is made on all Mabath memos. It has no bearing on FBI Classification. Therefore, this EC and the enclosures are unclassified.

Enclosures: For the San Diego office is the original Mabath letter and an English translation of same.

Details: Referenced San Diego EC advised (P) (P) was interviewed on 9/22/2001 by agents of the San Diego office of the FBI regarding his association with Omar Al-Bayoumi. Al-Bayoumi sponsored two of the deceased hijackers on AA flight 77 (Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Midhar) into a San Diego apartment complex. During the interview (P) advised both he and (P), (P) (P), knew Omar Al-Bayoumi. (P), during 1996 or 1998, resided with (P) in a San Diego apartment complex. Since that time (P) (P) was believed to have departed the United States and to be currently residing in Saudi Arabia. Referenced EC requested investigation to determine if (P) was in fact residing in Saudi Arabia, and if so, conduct an interview of him regarding his association and/or knowledge of Omar Al-Bayoumi.

As detailed in enclosed Mabath memo it was determined (P) (P) is not at this time residing within Saudi Arabia. They further

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: (F) 11/21/2001

advised the telephone number provided for him, (P-1) is listed to Alalamiyah Internet Company.

Legat (G) considers San Diego (F) covered.

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: (F) 11/21/2001

LEAD (s) :

Set Lead 1:

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Read and Clear.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 11/25/2002

To: International Operations
Counterterrorism

Attn:

(G), (S)

New York
San Diego

From:

(G)

Contact:

(S)

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

(F)

Title: PENTTBOM
MAJOR CASE #182
OO:NY

Synopsis: Cover [redacted] (F) by providing to San Diego the requested information.

Reference:

(F)

Administrative: It should be noted that the statement [redacted] (F) on the response received from the Mabahith is an internal classification system used by the Mabahith and has no significance for FBI classification purposes.

Enclosure(s): For San Diego, one copy of original response from the Saudi Mabahith (in Arabic) bearing number M/B/88/250F/423; and one English translation of same.

Details: By way of referenced Serial [redacted] (F) San Diego set lead (F) for (G) to interview Khalid Abdulrab regarding his relationship with hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, as well as San Diego targets Hashim Alattas; Mohdar Abdullah, aka Al-Mihdar Mohammad Al-Mihdar Zeid; Osama Al-Bayoumi, aka Abu-Emad; [redacted] (P) and Omer Bakarbashat. On 05/30/2002, [redacted] (G) prepared an EC to San Diego (referenced serial [redacted] (F)) providing a partial response to lead 4. On

To: International Operations From: (G)
Re: (F) 11/25/2002

07/18/2002, (G) prepared an EC to San Diego (referenced serial (F) stating that a second request was made of the Mabahith regarding the interview of Abdulrab. That request met with another partial response. Accordingly, (G) made a third request of the Mabahith, re-requesting that an interview be performed. The third request is referenced serial (F).

On 10/23/2002, the Saudi Mabahith provided its response to the third request regarding the interview of Abdulrab. That response was translated in (G) by a FBI Language Specialist. The English translation of the response is provided below, in pertinent part, for San Diego:

In reference to the above mentioned memos, We would like to inform you that the above mentioned individual has revealed the following information:

First/ Statistical Information:

Name: **Khalid Abdullah Saleh AlYafai**
Nationality: Saudi National - Yemeni origin.
Place and Date of Birth: Jeddah (P-1)
Profession: Employee with Sugar United Company
Security Account: No security restrictions in the past.

Summary of his interview:

He (AlYafai) was born in Jeddah in (P-1) where he was raised...Attended Al-Falah school...After he graduated from high school he left to Jordan where he received his Bachelor Degree in Accounting then he returned to the Kingdom...He left to The United States of America to study English and to get CPA.

He stated that he left The Kingdom to The United States in 1998 where he resided in California with one of the American Families...He took an English course at the (ELS) institute for almost four months, then he transferred to (EGS) institute where he studied for almost two months...Then he was transferred to (Bccker) where he received an acceptance to study in (SDIV) University in San Diego, California.

He stated that he returned to The Kingdom almost a year and four months after he traveled to The United States of America, based on his Father's request, to get his Saudi citizenship since he had a Yemeni citizenship...After he got his Saudi citizenship, he went back to The United Sates of America on year 2000 and stayed for six months to complete his studies...He returned to The Kingdom after he got his CPA.

The above mentioned individual was interviewed about his relationship with them:

To: International Operations From: (G)
Re: (F) 11/25/2002

1. Omar El-Bayomi; 2. Nawaf Al-Hazmi; 3. Khaled Al-Mehdar; 4. Omar Bakr Basset; 5. Hashem El-Attas; and 6. Mehdar Abdullah.

He (AlYafai) provided the following:

1. Omar El-Bayomi:

He stated that he met Omar El-Bayomi in Abu Bakr Mosque in The Islamic Center in San Diego, CA...He also visited Omar El-Bayomi who invited him to his house in the month of Ramadan...After El-Bayomi left to Britain, he e-mailed him from the United States to check on his health and such and El-Bayomi responded by a phone call...The relationship was only a friendship and the phone call was just to check on his health and such. They have not talked about any destructive or terrorism act.

2. Nawaf Al-Hazmi:

He stated that he has seen Nawaf Al-Hazmi in Abu Bakr Mosque in The Islamic Center in San Diego, CA specially during The Friday prayer because the people who pray at the mosque gather after the prayer to exchange conversation...He (AlYafai) denied any relationship or connection with Nawaf Al-Hazmi.

3. Khaled Al-Mehdar:

He totally denied any knowledge of Khaled Al-Mehdar.

4. Omar Bakerbeshan:

He stated that he met Omar Bakerbeshan NOT Omar Baker Basset in the English Language Institute (ELI) in California...They were also e-mailing one another, mostly asking about how's things going...He has not met with Omar outside the institute except for the field trips that was organized by the institute for the students which included a large number of students from different nationalities.

5. Hashem El-Attas:

He stated that he met Hesham El-Attas in Abu Bakr Mosque in California through Omar El-Bayomi...He also e-mailed Hesham El-Attas but didn't receive any reply from him...He (AlYafai) denied having a strong relationship with Al-Attas and he said that they only met at Abu Bakr Mosque. (LS. Note: It's believed that Hashem El-Attas or Hesham El-Attas is the same individual ...Please contact the Saudi Mabathith for any further explanation).

6. Mehdar Abdullah:

He (AlYafai) totally denied any knowledge of Mehdar Abdullah.

He (AlYafai) also stated that he (AlYafai) has several e-mail addresses so if one goes bad, he can use the other one. His e-mail addresses are:

To: International Operations From: (G)
Re: (F) 11/25/2002

(P-1)

The above mentioned individual totally denied any knowledge of any destructive or terrorism acts...He also denied hearing any of the above mentioned individuals talking about any destructive or terrorism acts emphasizing that their relationship was a normal relationship and within asking about health and such whether at the mosque or via e-mail.

This is for your information and we are awaiting what you have (about this subject)...Regards..

End translation.

Based upon the above, (G) considers (F)
(F) lead (F) covered.

To: International Operations From: (G)
Re: (F) 11/25/2002

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

IO

AT (G)

Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Adm)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

Read and clear.

Set Lead 3:

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO, CA

San Diego is requested to review the above and consider a response to the Saudi Mabahith regarding any recent developments in San Diego's investigation.

◆◆

(F)

[LEGAT (G) p.1]

NUMBER: M/B/88/247 F

DATE: 11/13/2001

SUBJECT: (P) and (P)

REFERENCE: Your memo No. (F) dated 10/11/2001

This memo is addressed to (S) Legal attache at the U.S. embassy in (G)

Greetings:

Regarding your above-referenced memo on both (P) and his brother, (P), (P) nationals. They were questioned by U.S. authorities about any information they might have on Omar Ahmed ALBAYOUMI.

We would like to inform you that neither of them is living in the Kingdom. Also, the telephone number with which you provided us in your memo, (P-1), is listed under the Alalamiyah (World) Internet Company.

This is for your information. Please accept our regards.

(F)

[document name: mab247f.01]

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/21/2004

To: Counterterrorism
New York

Attn: [Redacted] (G), (S)

From: New York
PENTTBOM Investigative Team, FBIHQ

Contact: SA [Redacted] (S)

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] PENTTBOM
MC 182

Synopsis: [Redacted] To summarize investigation to date of OMAR
AL-BAYOUMI.

[Redacted] (G)

Reference: [Redacted] (F)

Details: [Redacted] (P-1) OMAR AHMED MUSTAFA AL-BAYOUMI, date of birth
[Redacted], place of birth Alhajra, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 07/21/2004

passport [REDACTED] (P-1) social security account number [REDACTED] (P-1) first came to the attention of the FBI in 1998 when a complainant telephonically contacted FBI San Diego on 08/31/1998 to report information regarding AL-BAYOUMI and his wife MANAL BAGADER (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). The complainant advised that AL-BAYOUMI had received a suspicious package from the Middle East on 03/03/1998. In addition, the complainant advised that there had been large gatherings of males in the apartment of AL-BAYOUMI. As a result of these reports, a preliminary inquiry was initiated on AL-BAYOUMI on 09/08/1998.

[REDACTED] The preliminary inquiry did not uncover any information regarding AL-BAYOUMI to justify conversion into a full investigation. When interviewed, the local Postal Inspector advised that the package was listed as "suspicious" because it arrived without postage or paperwork. Therefore, upon completion of the preliminary inquiry, the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI was closed on 06/07/1999 (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]).

[REDACTED] Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that two of the hijackers aboard AA77, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, had resided at Parkwood Apartments, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED], 6401 Mount Ada Road (also listed as 6333 Mount Ada Road), San Diego, California, between 02/2000 and 05/2000. Rental records obtained from Parkwood Apartments revealed that AL-BAYOUMI had co-signed the apartment lease agreement for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. Upon receipt of this information, efforts commenced to fully identify and locate AL-BAYOUMI. AL-BAYOUMI was located in Birmingham, England, where he was residing with his family and attending Aston University.

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY) on 09/20/2001 under United Kingdom (UK) Terrorism Act 2000, Prevention of Terrorism. From 09/22/2001 to 09/28/2001, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed by NSY. On 09/28/2001, AL-BAYOUMI was released from custody without charges, as NSY could not allege any criminal activity on his part that would substantiate a continuation of his detention beyond the period authorized. [REDACTED] (C-2)

[REDACTED]
(C-2)

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI moved from England to Saudi Arabia in 08/2002 and was interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith in approximately 10/2002. In 08/2003, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed in Saudi Arabia by members of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). AL-BAYOUMI was also interviewed in Saudi Arabia by representatives of the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 07/21/2004

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission"), in the presence of the FBI, in 10/2003.

[REDACTED] FBI investigation has determined that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI assisted NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) upon their arrival in the San Diego, California, area in early 02/2000. To date, however, evidence and intelligence do not indicate that AL-BAYOUMI had advance knowledge of the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001 or knowledge of AL-HAZMI's and/or AL-MIHDHAR's status as Al Qaeda operatives. Therefore, to date, the evidence and intelligence developed throughout this investigation have not indicated that the assistance provided by AL-BAYOUMI to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR was witting. Furthermore, there is no evidence or intelligence that AL-BAYOUMI provided actual financial support to AL-HAZMI and/or AL-MIHDHAR. In response to previous reports to the contrary, and to provide a comprehensive summary of the investigation to date, the following details of the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI are provided. These details include information garnered from the interviews of AL-BAYOUMI conducted by the FBI, the Saudi Mabahith, and New Scotland Yard (NSY), as well as independent investigation into the associations and activities of AL-BAYOUMI while residing in the United States.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI first traveled to the United States on 08/01/1993 using Saudi Arabian passport [REDACTED] (P-1). On 06/06/1995, AL-BAYOUMI returned to the United States at Los Angeles, California. AL-BAYOUMI entered at that time on [REDACTED] (J-3) using Saudi Arabian passport [REDACTED] (P-1) with an intended address of [REDACTED] (P) Beadnell Way, Apartment [REDACTED] (P), San Diego, California (reference [REDACTED] (F)). AL-BAYOUMI and his family resided at this address until relocating to 6602 Beadnell Way, Apartment [REDACTED] (P) San Diego, California, in 02/1996. In the summer of 1999, AL-BAYOUMI and his family moved to Parkwood Apartments, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Mount Ada Road, San Diego, California.

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI returned to Saudi Arabia from 03/21/2000 to 05/31/2000. AL-BAYOUMI then resided with his family in San Diego until the fall of 2000, at which time he relocated to England and enrolled at Aston University in Birmingham. AL-BAYOUMI's wife and children remained in San Diego until 06/2001 when they moved to join AL-BAYOUMI in England. AL-BAYOUMI again traveled to Saudi Arabia from 06/26/2001 to 07/16/2001, then returned to Birmingham, England, where he and his family resided until moving to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 08/2002.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 07/21/2004

EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION OF AL-BAYOUMI

[REDACTED] Since approximately 1977, AL-BAYOUMI has been employed with the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA). Employment records indicate that AL-BAYOUMI was employed from 1977 to 1981 as an Aviation Fees Checker; from 1981 to 1982 as a Budget Clerk; from 1982 to 1986 as an Accounts Checker; from 1986 to 1992 as a Section Head; and from 1992 to 1995 as an Accountant (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). In 1995, AL-BAYOUMI traveled to the United States to attend English language school and graduate school in California. While in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI retained his employment with the PCA through a process known as "Saudization", a national initiative in Saudi Arabia to educate Saudi Arabian citizens in order for citizens to retain and/or assume positions within the workforce (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). Based on this program, AL-BAYOUMI was reassigned as a Senior Data Processing Technician at the Dallah Avco Trans Arabia Company (Dallah Avco), a contractor of the PCA.

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI had graduated from King Abdul Aziz University in 08/1988 with a Bachelor's degree in Administrative Science. Upon his arrival in the United States in 1995, AL-BAYOUMI attended English classes at the American Language Institute at San Diego State University and then enrolled at West Coast University (WCU). After WCU closed down, AL-BAYOUMI enrolled at United States International University (now known as Alliant International University) in 01/1997. AL-BAYOUMI graduated from United States International University in 12/1997 with a Master's degree in International Business Administration (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). AL-BAYOUMI subsequently enrolled in the Keller Graduate School/Becker CPA Review, where he attended CPA review classes in 1998 and 1999 (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). AL-BAYOUMI did not complete either of these classes and therefore did not receive any credits. In 03/2000, AL-BAYOUMI obtained a certificate for attendance at George Washington University, ESI International Project Management seminar.

[REDACTED] While attending school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive a salary. In addition to his base salary, AL-BAYOUMI also received an allowance for housing, transportation, and other expenses. In 04/2000, this allowance increased from 1,742 Saudi Riyals (USD 465) to 14,271 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,805), and stayed at that level until 12/2000. In 01/2001, the allowance was slightly reduced to 12,852 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,427), and remained at this level until the allowance payments ceased in 08/2001 [Note: the time frame of increased payments to AL-BAYOUMI

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 07/21/2004

does not correspond to the dates that hijackers NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR resided in San Diego]. Review of employment records obtained from the PCA indicates that AL-BAYOUMI received a promotion in 04/2000, and his contract status also was changed from "single" to "married" at that time. As a result, his salary and allowance were both increased.

[REDACTED] When applying for school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI had provided a letter from Ercan Engineering (Ercan) stating that AL-BAYOUMI was being supported while in the United States. Ercan was also listed as "sponsor" on AL-BAYOUMI's Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Form I-20. When interviewed, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] advised that Ercan had been a subcontractor of Dallah Avco and the PCA and that he was asked to provide the letter of support concerning AL-BAYOUMI. Review of employment records during the time that AL-BAYOUMI was in the United States indicated that AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive his salary and allowance through Dallah Avco.

[REDACTED] In addition to attending school in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI acted as the manager/facilities supervisor of the Al Medina Al-Munarawah Mosque, also known as the Kurdish Islamic Center, 511 South Magnolia, El Cajon, California. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he had been contacted by SAAD AL-HABIB regarding the local mosque used by the Kurdish population. AL-HABIB, a Saudi Arabian who had attended school in San Diego, informed AL-BAYOUMI that he was interested in funding a new mosque for the Kurdish community because the mosque was located in a small building without a parking lot. AL-HABIB asked AL-BAYOUMI to assist in acquiring a larger building to house the mosque, to which AL-BAYOUMI agreed. AL-BAYOUMI subsequently looked for and obtained a building in El Cajon, California, that included a parking lot. AL-HABIB provided all of the money to AL-BAYOUMI to purchase the building, to include the USD 10,000 for which AL-BAYOUMI then wrote a check for the initial down payment. As manager/facilities supervisor, AL-BAYOUMI kept an office at the mosque. AL-BAYOUMI advised that the position was on a volunteer basis and that he was not paid for his work at the mosque.

VISIT TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN CONSULATE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

[REDACTED] On approximately 02/01/2000, AL-BAYOUMI traveled by car from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles in order to renew his passport. AL-BAYOUMI was accompanied on this trip by ISAMU DYSON (now known as CLAYTON BIN DON), an associate from San Diego. DYSON, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] was invited by AL-BAYOUMI on the previous day to travel with him to Los Angeles

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 07/21/2004

(reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). Upon arriving at the Consulate, AL-BAYOUMI submitted his passport renewal documents and also obtained some Islamic books from the Islamic Affairs section to bring back to the mosque that he managed in San Diego. To date, the individual(s) with whom AL-BAYOUMI met at the Consulate are not known.

(P-1) [REDACTED] A copy of AL-BAYOUMI's Saudi Arabian passport recovered during the search of his residence in England, revealed that the passport was issued on 02/01/2000 in Los Angeles, California (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). This information has also been confirmed by information received from the Saudi Mabathith.

THE MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET RESTAURANT

[REDACTED] When inviting DYSON to accompany him to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI told DYSON of a halal restaurant at which they could eat lunch following their visit to the Consulate. After leaving the Consulate the following day, AL-BAYOUMI and DYSON went to the restaurant where they discovered that the restaurant had been converted into a Middle Eastern butcher shop that no longer served meals. The butcher shop employees recommended another nearby halal restaurant, the Mediterranean Gourmet, to which AL-BAYOUMI and DYSON proceeded on foot.

[REDACTED] While eating lunch at this second restaurant, AL-BAYOUMI and DYSON met AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. There is no information or evidence that this initial meeting was previously arranged. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he overheard two males speaking Arabic in the restaurant. Thinking that they sounded from the Gulf region, AL-BAYOUMI introduced himself and asked the two males where they were from. The two males introduced themselves as KHALID and NAWAF, and stated that they were from Saudi Arabia and were in the United States to learn English but did not like living in Los Angeles because they were having a difficult time and did not know anyone. AL-BAYOUMI recommended San Diego as a nice place to live; he provided AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR with his telephone number and offered to help them if they ever traveled there.

ARRIVAL OF AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR IN SAN DIEGO

[REDACTED] AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived in San Diego a few days after meeting AL-BAYOUMI and DYSON in the restaurant. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), 7050 Eckstrom Avenue, San Diego, California, and asked for him. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 07/21/2004

informed AL-BAYOUMI that they were looking to obtain an apartment in the area. AL-BAYOUMI then directed them to the nearby Parkwood Apartment complex at which he resided with his family.

[REDACTED] Investigation has determined that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI initially attempted to obtain an apartment at Parkwood Apartments on their own with cash, but could not because they did not have a credit history and because the leasing company did not accept cash payments. On 02/04/2000, AL-BAYOUMI signed as a guarantor and obtained a cashier's check drawn on his Bank of America checking account in the amount of USD 1,558 for their security deposit and first month's rent of Apartment [REDACTED] (P). When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR immediately provided him with the same amount of cash as the bank check and he then deposited the cash into his account. Financial records indicate that a cash deposit of the same amount as the cashier's check (USD 1,558) was made into AL-BAYOUMI's bank account on the same day, indicating the contemporaneous reimbursement from AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. While at the Bank of America, AL-MIHDHAR also opened bank account [REDACTED] (P) with an initial deposit of USD 9,900. These three transactions - the cashier's check for USD 1,558, the cash deposit of USD 1,558, and the opening of AL-MIHDHAR's account - were all posted within a time period of seven minutes on 02/04/2000. When interviewed, the bank teller who assisted with these transactions was able to corroborate the same information as obtained from the financial records (reference [REDACTED] (F)).

[REDACTED] A review of rental records from Parkwood Apartments indicated that in addition to AL-BAYOUMI's signature as guarantor, both AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR listed AL-BAYOUMI's residence (Apartment [REDACTED] (P)) as their last address; however, there is no other information or evidence that either AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR resided with AL-BAYOUMI prior to moving into Apartment [REDACTED] (P) (reference [REDACTED] (F)). In addition, the review of rental records as well as bank records indicate that all rental payments (subsequent to the initial security deposit and first month's rent paid by cashier's check from AL-BAYOUMI's bank account, as detailed above) were paid by AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. There is no evidence that AL-BAYOUMI supplied any rental payment for Apartment [REDACTED] (P).

INSTRUCTION RECEIVED BY AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR

[REDACTED] Information received from KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED (KSM) indicates that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were complying with the directions given to them prior to departing for the United States. According to KSM, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were instructed to make contacts at the local mosques and to request assistance from members

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 07/21/2004

of the Muslim community after their arrival in the United States. KSM advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were given such guidance because, unlike some of the other hijackers who spoke English and had spent time in western cultures, neither AL-HAZMI nor AL-MIHDHAR had such language skill and experience (reference [REDACTED] (F)).

DINNER PARTY HELD AT PARKWOOD APARTMENT [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] Soon after AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR moved into the Parkwood Apartments, AL-BAYOUMI held a dinner party in their apartment. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he had planned to hold the dinner in his own apartment but one of the guests had brought his wife. To comply with the traditional Islamic custom of separating males and females at social gatherings, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he decided to leave the females in his own apartment with his wife and to ask AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR if the males could gather in their mainly unfurnished apartment. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR agreed that the dinner could be held in their apartment.

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI advised that the dinner was in honor of a visiting sheikh who had spoken at the Al Medina mosque during Ramadan. Videotapes of the dinner, recovered during a search of AL-BAYOUMI's residence in England in 09/2001, confirm that plaques were given by AL-BAYOUMI to various individuals for their service at the mosque (reference [REDACTED] (F)). Furthermore, no evidence has been found to support information from ISAMU DYSON that the dinner was a welcoming party for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. AL-MIHDHAR appears for a very short time on the videotape; AL-HAZMI is not seen at all. Other individuals who were present at the dinner have advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stayed in a back room of the apartment during the dinner.

TRAVEL OF AL-BAYOUMI IN 2000

[REDACTED] When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he traveled often during the spring of 2000 and therefore seldom interacted with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR after the dinner held in their apartment. Specifically, AL-BAYOUMI traveled to Washington, DC, to attend a seminar at George Washington University for approximately two weeks in 03/2000. AL-BAYOUMI then traveled to Saudi Arabia between 03/21/2000 and 05/31/2000. Review of travel records, immigration records, and school records has corroborated this information. When AL-BAYOUMI returned from Saudi Arabia, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR had vacated their apartment and moved to another residence. After they moved out of Parkwood Apartments, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he only saw AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR at the mosque on one or two occasions.

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism, From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 07/21/2004

ALLEGATIONS THAT AL-BAYOUMI WAS A SAUDI INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

[REDACTED] Multiple individuals in the San Diego area, to reportedly include NAWAF AL-HAZMI, suspected AL-BAYOUMI to be a Saudi Arabian intelligence officer because he was frequently observed videotaping events at the local Islamic center. To date, the FBI has not received any information corroborating this assertion.

CONCLUSION

[REDACTED] In conclusion, the intelligence information and evidence acquired during the investigation to date do not indicate that the assistance provided by AL-BAYOUMI to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR was witting. There is no indication to date that AL-BAYOUMI had advance knowledge of the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001 or knowledge of AL-HAZMI's and/or AL-MIHDHAR's status as Al Qaeda operatives. Furthermore, the investigation has determined that AL-BAYOUMI did not provide any monetary support to AL-HAZMI and/or AL-MIHDHAR.

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 07/21/2004

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] For information.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

[REDACTED] For information.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/29/2005

To: New York

Attn: (S)

Washington Field
Los Angeles

Attn:

Attn:

San Diego

Attn:

From: San Diego

(G)

Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOM
MAJOR CASE - 182

Synopsis: Review telephone records obtained by San Diego Division in regard to Omar Al-Bayoumi.

Details: In connection with an effort by the Penttbom Team, Los Angeles Division and San Diego Division to review Penttbom investigation in Southern California, San Diego recently (D)

(D) Los Angeles obtained subscriber information for Los Angeles telephone numbers in contact with Al-Bayoumi telephone numbers and provided analysis under EC dated April 18, 2005.

This report is an analysis of FBI Telephone Application records on toll records received by San Diego Division for the time period November 1, 1999 through March 1, 2001. This analysis will cover three topics: the historical review of toll records received by San Diego Division, the analysis of calls on significant dates, and associates identified through toll analysis. Also attached is a time line showing significant dates regarding Al-Bayoumi.

A. Historical Review of Telephone Records

To: New York From: San Diego
Re: (F) , 09/29/2005

During the fall of 2001, San Diego Division obtained Grand Jury toll records for the following telephone numbers associated with Omar Al-Bayoumi:

1. Pacific Bell home telephone number (P) /formerly (P) tolls received January 17, 2000 through June 30, 2001, subscribed to Omar Al-Bayoumi, (P), San Diego, California. Note: An area code change from 619 to 858 began in approximately June 1999 and was mandatory by December 1999.

2. Sprint cellular telephone number (P), tolls received January 9, 2000 through June 7, 2000, subscribed to Omar Al-Bayoumi, (P), San Diego, California, from September 27, 1998 to June 8, 2000.

3. Sprint cellular telephone number (P), tolls received June 8, 2000 to April 2, 2001, subscribed to Omar Al-Bayoumi, (P), San Diego, California.

4. Airtouch cellular telephone number (P), tolls received November 20, 1998 through September 20, 2000, subscribed to Omar Al-Bayoumi, C/O Manal Bagader, (P), San Diego, California. From Al-Bayoumi's records found at the Kurdish Community Islamic Center (KCIC), (P) is referred as Manal's phone number, (F).

5. Pacific Bell Wireless telephone number (P), tolls received September 1, 2000 through July 28, 2001, subscribed to Manal Bagader.

6. Pacific Bell telephone number (P) tolls received July 1, 1998 through April 22, 2001, service disconnected April 22, 2001, subscribed to Omar Al-Bayoumi, dba Masjed Al Madianah, 511 S. Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, CA. This is the telephone number used in Al-Bayoumi's office at the KCIC. Al-Bayoumi was given power of attorney for (P) (P) to purchase a building in June 1998 for the KCIC.

7. Pacific Bell telephone number (P), tolls received December 15, 1999 through January 17, 2001, subscribed to Manal A. Bagader, (P) San Diego, California, installed September 1, 1999 and disconnected on May 14, 2001. This telephone line was primarily used to connect with Internet Service provider UUNET TECH.

During the time period when Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar were in San Diego, California (February 4, 2000 through June 10, 2000 and Al-Hazmi's continued residence through December 11, 2000) records indicate Omar Al-Bayoumi left San Diego during the time periods January 9, 2000 (Culver City); February 4, 2000 (Los Angeles); March

To: New York From: San Diego
Re: (F) , 09/29/2005

30, 2000 through May 31, 2000 (Saudi Arabia); July 12, 2000 (Culver City); July 31, 2000 through August 3, 2000 (Las Vegas); and October 9, 2000 through November 30, 2000 (Great Britain). When interviewed in Saudi Arabia in August 2003, Al-Bayoumi advised that he attended a two to three week seminar in Washington D.C. a couple of weeks after Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar arrived in San Diego. Review of Al-Bayoumi's financial records from February to March 30, 2000 do not show evidence of this travel or exactly when it occurred.

B. Analysis of Significant Dates

1. January 15, 2000: Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar arrived at Los Angeles International Airport on United Flight 2 from Bangkok arriving at 13:27.

The first call activity on Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) for January 15, 2000, was with his wife Manal's cellular telephone number (P) at 13:41 and 13:42. Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone records show two unknown incoming calls at 13:41 and 13:43, which are believed to be the two calls from Manal's cellular telephone. The next call noted on Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P), was a call made at 21:12 to (P), subscribed to Hashim Moshen AlAttas. Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number then called (P), subscribed to Broadway Pizza, known employer of Khalid Abdulrab, aka AlYafai. Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number called AlAttas' telephone number again at 21:42 and 22:10.

The first call activity shown between Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers and AlAttas' telephone number (P), was on January 12, 2000. Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) had twenty calls to (P) from January 12, 2000 to February 14, 2000. The first call activity shown between Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers and telephone numbers associated with Khalid Abdulrab was on July 16, 1999. Hashim AlAttas and Khalid Abdulrab will be discussed below.

On January 17, 2000 at 22:59, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number received a six minute call from (P), subscribed to Fahad Al-Thumairy. A detailed analysis of Al-Thumairy, former Imam of the King Fahad mosque in Culver City, California is discussed below.

2. February 1, 2000: Al-Bayoumi's trip with Isamu Dyson to Los Angeles, meeting with Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar.

Telephone records show that beginning January 19, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) had contacts with telephone numbers associated with the Saudi Embassy in Washington D.C. Beginning on January 26, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) had contacts with the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California, (P). (Note: Telephone records show that

To: New York From: San Diego
Re: (F) , 09/29/2005

Al-Bayoumi's telephone number at the KCIC, (P) had numerous contacts with both Saudi Embassy telephone numbers in Washington D.C. and the Saudi Consulate number in Los Angeles in 1998 and 1999.)

From searches conducted by New Scotland Yard and interview of Al-Bayoumi by the Saudi Mabahith, it was determined that Al-Bayoumi was issued a Saudi Passport at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California on February 1, 2000. During the trip to Los Angeles when Al-Bayoumi received his passport, Al-Bayoumi and Isamu Dyson have stated they met Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar by chance at the Mediterranean Gourmet Restaurant, 10863 Venice Boulevard, Los Angeles, California.

Al-Bayoumi's telephone call activity is consistent with the trip to Los Angeles as described by Dyson and Al-Bayoumi. On January 31, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) had two contacts with the Saudi Embassy, (P) three contacts with the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, (P) and two contacts with Isamu Dyson's cellular telephone number, (P).

On February 1, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) had three contacts with the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, 310-479-6000, 9:32, 9:53 and 12:09; one contact with Al-Bayoumi's home telephone number at 19:11; and one call with Dyson's cellular telephone number at 21:50.

Between (P) and (P) Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) had (P) calls to (P), subscribed to Isamu A. Dyson. Dyson, now known as Clayton Bin Don, is a (P-1) who has been interviewed by the FBI numerous times. Dyson advised that during the trip to Los Angeles, he and Al-Bayoumi stopped at the Saudi Consulate; met Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar, and then went to the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, 10980 W. Washington Boulevard, (P-1). When Al-Bayoumi was interviewed in Saudi Arabia in August 2003, he stated they did not visit the King Fahad Mosque during the trip to Los Angeles.

3. February 4, 2000: Evidence that Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar are in San Diego, California.

Al-Bayoumi's telephone records for February 2-3, 2000, do not provide any information in regard to exactly when Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar first arrived in San Diego. The toll records from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P), show the most activity with calls made to the Saudi Consulate, Saudi Embassy, various travel agencies, Keller Graduate School, Delaware College of Business, (P), and Khalid Abdulrab, aka AlYafai.

Parkwood Apartment rental agreements and financial records show that on February 4, 2000, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar were

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in San Diego. Financial records show Al-Bayoumi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar were in the Bank of America on Balboa Avenue from approximately 15:30-15:40. Parkwood Apartment records show Omar Al-Bayoumi, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar each signed rental agreements for apartment 6401 Mt. Ada, apartment #150 dated February 4, 2000. One document, Apartment Move-in/Move-Out List is signed and dated February 3, 2000, (F) attachments.

Al-Bayoumi's telephone activity for February 4, 2000 can be summarized as follows:

TO	FROM	TIME	DURATION
BAYOUMI Cell	UNKNOWN	11:21	1:00
BAYOUMI Cell	UNKNOWN	12:08	1:00
BAYOUMI AT BANK OF AMERICA		15:30-15:40	
BAYOUMI Cell	WIFE Cell	15:58	2:00
BAYOUMI Cell	WIFE Cell	16:04	1:00
BAYOUMI Home	BAYOUMI Cell	16:04	1:00
BAYOUMI Home	BAYOUMI Cell	16:10	1:00
BAYOUMI Cell	UNKNOWN	16:14	1:00
BAYOUMI Home	BAYOUMI Cell	16:30	1:00
AULAQI Home	BAYOUMI Cell	16:40	1:00
AR-RIBAT PAYPHONE	BAYOUMI Cell	16:42	1:00
AR-RIBAT FAX	BAYOUMI Cell	16:43	1:00
BAYOUMI Cell	ALTHUMAIRY (CBR)	16:52	1:00
BAYOUMI Cell	BAYOUMI Cell	16:54	1:00
ALTHUMAIRY (CBR)	BAYOUMI Cell	16:55	2:00
(P) (ABDULRAB Home)	BAYOUMI Cell	17:03	1:00
BAYOUMI Cell	BAYOUMI Cell	20:07	2:00
(P)	BAYOUMI Cell	20:54	1:00
(P)	BAYOUMI Cell	20:56	1:00

After leaving the Bank of America, Al-Bayoumi, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar most likely returned to the Parkwood Apartments to give the apartment manager the cashier's check for apartment (P) and a copy of Al-Mihdhar's opening bank account deposit. When Al-Bayoumi was interviewed in August 2003, he did not recall if he accompanied Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar back to the manager's office. Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone made calls to Anwar Aulaqi and the ar-Ribat mosque an hour after the bank transactions. The telephone activity for February 4, 2000, could suggest that Al-Bayoumi may have introduced Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar to Anwar Aulaqi and individuals at the ar-Ribat mosque. When interviewed in August 2003, Al-Bayoumi denied making introductions. Also of note are the calls from and to Al-Thumairy, received and made after Al-Bayoumi called Aulaqi and the ar-Ribat telephone numbers.

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4. February 15, 2000: Khalid Al-Mihdhar signed lease agreement for Hashim AlAttas apartment.

Hashim AlAttas, date of birth (P-1) , assisted Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar in trying to lease his apartment in February/March 2000. On or about February 15, 2000, Al-Mihdhar signed a lease agreement and agreed to move into AlAttas apartment on March 1, 2000. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar never actually moved into the apartment, interview of apartment manager (P) , (F) (F) . AlAttas was said to have returned to Saudi Arabia at the end of February/early March 2000. Checks with Immigration databases failed to reveal information on when AlAttas left the United States.

On February 14, 2000 at 20:27, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) , made a five minute call to (P) , subscribed to Hashim AlAttas. The next call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number was made at 20:32 to (P) , subscribed to (P) and given by (P) when he was interviewed in 2001 as his pager number, (F) . Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number had previously called (P) pager number on February 9, 2000 at 10:44, three minutes after receiving an unknown in coming call at 10:41. The next call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number on February 14, 2000 at 20:40, was a six minute call to AlAttas.

During an interview with (P) on October 31, 2001, (P) did not recognize the name or photograph of Omar Al-Bayoumi. (P) recalled being paged before Al-Mihdhar signed the lease agreement and when (P) returned the page he spoke with Nawaf Al-Hazmi. (P) s office telephone records did not record calls to local numbers, (F)

When Al-Bayoumi was interviewed in August 2003, he did not recognize the name (P) and he thought AlAttas may have used his telephone to contact (P) Al-Bayoumi stated he never let Al-Hazmi or Al-Mihdhar use his cellular or home telephones. Al-Bayoumi denied assisting Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar move into AlAttas' apartment and knowing how AlAttas met Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. Al-Bayoumi acknowledged that he knew Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar were planning to moved into AlAttas apartment, as AlAttas was returning to Saudi Arabia. Al-Bayoumi had known AlAttas for a long time and would see and call him often, (F) .

The call activity between Al-Bayoumi, Hashim AlAttas and (P) (P) could indicate that Al-Bayoumi may have assisted in facilitating the arrangements for Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar to move into AlAttas' apartment and most likely introduced AlAttas to Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar.

5. February 17-19, 2000: Party in Parkwood Apartments

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A videotape seized by New Scotland Yard during searches of Omar Al-Bayoumi in England, labeled (S) 14, shows Khalid Abdulrab receiving a plaque from Omar Al-Bayoumi. There is a group of people depicted in the video which is believed to have been taken in Parkwood Apartment number (P), residence of Nawaf Al-Hazmi, Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Ahmad Mustafa. An individual who looks like Khalid Al-Mihdhar is shown. The plaque to Abdulrab is from the Masjid Al-Madina Al-Munawara mosque, known as the KCIC, and gives thanks to Abdulrab for his assistance during Ramadan 2000. Ramadan occurred twice in 2000, from December 9, 1999 to January 7, 2000 and from November 28, 2000 to December 27, 2000. Records received from Awards Designers Scriber, 7736 Clairemont Mesa Boulevard, San Diego, California, show that the plaque for Khalid Abdulrab was made there and paid for by Omar Al-Bayoumi on February 17, 2000. Immigration records show that Khalid Abdulrab departed Los Angeles, California on February 20, 2000. From this information it can be determined that the party held in the hijackers apartment occurred sometime between February 17-19, 2000. During an interview of Al-Bayoumi, he advised that he planned a party for a visiting Sheikh from Norway who had provided services at the Kurdish mosque. Al-Bayoumi decided to hold the dinner at the Parkwood Apartments and he used Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar's apartment for the men to gather, (F). Others present at the dinner were individuals from the Kurdish mosque-KCIC, Sheikh (P), (P) individuals from the Islamic Center of San Diego to include (P) Isamu Dyson and (P).

On February 16, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) shows a five minute call at 9:33 to (P) subscribed to Near East Foods. A one minute call and a four minute call are then made to the KCIC fax number at 9:44 and 9:45. A six minute call was made to a phone number subscribed to Anwar Aulagi, (P) at 16:43 and a two minute call was made to (P), (P) at 17:03.

On February 17, 2000 at 13:55, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number had a three minute call with (P), subscribed to Near East Foods. At 19:08, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number had a two minute call with (P), subscribed to the KCIC. At 19:28, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number called (P), subscribed to (P). At 19:47 and 19:48 there were two calls from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number to (P), subscribed to (P). (P) is associated with Near East Foods. At 20:07, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number called (P), subscribed to the Islamic Center of San Diego. The last call recorded on Al-Bayoumi's cellular phone was an unknown incoming call at 20:50. Telephone number (P) was used on a lease application for Khalid Al-Mihdhar as a personal reference, (F). On January 31, 2005, (P) was interviewed by Seattle division and he denied knowing

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or meeting Khalid Al-Mihdhar. (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F) (P) was not asked about Omar Al-Bayoumi when he was interviewed by Seattle. There is only one call to (P) found in Al-Bayoumi's toll records.

Another number listed on Al-Mihdhar's lease application for AlAttas' apartment was (P), telephone number of (P) (co-worker of AlAttas). When interviewed, (P) stated that he went with AlAttas and two males to an RV park in order for the two males to take over AlAttas' apartment lease. (P) thought AlAttas was doing Khalid LNU, who worked at Broadway Pizza (believed to be Khalid Abdulrab), a favor by assisting the two males. (P) was shown a photograph of Al-Bayoumi and advised that he knew Al-Bayoumi from the mosque, (F) In a later interview, (P) advised the he did not provide his telephone number for the two men to use on the lease agreement.

On February 18, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number called (P) twice, once at 17:12 and again at 17:13; the Embassy of Saudi Arabia, (P) for two minutes at 19:58; a phone number subscribed to (P) a well known individual in the Kurdish community, for five minutes at 20:07; and a three minute call to Anwar Aulagi at 21:56.

On February 19, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number called the Embassy of Saudi Arabia, (P) for six minutes at 10:56; and a number associated with Khalid Abdulrab twice at 17:58 and 19:49.

The telephone activity would suggest that the party held at the Parkwood Apartments took place on February 17, 2000, based on the calls to the KCIC, ICSD and Near East Foods.

6. March 17, 2000: Call from Parkwood Apt. 150

On March 17, 2000 at 13:47, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) received a one minute call from (P), home telephone number of Nawaf Al-Hazmi, Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Ahmed Mustafa. The next call made from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number at 13:57 was a one minute call to (P), subscribed to Southwestern Communications. Al-Bayoumi had rented a room at Residence Inn by Marriott, 5400 Kearny Mesa Road, San Diego, California from March 10, 2000 through March 16, 2000. The room was rented for one person for the purpose of tourism, (F), Serial (F) Several calls were place from this room to a number subscribed to AOL, (P) and the (P) number.

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In regard to calls made to/from the apartment [REDACTED] (P) telephone number [REDACTED] (P) on March 17, 2000, only one other call is shown on the toll records, a call to [REDACTED] (P) subscribed to [REDACTED] (P) Tailoring at 17:23. From interviews of Ahmad Mustafa, Mustafa advised that [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) was a friend of his uncle who offered Ahmad a place to stay in San Diego, [REDACTED] (F), Serials [REDACTED] (F).

7. June 10, 2000: Khalid Al-Mihdhar leaves United States on flight from Los Angeles International Airport.

Al-Bayoumi's telephone records do not show any significant contacts made on or around June 10, 2000.

8. December 8-11, 2000: Hani Hanjour arrives in San Diego on December 8, 2000 and leaves with Nawaf Al-Hazmi on December 11, 2000.

Al-Bayoumi's telephone records during this time period do not show any contact with the one phone number associated with Nawaf Al-Hazmi during this time period, Abdussattar Shaikh's telephone number, [REDACTED] (P). On December 9, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's home and cellular telephone numbers had contacts with [REDACTED] (P), subscribed to Fahad Al-Thumairy, the longest call being five to six minutes at 16:20.

As noted above, only one call was made from the Parkwood Apartment [REDACTED] (P) home telephone number to Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers. During the time Nawaf Al-Hazmi resided with Abdussattar Shaikh, there were four one minute calls in August 2000 from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number [REDACTED] (P) to Abdussattar Shaikh's home telephone number [REDACTED] (P). The calls occurred on August 8, 2000 at 21:09; August 10, 2000 at 12:51 and 12:52; and August 23, 2000 at 13:24. Al-Hazmi resided at Abdussattar Shaikh's home from the time he left the Parkwood Apartments until he left San Diego in December 2000. Al-Hazmi used [REDACTED] (P) as his daytime telephone phone on California Department of Motor Vehicles records filled out on June 2, 2000, [REDACTED] (F), [REDACTED] (F).

C. Other Telephone Associates/Connections in 2000

1. Saudi Embassy/Saudi Consulate

Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers had approximately 104 contacts with telephone numbers associated with the Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Embassy of Saudi Arabia Islamic Affairs Office Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission, and Saudi Arabia Education Mission located in Washington D.C. during the year 2000. Al-Bayoumi's telephones also had approximately twenty-four contacts with [REDACTED] (P) subscribed to the Saudi Arabia

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Royal Consulate in Los Angeles, California, during the year 2000. Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) had eleven calls with (P) subscribed to the Saudi Arabia Royal Consulate from January 26, 2000 through February 10, 2000. Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P) had thirteen calls with (P) from July 11, 2000 through December 20, 2000. Documents taken from Al-Bayoumi's office at the KCIC show (P) was associated with (P). Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers to include his home telephone number, cellular telephone numbers, and office telephone number at the KCIC, had contacts with Saudi Embassy/Mission telephones numbers and Saudi Consulate telephone and fax numbers in 1998 and 1999.

2. Los Angeles Connections: Fahad Al-Thumairy, (P)
(P), and the King Fahad Mosque

Between December 16, 1998 and December 20, 2000, telephone numbers associated with Al-Bayoumi (home #1 (P); #2 cell (P); #3 cell (P); #4 KCIC (P)) had sixty-seven contacts with telephone numbers associated with Fahad Al-Thumairy, date of birth (P-1) (#1 home (P); #2 a can be reached (CBR) number used by Al-Thumairy, but subscribed to (P), (P) and #3 a cell number subscribed to (P), but used by Al-Thumairy, (P)).

DATE	TO	FROM	TIME	DURATION
12/16/98	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#4	19:27	1:00
11/15/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	14:23	4:00
12/6/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	22:58	1:00
12/7/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	19:17	2:00
12/8/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	11:24	1:00
12/15/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	14:23	4:00
12/18/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	16:08	2:00
12/19/99	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#4	21:10	1:00
12/19/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	22:17	3:00
12/20/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	15:35	3:00
12/20/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	23:04	9:00
12/21/99	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#4	17:43	1:00
12/21/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	22:50	3:00
12/27/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	18:27	9:00
12/27/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	23:36	6:00
12/28/99	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	23:02	1:00
1/2/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#4	05:06	3:00
1/6/00	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#2CBR	00:53	5:00
1/6/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#4	18:15	1:00
1/6/00	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#2CBR	18:21	1:00
1/6/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#4	18:30	4:00
1/9/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#2	12:21	1:00

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1/17/00	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#1	22:59	6:00
1/19/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#2	20:20	1:00
1/19/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#2	20:23	1:00
1/19/00	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#2CBR	22:13	5:00
1/24/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#4	18:09	1:00
2/4/00	BAYOUMI#2	THUMAIRY#2CBR	16:52	1:00
2/4/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#2	16:55	2:00
7/11/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#3	14:04	1:00
8/4/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	17:27	2:00

DATE	TO	FROM	TIME	DURATION
8/6/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	11:49	6:00
8/8/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	19:10	2:00
8/8/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	19:41	1:00
8/8/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	22:44	2:00
8/8/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	23:12	1:00
8/8/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	23:13	13:00
9/10/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	11:31	1:00
9/14/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	18:00	4:00
9/14/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	20:19	2:00
9/15/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	12:09	2:00
9/17/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	14:40	2:00
9/17/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	14:53	5:00
9/18/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#3	12:27	1:00
9/18/00	THUMAIRY#2CBR	BAYOUMI#3	12:28	1:00
9/18/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	12:29	1:00
12/2/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#4	20:53	:37
12/2/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#4	20:53:42	1:00
12/3/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	14:36	3:29
12/9/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	11:10	:14
12/9/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	16:18	:10
12/9/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	16:19	:00
12/9/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	16:19:58	:27
12/9/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	16:20	4:55
12/10/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	19:16	:46
12/10/00	THUMAIRY#3	BAYOUMI#3	21:39	4:00
12/10/00	THUMAIRY#3	BAYOUMI#3	23:25	2:00
12/11/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	11:51	:43
12/14/00	THUMAIRY#3	BAYOUMI#4	17:35	1:00
12/16/00	THUMAIRY#3	BAYOUMI#3	15:30	1:00
12/16/00	THUMAIRY#3	BAYOUMI#3	15:57	1:00
12/16/00	THUMAIRY#1	BAYOUMI#3	16:01	1:00
12/17/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	13:52	:36
12/17/00	THUMAIRY#3	BAYOUMI#3	14:04	6:00
12/17/00	BAYOUMI#1	THUMAIRY#1	14:30	1:29
12/20/00	BAYOUMI#3	THUMAIRY#1	16:08	:51

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12/20/00 THUMAIRY#3 BAYOUMI#4 16:08:52 2:38

When interviewed in Saudi Arabia in August 2003, Al-Bayoumi identified Fahad Al-Thumairy as the Imam of the King Fahad mosque and stated that he had visited the King Fahad mosque once or twice a year, but not on the day he went to Los Angeles with Isamu Dyson. It is apparent from the telephone activity noted above that Al-Bayoumi had substantial contacts with Al-Thumairy. Of interest are the calls made during significant time periods when Al-Mihdhar and/or Al-Hazmi were in Los Angeles, California and San Diego, California: January 17-24, 2000; February 4, 2000; December 9-11, 2000. The significance of these calls is unknown due to the lack of content for the calls and the frequency of calls during 1999 and 2000.

Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers also had contacts with telephone numbers associated with the King Fahad mosque, Culver City, California. During the September 26, 2001 search of Al-Bayoumi's office in the KCIC, telephone numbers [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P), and [REDACTED] (P) were found for the King Fahad mosque, 10980 Washington Boulevard, Culver City, California. The name [REDACTED] (P) was also related to telephone number [REDACTED] (P). Al-Bayoumi's telephone number at the KCIC, [REDACTED] (P), had a seven minute call to [REDACTED] (P) on July 8, 1999. On September 8, 2000 and September 13, 2000, the fax number at the KCIC, [REDACTED] (P), received two calls from 310-204-1260, the fax number at the King Fahad Mosque. On December 16, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number [REDACTED] (P) contacted [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P), both numbers associated with the King Fahad Mosque.

3. Anwar Aulaqi and the ar-Ribat mosque

Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers show eight contacts with telephone numbers associated with former Imam of the ar-Ribat mosque, Anwar Aulaqi, date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1), and the ar-Ribat mosque, 7173 Saranac Street, La Mesa, California from February 4, 2000 through December 25, 2000. As stated above, the calls on February 4, 2000 occurred an hour after Al-Bayoumi was in the Bank of America branch on Balboa Avenue with Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar.

A cellular telephone number subscribed to Al-Bayoumi and believed to be used by his wife Manal (see above under historical review), [REDACTED] (P) made five calls to telephone number [REDACTED] (P) (Aulaqi's home telephone number). The calls were made on November 20, 1998; February 26, 1999; May 7, 1999; October 3, 1999; and April 19, 2000. Travel records and interview reports show that Al-Bayoumi was in Saudi Arabia on April 19, 2000.

Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number [REDACTED] (P), called Aulaqi's home telephone number [REDACTED] (P), three more times, all in February 2000: a one minute call on February 10, 2000 at 20:42; a six

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minute call on February 16, 2000 at 16:43; and a three minute call on February 18, 2000 at 21:56. On December 18, 2000 at 19:37, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number [REDACTED] (P) made a one minute call to [REDACTED] (P) the office number to the ar-Ribat mosque. One minute later, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number [REDACTED] (P) made a two minute call to [REDACTED] (P), the pay phone at the ar-Ribat mosque. On December 25, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone makes a three minute call to the ar-Ribat pay phone. In January 2001, Aulaqi moved to Falls Church, Virginia, [REDACTED] (F)

4. Mohdar Abdullah [REDACTED] (P)

Mohdar Abdullah, date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1), was a close associate of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar during time they spent in San Diego, California. During an interview of Abdullah on September 18, 2001, Abdullah advised that Al-Bayoumi brought Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar to the mosque on Saranac (ar-Ribat mosque) and introduced them to Abdullah. According to Abdullah, Al-Bayoumi asked Abdullah to become acquainted with them, acclimate them to San Diego and assist them in any way, [REDACTED] (F). The phone analysis above regarding Aulaqi shows Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers had contacts with Aulaqi and the ar-Ribat mosque at a time when Al-Bayoumi was with or had just been with Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar on February 4, 2000. During Al-Bayoumi's August 2003 interview in Saudi Arabia, Al-Bayoumi denied introducing Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar to Mohdar Abdullah or asking Abdullah to assist them. Al-Bayoumi's telephone records could indicate Al-Bayoumi may have introduced Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar to Aulaqi, Abdullah and to the ar-Ribat mosque.

Telephone records show contacts between two cellular telephone numbers subscribed to Al-Bayoumi and a telephone number at the residence of Mohdar Abdullah, [REDACTED] (P), subscribed to Samir Karawia, [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P), La Mesa, California. On March 15, 2000 at 9:08, there was a one minute call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone [REDACTED] (P); on July 11, 2000 at 14:06 there was one minute call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number [REDACTED] (P); and on October 1, 2000 at 18:05 there was a one minute call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number [REDACTED] (P). Mohdar Abdullah also worked at the Texaco station on Spring Street in La Mesa, California. On June 23, 2000, there were two one minute calls to a telephone number subscribed to this Texaco station, [REDACTED] (P), from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number [REDACTED] (P), at 18:11 and 19:47.

Another telephone number, [REDACTED] (P), was associated with the [REDACTED] (P) address during the year 2000. Between July 22, 2000 and November 11, 2000, telephone number [REDACTED] (P) had twenty-nine calls to [REDACTED] (P), Abdussattar Shaikh's home telephone number where Al-Hazmi resided from approximately June 2000

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until he left San Diego in December 2000. There was a one minute call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P), to (P) on September 6, 1999.

Penttbom (D) (P), date of birth (P-1) (P-1), was an associate of Mohdar Abdullah. According to (P) he met Abdullah while they both worked at the Texaco station in La Mesa, California. (P) was interviewed in September 2001. He knew Al-Bayoumi and interacted with him at the mosque on Balboa and while living with other Saudi students in an apartment located off Balboa. (P) said he was introduced to Nawaf Al-Hazmi by Mohdar Abdullah at the Texaco station on Spring Street. (P) observed Al-Hazmi at the Texaco station and interacted with him. When (P) was confronted with information that his phone number was in Al-Hazmi's vehicle which had been found in the Dulles National Airport after September 11, 2001, (P) admitted he gave Al-Hazmi his phone number and that they were friends. (F) Telephone number (P) with the name (P) was found in Al-Hazmi's vehicle in the Dulles National Airport, (F). Telephone number (P) is associated with (P) residence located at (P) San Diego, California. It appears (P) resided at this address from June 2000 through the first of August 2000, (F) (P) then moved to (P) San Diego, California, telephone number (P) from approximately August 8, 2000 through January 1, 2001, (F). No telephone contacts were found between Al-Bayoumi's telephone numbers and (P). From August 18, 2000 through October 1, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number made thirteen calls to (P), the phone number for (P) apartment on (P).

5. Hashim AlAttas

See above under February 15, 2000 lease agreement.

6. Khalid Abdulrab

Khalid Abdulrab, aka AlYafai, date of birth (P-1), was a Saudi student who lived in San Diego from November 1998 to February 2000 and again from September 2000 through December 2000, according to his foreign exchange student host (P), (F). (F) Abdulrab briefly attended English Language School, a business school and he worked at Broadway Pizza. Abdulrab is believed to have assisted Al-Bayoumi at the KCIC mosque in El Cajon, California and was given a plaque from Al-Bayoumi at the party held in the hijackers apartment in February 2000 referenced above. During the time period January 9, 2000 through August 16, 2000, Abdulrab's home telephone number at (P)'s residence, (P) had thirty-eight calls with

To: New York From: San Diego
Re: (F) , 09/29/2005

three telephone numbers associated with Al-Bayoumi, (P), (P) and (P). On July 16, 1999, Al-Bayoumi's KCIC telephone number had one call to the (P) residence. On September 17, 2000, (P) subscribed to (P) had one call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number (P). Abdulrab was interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith in 2002 and the FBI in February 2004. Abdulrab stated he knew Al-Bayoumi from the Islamic Center of San Diego and had seen Nawaf Al-Hazmi at the Islamic Center. Abdulrab denied any knowledge of destructive or terrorism acts or talking with Al-Bayoumi or Al-Hamzi about destructive or terrorism acts, (F), (F).

7. Talal Al-Hamdan

Telephone records show that from January 22, 2000 to August 11, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone numbers, (P) and (P), had twenty-three calls to (P), subscribed to Talal Al-Hamdan. Al-Hamdan, date of birth (P-1), was interviewed in October 2001 and advised that his father, Ahmed Abdul Azziz Suleiman Al-Hamdan, told Talal to contact Al-Bayoumi at the Abu Bakr mosque in San Diego when Talal moved to San Diego. At the time of the interview, Al-Hamdan said his father was a Finance Ministry official for the Saudi government and at one time he helped Al-Bayoumi obtain a scholarship. Al-Hamdan advised their family was wealthy and well known in Saudi Arabia. Al-Hamdan did not provide any information regarding his involvement with terrorism and stated he was in disagreement with the attacks of September 11, 2001, (F), Serial (F)

8. (P)

Between March 27, 2000 and September 15, 2000, thirty-one calls were made from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone numbers (P) and (P) to (P), a telephone number used by Luwam Nour, date of birth (P-1). Al-Bayoumi listed (P) as a personal reference and emergency contact on his Parkwood apartment rental application signed July 28, 1999, (F). When interviewed in Saudi Arabia, Al-Bayoumi said that he assisted Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar to fill out the Parkwood apartment rental application and was instructed by the apartment manager to use his friend Luwam as a reference because (P) had been a long time resident at the Parkwood Apartments. (P) is listed as both a personal reference and an emergency contact, (F)

9. Osama Basnan

To: New York From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 09/29/2005

Allegation were received that Osama Basnan, date of birth (P-1) [REDACTED] (P-1), was a supporter of Osama bin Laden; considered the "mayor" of the San Diego Saudi community; and would have known the Saudi pilots from San Diego involved in the attacks of September 11, 2001,

(F) [REDACTED] Investigation determined significant telephone contacts between telephone numbers associated with Al-Bayoumi and his wife and telephone numbers associated with Basnan and his wife.

Reviewing Al-Bayoumi's and Basnan's telephone records for the year 2000, there are approximately thirty-one contacts between Al-Bayoumi's home telephone number [REDACTED] (P) and Basnan's cellular telephone number [REDACTED] (P). Five of these calls occurred when Al-Bayoumi was known to be overseas. One call from Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number [REDACTED] (P), was made to Basnan's home telephone number [REDACTED] (P) on July 30, 2000. Seventy-four out of eighty calls recorded between Al-Bayoumi's home telephone number and Basnan's cellular telephone number in the year 2001 were made when Al-Bayoumi was overseas. When Al-Bayoumi was interviewed in Saudi Arabia in August 2003, he acknowledged that Basnan was an acquaintance whom he did not care much for and that his wife and Basnan's wife were close friends. When Basnan was interviewed, he stated he did not like Al-Bayoumi and they had little personal contact, (F) [REDACTED]

10. Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies in America (IIASA)

Telephone records show that Al-Bayoumi's home telephone number [REDACTED] (P), cellular telephone number [REDACTED] (P), and telephone number at the KCIC, [REDACTED] (P), had twenty-one calls with phone numbers associated with the IIASA. On December 14, 2000, Al-Bayoumi's telephone number at the KCIC had two calls with [REDACTED] (P), subscribed to [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) professor IIASA, Fairfax, Virginia. Between December 22, 2000 and January 13, 2001, Al-Bayoumi's telephone number at the KCIC and his cellular telephone numbers [REDACTED] (P) had sixteen calls with two telephone number, [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P), subscribed to [REDACTED] (P), staff member at IIASA, Fairfax, Virginia. On December 15, 2000, [REDACTED] (P), subscribed to Institute for Islamic & Arabic Sciences, 8500 Hilltop Road, Fairfax, Virginia contacted Al-Bayoumi's cellular telephone number [REDACTED] (P). On February 12, 2001, [REDACTED] (P), subscribed to Institute for Islamic and Arabic Study, 8500 Hilltop Road, Fairfax, Virginia, made one call to Al-Bayoumi's home telephone number [REDACTED] (P). On February 13, 2001, [REDACTED] (P) made one call to Al-Bayoumi's telephone number at the KCIC, [REDACTED] (P).

Washington Field office has an ongoing case regarding the (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Fairfax, Virginia and [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED]

To: New York From: San Diego
Re: (F) , 09/29/2005

(D)

11. Mohammed Abd Al-Aziz Al Habib and Saad Abd Al-Aziz Al Habib, aka Al-Habeeb

When Al-Bayoumi was interviewed in August 2003, he stated that he was contacted by Saad Al Habib, a Saudi individual who had attended school in San Diego, regarding the purchase of a mosque for the San Diego Kurdish community. Al-Bayoumi stated Al Habib gave him all the money to purchase the building. Escrow documents support the fact that Al Habib, aka Al-Habeeb, funded the purchase of the Kurdish mosque property.

Financial records show that Al-Bayoumi received money from Mohammed Al Habib and Saad Al Habib for the purchase of the Kurdish mosque (KCIC); for repairs to the mosque building; and mostly likely to pay for the salary of a visiting Sheikh from Norway, Abdulrahman Barzanjee.

Checks with (O-1) and Immigration showed that (O-1) entered the United States through (O-1) (O-1) Escrow documents show a \$535,000 payment for the Kurdish mosque property was received from Saad A. S. Al Habeeb on June 18, 1998.

Al-Bayoumi's telephone records show that from December 17, 1999 through December 5, 2000, the telephone number at the KCIC made 26 direct calls to various telephone numbers in Saudi Arabia. None of the telephone numbers called are known telephone numbers associated with Saad Al Habib. Al-Bayoumi's other telephone number records show calls made through calling card numbers; however, no information was obtained showing call activity between Al-Bayoumi and Al Habib.

To: New York From: San Diego
Re: (F) 09/29/2005

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Provided for your information.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 02/04/2004

To: International Operations
(G)

Attn:
Attn:

(G), (S)

From: Counterterrorism
PENTTBOM Investigative Team

Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOM
MC 182

Synopsis: To provide additional information regarding the individuals requested to be interviewed by the 9/11 Commission and FBI.

Reference: Telcall between (G) ALAT (S) and PENTTBOM SA (S) on 01/24/2004; email from (G) Legat (S) dated 02/04/2004.

Details: Legat (G) was recently requested to coordinate with the Saudi Mabahith to make six individuals available for interviews by the 9/11 Commission and the FBI. In response to the request of Legat (G), the following information from the PENTTBOM investigation concerning these individuals is being provided.

FAHAD I. A. AL-THUMAIRY

DOB: (P-1)

POB:

PPN:

Last Known Address: Al Takassi, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Last Known Telephone: (P-1)

From 1996 to 2003, AL-THUMAIRY resided in Los Angeles, California, where he was a representative of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Affairs, and Religious Guidance at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As such, AL-THUMAIRY was the consulate liaison to the King Fahad Mosque, Culver City, California. Investigation into the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001 determined that hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR

To: International Operations From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) 02/04/2004

and NAWAF AL-HAZMI visited the King Fahad Mosque on at least one occasion in 06/2000. Furthermore, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI had arrived in the United States at Los Angeles in 01/2000 and stayed in the Los Angeles area until their relocation to San Diego, California, in 02/2000. It is not known to date where AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI stayed while in the Los Angeles area in 01/2000 and when/if AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI visited the King Fahad Mosque during 01/2000.

Prior to moving to San Diego at the end of 01/2000, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI initially met OMAR AL-BAYOUMI at a restaurant in Los Angeles after AL-BAYOUMI had visited the Saudi Arabian Consulate. Additionally, investigation through telephone records as well as interviews indicates that AL-THUMAIRY and AL-BAYOUMI were in contact through telephone calls and face-to-face contact at the King Fahad Mosque. When interviewed by the FBI in Saudi Arabia in 08/2003, AL-BAYOUMI identified a photograph of AL-THUMAIRY by name and stated that he knew AL-THUMAIRY from the King Fahad Mosque. However, when AL-THUMAIRY was interviewed in the United States in 05/2000, he stated that he did not know an individual named OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. Though interviewed in the United States in 05/2000, AL-THUMAIRY has never been interviewed regarding any potential association with KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and/or NAWAF AL-HAZMI.

KHALIL AL-KHALIL

AL-KHALIL was a co-founder of the King Fahad Mosque, Culver City, California (see above information regarding the King Fahad Mosque). The PENTTBOM Team does not hold any additional information regarding AL-KHALIL, and refers Legat to the Los Angeles Division if additional information is necessary.

SAUD ABDULAZIZ SAUD AL-RASHEED

DOB: (P-1)
POB:
PPN:

Information regarding AL-RASHEED has been previously passed to the Mabahith, and multiple requests have been made to conduct an interview of AL-RASHEED. AL-RASHEED came to the attention of the FBI when the (O-1)

(O-1)

To: International Operations From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) [REDACTED], 02/04/2004

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

AL-RASHEED was detained by the Mabahith from approximately 08/2002 to 02/2003. During interviews conducted by the Mabahith, AL-RASHEED denied any involvement with the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001. Since that time, however, additional intelligence has been received to the contrary. To date, AL-RASHEED has not been interviewed regarding this new information.

LAFI HUSSAIN SAIFI AL-JABIRI AL-HARBI

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
POB: [REDACTED]
PPN: [REDACTED]

Between 03/11/2000 and 03/27/2000, approximately eleven calls were made between a telephone number subscribed by NAWAF AL-HAZMI and a cellular telephone subscribed by LAFI AL-HARBI.

Investigation has determined that AL-HARBI is a Saudi Naval officer who was attending training in the United States. From 10/1999 to 03/2000, AL-HARBI attended training in Coronado, California. AL-HARBI then attended training in Newport, Rhode Island, from 04/2000 to 09/2000, after which time he returned to Saudi Arabia. Investigation to date has not determined any additional contact or association between the 09/11/2001 hijackers and AL-HARBI.

To date, AL-HARBI has not been interviewed regarding his telephonic contact with the telephone number subscribed by NAWAF AL-HAZMI.

YAZEED SAAD ATIF AL-SALMI

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
POB: [REDACTED]
PPN: [REDACTED]

YAZEED AL-SALMI and NAWAF AL-HAZMI rented rooms at the same residence in the San Diego, California, area during the same time period in 2000. AL-HAZMI was already residing at the residence when AL-SALMI began renting a room and, when AL-SALMI moved out approximately one month later, AL-HAZMI continued to reside at the residence. AL-SALMI and AL-HAZMI also shared an automobile insurance policy in San Diego.

On 07/16/2000, AL-SALMI purchased USD 4,000 of American Express Traveler's Checks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, prior to his arrival in the United States on 08/08/2001. On 09/05/2001, USD

To: International Operations From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) 02/04/2004

1,900 of these Traveler's Checks were deposited into the Bank of America account of AL-HAZMI.

On 09/23/2001, AL-SALMI was arrested pursuant to a Material Witness warrant for his association with participants in the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001. AL-SALMI was subsequently deported to Saudi Arabia after being charged with immigration violations. To date, AL-SALMI has not been interviewed concerning the financial transaction between himself and AL-HAZMI.

KHALID ABDULLAH SALEH AL-YAFAI, aka KHALID ABDULRAB

DOB: (P-1)
POB: (P-1)
PPN: (P-1)
Last Known Address: (P) Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
Last Known Telephone: Home (P-1); Work (P-1)

ABDULRAB, a Saudi national of Yemeni origin, previously resided in San Diego where he attended school. Before returning home to Saudi Arabia, ABDULRAB received a plaque from OMAR AL-BAYOUMI at the videotaped dinner held at the apartment of KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI. Furthermore, an individual named MOHDAR ABDULLAH who was introduced in San Diego to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI by AL-BAYOUMI stated that he was first introduced to ABDULRAB at the same time.

ABDULRAB was interviewed by the Mabahith in approximately 10/2002, but to date has not been interviewed by the FBI.

The information set forth above can be disseminated to the Mabahith.

To: International Operations From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) [REDACTED], 02/04/2004

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT (G) [REDACTED] WASHINGTON, DC

For information.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

(G) [REDACTED]

(G) [REDACTED]

As requested, Legat (G) [REDACTED] is being furnished the information contained within the Details section of this EC in order to coordinate with the Saudi Mabahith to make FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, KHALIL AL-KHALIL, SAUD ABDULAZIZ SAUD AL-RASHEED, LAFI HUSSAIN SAIFI AL-JABIRI Al-HARBI, YAZID SAAD A. AL-SALMI, and KHALID ABDULLAH SALEH AL-YAFAI, aka KHALID ABDULRAB available for interviews by the 9/11 Commission and the FBI.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 03/02/2004

To: International Operations
(G)

Attn: (G), (S)
Attn:

From: New York
PENTTBOM Investigative Team

Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOM
MC 182

Synopsis: To request Legat (G) coordinate with the Saudi Mabahith to (1) obtain current contact information of YAZEED SAAD ATIF AL-SALMI; and (2) allow the FBI to conduct a polygraph examination of OMAR AL-BAYOUMI.

Administrative: Reference Memo (F) and Memo (F) written and provided by writer to ALAT (S) on 02/26/2004 to pass to Saudi Mabahith.

Details: From 02/19/2004 to 02/26/2004, writer was TDY in Legat (G) to participate in interviews with the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. During that time, two requests emerged in regards to the PENTTBOM investigation. On 02/26/2004, writer provided ALAT (S) with two memos (F) and (F) to pass to the Saudi Mabahith. These requests are detailed as follows:

1) Pursuant to our request for an interview of YAZEED SAAD ATIF AL-SALMI, date of birth (P-1), (P-1) passport # (P-1), by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the Saudi Mabahith provided information that AL-SALMI had departed the Kingdom to study abroad in the Czech Republic. In order to pursue the interview of AL-SALMI, the PENTTBOM Investigative Team requests any additional information regarding the current location of AL-SALMI (F). Such information, to include address, telephone number, and name of school at which he is studying, will facilitate our ability to locate and interview him.

To: International Operations From: New York
Re: (F) 03/02/2004

By way of background, AL-SALMI was a housemate of NAWAF AL-HAZMI (hijacker of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) while in San Diego in 2000. AL-SALMI and AL-HAZMI also shared an automobile insurance policy while in San Diego.

On 07/16/2000, AL-SALMI purchased USD 4000 of American Express Traveler's Checks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, prior to his arrival in the United States on 08/08/2000. On 09/05/2001, USD 1900 of the Traveler's Checks were deposited into the Bank of America bank account of AL-HAZMI. To date, AL-SALMI has not been interviewed regarding this financial transaction between he and AL-HAZMI.

2) In 08/2003, the PENTTBOM Investigative Team interviewed OMAR AL-BAYOUMI in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This interview provided valuable information regarding the relationship between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. However, in order to make a determination in regards to our investigation, it is requested that the Mabahith provide us the opportunity to conduct a polygraph examination of AL-BAYOUMI (F) (F). The polygraph examination will assist in determining the credibility of information provided by AL-BAYOUMI, and therefore allow our investigation to reach a conclusion at this time.

By way of background, AL-BAYOUMI resided in San Diego from approximately 1997 to 2001. While visiting Los Angeles in early 2000, AL-BAYOUMI met KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) in a restaurant. During their conversation, AL-BAYOUMI spoke about residing in San Diego and provided AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI with his contact information. Approximately four to five days later, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arrived in San Diego and asked AL-BAYOUMI for assistance in obtaining an apartment. AL-BAYOUMI accompanied AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to the leasing office of the Parkwood Apartment complex where he co-signed their contract as guarantor. AL-BAYOUMI also accompanied AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to a nearby branch of Bank of America where AL-MIHDHAR opened an account. While at the bank, AL-BAYOUMI secured a bank check for the rent payment of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is believed that AL-BAYOUMI was contemporaneously reimbursed for this check by AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

To: International Operations From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 03/02/2004

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT [REDACTED] (G), DC

For information.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

[REDACTED] (G)

AT [REDACTED] (G)

To obtain from the Saudi Mabahith the current contact information in the Czech Republic of YAZEED SAAD ATIF AL-SALMI, date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1), Saudi passport # [REDACTED] (P-1), as requested in Memo [REDACTED] (F)

Set Lead 3: (Action)

[REDACTED] (G)

AT [REDACTED] (G)

To coordinate with the Saudi Mabahith in order for the FBI to conduct a polygraph examination of OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, as requested in Memo [REDACTED] (F)

◆◆

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

U.S. Embassy
Office of the Legal Attache
(G)

February 6, 2002

(C-2)

Saudi Mabahith
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

File #: M/B/88/258F

M/B/88/331F/422

FBI #: (F)

Dear (C-2)

May God's blessings be upon you, your family, and your colleagues.

We ask for your thoughtful consideration of the following.

Your two referenced files requested information about U.S. telephone number (P) You advised that KSA telephone number (P-1) made two calls to the U.S. number, on 3/15/2001 and 7/30/2001. The KSA telephone number, you advised, was utilized by a man with an alias of ABU ABDULRAHMAN ALKHAFAJI and is listed to KHALID NAJI SHIHAN AL'ANAZI.

Investigation in Portland, Oregon determined that telephone number (P) is subscribed to the address of (P) Portland, Oregon. Telephone number (P) has become of interest to the investigation of the 9/11/2001 attacks. It was called by ABDALLAH ALTOWAYAN.

ABDULLAH ALTOWAYAN, from 4/6/2001 through 8/5/2001, lived at 6401 Mount Ada Road, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. He lived with his wife, (P) and daughter (P-1) ALTOWAYAN identified himself with an Oregon identification card, number (P-1), showing an address of (P) (P) Portland, Oregon. That address is the administration building for the University of Oregon.

Of interest is the fact that during ALTOWAYAN's residency at the Mount Ada Road address, HANI HANJOUR, KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, and NAWAF AL-HAZMI, all hijackers of 9/11/2001, lived at the same apartment complex. Also living at the complex was OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, who was detained in London, for his potential involvement in the attacks. When AL-BAYOUMI moved from the San Diego complex, he had his mail forwarded to ALTOWAYAN's apartment.

Without a doubt, the most significant information obtained from the U.S. investigation in San Diego, relevant to the interest in ALTOWAYAN, is the fact that witnesses have stated ALTOWAYAN, AL-BAYOUMI, HANJOUR, AL-MIHDHAR, and AL-HAZMI were often seen together. This leaves no doubt that ALTOWAYAN was well acquainted with the hijackers in the days just prior to the attacks. It is our opinion that ALTOWAYAN either knew of the planned attacks or was involved in the planning or support of those attacks.

Further investigation in Portland, based on the Oregon identification card presented at the San Diego apartment complex, determined ALTOWAYAN obtained a safe deposit box from a local Portland bank. He obtained the box in November, 2000. In December, 2000, he retrieved a passport from the box. Accompanying ALTOWAYAN was an unknown Arab male who did not speak during their time in the bank.

Records relating to ALTOWAYAN's rental of the safe deposit box revealed the following information. He provided his date of birth as (P-1). He gave his full name as TOWAYAN ABDALLAH AL-TOWAYAN, place of birth KSA, and a KSA passport number of (P-1). Relative to his safe deposit box, he stated his mother's maiden name as (P). However, and likely correct, on another bank document, he identified his mother's maiden name as (P) and gave his birth date as (P-1).

The U.S. investigation has also determined that ALTOWAYAN had made telephone calls to a cellular phone identified as belonging to SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI, alias SAMI DHAHER AL-ANAZI. It was learned that ALANAZI, at the time of the calls, was residing at (P) Portland, Oregon. That is the residence where telephone number (P) is located. The number is, of course, the one which was called by ALKHAFAJI from the KSA, on 3/15/2001 and 7/30/2001.

Further investigation identified SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI, alias SAMI DHAHER AL-ANAZI as a white male, 5 feet 9 inches tall, 190 pounds. ALANAZI was issued Oregon identification card number (P-1). U.S. Immigration records revealed ALANAZI is a citizen of the KSA, was admitted into the U.S. on 10/6/2000 (J-3). His KSA passport number is (P-1).

Legat (G) finds the intersection of your investigation with the U.S. investigation to be very interesting and quite worthy of further scrutiny. There are so many coincidences regarding contacts, residences, and travel that further investigation of ALANAZI, ALTOWAYAN, and ALKHAFAJI must be conducted.

We will suggest the Portland office conduct further investigation of ALANAZI in view of the fact he has some type of connection to both the 9/11/2001 attacks and your own security investigation involving ALKHAFAJI.

We respectfully request you advise us of other connections ALKHAFAJI may have with the U.S. as well as any background information which you may believe will assist our Portland office in its attempt to further identify ALANAZI's contacts and activities as they may relate to the criminal and security interests for both of our countries. Also, it would be of very great value to determine if ALTOWAYAN and/or ALANAZI are currently in the KSA. If so, we believe it would be of significant value to have both interrogated relative to the KSA's security concerns and the investigation into the savage attacks of 9/11/2001.

As always, your generous cooperation is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

(S)

A rectangular grey box redacting the signature of the sender.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 02/08/2002

To: Counterterrorism
Investigative Services

New York

Portland
San Diego

Attn: (G), (S)
Attn:
Attn:
Attn:

Attn:
Attn:

From: (G)
PENTTBOMB Team

Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE 182

Synopsis: Connection between Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) investigation of ABU ABDULRAHMAN ALKHAFAJI and KHALID NAJI SHIHAN AL' ANAZI with U.S. (G) ABDALLAH ALTOWAYAN and SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI.

Administrative: Legat (G) had anticipated enclosing a copy of a letter to the KSA's Mabahith requesting additional information related to their investigation of ABU ABDULRAHMAN ALKHAFAJI and KHALID NAJI SHIHAN AL' ANAZI. However, due to the significant time delay in having "hard copies" arrive at the various destinations from Legat (G) the text of the intended enclosure has been made a part of this EC's text.

Reference: (F)

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: (F) 02/08/2002

(F)

Details: During a review of requests made by the KSA's Mabahith, Legat (A) (G) determined there to be a link, between an ongoing (and to date, not detailed) security investigation currently being conducted by the Mabahith, and the PENTTBOMB investigation.

The KSA's subjects, ABU ABDULRAHMAN ALKHAFAJI and/or KHALID NAJI SHIHAN AL' ANAZI had been in contact with a telephone number in Portland (P). Investigation in Portland determined the number to be at the residence of SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI, aka SAMI DHAHER AL-ANAZI.

A review of the Telephone Applications database revealed that ABDALLAH ALTOWAYAN (who was a close associate of KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, NAWAF AL-HAZMI, HANI HANJOUR and OMAR AL-BAYOUMI while living in San Diego just prior to the attacks of 9/11/2001) had called a cellular telephone subscribed by or utilized by SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI. Note: The review of ACS by Legat (G) could not determine when the calls were made from ALTOWAYAN to ALANAZI or the telephone numbers involved.

There is a possibility that the SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI who was (or is) residing in Portland may be identical or related to the KSA's subject KHALID NAJI SHIHAN AL' ANAZI. This needs to be determined through investigation in Portland and the KSA.

Referenced serials included information identifying both ALTOWAYAN and ALANAZI as citizens of the KSA. If SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI and ALTOWAYAN are no longer in the U.S., it is likely they have returned to the KSA. The Mabahith should be able to determine if the two are in the KSA. (G)

One issue that should be addressed as soon as possible is whether or not the appropriate U.S. Attorney's Office will seek to have ALTOWAYAN, and possibly ALANAZI, returned to the U.S. if found in the KSA. Both would be of significant interest to the KSA's own investigation and if found by the Mabahith prior to their possible returns to the U.S., the Mabahith would likely seek to prosecute the two in the KSA.

Due to the fact that Legat (G) does not have current information regarding the investigation, as it relates to the status of ALTOWAYAN as a (D), some of the leads set by this EC may already have been covered or be unnecessary. If recipients have the information requested in any of the leads, the file and serial numbers

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Re: (F) 02/08/2002

should be provided to Legat (G) so the information can be utilized in future requests of the Mabahith.

In order for recipients to be aware of the information requested of the KSA's Mabahith, the text of the letter is set forth below. It is anticipated the Mabahith will show particular interest in this request and begin providing the requested information shortly. If recipients have other, specific requests of the Mabahith regarding ALTOWAYAN and/or ALANAZI, leads can be set for Legat (G) The text of the request letter reads as follows:

``...Your two referenced files requested information about U.S. telephone number (P) You advised that KSA telephone number (P-1) made two calls to the U.S. number, on 3/15/2001 and 7/30/2001. The KSA telephone number, you advised, was utilized by a man with an alias of ABU ABDULRAHMAN ALKHAFAJI and is listed to KHALID NAJI SHIHAN AL'ANAZI.

Investigation in Portland, Oregon determined that telephone number (P) is subscribed to the address of (P) Portland, Oregon. Telephone number (P) has become of interest to the investigation of the 9/11/2001 attacks. It was called by ABDALLAH ALTOWAYAN.

ABDULLAH ALTOWAYAN, from 4/6/2001 through 8/5/2001, lived at 6401 Mount Ada Road, Apartment (P) San Diego, California. He lived with his wife, (P) and daughter (P-1) ALTOWAYAN identified himself with an Oregon identification card, number (P-1) showing an address of 5000 North Willamette Boulevard, Portland, Oregon. That address is the administration building for the University of Oregon.

Of interest is the fact that during ALTOWAYAN's residency at the Mount Ada Road address, HANI HANJOUR, KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, and NAWAF AL-HAZMI, all hijackers of 9/11/2001, lived at the same apartment complex. Also living at the complex was OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, who was detained in London, for his potential involvement in the attacks. When AL-BAYOUMI moved from the San Diego complex, he had his mail forwarded to ALTOWAYAN's apartment.

Without a doubt, the most significant information obtained from the U.S. investigation in San Diego, relevant to the interest in ALTOWAYAN, is the fact that witnesses have stated ALTOWAYAN, AL-BAYOUMI, HANJOUR, AL-MIHDHAR, and AL-HAZMI were often seen together. This leaves no doubt that ALTOWAYAN was well acquainted with the hijackers in the days just prior to the attacks. It is our opinion that ALTOWAYAN either knew of the planned attacks or was involved in the planning or support of those attacks.

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Further investigation in Portland, based on the Oregon identification card presented at the San Diego apartment complex, determined ALTOWAYAN obtained a safe deposit box from a local Portland bank. He obtained the box in November, 2000. In December, 2000, he retrieved a passport from the box. Accompanying ALTOWAYAN was an unknown Arab male who did not speak during their time in the bank.

Records relating to ALTOWAYAN's rental of the safe deposit box revealed the following information. He provided his date of birth as (P-1). He gave his full name as TOWAYAN ABDALLAH AL-TOWAYAN, place of birth KSA, and a KSA passport number of (P-1). Relative to his safe deposit box, he stated his mother's maiden name as (P). However, and likely correct, on another bank document, he identified his mother's maiden name as (P) and gave his birth date as (P-1).

The U.S. investigation has also determined that ALTOWAYAN had made telephone calls to a cellular phone identified as belonging to SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI, alias SAMI DHAHER AL-ANAZI. It was learned that ALANAZI, at the time of the calls, was residing at (P) Portland, Oregon. That is the residence where telephone number (P) is located. The number is, of course, the one which was called by ALKHAFAJI from the KSA, on 3/15/2001 and 7/30/2001.

Further investigation identified SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI, alias SAMI DHAHER AL-ANAZI as a white male, 5 feet 9 inches tall, 190 pounds. ALANAZI was issued Oregon identification card number (P-1). U.S. Immigration records revealed ALANAZI is a citizen of the KSA, was admitted into the U.S. on 10/6/2000 carrying (J-3). His KSA passport number is (P-1).

Legat (G) finds the intersection of your investigation with the U.S. investigation to be very interesting and quite worthy of further scrutiny. There are so many coincidences regarding contacts, residences, and travel that further investigation of ALANAZI, ALTOWAYAN, and ALKHAFAJI must be conducted.

We will suggest the Portland office conduct further investigation of ALANAZI in view of the fact he has some type of connection to both the 9/11/2001 attacks and your own security investigation involving ALKHAFAJI.

We respectfully request you advise us of other connections ALKHAFAJI may have with the U.S. as well as any background information which you may believe will assist our Portland office in its attempt to further identify ALANAZI's contacts and activities as they may relate to the criminal and security interests for both of our countries. Also, it would be of very great value to determine if ALTOWAYAN and/or ALANAZI are currently in the KSA. If so, we believe it would be of

To: Counterterrorism From: [REDACTED] (G)
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 02/08/2002

significant value to have both interrogated relative to the KSA's security concerns and the investigation into the savage attacks of 9/11/2001...."

It is not the intent of Legat [REDACTED] (G) to direct any portion of the PENTTBOMB investigation. However, in an effort to better support the investigation, appropriate information must be sought from the Saudis. By knowing what information is already possessed by the various divisions, more appropriate inquiries can be made. Additionally, if the PENTTBOMB investigation is related to the Saudis' own investigation, both can benefit greatly by sharing information of mutual use.

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: (F) 02/08/2002

LEAD (s) :

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

Provide background and biographical information on ABDALLAH ALTOWAYAN and SAMI SHAHER ALANAZI, aka SAMI DHAHER AL-ANAZI.

Set Lead 2:

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

AT WASHINGTON, DC

AT SIOC: Contact appropriate U.S. Customs and U.S. Immigration liaisons to determine if ALTOWAYAN and/or AL-ANAZI have departed the U.S. If so, provide details regarding flight numbers, passport numbers, and countries of destination. Also, advise Legat (G) if there are (O-1) for either mans re-entry to the U.S.

Set Lead 3:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

Advise Legat (G) if there has been a (D) warrant issued for ALTOWAYAN and if so, provide (G) with a copy of the affidavit filed to obtain the warrant.

Set Lead 4:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

(G) : Provide link analysis involving telephone numbers (P) (Portland) and (P-1) (KSA cellular phone).

Set Lead 5:

To: Counterterrorism From: (G)
Re: (F) 02/08/2002

PORTLAND

AT PORTLAND, OREGON

Provide Legat (G) with investigative results regarding ALTOWAYAN and/or AL-ANAZI (not contained in referenced serials).

Set Lead 6:

SAN DIEGO

AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

Provide Legat (G) with investigative results regarding ALTOWAYAN and/or AL-ANAZI (not contained in reference serials).

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COLLABORATIVE
Intelligence
ASSESSMENT

**Assessment of Saudi Arabian
Support to Terrorism and the
Counterintelligence Threat to the
United States**



Joint Intelligence Report
Prepared by

December 2004

Federal Bureau of
Investigation

Central Intelligence
Agency

[REDACTED]

Assessment of Saudi Arabian Support to Terrorism and the Counterintelligence Threat to the United States

Scope Note

This is a joint FBI-CIA intelligence report as prescribed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the FY 2004 Classified Annex S.1025/S. Report 108-44. This report provides the intelligence oversight committees with an assessment of the nature and extent of Saudi Government support of terrorism as well as the Saudi intelligence threat to the United States. In addition, this report

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

This assessment was prepared by the FBI and CIA. Comments and queries may be addressed to the FBI, attention Deputy Assistant Director [REDACTED] (P) Counterterrorism Analysis Branch, at [REDACTED] (S) or Section Chief [REDACTED] (P) Counterintelligence Analysis Section, at [REDACTED] (P) or to the CIA, Chief, Middle East North Africa Branch in the Counterterrorist Center [REDACTED] (O-1)

Executive Summary

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) has been working to assess Saudi Arabia's ties to terrorism, including the 2001 terrorist acts, in order to address questions arising about the country's support for organizations that may have provided support for previous al-Qa'ida attacks. Our assessment to date is as follows:

- There is no evidence that either the Saudi Government or members of the Saudi royal family knowingly provided support for the attacks of 11 September 2001 or that they had foreknowledge of terrorist operations in the Kingdom or elsewhere.
- There is evidence that official Saudi entities, chiefly the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and associated nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), provide financial and logistical support to individuals in the United States and around the world, some of whom are associated with terrorism-related activity.
- The Saudi Government and many of its agencies have been infiltrated and exploited by individuals associated with or sympathetic to al-Qa'ida.
- Suspected Saudi intelligence officers and cooptees appear to be engaged in collecting intelligence in the United States. Saudi-funded clerics have been found to be collecting on Saudi-Americans and other communities in the United States.
- Suspected Saudi intelligence officers and cooptees in the United States, including diplomats, are engaged in a campaign to influence public perception and policy.
- The Saudi Government and private Saudi individuals support the propagation of the conservative Wahhabi-Salafi sect of Sunni Islam in the United States. Jihadists adhere to and interpret this sect's beliefs to justify their actions.
- There is no information to indicate that either Omar al-Bayoumi or Osama Basnan materially supported the hijackers wittingly, were intelligence officers of the Saudi Government or provided material support for the 11 September attacks, contrary to media speculation.

Recent cooperation between Saudi intelligence and the USIC is largely driven by the Saudi royal family's recognition of the domestic threat posed to it by al-Qa'ida following several bombings by the group inside Saudi Arabia, starting in May 2003.

- In the past, the Saudi Government found itself in a precarious position, on the one hand it was denouncing al-Qa'ida as a threat, yet on the other hand it was underestimating al-Qa'ida's vitality within the Kingdom and treating the group with special consideration. Recent raids by the General Directorate for Investigations (Mabahith), which have resulted in the death or arrest of al-Qa'ida members in Saudi Arabia, demonstrate how this policy has changed.

The Government of Saudi Arabia and Terrorism

Assessment of Official Saudi Government Support to Terrorism

A review of intelligence over the past two years indicates that the Government of Saudi Arabia (GSA) was neither complicit in nor had foreknowledge of terrorist acts perpetrated by al-Qa'ida against the United States or other Western interests. Furthermore, no information indicates that the Saudi Government as an institution provides financial support to al-Qa'ida. It is difficult to discern, however, the extent to which individuals in the Saudi Government or royal family have provided donations to clerics or NGOs that funnel money to al-Qa'ida; in such cases, the donor may not be aware that al-Qa'ida is the end recipient of some of the funds.

- Given the large size of the Al Saud family—approximately 15,000 princes—and the Saudi Government, it is likely that some individuals may have provided and possibly continue to provide direct or indirect support to al-Qa'ida without detection by Saudi or US intelligence or law enforcement agencies.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) fears al-Qa'ida and has for years viewed the organization as a threat to the security and survival of the Al Saud. Several concurrent factors have recently put pressure on the Saudi royal family and strained its relationship with the religious community, which underwrites their legitimacy. Many Saudis perceive the royal family as increasingly corrupt, westernized, and less devoted to Islam. This is due in part to the presence of Western military, particularly American forces, in the Kingdom with the blessing of the Al Sauds.

- The deterioration of the Saudi financial situation in recent years meanwhile has disenfranchised a significant portion of the population, which appears to be turning to conservative Islamic sectors for relief.

Saudi Arabia's primary course of action to counter al-Qa'ida prior to 11 September was to co-opt or coerce extremists in an effort to bring them into the fold, possibly with an implicit or explicit understanding that al-Qa'ida would not strike on Saudi soil. USIC reporting indicates some al-Qa'ida members sought to conduct terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, but were banned from doing so at the direction of Usama Bin Ladin. Saudi authorities continue to use cooptation and accommodation with individuals they have detained, seeking the assistance of family members and other Saudis to turn in wanted suspects. For instance, one terrorist's surrender was facilitated by a cleric and members of the terrorist's family in June 2003.

The Saudi Government has been at war with al-Qa'ida since the May 2003 bombings against three residential housing compounds in Riyadh and the November 2003 attack on another compound, and has taken significant steps to mitigate the threat and curb support for terrorism among its population. Saudi Government action since the bombings in May underscores its commitment to destroying al-Qa'ida—a commitment that has cost the lives of dozens of Saudi security officials who died at the hands of the terrorists.

- The GSA has aggressively hunted members of the Saudi-based al-Qa'ida network, stripping it of its senior ranks and disrupting plots aimed at Western targets, including the

[REDACTED]

US and British Embassies. Its success over the past year has created a hostile operating environment for the terrorists, forcing them to adapt and to scale back operations, as shown by their recent focus on targeting individual Westerners.

- On 18 June Saudi authorities killed the network's leader, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin (aka Abu Hajir al-Najdi), and three other wanted operatives. Al-Muqrin was the last of the original senior cell leaders remaining in the Kingdom. This past year two other cell leaders, along with the former chief of operations, died at the hands of Saudi security services. Saudi authorities also disrupted a plot involving Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faqaasi al-Ghamdi (aka Abu Bakr al-Azdi), a senior cell leader, to hijack aircraft and crash them into unspecified targets on the United States East Coast. Al-Ghamdi surrendered to Saudi authorities in June 2003 and remains in detention.
- Three clerics who provided spiritual guidance for al-Qa'ida have also been detained since May 2003, along with hundreds of foot soldiers.

[REDACTED] Both the FBI and CIA have noted that NGOs receiving money from the GSA and supporting Islamic extremism pose a serious threat to US interests. The GSA has provided funds to a variety of Islamic groups and NGOs in the United States and around the world. These groups are, by and large, globally networked religious organizations and NGOs involved in legitimate charitable activities. However, extremists have exploited many of these NGOs for their own purposes.

[REDACTED] The Saudi Government has been accused of negligent oversight of these organizations. It is likely that the KSA ignored the organizations' activities because of their close association with the religious partners of the Al Sauds, the Al Shaykhs, who control the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, and Da'wah (MIA) and its associated religious entities, and are committed to spreading Wahhabi Islam.

[REDACTED] While senior Saudi royals oppose al-Qa'ida, it is likely that at least some royal family members, government officials, or other prominent citizens share al-Qa'ida's anti-American sentiments on an individual basis and support organizations with ties to al-Qa'ida or other extremist organizations. The CIA and FBI have no information indicating that the Saudi Government as an institution provides financial or other support to al-Qa'ida. The CIA has limited, fragmentary intelligence suggesting that two individuals—one senior and one minor member of the Saudi royal family—may have provided financial support to al-Qa'ida. In both cases, we have no information to suggest that other members of the Saudi Government or royal family were aware of their activities. A limited body of uncorroborated CIA reporting from (O-1) separate sources suggests (O-1) the youngest of (O-1) full brothers, and Turki Bin Fahd Jiluwi, have had contact with individuals tied to al-Qa'ida and other terrorist organizations. The specific nature of their contacts is unknown.

- According to a sensitive source, (O-1) Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the largest Islamic insurgent group in the Philippines.
- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- Senior al-Qa'ida detainees Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) and Walid bin 'Attash claim that [REDACTED] (O-1) is sympathetic to the extremist cause. KSM stated that [REDACTED] (O-1) was an al-Qa'ida sympathizer and possible fundraiser and that he maintained a close relationship with Bin Ladin at an unspecified time. Bin 'Attash has told us that [REDACTED] (O-1) helped Bin Ladin escape the Kingdom in 1992.
 - In early 2003, KSM identified an individual named Bin Jiluwi, who may be identifiable with Turki Bin Fahd Jiluwi, an important al-Qa'ida donor who hails from a minor line in the Saudi royal family. Separate sensitive reporting indicates that Bin Jiluwi is a key leader of the Eastern Province office of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), an NGO. According to foreign government service sensitive reporting, Riyadh suspects Bin Jiluwi has embezzled more than \$3 million from IIRO. The Mabathith has been investigating his activities.

[REDACTED] A variety of intelligence reporting indicates that jihad operatives with ties to al-Qa'ida continue to seek funding for their activities from private sources in Saudi Arabia. The USIC is working in conjunction with Saudi authorities to trace and stop these funds.

[REDACTED] Riyadh's efforts against al-Qa'ida, meanwhile, have revealed instances of sympathizers in the security services, but Mabathith is working with us to contain the problem. Limited reporting suggests that al-Qa'ida operatives have obtained information and assistance from family members or other individuals within the security services who are sympathetic to their cause.

- Sympathizers' efforts delayed but did not derail some Mabathith operations. The discovery of sympathizers spurred a major reassignment of personnel at the Ministry of Interior in mid-2003 to protect counterterrorism operations. Members of certain tribes have been removed from positions wherein they could access sensitive information that might be passed to terrorists. Mabathith is often unwilling to watchlist individuals for fear of leaks and employs strict compartmentalization to avoid compromise.
- Al-Qa'ida's Saudi-based network has altered the appearance of trucks to resemble official vehicles and has used military or police uniforms, notably in the bombing of the al-Muhayya compound in November 2003 and in the kidnapping of American Paul Johnson, respectively. We cannot corroborate press reporting and statements by the al-Qa'ida network claiming that the uniforms used in the kidnapping were provided by sympathizers in the military. According to foreign government service sensitive reporting, Mabathith investigated a tailor in November 2003 who had been tasked to make 15 military jackets without trousers by an individual who fit the description of Abu Hajir.

[REDACTED] Various press reports suggest that Saudi authorities negotiated with or facilitated the escape of the perpetrators of the 29 May 2004 massacre at al-Khobar. The CIA is unable to corroborate these claims, and reporting on the subject has been contradictory. The Saudi Government has officially disputed this claim but a sensitive source reported [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

The Saudi Government Cracks Down

The KSA's efforts to crack down on al-Qa'ida's financial network and stem the flow of funds to terrorists abroad have improved dramatically since the 12 May bombings. These efforts include actions against Saudi-based al-Qa'ida fundraisers and facilitators, intelligence sharing and cooperation, and legislative and regulatory actions.

- Riyadh has neutralized more than 50 financial facilitators, and killed one of the most prominent, Yusef al-Iyari (aka Swift Sword).
- In early 2004, in response to US and international pressure for the GSA to improve oversight of Islamic charities and their activities, Riyadh announced the formation of a new commission to regulate the finances of Saudi charities with an international presence. Riyadh has since given few additional details of how and when the entity will be implemented. In October 2004 the GSA said the new commission would assume control over assets of the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, a Saudi NGO (G) (G) but would not regulate the international activities of International Islamic Relief Organization and World Assembly of Muslim Youth, two large Saudi charities (G)

Demonstrating its commitment to destroying al-Qa'ida in the Kingdom, Riyadh also launched a propaganda effort aimed at undercutting the legitimacy of the organization on Islamic grounds in the aftermath of the 2003 attacks. The government has publicized the names of its most wanted terrorist suspects and has offered substantial rewards to individuals who provide any information regarding the whereabouts of the suspects or possible planned operations. Riyadh has also responded immediately to and has shared threat information with the USIC regarding possible operations.

- In early April Riyadh shared detainee reporting describing a plot to target US and British diplomatic facilities. Mabahith also seized five truck bombs in early April likely associated with the operation, unilaterally disrupting what would have been a catastrophic attack.

Riyadh's abilities and the pace of its support do not always meet the USIC's expectations. However it is the judgment of both the FBI and the CIA that in most instances Saudi security shortcomings have been failures of capability rather than will. Raids and arrests continue almost daily in Saudi Arabia and Saudi forces have lost a considerable number of men in confrontations with al-Qa'ida operatives.

Saudi Arabia's Intelligence and Security Services and their Activities

Saudi Intelligence Activities Inside the Kingdom

When they operate overseas, the Saudi intelligence services tend to devote most of their resources to monitoring perceived threats to the regime, including Islamic extremists, dissidents, and critics of the royal family. As a general rule (O-1) (O-1)

- [REDACTED]
- The capabilities of the three main services are sufficient [REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)
 - The intelligence arm of the Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA-J2) focuses on collecting traditional military intelligence such as order of battle in neighboring countries. In January 2004 the MODA officials established a Counterintelligence Division within the Military Security Directorate. According to military reporting, this division is responsible for conducting internal MODA investigations on suspected criminals and al-Qa'ida sympathizers in addition to enhancing security within the workplace.
 - The Saudi Government recently [REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (U-1)

Partnerships Bearing Fruit

Since the early 1970s [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] The FBI has had a Legal Attaché office in Saudi Arabia since 1996. Although legal issues continue to hamper some cooperative efforts on both sides, cooperation from Saudi authorities has increased greatly since the 12 May 2003 bombings.

- Mabahith is more frequently requesting FBI expertise or resources to assist in their investigations—Mabahith requested and received the use of a FBI hostage negotiation, FBI cadaver dogs and their handlers during the Paul Johnson, Jr. investigation and recovery efforts.
- The FBI continues to investigate major terrorist events in Saudi Arabia in which a US person or interest is a victim or target and has deployed investigative teams to the Kingdom for this purpose. The terrorist attacks in Yanbu and the Kenneth Scroggs/Paul Johnson, Jr. kidnapping and murders in Riyadh are recent examples.

[REDACTED] The FBI is a full partner with the IRS, the CIA and Saudi intelligence and law enforcement in the Riyadh-based US/Saudi Joint Task Force on Terrorist Finance (JTTF) which was established in August 2003. FBI presence in the Arabian Peninsula has been expanded since 11 September 2001 by the addition of Legal Attaché offices to the US embassies in Yemen and the United Arab Emirates.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The FBI has a Special Agent (SA) assigned to a [REDACTED] (O-1) at the Embassy in Riyadh. The FBI SA is the counterpart [REDACTED] (O-1) and participates [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) by adding FBI subject expertise. The SA [REDACTED] (O-1) is also responsible for keeping the FBI's Legal Attaché (LEGAT) fully informed about intelligence pertaining to FBI investigations or US subjects as they arise in the work [REDACTED] (O-1). The FBI LEGAT remains the FBI representative for all investigative programs in country and is the spokesperson for the FBI in dealing with the Ambassador and the Country Team.

[REDACTED] Mabathith, the preeminent domestic service, and the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP), which performs most foreign intelligence tasks, both share CI responsibilities. [REDACTED] (O-1) in the aftermath of the 12 May 2003 terrorist attacks in Riyadh, Saudi cooperation against terrorism, including willingness to share critical terrorist-related information with US counterparts, has improved. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] citing the capture or death of most of the Kingdom's senior al-Qa'ida cell leaders, recovery of caches of weapons and explosives, and disruption of extremists' financial support and operational planning.

[REDACTED] Mabathith Cooperating More

[REDACTED] Deputy Interior Minister for Internal Security Affairs Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, who since 2002 has been in charge of Mabathith, has attempted to play a balanced role in his interaction with US intelligence officials. Immediately following the 12 May 2003 bombings, Crown Prince Abdallah gave Muhammad a mandate to work closely with the CIA on internal security issues and promised him the resources he needed. Muhammad has become the major player in the Saudi antiterrorism campaign, but he walks a fine line with his father, Minister of Interior Prince Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz, who has resisted Abdallah's efforts since 2001 to reform Saudi political and social life. [REDACTED] (O-1) provides some of his interactions with the CIA from Nayif, according to a senior CIA officer.

- In 2003 [REDACTED] (O-1) told a senior CIA officer that he wants to insulate Mabathith's relationship withUSIC from the ups and downs of bilateral political relations. Muhammad more recently told other US officials and members of Congress that he wants to keep the fight against terrorism separate from politics.

[REDACTED] Using Enhanced Intercept Capabilities

[REDACTED] Mabathith has been expanding its technical intercept capabilities to bolster its ability to identify and track CT threats. [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED] Mabahith is competent in using technical surveillance equipment, including [REDACTED] surveillance and GSM tracking and monitoring. In 2001 Mabahith [REDACTED] (O-1)

Against a Backdrop of Problems

[REDACTED] Nonetheless, significant short- and long-term concerns remain, including possible penetration of the Saudi intelligence community, lingering resistance by the MOI, technical tradecraft and skills limitations, and ties to services that may be more hostile to the United States. Cultural factors, including a weak work ethic, a high premium on self-esteem that limits learning, and centralized authority, play a large part in the services' shortcomings.

Foot-Dragging by Minister of Interior

[REDACTED] Prince Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz, who has led the MOI since 1975, has oversight over Mabahith. Nayif, a full brother of King Fahd and a member of a powerful circle of regime insiders, is a prime defender of the political status quo. In mid-April, Nayif warned a group of moderate Saudi reformers that the royal family would not tolerate continued calls for political or social change. [REDACTED] (O-1) Nayif is deeply suspicious of US intentions and resisted cooperation with the FBI during the investigations of the 1995 Office of Program Manager/Saudi Arabia National Guard and 1996 Khobar Towers bombings that together killed 24 US military personnel. He maintained for months after 11 September 2001 that no Saudis or Arabs had been involved in the attacks, but rather that the attacks were plots by the CIA and Israel's Mossad.

- [REDACTED] (O-1) the May 2003 bombings, [REDACTED] (O-1) Nonetheless, in an interview published on 17 June 2004 by *Le Figaro*, Nayif reiterated his view that the causes of terrorism do not lie within the Saudi system.

[REDACTED]

Leaks and Compromises

[REDACTED] An immediate concern is highlighted by several instances since mid-2003 involving the compromise of impending raids against alleged terrorists and leaked information about Mabath officers, documented in [REDACTED] (O-1) and open-source reporting. The intelligence services reportedly tend to recruit young men from rural areas—particularly from the relatively poor, neglected southwestern region of the country, which is also home to tribesmen who are sympathetic to al-Qa'ida and other Islamic militants. Mabath leadership suspects that Islamist sympathizers have penetrated the security services or that Islamists take advantage of family and tribal ties to glean information from service members.

Inadequate Training and Skills

[REDACTED] Saudi security officials' weak tradecraft in disciplines such as physical surveillance, and their reliance on foreign technical advice create counterintelligence problems and vulnerabilities.

- Saudis' use of technology is constrained by a lack of training, leaving the Kingdom dependent upon foreign technicians to operate and maintain the equipment. Moreover, existing capabilities are sometimes degraded when security personnel are shifted to handle new priorities. (O-1)

- Mabath's ability to exploit its intercepts is hampered by its lack of sophisticated data management and reluctance to rely on computer technology. (O-1)

Dangerous Liaisons

[REDACTED] Although the United States is probably the Kingdom's primary intelligence partner, Saudi leaders as of March 2004 had intelligence liaison relations with 48 other countries, according to sensitive special intelligence. (O-1)

(O-1) Saudi leaders' efforts to balance their dependence on the United States by cultivating security and military ties to such countries as China, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia increase the risk to US intelligence activities.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- Both the GIP and Mabahith have liaison relationships with their Pakistani counterparts, reflecting the close military and political ties between Riyadh and Islamabad. (O-1) (O-1)
 - Both the Russians and the Chinese have intelligence officers assigned to diplomatic locations in Saudi Arabia. (O-1) (O-1)
 - In part to end Iranian meddling with Saudi Shi'a, Crown Prince Abdallah initiated a rapprochement with Iran in 1997, and Interior Minister Nayif signed a security agreement covering bilateral cooperation on countering narcotics, smuggling, and extradition of criminals during a visit to Tehran in 2000. Saudi-Iranian relations took another step forward when assistant GIP director Prince Faisal bin Abdullah bin Muhammad met with his Iranian counterpart in February 2004 and agreed to exchange liaison officers, according to sensitive special intelligence. In an effort to encourage better ties to the GIP, on 25 April 2004 Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security provided the GIP with copies of the passports and visa applications of four Saudis suspected of belonging to al-Qa'ida who had attempted to obtain visas to Iran, according to sensitive special intelligence. Sensitive special intelligence indicates that Iran has intelligence stations in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, that actively collect on US targets in the Kingdom. (O-1) (O-1)

The Saudi Presence and Influence in the United States

The overlap of public and private funds, politics and religion, and the intersection of foreign intelligence and terrorism matters make for a complex web of issues and relationships involving Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Diplomatic Presence in the United States

The GSA currently has approximately 926 officials posted to diplomatic establishments in the United States. Saudi diplomatic and affiliated establishments are located throughout the United States. Establishments include the Embassy in Washington, DC, the Saudi Arabian Mission to the United Nations (UN), in New York, NY, and three Consulate Generals, in New York, NY; Houston, TX; and Los Angeles, CA. (A), (G), (J-1), (O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1), (O-1)

The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC

The bulk of Saudi Arabia's 926 diplomats in the United States, and their 1,093 dependents and domestics, are at its Embassy in Washington, DC. Complicating FBI

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) Several NGOs are controlled and/or funded by the Embassy. Additionally, it has been determined that particular NGO leaders and "friends" of the royal family have come to the United States on Saudi diplomatic passports and visas, although they have never physically worked at Saudi diplomatic establishments. The FBI has been working closely with the US Department of State (USDS) and the USIC to identify individuals of concern who have diplomatic status.

- The USDS has directed the Embassy to review and update its diplomatic roster and made this a prerequisite to the GSA opening any new consulates. The USDS has issued new diplomatic license plates based on the updated diplomatic list to restrict abuses of the licenses. The Embassy appears to be cooperating in this effort, but it is too early to tell how long it will take to completely review and revise the Saudi diplomatic list and ensure that its citizens who are in the United States on diplomatic visas are actually serving in diplomatic capacities.

[REDACTED] Non-diplomatic Saudi Presence in the United States

[REDACTED] In addition to the significant diplomatic presence, there are a considerable number of Saudi military officials and private citizens studying, training and working in the United States. Some of these individuals are suspected of engaging in intelligence- and terrorism-related activity.

[REDACTED] Saudi Intelligence Activities in the United States

[REDACTED] The GSA conducts intelligence activities within the United States using both traditional and nontraditional methods principally to maintain the reign of the Saudi royal family in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (GSA). Toward this end, the GSA and its intelligence services are engaged in promoting US-Saudi relations, influencing public perception, and countering dissidents.

[REDACTED] For several decades, the GSA has maintained an alliance with the United States based on shared geopolitical interests. [REDACTED] (O-1)

- There is no declared Saudi intelligence presence in the United States. The FBI [REDACTED] (O-1) is investigating a number of suspected IOs, cooptees, and agents operating in Washington, DC.
- At present, the FBI is investigating [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) based on suspected intelligence affiliation and/or intelligence collection. Of those, nearly half are affiliated with the Embassy's [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) which oversees proselytizing activity across the United States.

[REDACTED]

The organizational divisions of the Embassy include Military, Congressional and Public Affairs, Political and Economic, Islamic Affairs/Da'wah, and NGOs. Each division engages in the movement of significant amounts of cash through local banking institutions. The extent to which [REDACTED] (O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(O-1)

- The Congressional and Public Affairs Division is responsible for perception management, public policy, and foreign relations. The Political and Economic Division is responsible for open source reporting.
- For the most part, the Islamic Affairs/Da'wah Division manages its intelligence collection activities on Saudi-Americans, dissidents and NGOs, independently from the GIP or the Mabahith.

A primary function of Saudi Government officials in the United States has been to quiet dissident voices within the US émigré population. Investigative findings indicate that the GSA monitors local Saudi dissidents and dispenses money to various charities and individuals in exchange for halting anti-government or anti-royal family rhetoric.

- [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Abdulaziz Aseel, an in-status, (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) from Saudi Arabia who is an attaché at the Embassy to squelch the activities of at least one leading dissident by offering him a large sum of money. This appears to be a common method of influencing dissidents, while more heavy-handed methods are also used to pressure family members still in Saudi Arabia to influence dissidents.
- The GSA has repeatedly reproached the USG for providing asylum to a Saudi oppositionist but has not been able to provide the FBI with any incriminating information on him to support requests for his extradition.

(A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] the GSA also uses a decentralized system of coordinators in the United States who communicate with the Saudi Services' headquarters in the Kingdom. The GSA and its coordinators use local resources to obtain information, including hiring private contractors to investigate individuals, among them US persons, believed to be dissidents or anti-Saudi. It has also been reported that the GSA utilizes [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) to report on Saudi dissidents and opposition groups.

Military Personnel

Due to the close alliance between the GSA and USG, especially in defense matters, Saudi military personnel are routinely assigned as foreign liaison officers at US bases and receive training at US military installations or defense contractor facilities. The FBI [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1) [redacted] in the United States. Unfortunately (O-1) [redacted] and FBI investigations identified several Saudi military personnel who failed to report their military affiliation when applying for an F-1 visa, as required through US-sponsored training programs.

(O-1) [redacted] Saudi foreign liaison officers (O-1) [redacted] their lengthy postings to military installations in the United States—some for periods of 10 or more years. This unusual longevity, as compared to other military foreign liaison officers, and its associated familiarity with the personnel and facilities to which the officers are assigned (O-1) [redacted]

[redacted] The GSA places great emphasis on the identification and acquisition of cutting-edge military technology. Despite the limited capability of the Saudi Services, the FBI assesses that the GSA would take whatever steps necessary to remain on par with or exceed the military abilities of its regional neighbors.

[redacted] Extremist groups can also exploit the Saudi military presence in the United States. A recent counterterrorism investigation identified a Saudi officer who was in the United States for training who actively supported a known al-Qa'ida terrorist.

- Faisal al-Shehri, a Saudi citizen and non-commissioned officer in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Air Force who worked as a data maintenance analyst, routinely communicated with al-Qa'ida propagandist and operational planner Yusef al-Iyari (aka Swift Sword), who died in a gun battle with Saudi authorities in mid-2003.
- Al-Shehri, who was detained, interrogated, and then handed over to Mabath in July 2003, was attending maintenance data systems analysis training at Lackland Air Force Base, TX.
- Al-Shehri provided Swift Sword with information (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted]
- After his arrest, al-Shehri provided the FBI with the names of many of his associates, including 50 members of a Dhahran Air Force Base Da'wah (proselytizing) group, whom he identified as pilots. The GSA was alerted to al-Shehri's activity, cooperated with US authorities, and arrested 31 of those named by al-Shehri.

[redacted] Saudi Students in the United States

[redacted] The number of Saudi national F-1/student visa requests has (O-1) [redacted] percent since 2001, and (O-1) [redacted] visas were issued to Saudi students in 2002. The GSA and the Embassy financially and/or logistically support Saudi students in the United States. Historically, these students have been tasked to report back on local Saudi and Saudi-American dissidents.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FBI investigations indicate that, in some instances, extremists who are troublesome to the regime in the Kingdom but not involved in punishable offenses are sent overseas on proselytizing or education missions. The GSA has begun to recognize that a number of these individuals have remained involved in anti-government activity, but it is unclear if it will change its method of dealing with extremists.

[REDACTED] In late 2003 the Embassy provided the FBI with a list of (O-1) Saudi students who are sponsored by various Saudi entities for study in the United States. The FBI is currently investigating a number of these students. Preliminary investigation indicates that many of the students have connections to subjects of ongoing FBI investigations.

- Ibrahim al-Zkeri, a Saudi Government-funded student in Ohio, is managing a proselytizing program aimed at federal and local correctional facilities. Al-Zkeri has been in contact with a number of extremist clerics in Saudi Arabia as well as US-based subjects of FBI investigations.
- Ibrahim S. Abdullah, until recently the director of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) US office in Annandale, VA, was a Saudi-funded graduate student at George Mason University. FBI investigation determined that Abdullah holds a Saudi passport and is associated with subjects of FBI al-Qa'ida and Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) investigations through his WAMY activities and phone records. Abdullah recently departed the US following a search of WAMY's northern Virginia headquarters.
- The spouse of a Saudi scholarship student in the United States appears to have been providing computer technology support to al-Qa'ida affiliated terrorists in Saudi Arabia with whom he has been in contact, according to FBI investigation.

[REDACTED] The FBI is also examining the possibility that al-Qa'ida or other radical Islamic extremists are recruiting at US schools and universities. State-sponsored Islamic student organizations, such as WAMY, are specifically targeting students at universities and public schools in the United States to promote their Islamic ideology. Several of these organizations and individuals are subjects of FBI terrorism investigations. Islamic extremists or al-Qa'ida members participating in these types of organizations could recruit new members, who could then become targets for extremist recruiters.

- Since September 2001 WAMY operated what appears to be an Orlando chapter from an unmarked storefront near the University of Central Florida. While this storefront is still operational, its links to WAMY in Saudi Arabia appear to have been severed in the past year.
- Mohammed Rafique Quadir Harunani, who is associated with WAMY and several Saudi individuals and NGOs, was working on a proselytizing plan that calls for establishing Centers for Peace (C4Ps) on major university campuses and near major mosques throughout the United States. Only one C4P is known to have been established, at a mosque in Orlando, Florida.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Al-Qa'ida terrorist operative Khaled al-Buluwi, who was detained in 2003 in Saudi Arabia, was a student at universities in New Mexico and Texas in the early 1990s. Al-Buluwi made multiple attempts to force his radical views onto the student members of the local Islamic Center and repeatedly sent the director anti-Saudi literature and pro-jihad propaganda in an attempt to influence his beliefs.

Saudi Money in the United States: Where Politics and Religion Converge

[REDACTED] Much of the Saudi money and energy in the United States appear to have focused on spreading the conservative form of the Wahhabi-Salafi Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia. Salafism, which follows a rigid interpretation of seventh-century Islam, calls for a rigorous and literal application of Shari'ah (Islamic law) and espouses breaking with Western values and modernization.

[REDACTED] The Saudi Government sponsors and funds a number of NGOs operating in the United States for this purpose. (See Appendix A) Among these are the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) (currently operating as the Success Foundation in the United States), WAMY, and the Muslim World League (MWL). FBI investigation of both IIRO/Success and WAMY has brought to a halt the operations of both organizations. Also, following (O-1) FBI- (O-1) search, a portion of the US branch of the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (HIF) was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the US Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control, and its US assets were frozen. Overseas, these NGOs have wittingly or unwittingly provided support to terrorism. For example, they have provided assistance to fighters traveling to and from jihad areas, employed individuals directly involved in terrorist acts against the United States and other countries, and provided lodging and other logistical support to individuals training for or involved in jihad.

[REDACTED] We are encouraged by recent Saudi efforts to reorganize their international charities and regulate their activities. In 2003 the GSA ordered Al-Haramain to close all of its overseas branches. In January 2004, four branches of the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation were jointly designated as terrorist organizations by the US Department of the Treasury and the Saudi Arabian government for their alleged links with terrorist groups. The branches in Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania and Pakistan are alleged by the US to have provided financial, material and logistical support to the al-Qa'ida network and other terrorist organizations. The Saudi government announced the closing of the al-Haramain organization altogether in early June 2004, and the consolidation of its remaining overseas branches into the newly-established Commission for Relief and Charitable Work Abroad.

[REDACTED] The Saudi Government maintains significant financial holdings in the United States in order to fund Saudi weapons purchases from American companies, Embassy operating expenses, medical assistance to Saudi nationals, student scholarships, and select NGOs. Until recently the Saudi Embassy maintained 112 accounts at Riggs Bank in Washington, DC.

- The FBI's ability to quickly track all aspects of Saudi financial operations is hampered by the significant amount of cash transfers and withdrawals, large number of accounts, and large volume of transactions that occur.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Money also appears to be used to influence business and other relationships and to support religious propagation. Largesse by royals affiliated with the Embassy toward petitioners they do not know is also common.

[REDACTED] Following investigation by the USG, Riggs Bank closed all Saudi Embassy accounts. The Saudi Embassy is currently seeking a new financial institution for its US holdings.

[REDACTED] Religious Propagation

[REDACTED] FBI investigations indicate that the GSA is providing regular financial support—every two to three months, on average—to Sunni Muslim preachers in the United States. (See Appendix B.) A number of them are either subjects of or are tied to counterterrorism investigations involving al-Qa'ida, Jama'at al-Tabligh (JT), or HAMAS.

[REDACTED] An FBI review indicates that the individuals receiving funds from the Embassy were being paid from accounts that receive regular deposits from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, and Da'wah in Saudi Arabia. All the US persons receiving payments have been or are being investigated for possible connections to terrorism. Two of these investigations are detailed below.

[REDACTED] Musaed al-Jarrah, an in-status, [REDACTED] (J-3) from Saudi Arabia, is the Assistant Director for Islamic Affairs at the Embassy responsible for disbursing stipends to individuals in the United States. FBI investigations indicate that some of the stipend recipients have ties to terrorism. [REDACTED] (O-1) Al-Jarrah's official position is listed in USDS records as embassy accountant, but his responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas for these individuals.

[REDACTED] In January 2004 Omar Abdi Mohamed, a legal permanent resident alien from Somalia, was arrested for lying during his naturalization interview. Mohamed had received a monthly stipend of \$1,750 and was one of 50 individuals that the Saudi Embassy admitted to paying for preaching and proselytizing activity in the United States.

- A search of Mohamed's San Diego residence uncovered several letters addressed to him from the Islamic Affairs Office at the Saudi Embassy and tasking him to collect and report information on the structure of immigrant communities and their organizations, financial conditions, education levels, and religious leanings. Converting professional Americans to Islam was urged as a priority in order to help make inroads into American society and gain influence. Information on prominent American converts was also requested, most likely to help recruit individuals who might be helpful to Saudi interests.

[REDACTED] Saudi officials in Washington, DC, apparently were either unaware of or were turning a blind eye to the radical connections of the US-based individuals on their payroll. Recent developments indicate an effort is currently under way at the Embassy to lower the profile of the Islamic Affairs Office, indicating an awareness of the controversial nature of its activities. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] recently indicated that Embassy officials may be moving the Islamic Affairs Office, out of the Embassy altogether. If the move takes place, future payments to the

[REDACTED]

employees of these offices will come directly from Saudi Arabia rather than through the Embassy's accounts. We have already seen evidence that payments that used to come from the Embassy are now originating from Saudi-based bank accounts.

[REDACTED] Lobbying

[REDACTED] The GSA is clearly concerned about maintaining US-Saudi relations and countering negative US public opinion and expends considerable effort on public relations. FBI investigations suggest that the Embassy may have overstepped the bounds of normal diplomatic activity when it retained a US public relations firm, Qorvis Communications, to mount a pro-Saudi campaign while concealing the GSA's participation and financial support.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Gifts to Individuals

[REDACTED] FBI investigations have revealed that the Saudi Embassy receives frequent requests for financial assistance from Saudis living in the United States. These requests are often referred to the ambassador's wife, Princess Haifa. The princess and her staff make decisions as to who will receive the donations based on each individual's need. The donations are usually in the form of one-time payments but have on occasion been provided as a monthly stipend. As with religious propagation payments, there is little oversight for gifts to individuals.

- The wife of Osama Basnan, a Saudi national residing in California, received one of these stipends. Basnan's associate, Omar al-Bayoumi, had contact with two of the 11 September hijackers, and his name was discovered on their apartment lease. Basnan came to the FBI's attention [REDACTED] (O-1) after 11 September; al-Bayoumi came to the FBI's attention through investigation into the hijackers' activity in San Diego.
- Extensive investigation by the FBI has not found any record of financial support to the hijackers from al-Bayoumi or Basnan, or that either man was aware of the hijackers' plans.

[REDACTED] The FBI has no information to indicate that either al-Bayoumi or Basnan was an intelligence officer or agents of the GSA, or that either knowingly provided support for the 11 September attacks. (See Appendix C for details of the investigation of al-Bayoumi and Basnan in support of FBI conclusions.)

[REDACTED] Strengths and Shortcomings in Collection and Analysis

[REDACTED] Following the 11 September attacks, it became apparent to the USIC that the role of Saudi Arabia and its citizens in the support of terrorism, whether direct or indirect, warranted a much closer look and a refocusing of our intelligence collection and analysis methods. Although the GSA is cooperating much more robustly with the United States on counterterrorism matters, continued strong al-Qa'ida activity in the Kingdom, sympathy for Islamic extremists among

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

many groups in Saudi society, and the fragility of the Saudi Government will require the continued devotion of intelligence resources to the Saudi issue.

In recognition of the complexity of Saudi issues and the closed nature of the Kingdom.
(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1) particularly over the past year.
(O-1)

(O-1) reporting is critical on political and economic topics.
(O-1)

(O-1) and USDS officers'
(O-1)

(O-1) analytic efforts.

(O-1) Open-source exploitation continuously proves invaluable to
(O-1)

(U-1) improve our analyses.
(U-1)

[REDACTED]

The CIA's Counterterrorist Center conducts analysis of terrorism overseas, including Saudi-based terrorism. CIA's Directorate of Intelligence's cadre of political, military, economic, and leadership analysts of Saudi Arabia routinely monitor the issue and contribute analysis. CIA experts on transnational issues, such as illicit financial flows, are important to the overall analytic effort. CIA has also just recently established a Political Islam Strategic Analysis program. The Defense Intelligence Agency and J-2 have a host of military analysts who emphasize the general counterterrorism issue and [REDACTED] (O-1) USDS's Bureau of Intelligence and Research analysts similarly contribute to analysis on political developments, al-Qa'ida structures and activities, and illicit financial flows. The FBI employs a

[REDACTED]

number of all-source and operational support analysts who monitor Saudi activities in the United States.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

(O-1)

Unofficial Saudi support to terrorists by government employees but not sanctioned by the regime, for example, is difficult to uncover or measure. Even Saudi intelligence finds this to be a difficult task, because the number of individuals potentially to be targeted for collection is large, and individual support activities, such as contributing cash or passing information to someone linked to terrorism, may be small.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

(O-1)

analysts under the Directorate of Intelligence's Analysis for the Global Mission Initiative, some of whom would focus on Saudi Arabia.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

The FBI has enhanced its analytical and investigative capabilities in a variety of ways. Directly following 11 September 2001, the FBI created the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) to investigate, prosecute, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist-related financial and fundraising activities. Much of TFOS's activity has been focused on Saudi financing of terrorism. The FBI also plays a prominent role on the National Security Council's Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Terrorist Financing, which has been focused on joint US-Saudi cooperation issues in the area of terrorist financing.

In 2002 the FBI formed a Saudi Task Force to undertake a comprehensive review of all Saudi-related matters. Shortly after the Saudi Task Force began its work, the FBI's Washington Field Office (WFO) established a Middle East (Arabian Peninsula) Squad dedicated to the Saudi target. The WFO squad has since initiated more than 100 investigations on individuals and entities suspected of criminal, intelligence-related, and terrorism-related activity.

In mid-2003 the Arabian Peninsula Unit (APU) was established within TFOS at Headquarters to provide program guidance to FBI field offices related to Saudi intelligence and terrorism investigations, supply technical coverage of Saudi diplomatic establishments and individuals, and coordinate with other USG. APU coordinates with TFOS's operational units, FBI Field Offices, and the USIC in order to cover the financial investigation of Saudi issues. APU also tracks requests to and from Saudi law enforcement entities to ensure the flow of information.

[REDACTED]

Appendix A: Saudi Nongovernmental Organizations in the United States

Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation

The al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (HIF) is a Saudi-based NGO whose stated goals are to spread Islam, aid Muslims in difficulty, propagate the faith among non-Muslims, and establish the Salafist Wahhabi fundamentalist form of Sunni Islam. Two Saudi cabinet members officially supervise HIF's activities. The Minister of Islamic Affairs, Sheikh Saleh Bin AbdulAziz Bin Mohammed Bin Ibrahim Al Shaykh, is the titular head and superintendent of HIF. The foundation is part of the Saudi Joint Relief Committee, which is headed by the Minister of Interior, Prince Nayif bin Abdul-Aziz al-Sau'd, a member of the Saudi royal family and head of Mabathith. HIF has offices and representatives in more than 50 countries, including the United States and Canada. (O-1) indicates that some HIF offices have provided material support to the terrorist activities of al-Qa'ida around the world. HIF has been used as a front organization to support and facilitate the movement of Islamic *mujahidin* into areas of Kosovo, Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bosnia. Furthermore, HIF offices in Tanzania and Kenya are reported to have aided the al-Qa'ida cells responsible for the 1998 US Embassy bombings.

HIF opened an office in Ashland, OR, in 1997. Pirouz Sedaghaty (aka Pete Seda) is the head of the US office. Soliman al-But'he, an officer of al-Haramain US, is also a ranking official of al-Haramain international; Saudi-based individuals, including al-But'he, have provided over \$700,000 to the US-based offices of HIF. Approximately \$600,000 of these funds came from al-But'he's personal account at the al-Rajhi Bank and Trust.

- Portland's investigation has established no direct link between US-based HIF officials and Saudi Government officials. There are, however, financial links with extremist individuals in Saudi Arabia.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

An American convert to Islam who was employed by al-Haramain as an Imam came under investigation in North Carolina after his name, phone number, and address were found on a business card recovered during a raid of the home of an al-Qa'ida operative in Pakistan.

- Deya Ud-Den Eberle (aka Abu Salman and Richard Eberle), a US person who lived in the Middle East for 12 years and obtained a Ph.D. in Islamic studies from Medina University in Saudi Arabia, is believed to have attended a Lashkar-e-Tayiba training camp in Pakistan in the late 1990s.
- Eberle currently resides in Raleigh, NC, and works for HIF as a translator. He also teaches at American Open University, which has strong ties to al-Qa'ida.

[REDACTED]

Dar Makkah and the Islamic Center of Portland

The investigation of six individuals in Portland who attempted to travel to Afghanistan and support Taliban and al-Qa'ida operations against the United States in late 2001 led to another investigation of the Islamic Center of Portland; its Imam, Mohammed Kariye, and Dar Makkah, an Islamic nonprofit organization headed by Ala'a Abunijem. Kariye is suspected of recruiting and funding the travel of the Portland Six. Financial investigation revealed that Abunijem, who was financing Kariye, received a significant amount of money from three Saudi citizens believed to be former students at Colorado State University who were associated with the Saudi Student House in Fort Collins, CO. A preliminary review of the Saudi Student House's finances indicates that its main source of funds is the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Culture. Investigation has also linked individuals associated with the Saudi Student House to Abdullah Bin Ladin, a relative of Usama Bin Ladin and a former longtime President of WAMY in the United States. Kariye is being prosecuted for social security fraud. The Portland Six have been indicted for material support of terrorism.

The Muslim World League, the International Islamic Relief Organization, and the Success Foundation

The GSA created the Muslim World League (MWL) in 1962. Saudi Arabia has used this organization to spread Wahhabi ideology throughout the world. Saudi Arabia has financed many charity projects through MWL and other NGOs in order to gain status as the leader of the international Islamic community.

In 1978 MWL created the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), with a stated objective to provide relief and aid to Muslims. IIRO's offices in more than 90 countries distributed more than \$400 million in aid between 1987 and 1995, according to public statements. FBI investigation has established that the International Relief Organization (IRO), the American branch of IIRO, has been operating in the United States as the Success Foundation.

The FBI is currently investigating the Success Foundation, the nature of its support by the GSA under the MWL umbrella, and its suspected ties to various US-based Islamic fundamentalists and other suspect NGOs, including the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies in America (IIASA), located in Virginia.

The Success Foundation and its management, like many Saudi-based charities operating in the United States, appear to be connected to a number of individuals and organizations associated with subjects of al-Qa'ida investigations, and with individuals associated with militant Palestinian causes. According to USIC reporting, the foundation may also be involved in money laundering for HAMAS.

- Success Foundation chairman Abdurahman Alamoudi, a naturalized US citizen, has numerous ties to HAMAS leaders, and [REDACTED] (J-2) He is currently under arrest in the United States and has admitted to being involved in a Libyan-sponsored plot to assassinate Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah. He was sentenced to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

23 years in jail after he pled guilty on separate charges relating to business transactions he conducted with the government of Libya. Alamoudi is cooperating with the USG as part of his plea agreement and has been providing information regarding international terrorism. As a result of Alamoudi's incarceration, the Foundation is to be dissolved.

- Success Foundation president Mohammed Omeish, a Libyan national who holds a green card, has traveled to Chechnya on behalf of the Foundation. [REDACTED] (C-1) the purpose of his travels was possibly to deliver cash to *mujahidin* fighters. Our investigation also reveals that Omeish participated in a covert videotaping of security practices at Dulles International Airport in 1996. Omeish is suspected of being involved along with Alamoudi in the plot against the Saudi Crown Prince.
- Jamal Badawi, a member of the Success Foundation's board of trustees based in Halifax, Nova Scotia, is a known associate of the international Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement and HAMAS.

[REDACTED] The Success Foundation has been associated with Sanabel al-Kheer of Herndon, VA (aka Sana Bell, Inc.), which invests money in businesses in order to raise money for charities, including the Success Foundation. Yaqub M. Mirza, a naturalized US citizen, and Abdullah A. al-Noshan, a Saudi national and Embassy employee, are both on the board of Sanabel al-Kheer. Both men are also affiliated with a number of Saudi charities under investigation, including MWL, whose registered president in the United States is al-Noshan.

- Al-Noshan, who has an [REDACTED] (J-3) has been observed by FBI surveillance acting in a manner consistent with a foreign intelligence officer.
- Al-Noshan is connected through monetary transactions and telephone calls to an FBI subject in Kentucky whose name, address, and telephone number were found in an al-Qa'ida safehouse in Karachi.

[REDACTED] The Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America

[REDACTED] The Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America (IIASA) is a branch of the Imam Muhammad Bin Sa'ud University in Riyadh and maintains links to suspected terrorist organizations and their supporters according to FBI investigation. Several of IIASA's staff members have been Saudi nationals employed in an official capacity as administrative officers at the Embassy. IIASA is funded by the Embassy.

- During a one-month period in late 2002, an FBI source reported that approximately \$2 million in cash was delivered to IIASA. FBI was able to substantiate the corresponding financial transactions in the organization's accounts.
- Mohammed Y. al-Raei, a Saudi IIASA instructor of Pakistani origin, has recently been charged with a number of Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) violations and will be deported. In addition to his IIASA association, al-Raei was a professor of aeronautics at the University of the District of Columbia.

- [REDACTED]
- The FBI has learned that IIASA has a new management team. Funding by the Embassy has ceased, and the institute's funding is now believed to come from its parent organization in Riyadh.

- [REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)
and ICE has investigated immigration violations by former IIASA staff members.

[REDACTED] The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

[REDACTED] The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) is a Saudi Arabia-based NGO with ties to Abdullah Bin Ladin (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1) WAMY's 2002 US plan called for approximately \$5 million in spending over 18 months.

[REDACTED] (O-1) the plan originated in Jeddah in November 2002. An FBI source reports that Mohammed Rafique Quadir Harunani, of Orlando, FL, is expected to manage and lead the five-year plan's implementation in the United States.

- Harunani, a Uganda-born Kenyan citizen of Pakistani origin, is under investigation for his ties to WAMY and al-Qa'ida subjects in the United States.
- FBI information also links Harunani to Abdullah Bin Ladin and WAMY through his company, Discover Islam, reportedly one of the linchpins of the five-year plan.
- Harunani's activities have been limited following several FBI interviews on a variety of matters.

[REDACTED] WAMY offices in other countries are directly funding HAMAS-affiliated NGOs, including the UK-based charity Interpal and the Palestinian *zakat* (tithing) committees. The FBI is monitoring WAMY's US activities, which appear to have been severely curtailed since the FBI conducted a search of the organization's Northern Virginia office in conjunction with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement earlier this year.

[REDACTED] Sulaiman Abdul-Aziz al-Rajhi Foundation

[REDACTED] The Saudi Arabian-based al-Rajhi family established the Sulaiman Abdul-Aziz al-Rajhi (SAAR) Foundation in the 1980s to manage the family's charitable contributions. SAAR is a complex web of overlapping companies with parallel ideologies, personal relationships, and financial associations that has exhibited numerous affiliations with entities known to support terrorism. [REDACTED] (O-1) the SAAR Foundation, in concert with its subsidiary companies, provided monetary support and other assistance to organizations linked to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and HAMAS.

[REDACTED]

Appendix B: US-Based Muslim Clerics Funded by the Saudi Government

Several radical Imams preaching in the United States who are mostly Arab or African nationals are paid a salary or stipend by the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA), on an irregular but almost bi-monthly basis. More than a dozen of these individuals are or have been subjects of FBI counterterrorism investigations, with HAMAS and/or al-Qa'ida links. Investigations are ongoing to further identify these individuals, their associates, and the nature of their relationship with the GSA. The following are some of the individuals who have received stipends:

Abdirahman S. Ahmed (aka Ahmed), who receives a stipend of \$800 from the Embassy, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) he organized a fundraiser on behalf of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI) in 2001 that raised \$167,000. Ahmed, a naturalized US citizen, is believed to be AIAI's current leader in the United States. AIAI is a Somalia-based terrorist organization with ties to al-Qa'ida.

Jamal Mohammed Abdellatif (aka Jamal M. Said), who receives a stipend of \$1,948.54 from the Embassy, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) for his connections to HAMAS. Said was born in Jordan and became a naturalized US citizen in 1988. He is the Imam at the Mosque Foundation of Chicago in Bridgeview, IL. Said is under investigation for his involvement with HAMAS.

Monir Yasin al-Farra, who receives a stipend of \$1,150.93 from the Embassy, is under investigation for ties to Muslim extremists. A Saudi national living in the United States as a permanent resident alien, al-Farra is the Imam at the Little Rock Islamic Center in Little Rock, AR. Al-Farra is involved with Jamaat al-Tabligh (JT) activities in the United States, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) JT, an international Muslim missionary organization, has been infiltrated by Islamic extremists.

Melvin Eckless Perkins (aka Umar I. al-Khattab), who receives a stipend of \$637.60 from the Embassy, is a US-born African-American convert to Islam. He is the Imam at the Al-Fajr Mosque located in Indianapolis, IN. Perkins is associated with Abdul Salam, an FBI investigation subject who [REDACTED] (O-1) is tied to the al-Qa'ida network based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Salaam has met with Perkins in Indianapolis.

[REDACTED]

Appendix C: Omar Al-Bayoumi and Osama Basnan

[REDACTED] At this time the FBI has no information to indicate that either al-Bayoumi or Basnan were intelligence officers of the Saudi Government or that they provided material support for the 11 September attacks.

Omar Al-Bayoumi

[REDACTED] Omar al-Bayoumi unwittingly assisted hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi following their arrival in the San Diego area in early February 2000. Al-Bayoumi helped the hijackers secure an apartment by obtaining a cashier's check for them and signing as a guarantor on their lease application. He also assisted al-Mihdhar in the opening of a bank account. There is no evidence that al-Bayoumi provided financial support to the hijackers.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi was employed by the Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA) from 1975 until 1995. From 1995 employment records indicate that al-Bayoumi was paid as a "ghost employee" of Dallah (a Saudi subcontractor of PCA).

[REDACTED] Many Arab individuals in the San Diego area, including [REDACTED] (O-1) as well as al-Hazmi himself, suspected al-Bayoumi of being a Saudi intelligence officer because he was frequently observed videotaping events at the local Islamic center. To date the FBI has not received any information to corroborate this assertion.

[REDACTED] According to FBI interviews of Isamu Dyson, in late January 2000, al-Bayoumi and Dyson went to the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, where al-Bayoumi met with an unknown consular officer. After visiting the Consulate, al-Bayoumi and Dyson went to a restaurant and discovered that it was now a butcher shop. The butcher shop employees recommended another *halal* restaurant nearby. At this second restaurant, al-Bayoumi and Dyson met Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who both stated that they did not like living in Los Angeles, to which al-Bayoumi suggested that they come to San Diego.

[REDACTED] Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi arrived in San Diego shortly thereafter. Investigation has determined that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi initially attempted to obtain an apartment on their own with cash. Because they did not have a credit history and because the leasing company did not accept cash payments, al-Bayoumi signed as a guarantor and obtained a cashier's check for them. Financial records indicate that a cash deposit of the same amount as the cashier's check was deposited into al-Bayoumi's bank account on the same day.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi departed the United States in the summer of 2001 to attend school in England. When his association with the hijackers was determined after 11 September, New Scotland Yard (NSY) detained al-Bayoumi on 21 September 2001 under the United Kingdom Terrorism Act of 2000. Al-Bayoumi's residence, office, and automobile were searched. Evidence recovered in the search of his residence revealed various documents and correspondence that can be interpreted as extremist in nature. Al-Bayoumi was interviewed by NSY between 22 and 28 September 2001.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] An arrest warrant for al-Bayoumi was issued on 27 September 2001 in the Southern District of California based on a criminal complaint alleging fraud and misuse of US immigration documents. A provisional US arrest warrant was not secured, however, because the immigration-related offense did not fall within the regulations of extradition from the United Kingdom to the United States.

[REDACTED] On 28 September 2001 al-Bayoumi was released from custody since NSY did not have enough evidence to charge him with any criminal violation. (C-2)

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi moved from the United Kingdom to Saudi Arabia in August 2002; he was interviewed by the Saudi Mabathith sometime during October 2002.

[REDACTED] Osama Basnan

[REDACTED] Osama Basnan came to the attention of the FBI as the result of an interview conducted by the San Diego Field Office immediately after the 11 September attacks. The interviewee alleged that Basnan was a supporter of Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) and had espoused anti-American rhetoric. Basnan, a 44-year-old citizen of Saudi Arabia, entered the United States in 1980 on a visitor's visa. In 1992 Basnan listed his place of employment on apartment rental records as the Saudi Arabian Educational Mission in Washington, DC, which is associated with the Saudi Embassy in Washington. Uncorroborated source reporting alleged that on 17 October 1992, Basnan hosted a party in Washington, DC, for Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, aka the "blind sheikh," convicted in 1995 on multiple terrorism-related charges stemming from his involvement with the conspirators in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and additional plots to attack landmarks in New York City, NY. However, a review of Basnan's financial records from the relevant time period fails to corroborate that allegation.

[REDACTED] Prior to 11 September, some considered Basnan a prominent member of the San Diego Saudi émigré community. He claims to have been in contact with UBL family members and may also have ties to the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, a Sudanese-based terrorist group. He was also a close associate of Omar al-Bayoumi. In April 2001 the wives of both al-Bayoumi and Basnan were arrested together in San Diego for shoplifting. Prior to and after the 11 September attacks, Basnan had significant telephonic contact with the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC, the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, and Princess Haifa, the wife of Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States.

[REDACTED] Basnan's wife has received significant payments from the Saudi government. Between January 1999 and May 2002, Basnan's wife received 34 checks from Princess Haifa, most in the amount of \$2,000 per month, totaling \$82,000. Other payments were also made to Basnan or his wife from Prince Bandar's or the Embassy's account. In total, Basnan and his wife received \$127,469.29 from the Saudi government between January 1998 and May 2002. When interviewed by the FBI, Basnan explained that these payments were scholarships and charitable contributions he had solicited to help pay for his wife's thyroid surgery and support his family. Princess Haifa reportedly provided the money to help cover the family's medical and daily living expenses. The Saudi government has denied that Basnan was ever employed by the Embassy or Educational Mission, or that he was ever on a scholarship. However, the Saudi

[REDACTED]
Government has confirmed the payments to Basnan's wife for medical and subsistence expenses
(O-1)

[REDACTED] To date, no information developed by the FBI indicates that Basnan ever had any contact with al-Mihdhar or al-Hazmi other than being introduced to al-Hazmi by al-Bayoumi.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan said he "met" al-Hazmi through al-Bayoumi. (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan denied that he "knew" al-Hazmi or al-Mihdhar. Basnan also told the asset that he "saw" (that is, "observed") al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, who lived in the Parkwood apartment complex located across the street from the apartment complex where Basnan resided. Although Basnan had significant telephonic contacts with al-Bayoumi and Omar Bakarbashat, both of whom were close associates of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, there is nothing to indicate that Basnan ever interacted with al-Hazmi or al-Mihdhar other than his introduction to al-Hazmi. In an interview with the FBI in August 2002, Basnan said he saw al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar at the mosque but never met them.

[REDACTED] During the Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry, there was much speculation as to the meaning of a consensually recorded Arabic conversation between Basnan and an FBI asset. During their discussion the asset referred to al-Bayoumi and his relationship with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Basnan told the asset that al-Bayoumi was "nothing compared to what I used to do." The Joint Intelligence Committee construed Basnan's comment to mean that Basnan did more for the hijackers than al-Bayoumi did; however, a studied examination of the entire conversation reveals otherwise. In this conversation Basnan compared his religious activities seven or eight years ago to what al-Bayoumi did for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in helping them to get established in San Diego. In the conversation the asset brought up al-Bayoumi, saying that al-Bayoumi did a favor for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar by arranging for their apartment and, as a result, was now the subject of law enforcement scrutiny. Basnan responded that al-Bayoumi collected a lot of funds from a rich person and bought a mosque. Basnan advised that al-Bayoumi had stopped all of his religious activities and was now with his family. He told the asset that if the asset had come to the United States (A), (G), (J-1) years ago, he would have seen how active Basnan was in the Muslim community, visiting Muslims in prison and giving the Friday liturgy at the mosque. The language specialist who translated this conversation believes it is clear that Basnan was boasting about his religious activities in the Muslim community seven or eight years ago and comparing it to al-Bayoumi's activities. There is nothing in the conversation to indicate that Basnan was suggesting he helped al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar more than al-Bayoumi did.

[REDACTED] As a result of FBI investigation, Basnan and his wife were charged with visa fraud in August and September 2002 and pleaded guilty. Basnan was deported to Saudi Arabia in October 2002, and his wife was deported to Jordan a month later.

- There is no indication that any of the money Basnan or his wife received from the Saudi government ever went to al-Hazmi or al-Mihdhar.
- Based on his overt contacts with the Saudi Embassy, the Saudi consulate, and members of the royal family, it does not appear that Basnan was a Saudi intelligence officer.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/04/2002

To: Los Angeles

From: Los Angeles

(G) Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: (A), (G), (J-1) ER)

Synopsis: Request opening of a Full Investigation on captioned subject and authorization to conduct physical surveillance on captioned subject.

(G)

Full Field Investigation Instituted: (A), (G), (J-1)

Administrative: Attached with communication, is a copy of a letter from FBIHQ, approved by (S) dated 08/26/2002, (O-1) statement regarding captioned subject. The (O-1) was approved on 09/03/2002.

Reference (s): (F)

[Redacted Reference(s) content]

[Redacted content]

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Details: [REDACTED] The above referenced communications document various interviews of several material witnesses involved in the PENTTBOM Investigation.

[REDACTED] Two of the [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED], Isamu Dyson (DYSON) and Mohdar M. Abdullah (MOHDAR), have given detailed accounts of their involvement with American Airlines Flight #77 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf AlHazmi, while they were in Los Angeles and San Diego. Portions of Dyson and Mohdar's interviews are listed below to support the opening of a Full Investigation on Fahad Althumairy, captioned subject.

[REDACTED] During October 2001, Dyson was interviewed several times by Boston, Portland Maine RA agents, San Diego agents, and [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] During the interviews, it was learned that Dyson knew Mr. OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, subject of San Diego investigation, during late 1999 and early 2000. Dyson indicated he once took a trip to Los Angeles with Omar Al-Bayoumi during this time frame. They went to the Saudi Arabian consulate in Los Angeles and then to a small Mediterranean café/restaurant in the Culver City area. It was at this restaurant that Omar Al-Bayoumi met American Airline Flight #77 hijacker's Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar.

[REDACTED] After this meeting (exact date unknown), the hijackers moved to San Diego. Al-Bayoumi played a major role in getting them established in the community. This included finding them an apartment and providing them with financial assistance. As receiving offices are aware, Al-Bayoumi is being actively investigated, by San Diego, for his role of supporting the hijackers. He is currently in England. He was detained and questioned in September related to the terrorist attacks, but had to be released.

[REDACTED] Investigators brought Dyson to the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. Dyson indicated that Al-Bayoumi dealt with a representative of the Consulate described as a Middle Eastern male, approximately 5'8" in height, in his 40s, with a black/grey beard down to his chest, wearing a suit. It appeared obvious to Dyson that Al-Bayoumi and the Saudi official knew each other and had met before. Their conversation was in Arabic however, and Dyson did not comprehend it. Al-Bayoumi and this man then went behind closed doors to take care of their "business". They spend up to one hour at the Consulate.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] es [REDACTED] geles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 09/04/2002

[REDACTED] After leaving the consulate, Al-Bayoumi suggested that he and Dyson travel to a local restaurant to have lunch. The two first entered the Mediterranean Café. Al-Bayoumi had informed Dyson that he and his family had dined at this restaurant before. Once Al-Bayoumi and Dyson entered the Mediterranean Café, they were informed that the Mediterranean Café did not serve food. Al-Bayoumi asked if this was the Mediterranean Café on Venice Blvd. Al-Bayoumi was informed that another Mediterranean restaurant was located a few yards away. Al-Bayoumi and Dyson walked a short distance west on Venice Boulevard and into the MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET Restaurant, located at 10863 Venice Boulevard, phone number (310)842-8291.

[REDACTED] While at the MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET, Al-Bayoumi and Dyson met with hijackers Al-Mihdhar and Alhazmi. It is unknown at this time whether this meeting between Al-Bayoumi and the hijackers, in LA, was a planned event or a "chance meeting." meeting is believed to have occurred on 02/01/2000, based on [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) and toll record analysis. San Diego investigation has indicated that Al-Bayoumi has extensive ties to the Saudi government. He was being supported in the U.S. with a stipend from his employer, the Saudi Arabian Civil Air Administration, and/or the Saudi government. There is speculation that Al-Bayoumi could be a Saudi intelligence officer based on numerous factors and circumstances. Therefore, there remains the possibility that the meeting was planned or Al-Bayoumi was directed by someone at the Saudi Consulate to meet the two hijackers at the restaurant in LA.

[REDACTED] During the conversation, Dyson learned via Al-Bayoumi that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar had an apartment in LA and have only been there and in the United States for a short time. They stated that they did not like Los Angeles. They were having a difficult time and didn't know anyone. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar were in the U.S. to learn English. Al-Bayoumi invited them to come to San Diego and check it out. Al-Bayoumi told them they would probably like it in San Diego. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar indicated they were interested. Al-Bayoumi gave his phone number to Al-Hazmi. It is also possible that Al-Bayoumi got their phone number as well, but Dyson was unsure. Al-Bayoumi and Dyson left the restaurant/café and went to the Culver City Mosque, also know as the King Fahad Mosque.

[REDACTED] The next time Dyson met Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar was when they were in the Parkwood Apartments on Mt. Ada Road in San Diego. This was at the welcome/housewarming party Al-Bayoumi had thrown for the hijackers. It was a matter of a few weeks to a month between the meeting at the LA restaurant and the time of the welcoming party for Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. During this interim period, Al-Bayoumi did mention that he had been in contact with the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Los Angeles [REDACTED] ngeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 09/04/2002

two men they met at the restaurant in LA. Al-Bayoumi also told Dyson that they even came down to visit San Diego one time and liked it.

[REDACTED] Mohdar stated that he met and became acquainted with Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in 1999, after an introduction by Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi. Nawaf told Mohdar that they, Nawaf and Khalid, had arrived in Los Angeles via United Airlines into Los Angeles Airport. Mohdar was unaware of the location they stayed in Los Angeles or how they arrived in San Diego. Omar brought Nawaf and Khalid to an Islamic Mosque located in Lemon Grove, CA, to make the introduction to Mohdar. Omar asked Mohdar to become acquainted with Nawaf and Khalid, acclimate them to the area and assist in any way in their affairs. Mohdar noted that Nawaf told him not to tell anyone that they had taken an excursion trip to Malaysia after arriving in Bangkok. Mohdar knew that the hijackers traveled in their Toyota to Los Angeles, however, he did not know the purpose of the trip or the date.

[REDACTED] In approximately the summer on 2000, Mohdar traveled with Nawaf in the Toyota to take Khalid to the LAX Airport in Los Angeles, CA. Khalid was returning to Saudi Arabia to be with his wife and newborn female child. Khalid traveled commercial airlines from LAX on Lufthansa Airline. After dropping off Khalid at the airport, Mohdar and Nawaf visited the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA. They returned to San Diego the same day. Nawaf had a gifted voice for leading the prayer at the residence and at the Mosque. FBI Los Angeles Comment: Los Angeles has no explanation as to why Khalid Al-Mihdhar had to travel from San Diego to Los Angeles in order to fly to Saudi Arabia.

FBI Los Angeles Investigative Results:

[REDACTED] Los Angeles has determined that Fahad AlThumairy may be a potential contact of the hijackers and Al-Bayoumi in Los Angeles. AlThumairy is an administrative officer at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and may have diplomatic status. AlThumairy is also believed to be one of the Imams at the King Fahad mosque. AlThumairy also fits the description, as provided by Dyson, of the individual that Al-Bayoumi met at the Saudi consulate prior to Al-Bayoumi's "chance" meeting with the hijackers at the restaurant.

[REDACTED] Los Angeles review of ACS also revealed a communication from Legat [REDACTED] (G) to Counterterrorism and Los Angeles ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]) dated 12/17/2001, that according to a letter from the Saudi Arabian Mabahith to Legat [REDACTED] (G) AlThumairy is "a Saudi National and representative of the KSA's Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and Religious Guidance" and that he has been sent to the United States for the "purpose of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Los Angeles ngeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/04/2002

religious guidance." The Saudi Mabahith letter also indicated that the Mabahith request of Legat [REDACTED] (G) had the "special attention of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Abdullah". Los Angeles notes that according to the US Department of State records, Al-Thumairy is listed as an Administrative Officer and does not carry any special religious status within the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles. ACS further indicated that in [REDACTED] (F), [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] A review of Al-Bayoumi's home telephone records and cellular telephone records has revealed that Al-Bayoumi had (16) telephonic contacts with AlThumairy. In addition, Al-Bayoumi had (24) telephonic contacts with the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles prior to the events of 09/11/2001.

[REDACTED] Various reliable sources of the Los Angeles have reported that AlThumairy returned to Saudi Arabia in mid-August 2001 and did not return to Los Angeles until 12/24/2001. Los Angeles notes that Al-Bayoumi also left the United States, for England, prior to the events of 09/11/2001. Sources have also reported that AlThumairy's sermons at the King Fahad mosque have a militant, anti-West tone to them. Al-Thumairy is also reported to be anti-United States and Israel.

[REDACTED] According to Mohdar, the hijackers and Mohdar took a trip to Los Angeles in order for Khalid Al-Mihdhar to return to Saudi Arabia for the birth of his daughter. Mohdar stated that they stayed at a hotel close to the mosque. Mohdar also reported that the hijackers met several people at the King Fahad mosque including a person identified as "Khallam". According to Mohdar, Khallam visited the hijackers at the hotel that evening. Upon Khallam's arrival, the hijackers asked Mohdar to wait outside. FBI investigation has determined that Mohdar and the hijackers stayed at Deno's Motel on 06/09/2000. Information from FBI New York has revealed that [REDACTED] (O-1), SAID SALEH BIN ATTASH, aka "KHALLAD" [REDACTED] (O-1). Bin Attash is the alleged mastermind behind the bombing of USS Cole in Aden, Yemen. New York indicated that [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1). New York opined that certain diplomatic arrangements exist at various airports which allow diplomats to meet incoming foreign nationals at the baggage [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1). Los Angeles can not confirm whether "Khallad" and "Khallam" are identical.

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] es From: Los Angeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 09/04/2002

[REDACTED] On 03/07/2002, Los Angeles interviewed Mr. Qualid Moncef Benomrane, while in INS custody. Benomrane is a Tunisian national that regularly attended the King Fahad Mosque.

[REDACTED] Benomrane reported that he had heard that two Saudi Arabian men had arrived at LAX and were met by a person unknown to Benomrane. This unknown person then took the two Saudis to an apartment complex that had already been rented for them. Benomrane stated he could not remember the address, but that it was a large white building located on Sepulveda Blvd. between Venice Blvd. and Palm St. FBI Los Angeles Comment: This is the apartment complex whose records were recently search by Los Angeles.

[REDACTED] One or two days after the arrival of the Saudis, Benomrane was at the King Fahad Mosque. While at the mosque Sheik Fahad Al-Thumairy introduced Benomrane to the two Saudis and asked Benomrane if he could help them during their time in Los Angeles because they did not speak English. Benomrane agreed and gave the Saudis his taxi cab business card.

[REDACTED] The next day the Saudis called Benomrane and asked him to pick them up and drive them around Los Angeles. Benomrane picked them up at their apartment complex and then drove them around. They then ate at the Mediterranean Restaurant located on Venice Blvd. At the end of the day Benomrane took them back to their apartment complex.

[REDACTED] Two to three days later the Saudis called Benomrane again. This time they wanted to go to Sea world in San Diego. Benomrane agreed and picked them up at their apartment where he was given \$100 and told he would get the remainder after the trip. Benomrane stated they drove straight to San Diego and the only stop that they made was at a San Diego gas station. Benomrane could not remember the gas stations location in San Diego. One or two days after they returned to Los Angeles Benomrane called them to receive the remainder of his money. The Saudis told him that Sheik Fahad AlThumairy would give him the rest of the money.

[REDACTED] When asked by investigators who else knew about the two Saudis, Benomrane replied that no one at the Kind Fahad Mosque knew about them and that he was told by Sheik Fahad Al-Thumairy to keep the presence of the two Saudis to himself. Benomrane did say that the Saudi Consulate knew about the two Saudis because it was the consulate that told Sheik Fahad to take care of the Saudis.

Benomrane was told by Sheik Fahad that the Saudis were here to see their sick father who was in a local hospital. Benomrane said that the Saudis stayed in Los Angeles for approximately one month and then they returned to Saudi Arabia. When asked if Benomrane

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] es [REDACTED] ngeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/04/2002

knew for a fact that they returned to Saudi Arabia he replied no and that he was just told that they had left Los Angeles.

[REDACTED] Benomrane could not remember the Saudis names, but remembered one was approximately twenty one years old and the other was approximately twenty-five years old. Benomrane stated over and over that the two Saudis came to Los Angeles prior to 09/11/2001.

[REDACTED] During the interview, Benomrane was shown photographs of all the hijackers and numerous photographs of unrelated individuals. Benomrane looked at all the photographs carefully and placed all the photographs in a pile on the left side of the desk. When he viewed the photographs of Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi, he placed the photographs on the right side of the desk. Once he had gone through all the photographs, he mixed the photographs and stated that he did not recognize anyone from the photos. FBI Los Angeles is of the opinion that Benomrane may have been less than truthful with the investigators regarding his recognition of anyone from the photographs.

[REDACTED] As stated earlier, Los Angeles conducted a search of lease/rental records of the apartment complex that was shown to the investigators by Benomrane. The search revealed that Fahad Al-Thumairy and the King Fahad Mosque had an extensive rental history with the apartment complex. Lease records indicated that Al-Thumairy would customarily rent furnished apartments for a 4-6 week period. Lease records also indicated that Al-Thumairy would not personally reside in the apartments rented at the complex. This apartment complex is within ½ mile of the Mediterranean restaurant where Al-Bayoumi and Dyson met the hijackers. The apartment is withing 3/4 mile of the King Fahad mosque and is within one mile from Deno's motel where the hijackers and Mohdar had stayed on 06/09/2000. Additionally, a check of all other hotels in the vicinity of the King Fahad Mosque and Deno's Motel revealed that Al-Thumairy has an extensive rental history with Travellodge Hotel and Sunburst Motel. The hotel searches also revealed that Al-Bayoumi has extensive rental history at the Travellodge Hotel and the Half Moon Motel. All these motels/hotels are adjacent to Deno's motel and within ½ mile of the apartment complex.

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] Los Angeles is of the strong opinion that Fahad Al-Thumairy may have known about the hijackers while in the United

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Los Angeles [REDACTED] ngeles
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/04/2002

States and may have assisted them. Based on the above, Los Angeles has initiated a Full Field investigation on Al-Thumairy in order to determine his association with the tragic events of 09/11/2001 and to disrupt any future terrorist operations that may be planned by Al-Qaeda or its support network in the United States.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/20/2008

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

(G)
SSA (S)
IA (S)
LEGAT

(G)

From: Los Angeles

(G)

Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F), (G)

Title: FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: To request authorization from FBIHQ to close captioned case and to provide Counterterrorism with a closing Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) as required by the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). Captioned subject will remain in (G)

(G)

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for the Los Angeles file is the Annual Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) of the captioned case. An electronic copy of the LHM will be sent to FBIHQ via email for passage to DOJ. FBIHQ is requested to review the electronic copy of the annual LHM for passage to (G)

Administrative: This closing EC was coordinated with CTD on 10/01/2008.

Full Investigation Initiated: 11/30/2007

Details: This investigation was originally predicated on information that ALTHUMAIRY was associated with an individual

who had extensive contacts with two of the September 11th hijackers. FBI investigation determined that ALTHUMAIRY had contact with OMAR ALBAYOUMI, who had substantial contact with 9/11 hijackers NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIDHAR. Further, ALTHUMAIRY was identified (O-1) as a "hard core extremist" whose sermons at the King Fahad Mosque appealed to the extremist and militant attendees of the mosque.

ALTHUMAIRY departed Los Angeles on 02/06/2003 and returned to Saudi Arabia for his brother's wedding. On 05/06/2003, ALTHUMAIRY re-entered the U.S., unaware that his (J-3)

(J-3) ALTHUMAIRY was interviewed by the FBI at the Los Angeles International Airport. ALTHUMAIRY was refused entry into the U.S. and was returned to Saudi Arabia on 05/08/2003. Subject was interviewed in February 2004 by FBI agents at his home in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. No new information was garnered as a result of the interview. ALTHUMAIRY's investigation was closed on 10/31/2005 because he was no longer in the United States, although he (G)

Per (F) (P) who was closely associated with 9/11 hijackers ALHAZMI and ALMIDHAR, was interviewed on 08/29/2007. (P) noted that he personally introduced ALTHUMAIRY to the hijackers, which indicated that ALTHUMAIRY had more direct contact with the hijackers than was previously known.

Due to ALTHUMAIRY's prominence in the Los Angeles area and association with the 9/11 hijackers during that time, Los Angeles re-opened the closed investigation on ALTHUMAIRY in order to locate and interview him.

On 01/28/2008 (F) CTD passed two (G) approved tearlines to Legat (G) requesting Mabahith assistance in coordinating an interview of Fahad Al-Thumairy (F) and Princes Nawaf and Meteb Al-Saud in Saudi Arabia. However, per telephonic and email communications with LEGAT (G) Saudi Mabahith denied the interview requests. Due to the fact that Al-Thumairy remains in Saudi Arabia, this case is being closed. Al-Thumairy will, however, (G) because of his reported association with the 9/11 hijackers.

As set forth in an EC provided by CTD, dated 12/01/2006, "Section 19 of the National Foreign Intelligence Program Manual (NFIPM), or (F) policy, is being modified to include policy and procedures when an international terrorism investigation in the (F) classification is closed." As requested, information contained within this text is reiterated below:

- a. This was a Full Field Investigation.

- b. The investigation was opened on 11/30/2007.
- c. The investigation was initially opened as a Full Field Investigation.
- d. There is no recent LHM because the case is being closed within a year of opening. The closing LHM is attached.
- e. The subject is a Non-USPER.
- f. The extent to which the subject is aware of the terrorist aims of the foreign power is unknown due to his location in Saudi Arabia and the inability to conduct a subject interview.
- g. A sensitive national security matter exists as FAHAD AL-THUMARY may currently hold diplomatic status in the Saudi Arabian government.

h. Known Identifiers

(U) The following identifiers are being provided for the captioned subject:

- a) Name: FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY; FAHD IBRAHIM ABDULLAH
ALTHUMAIRY
- b) DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
- c) Non-USPER
- d) Religious affiliation: Sunni

Descriptive Data:

(U) Main Subject

Name -
 Last: ALTHUMAIRY
 First: FAHAD
 Middle:
 Race: W
 Sex: M
 DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
 POB:
 ARN: Alien Registration #
 DLN: None
 PNO: [REDACTED] (J-3)
 SOC: [REDACTED] (P-1)
 Alias(es) -
 Last: ALTHUMAIRY
 First: FAHD
 Middle: IBRAHIM ABDULLAH
 Address(es) -
 House #: Unknown
 Street Name:
 Street Suffix:
 Unit:
 City:
 State:
 Postal Code:
 Country: Saudi Arabia



Miscellaneous -

Subject is a non-USPER.

- i. Subject has resided in Saudi Arabia since he was refused re-entry into the U.S. on 05/08/2003. LEGAT (G) is aware of ALTHUMAIRY's presence in Saudi Arabia.
- j. Subject is classified as possible direct associate.

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Request concurrence to close captioned investigation. Provide the enclosed LHM, making notification of the closing of this investigation, to DOJ.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

(G)

AT [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] LEGAT: Read and clear.

◆◆



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
Connections to the Attacks of September 11,
2001

Date: 07/23/2021

From: [REDACTED] (G)
Contact: [REDACTED] (S)

Approved By: [REDACTED] (S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED] (S)

Case ID #: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
PENTTBOMB [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] PENTTBOMB [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) MAJOR
CASE (MC) 182 [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 07/23/2021

(F)

[REDACTED]

Synopsis: [REDACTED] To file. To provide summary and historical information for subsequent agents of [REDACTED] (G)

(G)

[REDACTED]

Administrative Notes: [REDACTED] Attached to this EC is a document summarizing the connections between the 9/11 investigation and elements affiliated with the Saudi Arabian government in the U.S. This replaces Serial [REDACTED] (F) which was intended as a draft for review but was serialized. Serial [REDACTED] (F) will be removed at a later date.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. [REDACTED] Saudi 9/11 Connections

Details:

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information related to the involvement of personnel and entities controlled by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and its affiliates within the United States with the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks / PENTTBOMB). Such an analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to understand the origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted, this document only discusses entities that are part of or closely tied to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001 investigation are only noted if related to this purpose. This report should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not intended as such.

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 07/23/2021

An additional purpose of this communication is to document investigations and supporting documentation regarding the Saudi(Wahhabi)/Salafi/militant network that was created, funded, directed and supported by the KSA and its affiliated organizations and diplomatic personnel within the U.S. As Saudi government officials and intelligence officers were directly operating and supporting the entities involved with this network, their involvement with the activities of these organizations/individuals would logically be supposed to have the knowledge or concurrence of the KSA government. This knowledge and/or concurrence by the SAG is related to the 9/11 investigation not only be the direct involvement of some personnel but also via the creation of a larger network for such activities.

In addition, the below analysis will update information available on the ties of some of these entities to Saudi Arabian intelligence services. Much of the publically known information regarding the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks was documented in the 9/11 Commission Report which was published in 2004. Thus much available information from subsequent and ongoing investigations was not noted in the Commission's Report. In addition, the classified "28 pages" was subsequently de-classified and investigations since 2004 shed additional light on the information that was contained within these 28 pages which were created in 2004 as part of the original Commission Report.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] there was located within the EKSA the offices of the Islamic Affairs Department and the office of Dawa (or Propagation). Investigation of the 9/11 hijackers and their support networks identified significant connections to these offices either directly or via the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. As such, a primary portion of this communication will focus on these offices and connections to the 9/11 hijackers. In addition, the SAG/EKSA was also involved with the funding and creation of a multitude of Islamic organizations, offices, imams and other religious figures within the US – many of which were involved with militant ideology. Several of these were known to be tied directly to Prince Bandar and/or were involved with the collection of information on US based Islamic entities. As the propagation of militant ideology would naturally provide justification for those who were in the hijacker's support network – these organizations will also be listed below (below is not an all-inclusive list as this would be too large.)

Administration:

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] was originally formed as [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] in 2002 as a result of the PENTTBOMB investigation identifying connections between the 9/11 hijackers, their support network and individuals associated with the SAG. As is well known, 15 of the deceased 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia with a possible 20th - Mohammed Alqahtani - subsequently captured in Afghanistan and confined at Guantanamo Bay after unsuccessfully attempting to enter the US. At the time of creation of [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] there was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] a few investigations of some Saudi Arabian

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 07/23/2021

government personnel and organizations had been previously established. [REDACTED] (G) was quickly transferred to the new [REDACTED] (G) and changed to [REDACTED] (G) and then subsequently [REDACTED] (G). During a portion of this time the squad's FBIHQ oversight was within the [REDACTED] (G) and much of the squad investigative efforts were focused on Saudi Arabian charities in the [REDACTED] (G) AOR as well as individual subjects with established or alleged AQ or militant connections. After approximately ten years in [REDACTED] (G) the program was again transferred to [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) before returning to [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] of Saudi Arabian entities before and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under the [REDACTED] (F) classification. Later this designation was changed to [REDACTED] (F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations prior to and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under [REDACTED] (F) and [REDACTED] (F). These were later combined under [REDACTED] (F) and then [REDACTED] (F) classifications. For the most part, serials noted within this document utilize the case caption of the relevant time period.

[REDACTED] As the purpose of this document is to highlight and encapsulate the connections between the Saudi Arabian establishments and government entities in the U.S. with the 9/11 hijacker support network writer is not investigating or re-investigating the 9/11 investigation. This is particularly relevant due to a lack of resources and analytical assistance. As such, writer has located relevant serials and have copied that information directly within this communication. **The language, spelling, source symbol numbers, grammar, formatting and emphasis of the original serials is retained.**

[REDACTED] As the original language of the referenced serials is retained, a note on how sources were referenced is necessary. During the 9/11/2001 time period, Letter Head Memorandums (LHMs) were necessary for dissemination to DOJ. The LHMs removed the standard source number [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) replaced by a non-standard [REDACTED] (G) designation that was created entirely by the writing agent. Thus research is necessary in order to locate and identify the original source. During this time period, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

◆◆

(F)

The Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and their affiliated offices within the U.S.; their connections to the support network for the attacks of September 11, 2001; and the SAG creation of and support and direction for a network of offices and personnel involved with militant Salafi Islamic activities and proselytization within the United States.

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information related to the involvement of personnel and entities controlled by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) and its affiliates within the United States with the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks / PENTTBOMB). Such an analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to understand the origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted, this document only discusses entities that are part of or closely tied to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001 investigation are only noted if related to this purpose. This report should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not intended as such.

An additional purpose of this communication is to document investigations and supporting documentation regarding the Saudi(Wahhabi)/Salafi/militant network that was created, funded, directed and supported by the KSA and its affiliated organizations and diplomatic personnel within the U.S. As Saudi government officials and intelligence officers were directly operating and supporting the entities involved with this network, their involvement with the activities of these organizations/individuals would logically be supposed to have the knowledge or concurrence of the KSA government. This knowledge and/or concurrence by the SAG is related to the 9/11 investigation not only be the direct involvement of some personnel but also via the creation of a larger network for such activities.

[REDACTED]

In addition, the below analysis will update information available on the ties of some of these entities to Saudi Arabian intelligence services. Much of the publically known information regarding the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks was documented in the 9/11 Commission Report which was published in 2004. Thus much available information from subsequent and ongoing investigations was not noted in the Commission's Report. In addition, the classified "28 pages" was subsequently de-classified and investigations since 2004 shed additional light on the information that was contained within these 28 pages which were created in 2004 as part of the original Commission Report.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] there was located within the EKSA the offices of the Islamic Affairs Department and the office of Dawa (or Propagation). Investigation of the 9/11 hijackers and their support networks identified significant connections to these offices either directly or via the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. As such, a primary portion of this communication will focus on these offices and connections to the 9/11 hijackers. In addition, the SAG/EKSA was also involved with the funding and creation of a multitude of Islamic organizations, offices, imams and other religious figures within the US - many of which were involved with militant ideology. Several of these were known to be tied directly to Prince Bandar and/or were involved with the collection of information on US based Islamic entities. As the propagation of militant ideology would naturally provide justification for those who were in the hijacker's support network - these organizations will also be listed below (below is not an all-inclusive list as this would be too large.)

Administration:

(G) [REDACTED] was originally formed as (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] in 2002 as a result of the PENTTBOMB investigation identifying connections between the 9/11 hijackers, their support network and individuals associated with the SAG. As is well known, 15 of the deceased 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia with a possible 20th - Mohammed Alqahtani - subsequently captured in Afghanistan and confined at Guantanamo Bay after unsuccessfully attempting to enter the US. At the time of creation of (G) [REDACTED] there was (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] a few investigations of some Saudi Arabian government personnel and organizations had been previously established. Squad (G) [REDACTED] was quickly transferred to the new (G) [REDACTED] and changed to (G) [REDACTED] and then subsequently (G) [REDACTED]. During a portion of this time the squad's FBIHQ oversight was within the (G) [REDACTED] and much of the squad investigative efforts were focused on Saudi Arabian charities in the (G) [REDACTED] AOR as well as individual subjects with established or alleged AQ or militant connections. After approximately ten years in (G) [REDACTED] the program was again transferred to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(G)

before returning to

(G)
[REDACTED]

(F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations of Saudi Arabian entities before and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under the (F) classification. Later this designation was changed to (F) (A), (G), (J-1) investigations prior to and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under (F) [REDACTED]. These were later combined under (F) and then (F) classifications. For the most part, serials noted within this document utilize the case caption of the relevant time period.

[REDACTED] As the purpose of this document is to highlight and encapsulate the connections between the Saudi Arabian establishments and government entities in the U.S. with the 9/11 hijacker support network writer is not investigating or re-investigating the 9/11 investigation. This is particularly relevant due to a lack of resources and analytical assistance. As such, writer has located relevant serials and have copied that information directly within this communication. **The language, spelling, source symbol numbers and emphasis of the original serials is retained.**

[REDACTED] As the original language of the referenced serials is retained, a note on how sources were referenced is necessary. During the 9/11/2001 time period, Letter Head Memorandums (LHMs) were necessary for dissemination to DOJ. The LHMs removed the standard source number (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] standard (G) designation that was created entirely by the writing agent. Thus research is necessary in order to locate and identify the original source. During this time period, (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]

Background of Movement of 9/11 Hijacking Team

According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the 9/11 planning and recruitment of personnel for the operation was being developed through 2000 and early 2001. The pilots who were selected were the first to enter the U.S. and the "muscle hijackers", although recruited in 2000, were the last - not arriving until the Spring/Summer of 2001.

According to the 9/11 Commission Report and open source information, Khalid Almihdar and Nawaf Alhazmi (described by the report as the 2nd in command after Mohammed Atta) were two original hijackers involved in the attack planning and, although other known hijackers had prior entries into the US, appeared to be the first to enter the U.S. as an operational component of the 9/11 plan. According to investigation and the 9/11 Commission report, Almihdar and Alhazmi first entered the U.S. via Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. Per the 9/11 Commission Report, neither Almihdar nor Alhazmi were well prepared for the operation, spoke little English and their only qualifications appeared to be their support of UBL and their ability to obtain visas. Although the initial plan may have been for Alhazmi and Almihdar to have been pilots for the plot, neither passed initial flight training and both had problems acclimating to the U.S. Almihdar's difficulties may have resulted in his sudden return to Yemen on June 10, 2000 (or he was possibly working on logistics overseas) that would have left Alhazmi alone in California except for elements of his support network. Almihdar would not return to the US as a "muscle hijacker" until July 2001. Both Alhazmi and Almihdar arrived in the U.S. after having attended what is presumed to be the planning meeting for the attacks that were held in Kuala Lumpur.

It is important to note that both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known AQ operatives. Both were Saudi nationals who had traveled together to Bosnia in 1995. Alhazmi conducted training with KSM in Pakistan in late 1999 and both Alhazmi and Almihdar were present in the planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur in December 1999. Alhazmi was reportedly personally selected by UBL for the operation. Almihdar was from a prominent family and married into a family with extensive AQ connections. Both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known to Saudi and U.S. intelligence as being AQ members. After Almihdar departed the U.S. Alhazmi was left alone until Hani Hanjour was sent in December 2000. The second primary group of hijackers were the "Hamburg Group"

[REDACTED]

(Mohammed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi and Ziad Jarrah (along with Ramzi Binalshibh) who arrived in Afghanistan in November 1999 and began to be selected for the operation. Unlike Alhazmi and Almihdar, these four spoke English and were acclimated for living in the West. Their need for a support network would be minimal.

Due to the lack of preparedness of Alhazmi and Almihdar for the operation and residing in the West without arousing suspicion the existence of a support network would make operational sense. Investigation determined that a significant portion of the network assisting these two hijackers centered on offices affiliated with the KSA to include the Saudi Arabian Los Angeles Consulate, the King Fahd Mosque as well as multiple individuals associated with these locations and/or the Saudi Arabian government.

[REDACTED]

Islamic Affairs Department (IAD) Islamic Affairs Office (IAO)
(Ministry of Islamic Affairs)(MIA) / Dawa Office Connections to Saudi
Arabian Intelligence

[REDACTED] Summary: Within the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C. (as in other Saudi Arabian Embassies throughout the world) was located an Islamic Affairs Office and a Dawa Office (Dawa means proselytizing). The D.C. offices were staffed with both Saudi Arabian diplomats and local hires and their roles were often mixed. The Islamic Affairs Offices worldwide and in the U.S. played a key role in supporting the Saudi Arabian Government's objective to be perceived as the leader of the Islamic world and also played a key role in Saudi Arabia's religious and political competition with Shia Iran. (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1), the key personnel within the Islamic Affairs office (A), (G), (J-1) and one of the roles of the Islamic Affairs Office was to provide intelligence on local Islamic populations and to provide cover for the movement of (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1). Saudi Arabian "non-governmental organizations" (NGO), ie. "charities", supplemented this activity with large funding streams as well as cover for personnel.

One of the primary speculative questions regarding the PENTTBOMB investigation is whether the SAG was significantly connected to, had prior knowledge of or supported the attacks of September 11, 2001. Due to the involvement of the Islamic Affairs/Dawa Office personnel within the support network of the hijackers it is of possible significance to identify the connections of these offices to Saudi Arabian intelligence.

Relevant Serials:

(O-1) [REDACTED] FBI Serial (F) (F) [REDACTED] reported that as of early 2001 the EKSA had one of the largest Ministry of Islamic Affairs sections in the world with approximately 50 MIA officers. (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] Many Saudi Embassy officials believed that the chief of the MIA section, Majid Aljashaihan (SA (S) NOTE: This would be **Majed Algheshey**), was either a GIP officer or had some type of special connection to the GIP. The same opinions were held about **Khalil Khalil**, the deputy

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

chief of the MIA section. Musaid Aljarrah (**Musaed Aljarrah**) was one of the known GIP officers in the MIA section.

[SA (S) note: Presumably the above number of "approximately 50" would include both Saudi and non-Saudi personnel (non-diplomatic) in both Islamic Affairs and Dawa. It is unknown if personnel assigned to other offices such as **Muslim World League (MWL)**, **World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)** and the **Institute of Islamic Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)** would be included (G) [The large number of employees in a national not pre-dominantly Muslim signaled the significance of the activities of this office in the U.S. to overall Saudi Arabian policies and objectives.]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(F) On (A), (G), 2009
(O-1) Sahal Ergesous was the head of
(J-1) the Islamic Affairs office at the
EKSA. (O-1) the Islamic Affairs Office is active
and is charged with monitoring Indian, Iranian and Egyptian
Islamic societies primarily. Ergesous is a Ministry of Foreign
Affairs employee (O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(F)

On 08/20/2010

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

Various serials in indices notes that (A), (G), (J-1) worked at the EKSA as the (A), (G), (J-1) the (A), (G), (J-1) Office and that Musaed Aljarrah was assigned to work (A), (G), (J-1) (see (F) Serial (F)). According to (F) Serial (F) that in February 2005 Aljarrah met with (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1). Aljarrah stated that (A), (G), (J-1); however, (A), (G), (J-1) insisted that Aljarrah return to head the Islamic Affairs Office and Aljarrah returned in March 2005.

Per the above and information on visas noted below it is known that (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1)

(O-1) (O-1) (J-3)

(J-3) (A), (G), (J-1) Aljarrah was (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) Aljarrah's replacement was Abdullah Alajroush (F) (F). Alajroush was a suspected Intelligence Officer (SIO) who had previously served in Pakistan (O-1)

(O-1) (A), (G), (J-1) and had attempted to (A), (G), (J-1)

Alajroush's replacement was Sahal Ergesous (Sahl Ergesous) (G) (G) (A), (G), (J-1)

discussed (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1) and (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) (F) Serial (F).

[REDACTED]

The above information helps verify the involvement of the GIP within the MIA offices. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and Aljarrah's subsequent replacement by Alajroush is classic intelligence officer [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). This is significant considering the MIA/Dawa office's involvement, and Aljarrah's in particular, with the support network of the 9/11 hijackers as well as with the creation, funding, direction and support of the extensive Salafi proselytizing network that extended throughout the U.S.

[REDACTED]

Use of MIA/Dawa Offices to Obtain Intelligence

The purpose of the MIA/Dawa offices is also of relevance. The information below clearly indicates that one of the purposes of the offices was to obtain intelligence on individuals and communities of value to Saudi Arabian intelligence or government purposes. Thus at least some individuals assigned to these offices would be working at least partially for Saudi Arabian intelligence.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] This serial provided excellent information related to one of the purposes of the Dawa/MIA offices and is particularly interesting as it provides information regarding taskings as well as names of personnel during the crucial years before 9/11.

[REDACTED] The communication reported the arrest of Omar Abdi Mohammed (aka Omar Alkhatib) (F) [REDACTED] in San Diego, California on 01/20/2004 and documents obtained during a subsequent search. Omar Abdi Mohamed had been identified (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] as the leader of the Al-Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI) in the United States. Mohamed was selected as the AIAI leader of the U.S. approximately nine months ago. AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). WFO had previously obtained a list of 50 US based clerics who were supported by the EKSA IFTA (Dawa) office. Alkhatib was one of those listed. On January 20, 2004, he was arrested for immigration fraud. Investigation by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) determined that Mohamed was in charge of the of the "Western Somali Relief Agency" which was a fund raising entity that allegedly provided drought and humanitarian relief to the people of Somalia and Ethiopia. During a US naturalization

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

interview, Mohamed lied about receiving approximately \$350,000 from the Global Relief Foundation (GRF). The United States Treasury Department has frozen the assets of the Global Relief Foundation and accused it of providing financial support to terrorism.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
(O-1)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Documents located during searches of Muslim World League identified efforts to recruit within the U.S. military.

[REDACTED] The above documents (there are others within FBI indices) help confirm [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] reporting regarding the functions of the MIA/Dawa offices.

[REDACTED]

Personnel Assigned to the MIA/Dawa Offices:

[REDACTED] Multiple individuals were employed inside the MIA/Dawa offices within the EKSA. The following is summary information on the most pertinent individuals within these offices that are associated with the 9/11 support network.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

Passport: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Memo on [REDACTED] (J-3)

Employer: **Prince Bandar bin Sultan**

Telephone: [REDACTED] (P-1)

POC: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Possible USPER [REDACTED] (P) DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) / [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Summary: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was an official diplomat assigned to the EKSA and was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) has been

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] known to have been employed by Bandar bin Sultan's National Security Council. (O-1) [REDACTED]

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] As noted above, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) to be a GIP [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) at the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) .

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (J-3), (O-1) [REDACTED] (J-3), (O-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3), (O-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Musaed A Al Jarrah (Musaed Aljarrah)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Occupation: Accountant

Address: [REDACTED] (P) McLean, Va

Telephone: [REDACTED] (P) (home) [REDACTED] (P) (cell)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Aljarrah was a Saudi diplomat assigned to the EKSA and was a high level employee in the Islamic Affairs Office. Aljarrah was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and was heavily involved with the movement and support of the Saudi Salafi network within the U.S. to include those members of the 9/11 hijacker support network in Southern California. Aljarrah had numerous contacts with terrorism subjects throughout the U.S. Aljarrah was closely associated with Bandar bin Sultan.

[REDACTED] Aljarrah, an EKSA employee, is one of the key figures of the 9/11 investigation as it pertains to Saudi Arabian government involvement. Per investigation and subsequent affidavits Aljarrah had a "controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sunni extremist activity in Southern California." Moreover, Aljarrah directed and controlled and funded the activities of **Almuhanna** (herein) and **Althumairy** (herein) who had served as Imams at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA. After Almuhanna and Althumairy were expelled for from the King Fahd Mosque, they and their followers created an "underground" mosque near the King Fahd Mosque. After their departure, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Communication dated November 2000 requesting [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) reported that [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] dated 11/14/2003] [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Musaed Aljarrah was the MIA (officer) at the EKSA and had a similar "Wahhabi line of thinking" as Mohammed Almohanna (see herein). [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Aljarrah was last in LA two years prior.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 2009] [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) MUSSAED AL-JARRAH was at the EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA (EKSA) starting in the early 1990s. He was assigned to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. Originally AL-JARRAH started at the EKSA as an administrative person [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) In 1995, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). It was at this point that AL-JARRAH became very engaged with U.S. Islamic centers throughout the U.S. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and also became very involved in the dealing of the **ISLAMIC INSTITUTE OF ARABIC AND ISLAMIC STUDIES (IIASA)**, (see herein) a Saudi university in Falls Church, VA that was sponsored by the EKSA, but was owned and managed by IMAM UNIVESITY in Riyadh. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

of the Islamic Affairs department. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 2007] According to multiple sources, Al-Jarrah returned to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia where he works for Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., in the Saudi National Security Ministry. However, Al-Jarrah returned to the U.S. on July 11, 2006 using [REDACTED] (J-3) departed on September 19, 2006, and has not returned since. Al-Jarrah reportedly traveled to several U.S. cities and has been associating with [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) assigned to the EKSA. Over the past several months, Al-Jarrah has traveled to Cairo, Egypt; San Paulo, Brazil; Beirut, Lebanon; Demascus, Syria; Tokyo, Japan; and Hong Kong, China. It is unknown what Al-Jarrah is doing during his travel. (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (G) that Al-Jarrah [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) actually works for Prince Bandar's National Security Ministry in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted]

(O-1)

(O-1)

[Redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

Southern California Based Investigations

[REDACTED] A portion of the PENTTBOMB investigation focused on the support network for 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almhidhar and Nawaf Alhazmi and this was also a focus of the subsequent New York investigation Operation Encore. During the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) as well as the King Fahd Mosque were noted to be involved. The individuals in these locations were known to have contact with individuals assigned to the MIA/Dawa offices in the EKSA. As noted above, Fahad Althumairy was employed at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA in addition to being listed as employed in the EKSA Dawa office. The following additional persons of interest were working at the Consulate:

[REDACTED]

Fahad bin Ibrahim Al Thumairy

Fahad I A Al Thumairy (Fahad Althumairy)

DOB: (P-1)

(J-3)

Abdullah Fahad Althumairy DOB: (P-1), believed to be Althumairy's son, was initially (J-3) to visit California (google was listed) in 2013 but was later revoked.

(F)

(J-3)

Summary: Fahad Althumairy was a Saudi Arabian diplomat assigned to EKSA as well as the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles. Althumairy was a representative of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and FBI queries were of interest to the highest levels of the Saudi government. Althumairy was a close contact of the 9/11 hijackers support network and may have known Alhazmi and Almihdar and/or arranged for their meeting key members of the support network. Althumairy was an imam at the King Fahad mosque.

[REDACTED] Investigation was opened on Althumairy by LA in 2002 under (F) [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] This investigation was originally predicated on information that ALTHUMAIRY was associated with an individual who had extensive contacts with two of the September 11th hijackers.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FBI investigation determined that ALTHUMAIRY had contact with OMAR ALBAYOUMI, who had substantial contact with 9/11 hijackers NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIDHAR. Further, ALTHUMAIRY was identified [REDACTED] (O-1) as a "hard core extremist" whose sermons at the King Fahad Mosque appealed to the extremist and militant attendees of the mosque.

[REDACTED] ALTHUMAIRY departed Los Angeles on 02/06/2003 and returned to Saudi Arabia for his brother's wedding. On 05/06/2003, ALTHUMAIRY re-entered the U.S., [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3)

ALTHUMAIRY was interviewed by the FBI at the Los Angeles International Airport. ALTHUMAIRY was refused entry into the U.S. and was returned to Saudi Arabia on 05/08/2003. Subject was interviewed in February 2004 by FBI agents at his home in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. No new information was garnered as a result of the interview. ALTHUMAIRY's [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) because he was no longer in the United States, although he [REDACTED] (G).

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] A communication from Legat [REDACTED] (G) to Counterterrorism and Los Angeles [REDACTED] (F) dated 12/17/2001 provided Saudi Mabath return of information related to a request for information on Althumairy. The Saudi response noted that

Althumairy is "a Saudi National and representative of the KSA's Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and Religious Guidance" and that he has been sent to the United States for the "purpose of religious guidance." The Saudi Mabath letter also indicated that the Mabath request of Legat [REDACTED] (G) had the "special attention of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Abdullah".

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (U-1)

[REDACTED]

(F) [REDACTED] On 03/10/2020 Operation Encore agents interviewed (P) [REDACTED] regarding any knowledge that he may have regarding the relationship between (P) [REDACTED] and the two 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Al-Mihdhar (Al-Mihdhar) and Nawaf Al-Hazmi (Al-Hazmi). (P) [REDACTED] stated that he was told by (P) [REDACTED] that Fahad Al-Thumairy, the Imam of the King Fahad Mosque, had asked him to look after two very "significant" people. (P) [REDACTED] did not inquire into the word "significant" or why he referred to them this way, other than to say, that if Thumairy assigned him to look after someone it meant that they were important. (P) [REDACTED] did request (P) [REDACTED] to meet the two men, (Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi), whenever they came across each other at the mosque. (P) [REDACTED] would see (P) [REDACTED] with the two men at the mosque almost every day, even sometimes in the company of Al-Thumairy in the library of the mosque.

(P) [REDACTED] states he was told by (P) [REDACTED] that the two men were living at his house on (P) [REDACTED]. (P) [REDACTED] stated to (P) [REDACTED] that he had asked his sister, who was living there at the time, to move out and stay with (P) [REDACTED] other sister for a couple of weeks, that he was having visitors stay with him and needed the space in the house. (P) [REDACTED] was unaware when (P) [REDACTED] had requested that of his sister.

(P) [REDACTED] recalls a conversation that he had with (P) [REDACTED] shortly after the Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi arrived in L.A. regarding the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. He states that (P) [REDACTED] told (P) [REDACTED] that he needed to take the two men to the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. (P) [REDACTED] asked why he was taking them to that restaurant because the food was not very good, and the service was poor. (P) [REDACTED] stated to (P) [REDACTED] that he just needed to take them there. (P) [REDACTED] did not question him any further about this topic, but advised the interviewing agents that people would go to that restaurant to have private meetings. [See **Bayoumi**]

[REDACTED]

Mohammed S Almuhanha (Mohammed Almuhanha / Mohammed Almohanna)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Phone #: [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P),
[REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Almuhanha was a Saudi diplomat and employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. Almuhanha was known to be a leader and spiritual guide amongst a militant group that separated from the King Fahd Mosque. Almuhanha was a close associate of Althumairy.

[REDACTED] Investigation was predicated on MOHAMMED ALMUHANNA's direct ties to FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, a Sunni Salafi extremist with ties to 9/11 (subject of [REDACTED] (F)).

ALMUHANNA was previously a consular official at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, and is reported to have founded, with ALTHUMAIRY, the King Fahad Mosque. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) "ALMUHANNA is a Sunni Islamic extremist associated with a radical form of the Salafi ideology...and a graduate of the Ibn Mohammad Islamic University in Riyadh" [REDACTED] (F)
[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Almuhanha is the son of prominent Saudi judge - Sulaiman Almuhanha (DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED]).

[REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) A brother is most likely Abdulmajed Almohna (DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED]).

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] dated 11/13/2003] [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] that Almuhanha had made an inflammatory speech at the King Fahd Mosque on 01/11/2002 calling for jihad.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Per interview of **Mohammed Alqudhaieen** (see herein) Almuhanhad was invited by Alqudhaieen to provide sermons while in Tucson. [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Interviewee stated that al-Muhanna was a virulent critic of America and American society. According to [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] al-Muhanna was disdainful of Western values and was openly hostile to non-Muslims and Muslims who did not meet al-Muhannas religious standards. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] stated that many people in the Muslim community were surprised when al-Thumairy was not allowed to re-enter the United States, but no one was surprised that al-Muhanna was excluded.

[REDACTED]

Sultan Mehmas Sultan Alkahtani (Sultan Alkahtani)

[REDACTED] (F)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Alkahtani was a Saudi Arabian diplomat and employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. Alkahtani was a close associate of Almuhanha. Alkahtani's brother was identified as having been killed fighting for ISIS.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) : [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Al-Muhanna is the subject of Los Angeles [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (F) based on the extremist ideology which he has preached at the King Fahd Mosque in Los Angeles and a smaller mosque/madrassa school Al-Muhanna helped create known as the Dar Al Quran Education Center. Al-Muhanna has been associated with **Fahad Althumairy**, another religious mullah from the Consulate, who is the subject of Los Angeles FFI [REDACTED] (G). Al-Muhanna also gives religious guidance to the Islamic Center of Long Beach where he is in

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

contact with Hamad Al-Badr, [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G).

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Prior FBI investigation has determined that Alkahtani's brother - Fahad Mihmas Alqahtani - [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) prior to traveling to Syria to join ISIS where he subsequently was killed. [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Mutaib Alsudairi (Mutaib Alsudairy)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] Asudairi's Virginia DMV photo that lists place of residence of [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va in September 1999.

[REDACTED] Summary: Mutaib Alsudairy and Adel Alsadhan were two Saudi clerics and Saudi Arabian officials who entered the U.S. in 1999 and met with Omar Albayoumi. These individuals later attempted to reenter the U.S. Alsudairy is known to have lived with AQ facilitator Ziyad Khaleel.

[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

DC and had [REDACTED] (J-3). (FBI Comment: This was the same arrival date as al-Sadhan and both men listed [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3). Al-Sudairy was an administrative officer at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC. He assumed duty on 14 June 1999. Al-Sudairy's position was terminated on 11 April 2001. Prior to this he worked at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia from March 1998 to June 1999. Al-Sudairy was reported to be the nephew of Doctor Abdullah bin Turki, former head of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Muslim World League president.

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] FBI TA shows that al-Bayoumi called al-Sudairy five (5) times while the hijackers were in San Diego with al-Bayoumi. The dates

of the calls are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January, 26 January, and 30 January 2000 - on these particular days al-Bayoumi met the hijackers in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming to San Diego. The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4 February 2000 al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment he obtained for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America to assist them in opening a bank account. The last call occurred on 7 February 2000. A "welcoming party" for the hijackers was coordinated by al-Bayoumi and likely held on 17 February 2000.

[REDACTED] Al-Sudairy subsequently moved to Columbus, Missouri and al-Sadhan moved to Lawrence, Kansas. While in Missouri, al-Sudairy lived with **Ziyad Khaleel** (see herein) for about four months in 2000. Khaleel was a known key communications equipment procurement officer for Usama bin Laden and provided satellite phones used in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa. The two men opened a joint Post Office Box in Columbus, Missouri. Following al-Sudairy's return to Saudi Arabia he met with Khaleel twice. (FBI Comment: Khaleel was reportedly killed in a car accident in Saudi Arabia in March 2002)

[REDACTED]

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

SA (S) note: Mutaib Alsudairy is the brother of long term LA Saudi Consulate employee Faisal Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) (confirmed via review of applications that confirmed same father and mother). (J-3)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [(F)] Faisal Alsudairy was the subject of an LHM to (J-3) as well as (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(J-3)

(J-3) Another brother, Saud Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) was a brother assigned as a diplomat at the EKSA. Another brother, Turki Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) is noted in early New York Saudi investigative file and in PENTTBOMB files for unknown reasons.

Another brother Ahmad Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)), an MOI officer, (J-3)

(J-3) Ahmad was the (G) communication is unclear.

Another brother Mishaal Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) appears to have been (G) (G). Another brother Bandar Alsudairy (DOB: (P-1)) is an MOD police officer.

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

Faisal Alsudairy, Mutaib Alsudairy's possible brother, (J-3)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Adel Alsadhan

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1) Captioned investigation was opened based on [REDACTED] (O-1) AL SADHAN works under WFO FI subject **MUSAED AL-JARRAH** [REDACTED] (F)) at the Islamic Affairs Section of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (RESA) and helps AL-JARRAH coordinate/direct all Saudi Imams assigned to and/or financially supported by the Saudi government in the United States. AL SADHAN is believed to help AL-JARRAH support extremist Saudi Sunnis in the United States. AL SADHAN [REDACTED] (O-1) a believer in a radical form of Sunni Salafiyism and reportedly travels frequently within the United States.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Serial [REDACTED] (F) dated 09/26/2001] Interview of Doctor Abdussattar Shaikh: **Omar Albayoumi** introduced Shaikh to Mat'Ab Alsudairy and Adil Al'Sadhan, two scholars visiting from Saudi Arabia. They did not seem to know Albayoumi very well. Albayoumi was looking for somewhere for these two visitors to stay. Shaikh allowed them to stay with him. They stayed with him for approximately six or seven

[REDACTED]

weeks. [NOTE: Alhazmi and Almihdar also lived at Shaikh's residence at a later date. (F) This serial also noted that both Alsudairy and Alsadhan were imams at the Kurdish Mosque in El Cajon (San Diego) (See Albayoumi).

(J-3) [REDACTED] Attempted to enter the US in 2013 as (J-3) [REDACTED] but was refused. (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(P)

(P)

DOB: (P-1)

SSN: (P-1)

Possible phone prior to 9/11/2001: (P) (LA) / (P)

Possible present address:

(P)

Anaheim, CA

May be USPER of (P) origin

Summary: (P) was a local hire as an employee of the Saudi Arabian Consulate in LA. (P) was a close associate of Alhtumairy and may have met Albayoumi prior to his supposed chance encounter with Alhazmi and Almihdar. A phone associated with (P) later had contact with the support network of the hijackers in Virginia.

Relevant Serials:

(F) Listed employees of the Saudi Arabian Consulate as of 09/1999 which listed (P) as a translator with a US arrival date of 10/23/1991 although the biographical section noted he was an employee of the Saudi Cultural Attache in LA from 1979-1983.

[REDACTED] In February of 2000, **Omar Al-Bayoumi** and Kaysan Bindon, aka Isamu Dyson, traveled from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate where Al-Bayoumi handled paperwork for passports for his family and picked up some religious materials. Afterwards they went to a restaurant near the King Fahd mosque where they met 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hamzi. When later interviewed, Al-Bayoumi and Bindon characterized this initial meeting as a chance encounter. On 08/03/2004, Bindon identified a photograph of (P) as the person at the Consulate who gave religious materials to Al-Bayoumi.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During the investigation of the 9/11 attacks by FBI personnel an associate of the hijackers identified as Isamu Dyson was interviewed and advised that he knew Omar Albayoumi from 1999. Dyson indicated that he once visited the Saudi Consulate in LA with Albayoumi and while there Albayoumi met separately with an unknown individual. [During an interview on 08/18/2003 Albayoumi described this person as follows: a tall individual, heavier than AL-BAYOUMI, with a long black/gray beard and not from Saudi Arabia. After this meeting they traveled to a cafe in Culver City where Albayoumi met with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdar. At the time, investigators believed this meeting occurred in February 2000.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 04/2016] This serial details investigation of [REDACTED] (P) as part of Operation Encore. Contrary to [REDACTED] (P) claims of not discussing 9/11, a source reported that after the attacks [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (O-1) stated "Isn't it great that our brothers are fighting?"

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 04/2016] [REDACTED] (P) known telephone number ([REDACTED] (P)) was also known to have one contact (06/14/2001) with telephone [REDACTED] (P) which was registered to an apartment used by Eyad Alrababah and [REDACTED] (P) who both also provided significant logistic support to Mihdar, Hanjour and two additional hijackers. According to Alrababah, he met Hanjour and Hamzi at a 7-11 store "by chance" (similar to the story made by Albayoumi). In May 2001, Alrababah drove four of the hijackers to Connecticut and New Jersey. [REDACTED] (D)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Dated 04/2016] [REDACTED] (P) was a close associate of **Althumairy** and led prayers and handled administration at the King Fahad Mosque. Althumairy also served as an admin officer at the Saudi LA Consulate and held an office at that location.

[REDACTED]

Omar Albayoumi

Alternate names found: Omar Al Bayoumi / Omar A M Al Bayoumi / Omer Bayoumi / Omar Bayoumi / Omar Bayayoomi / Umar Albayoumi

Omar Abu Emad)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

(J-3) It is known that Albayoumi, a Saudi national, had entered the US in the decade before 9/11 and remained.

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: [REDACTED] Omar Albayoumi was directly involved with day to day support of the Alhazmi and Almihdar. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

Albayoumi was known to be paid by a Saudi affiliated company as a "ghost employee" while in the U.S. After Almihdar departed the U.S. in June 2000, a nephew of Albayoumi's supposed employer moved into the home.

Relevant Serials:

Omar Albayoumi was originally opened as [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) Provided synopsis of Saudi official links to Albayoumi:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Omar Albayoumi was a major subject of interest due to his close and confirmed contact with several of the 9/11 hijackers. The 9/11 Commission report speculated that Albayoumi worked for Saudi intelligence; however, [REDACTED] could not locate any evidence and Albayoumi claimed his association with the two hijackers was based on a chance meeting. Information contained herein, [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) This is significant as Albayoumi (as well as others) was almost immediately available to Hazmi and Mihdar upon entry into the U.S. during a time period that both of these ill-prepared operatives were most vulnerable to possible detection. Albayoumi was being paid as a "ghost employee" of a Saudi company during his time in California. A relative of Albayoumi's boss within this company would later move in to the same apartment with Alhazmi after Mihdar's departure.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] The earliest reference to Albayoumi in electronic indices noted by writer were from 1998.

[REDACTED] [(F) Serial (F)] On (A), (G), (J-1) 1998, [REDACTED] (F) (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) new property has been purchased for a mosque, located at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) in El Cajon. The mosque will cater mainly to the Kurdish people. The person in charge is a Saudi (Egyptian descent), Omar Bayoumi, aka Abu Emad. The mosque number is [REDACTED] (P), Bayoumi's residential number is [REDACTED] (P) and his cellular phone is [REDACTED] (P). The property cost \$580,000.00 and is going to be renovated. Saudi financing appears to be the means by which the property was bought and renovated.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Date 04/01/1999] In this communication an interviewee advised that Omar Bayayoomi (phonetic), user of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) had delivered \$400,000 to the Islamic Kurdish community in El Cajon, CA for the purpose of building the Al Medina Mosque. The money originated from the neighbors of Sheikh Al Zamel, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interviewee also opined that Bayayoomi must be an agent of a foreign power or of Saudi Arabia. Omar Al-Bayoumi, pdob [REDACTED] (P-1), [REDACTED] (P-1) address [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] San Diego, CA (Villa Balboa Apt. Complex), wife Manal Bagader, telephone [REDACTED] (P), may be identical to the "Omar Bayayoomi"

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]] An interview of an employee of Dallah Al Baraka in Saudi Arabia noted that Albayoumi first appeared to his knowledge in early 1995 as a result of AVCO Overseas Services dropping its contract with the Saudi Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA) in part for the presence of "ghost employees" which AVCO was forced to pay for under the contract. The employee stated that the Director General of PCA at that time, [REDACTED] (P) (DOB [REDACTED] (P-1)), had "side deals" regarding some of the ghost employees with AVCO whereby AVCO paid the expenses related to these individuals. Omar Albayoumi was one of the ghost employees. The interviewee estimated that there were approximately 50 such individuals on the books who were being paid for doing no work (for AVCO). When the contract was moved to ERCAN [REDACTED] (P) assured the interviewee that he [REDACTED] (P) wanted to Albayoumi to stay in the US and that the interviewee should not pry for information. The interviewee thought that Albayoumi was a huge financial drain on the program. The interviewee advised that whenever Albayoumi needed additional money beyond his salary that a purchase order would appear which was devoid of information on the item to be purchased but was already approved by [REDACTED] (P). These purchase orders were controlled by Mohammed Basharil (Mohamed Basharahil)(PCA). Basharil and a Hamid Alrashid (PCA) would take the payment and wire transfer the money to Albayoumi's account.

[REDACTED] [9/11 Commission Report] Saudi student Yazeed Alsalmi moved into the home in which Alhazmi resided after the previously noted departure of Almihdar. Yazeed Alsalmi (Yazeed S A Alsalmi) DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] .

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]] [REDACTED] Anwar AULAQI and BAYOUMI clearly knew each other, as would be expected since each was a well-known member of the local Muslim community. While they may not have liked each other, they appear to have had an instrumental relationship in regard to the

[REDACTED]

hijackers, with phone calls between them becoming necessary for the support network's functioning and effectiveness. [Anwar Aulaqi, Yemeni-American AQ operative, was associated with the hijackers while in San Diego and later moved to Northern Virginia (Dar Alhijra mosque) at the time that the hijackers were in Northern Virginia. Aulaqi allegedly later met with several hijackers to include Alhazmi while working at the Dar Alhijra. Aulaqi was later killed by U.S. forces in Yemen while a part of AQAP.] [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) dated 10/03/2001 Interview of [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G)] [REDACTED] (G) noted that Khadib has a "tight" connection to Omad Ahmed Albayoumi. Albayoumi is a braggart from a low status Egyptian family that migrated to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Albayoumi has access to Saudi money, more than \$800,000, to build Mosques and Islamic schools. Albayoumi is considered by many in the Muslim community to be a Saudi Arabian intelligence officer, as he would come to the Mosque and video tape everything. [REDACTED] (G) noted that Albayoumi is described as a social animal who has connections everywhere including the Minister of Islamic Affairs, the Saudi Consulate and even with known crooks.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) Dated 04/2016] Operation Encore analysis: [REDACTED] (P) described Bayoumi as a Saudi citizen with great respect inside the Saudi Consulate, well regarded by Consulate personnel who held a "very high status" when he entered the building. Bayoumi's status was higher than many of the Saudi persons in charge of the Consulate.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F)] On September 27, 2001, execution of a federal search warrant was conducted by the San Diego Division in a room utilized by Al-Bayoumi as an office within the Kurdish Community Islamic Center (Masjid Al-Madina Al-Munawara), located at 511 S. Magnolia Avenue, El Cajon, California. As a result of that search a copy of Al-Bayoumi's phone book, dated October 4, 2000 was seized.

[REDACTED] Listed in Al-Bayoumi's phone book were the following names and telephone numbers:

[REDACTED] Dr. Jameel Alshami [REDACTED] (P) ; Saudi Embassy WA. [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) , AbdulAziz Assaleh
[REDACTED] (P) and F [REDACTED] (P) **Khalid Asswailem** [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) and C [REDACTED] (P) . **Saudi Consulate** [REDACTED] (P) F
[REDACTED] (P) , **Islamic Affairs** [REDACTED] (P) Abdullah Awaad [REDACTED] (P) Sami
Assadhan [REDACTED] (P) and Saad Al Jebreen, [REDACTED] (P) LA, CA

[REDACTED]

90025. [REDACTED] From January 2000 through May 2000, two known cellular telephones associated with Al-Bayoumi showed 32 calls placed to the Embassy, 24 calls placed to the Consulate in Los Angeles and 37 calls placed to the Cultural Mission.

[(F) [REDACTED] Serial (F) [REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi is also linked to **Abdolrahman Barzanjee**. Barzanjee is a possible Al-Oaida associate, [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

[SA (S) [REDACTED] Note: Bayoumi's association with the Kurdish Mosque, reportedly paid for with Saudi money, and his association with Barzanjee may be of interest. According to open source reporting, AQ was exploring its associations with Iraq during this same time period which resulted in the organization of Ansar Al Islam in Northern Iraq's Kurdish areas. See [REDACTED] (F)

[SA (S) [REDACTED] note: Possible brother Ahmed Albayoumi has a more recent [REDACTED] (J-3) .]

[REDACTED]

Osama Basnan (Osama Bassnan / Osama Yousef Bassnan / Usama Basnan)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Osama Basnan was also a known associate of the hijackers in Southern California. A prior Saudi Arabian employee, Basnan was also known to have connections to the "Blind Sheikh." Basnan and his wife were close friends of Bayoumi. Basnan's wife, who was known to have sympathy for Hamas, was paid money by Saudi Ambassador Bandar's wife.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) This serial noted (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) This investigation was predicated based on interviews conducted during the PENTTBOMB investigation. Information was developed that identified Osama Basnan as having a very close relationship with Omar Al-Bayoumi, who provided support to hijackers Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar in San Diego. Basnan was also reported to be the "Omad," or informal

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

mayor, of the Saudi Arabian Community in San Diego. Individuals in the Middle Eastern community opined that Al-Bayoumi was a Saudi Intelligence Officer and that Basnan came to San Diego to take his place. Basnan was living in the same apartment complex on 09/11/2001 where Al-Bayoumi and the hijackers had resided and Al-Bayoumi's mail was being forwarded to Basnan's apartment. Basnan harbors anti-American sentiments and espouses pro-UBL opinions.

Basnan entered the U.S. in 1980 [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] believed to be associated with the Saudi Embassy. Also in 1992, he hosted a party for the blind Sheik Omar Rahman in Washington, D.C. prior to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. In 1998, he moved to San Diego and became the Omad. In January of 1999, he began to receive \$2,000 per month in his wife's name from the Princess Haifa Bint Faisal, the wife of Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar. The checks were endorsed by Basnan and Al-Bayoumi's wife. In April of 2001, Al-Bayoumi's wife and Basnan's wife were arrested together for shoplifting. In June of 2001, Al-Bayoumi and his wife claimed to leave the U.S. to return to Saudi, but actually went to London.

[REDACTED] In July of 2001, Basnan moved into the same apartment complex where Al-Bayoumi and the hijackers lived. In August of 2001, the U.S. Post Office began to forward Al-Bayoumi's mail to Basnan's residence. On [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) who has provided extensive [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) of Basnan and his associates [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) . [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] According to a witness, on October 17, 1992,

BASNAN hosted a party at the [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) Washington D.C. for the blind Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman. The party was hosted in a common area party room located in the [REDACTED] (P) complex where BASNAN lived. BASNAN's name was the tenant name on the reservation sheet for the party room the night the party was held. The witness identified Sheik Rahman from television photos. Sheikh Rahman attended the party along with a large entourage.

On [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) he hosted a party at his house for Sheik Omar Rahman. After Rahman was jailed, Rahman dispatched a

[REDACTED]

messenger to Basnan to instruct him not to contact Rahman in jail. Basnan stated [REDACTED] (O-1) came to interview Basnan regarding his association with Rahman. Basnan lied to [REDACTED] (O-1) about his association with Rahman and acted like he didn't speak any English.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was questioned about Omar Abdel Rahman and the first World Trade Center bombing. Basnan acted like he did not understand the questions by [REDACTED] (O-1) and the he played stupid putting on a production. Basnan stated .. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Basnan was told by another [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F)] In 1980, BASSNAN, a Saudi Arabian citizen, enters the United States [REDACTED] (J-3) BASSNAN may be an operative for Saudi Arabian government and is in the United States illegally.

2. [REDACTED] On October 17, 1992, BASSNAN hosts party for Sheik Omar Rahman, mastermind of 1993 bombing of World Trade Towers. [SA [REDACTED] (S) Note: [REDACTED] (F) noted the specific date to be 10/17/1992]

3. [REDACTED] Since 1998, BASSNAN is considered the "Omad," or informal mayor of Saudi Arabian's living in San Diego, California.

Payments from Princess Haifa to Majeda Dweikat (Basnans wife), 1999-2001. Manal Bagader (Al-Bayoumis wife) co-endorsed three of the checks. Of the three co-endorsed checks, one check was deposited by Yasser Hijazi (Basnans associate) in Maryland; an attempt was made to deposit one check into Bagaders account, but the check was returned as payee not verified; and one check was deposited into an unknown account. FBI information indicated that from at least April 1999 through at least September 2001 Princess Haifa, the wife of Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar, provided \$2,000 monthly payments totaling \$40,000 in checks and wire transfers to the wives of al-Bayumi and Basnan. Note: There is no indication of direct payments to Manal Bagader, the wife of Al-Bayoumi.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] On February 10, 2002, ABDULRAZAQ ALI A. ALTURKI, Managing Director, Namma Cargo Services was interviewed in Riyadh. ALTURKI worked as an assistant to Ambassador PRINCE BANDAR at the Saudi Embassy in DC and while working there in

[REDACTED]

about 1991 he met OSAMA BASSNAN. ALTURKI established numerous contacts at the Embassy which led him to his current professional status. ALTURKI's relationship with the Saudi government is very strong. ALTURKI is friendly with Saudi government officials and members of the Royal Family, particularly PRINCE BANDAR. ALTURKI travels to Houston, Texas where [REDACTED] (P-1)

(P-1) In August 2001, ALTURKI departed the United States somewhat hastily, but because of pressure from work. ALTURKI did make stops in Washington DC and Boston on his return trip to Saudi Arabia, visiting friends in the Saudi Embassy. ALTURKI stated he has not provided money to BASSNAN. [REDACTED] (F), Serial (F) and [REDACTED] (F), Serial (F)

[REDACTED] On May 14, 1992, [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED] For financial activity: [REDACTED] (F) Serial (F). For summary see [REDACTED] (F) Serial (F)

[REDACTED] (F) Serial (F) [REDACTED] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2002, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (F), [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) BASNAN recently obtained a large unspecified amount of money during his recent travel to Houston, Texas. BASNAN's friend, ABDULRAZAQ ALTURKI introduced BASNAN to MOHAMMED TURKI AL SAUD, a member of the Saudi Royal Family and part of the Saudi Arabian government delegation that was in Houston for a summit meeting with President Bush. AL SAUD was the person who gave BASNAN a large sum of money. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) BASNAN received money in excess of \$10,000. BASNAN [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) gave a large portion of the money to his wife to give to her family who lives in the West Bank area of Israel. [REDACTED] (F), Serial (F). [SA (S) note: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Mohammed Alsaud [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) may have been Turki bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Alsaud (NFI).]

[REDACTED]

(F) [REDACTED] On (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] 2001, Basnan asked (G) [REDACTED] specific questions about how Anthrax and Small Pox are transmitted and what affects infection has on the human body. On (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] 2001, Basnan asked (G) [REDACTED] specific questions about how Small Pox infection advances through the human body. Basnan (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] was true that just prior to dying a Small Pox victim suffers extreme abdominal pain. On (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] 2001, (G) (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Basnan's wife, Majeda Dweikat, in possession of a book titled "Chemical and Biological Weapons: Anthrax and Sarin." The book was in Basnan's residence. (G) (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Dweikat had tabbed a section of the book that showed the skin coming off the body.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Abdullah A S Al Jraithen (Abdullah Aljraithen)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] As outlined by writer in referenced serial, ABDULLAH ALJRAITHEN registered at the Travelodge Hotel in Culver City, California with **OMAR AHMED ALBAYOUMI** on 12/20/1999 and checked out the following day. Little additional information was located regarding ALJRAITHEN at the time referenced serial was written.

[REDACTED] After the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, ALBAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY), his apartment was searched and documents were seized. A recent review by NYPD Intelligence Research Specialist (IRS) [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] (S) of documents obtained by NYO-JTTF from NSY yielded further information regarding ALJRAITHEN (this information is also described on [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] ALBAYOUMI's telephone book contained an entry for Dr. ABDULLAH ALJOAITHEN, with the numbers [REDACTED] (P-1) and C (cell) [REDACTED] (P-1). (Analyst note: the first number is presumed to be a Saudi number, the second number appears to be a Saudi cell phone number given the code "5" followed by a 7-digit number; neither number was found in the Telephone Application.)

[REDACTED] ECF searches on [REDACTED] (P-1) and [REDACTED] (P-1) both yielded a hit on [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1), which describes reporting from a foreign government service regarding "names and telephone numbers

[REDACTED]

appearing on a laminated card retrieved from the villa in Madinah, Saudi Arabia, where SHAYKH 'ALI KHUDAYR FAHD ALKHUDAYR AND SHAYKH AHMAD HAMUD MUFARRIJ ALKHALIDI were arrested during a raid conducted in late May 2003. The relevant entry on this contact list was for ABDALLAH BIN 'ALI AL-J'AYTHAN (P-1) and cell (P-1). An IDW search on (P-1) yielded additional other government service information (O-1): "DR. 'ABDALLAH AL-JUHAYN (P-1)" was found on a confiscated hard-drive from an October 6, 2001 raid on the Al-Haramayn offices in (O-1)

[REDACTED] According to a (G) report on ABDALLAH BIN ALI ALJAYTHAN: (G) Intelligence Assessment: Shaykh Ali KHUDAIR is a probable terrorist supporter (Financier). KHUDAIR was believed to be the source of weapons, passports, money and supplies for ANSAR AL-ISLAM operations in Iraq. Ali KHUDAIR is believed to be detained in Saudi Arabia.

[REDACTED] Also according to the (G) report, a 22-page Arabic language document containing instructions for making a variety of improvised explosives devices (IEDs) was found on a hard drive seized during the 05/27/2003 arrests of radical clerics and extremist shaykhs Ali KHUDAIR and Ahmad Humud AL-KHALIDI in Medinah, Saudi Arabia. Much of the material in the document closely parallels that in an explosives manual handwritten by Abu Khabab AL-MASRI, the former explosives and poisons trainer at the AL-QAIDA associated DERUNTA TRAINING CAMP in Afghanistan. (Source: (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) AITHREAT@00001 NON-RELEASABLE)

[REDACTED]

Islamic Foundation of Sheikh Ibn Taimmiyyah

11004 Washington Blvd, Culver City, CA

(King Fahd Mosque)

10980 Washington Blvd, Culver City, CA

[REDACTED] Ibn Taimmiyyah was a medieval Islamic jurist whose teachings formed the basis of Wahhabi doctrine (Ibn Al Wahhab). Ibn Taimmiyyah's teachings included the belief that Muslims could kill other Muslims (Takfir) which is utilized by AQ to justify attacks. The Saudi Arabian foundation that supports the King Fahd Mosque is named for Ibn Taimmiyyah.

[REDACTED] The associations between Saudi Arabian diplomats who worked at the King Fahd Mosque and the hijacker support group are otherwise noted above. An additional person of interest is listed Chairman of the Ibn Taimmiyyah Foundation Khalil Alkhalil.

Khalil Alkhalil (aka Khalil Khalil / Khalil Alkhaleel)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED]

[(F) Serial (F) For the information of Los Angeles, (O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1) KHALIL al-KHALIL, who was head of the Islamic
Affairs Section at the EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
(SAEMB), Washington, D.C. about ten years ago, resides in
California (O-1) al-KHALIL set up the BIN (possibly
IBN) TAIMIYAH mosque in Los Angeles. (O-1) al-
KHALIL had access to a lot of money.

(F) Serial (F) On December 6, 1999, (P)
(ALTHUMAIRY)
called (P-1) at 22:05:00 for 2 minutes. (This number is KHALIL
ALKHALIL's cell phone according to an FBI interview with FAHAD
ALQAHTANI.) At 22:58:00, (P) (ALTHUMAIRY) called (P)
(ALBAYOUMI), duration 1 minute (note: this is believed to be the
first call between ALTHUMAIRY and ALBAYOUMI since the previous
year).


(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

Other Offices Associated with EKSA

[REDACTED] Investigation of [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) activities within the US prior to and especially after 9/11 identified numerous "charities" and "non-governmental organizations" (NGO). Several of these organizations were [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) prior to 9/11. Although the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) as an element many were [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) due to suspected funding of association with HAMAS. The connections of these "charities" and "NGOs" to terrorism is well documented both in open source and within [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) communications.

[REDACTED] The primary NGO of Saudi Arabia was MWL under which operated the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), Sana Bell (Sanabel Alkheer "Seeds of Charity") (an investment arm), Alharamain and World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). The Saudi charities such as MWL and IIRO were also affiliated with the Virginia based offices of the "Herndon charities" of which Sanabell (Sana Bell Alkheer) was a part as well as the SAAR Foundation. These were collectively run out of offices at [REDACTED] (P) in Herndon, Va. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[See [REDACTED] (F)] This serial documents the extensive ties to the Saudi Arabian government as well as extensive ties to terrorism - specifically AQ. AQ members were employed within these organizations and utilized funding for terrorism support and used the offices for cover for movement of personnel. Extensive open source information and court documents are also available detailing this same information.

[REDACTED] (F) A telephone directory obtained by the FBI in 2002 listed the following additional offices under the title " Saudi Arabian Offices":

International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)

[REDACTED] (P)

Falls Church

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Muslim World League (MWL)

134 West 26th Street

New York, NY

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

4516 Old Columbia Pike

PO Box 8096

Falls Church, Va

Telephone: [REDACTED] (P)

The Islamic Center

2551 Massachusetts Avenue NW

Washington, DC

Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)

8500 Hilltop Road

Fairfax, Va

Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America (IIASA)

(F)

Summary: Per above, the IIASA, located at 8500 Hilltop Road, Fairfax, Va., was affiliated with the EKSA. The school was a U.S. subsidiary of the Imam Mohammed bin Saud University in Saudi Arabia. The EKSA was known to finance the IIASA and its primary administrators and teachers were Saudi Arabian diplomats. The IIASA was one of the many pieces of Saudi proselytizing activity in the U.S.



Mohammed Alsaud is believed to be on left. Bandar Bin Sultan Alsaud on right (seated).



Seated in front row of the above noted opening ceremony (left to right): Abdullah Alsaif (Saudi (J-3) (A), (G), (J-1) as hating

[REDACTED]

America); Abdullah Alnoشان (see herein) and Salah Albakhit (Saleh Albakheet - PhD student).

[REDACTED] (F) Serial (F)]According to its website, IIASA is a non-profit educational institution affiliated with the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. IIASA is one of six overseas institutions affiliated with the IMSIU. IIASA was established in 1988 in Fairfax, Virginia. The stated goals of IIASA are; to introduce the Arab-Islamic civilization to America and encourage the fruitful exchange between the two sides; to coordinate the efforts of scholarly exchange between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United States of America; to offer workshops, undergraduate and graduate degrees in the fields of Islamic education and Arabic language teaching; to cooperate with North American universities and educational centers in teaching Islamic studies and Arabic language; to conduct and publish research; and to hold a series of annual academic and educational seminars.

[REDACTED] (F) Serial (F)] [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was initiated in October 2002 based on information indicating that the IIASA was one of seven "Saudi Arabian Offices" located in the United States and on information indicating that an address found during a 05/30/2002 joint CIA/FBI [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) raid of an Al-Qaeda safe-house in [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) included an address utilized by an individual that listed their employer as the IIASA and their supervisor as being ABDULLAH BIN LADEN.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) the IIASA was associated with the WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH (WAMY), in Alexandria, Virginia and [REDACTED] (P) with the ISLAMIC ASSEMBLY OF NORTH AMERICA (IANA) in Michigan, which are also funded by the Saudi Government. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) not aware if IIASA provided any monetary support to terrorist organizations or groups; however, the individuals that worked at the IIASA were obviously recruiting individuals into extremist views.

[REDACTED] (D)
[REDACTED] (D)

(D) Information provided by [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1) [REDACTED] NADWI was involved in facilitating the movement of Al Qaeda operatives involved in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa.

[REDACTED] In 2003, NADWI's [REDACTED] (P-1) in Mombasa, was linked to telephone numbers connected to 2002 Mombasa bombing suspect SALAH ALI SALAH NABHAN. (O-1)
(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Another individual associated with IIASA, ABDULLAH ALNOSHAN (A), (G), (J-1), (D) and financially to (A), (G), (J-1) subject MUTAIB AL-SUDAIRY (F) (F)). ALNOSHAN was "employed at the IIASA as (J-3) " with the SAE and at the end of 1998 became the head of MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE (MWL) (F)

[REDACTED] During January 2004, [REDACTED] (J-3) (J-3)

(J-3) Ten of those individuals returned to Saudi Arabia. The six that remained in the United States claim to have the legal status to do so. The Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement was notified that these six remain in the United States.

(D)

(D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

Below are some observations supporting the above:

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] According to its website, IIASA is a non-profit educational institution affiliated with the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. IIASA is one of six overseas institutions affiliated with the IMSIU. IIASA was established in 1988 in Fairfax, Virginia. The stated goals of IIASA are; to introduce the Arab-Islamic civilization to America and encourage the fruitful exchange between the two sides; to coordinate the efforts of scholarly exchange between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United States of America; to offer workshops, undergraduate and graduate degrees in the fields of Islamic education and Arabic language teaching; to cooperate with North American

[REDACTED]

universities and educational centers in teaching Islamic studies and Arabic language; to conduct and publish research; and to hold a series of annual academic and educational seminars.

[REDACTED] During January 2004, [REDACTED] (J-3)
[REDACTED] (J-3)

(J-3) Ten of those individuals returned to Saudi Arabia. The six that remained in the United States claim to have the legal status to do so. The Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement has been notified that these six remain in the United States.

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(D)

(O-1)

(D)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that between
(A), (G), (J-1) and
(A), (G), (J-1) 2003 the IIASA deposited approximately \$23,318,623 into
its accounts. The primary source of these funds was the Saudi Embassy
and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Association (SAMA).

(O-1)

A review of Virginia Corporation and Limited Partnership Records indicates that the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America was incorporated on 10/26/1993 and voluntarily terminated on 08/18/1995. According to public source information, the President of this corporation was listed as His Excellency PRINCE BANDAR BIN SULTAN and the Executive Director was SULAIMAN ALJARALLAH.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Those requested to be removed from the U.S. by USDS were the following who were listed as Saudi Arabian diplomats:

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(O-1), (J-3)



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Muslim World League (MWL)

[REDACTED] (F)

Abdullah Alnoshan (Abdullah Alnushan / Alnoashan)

(Director) [REDACTED] (G)



[REDACTED] The Muslim World League (MWL) was created by the Saudi Arabian government in 1962 in order to combat the influence of Egyptian President Gamal Nasser's nationalist influence in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia has used this organization to spread the Wahhabist faith throughout the Islamic world as well as spread Islam in areas that were not known to be heavily Islamic. Saudi Arabia has financed many charity projects through MWL and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) in order to gain leadership over the Islamic community. Many of these charities were known to have supported AQ and related groups both financially and operationally throughout the world. MWL was the organization under which the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and other such as World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) operated at an international level.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] The US based office(s) of MWL and its director, Abdullah Alnoshan, were extensively connected to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) See [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

(F) [REDACTED] for connections to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) - the connections being too extensive to summarize herein. Alnoshan was known to have been a "purchasing agent" for the EKSA (see [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Alnoshan was an associate of Musaed Aljarrah.

[REDACTED] The address listed for MWL within the phone roster noted above, the New York address, was formed into a sub-office by the time of the creation of [REDACTED] (F). The main office had been moved to 360 South Washington Street, Suite 300, Falls Church, Va. This address is listed as the office of IIRO on the phone roster - however, by this same time IIRO had relocated to another office (see below). The South Washington address was owned by Sanabal Alkheir (a "Herndon Charity") and was also, subsequent to 9/11, the location of the Dar Al Arqum mosque which hosted many of the convicted "Northern Virginia Jihad Group." (see more below)

(F) [REDACTED] During the search of MWL's office space in New York in 2005 the FBI found a document titled "First Annual Ijtima of Mujahideen and Jihaad Conference" dated 1991. This document was from Tehreek-E-Jihaad, Sherpur House, Karachi, Pakistan, and included sign-up sheets. The conference was: "To publicize Jihad on an international and inter-Islamic level."

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) connections with MWL are extensive and are best viewed within [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

[REDACTED] (F)

Abdullah Bin Laden

[REDACTED] (G)

Related: [REDACTED] (G)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

Relevant Serials:

[(F) [REDACTED] Serial (F)]: [REDACTED] Analysis revealed that the WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH, aka al-Nadwa al-'Alamiyya lil Shabab al-Islami, is headquartered out of Mecca, Saudi Arabia. WAMY's U.S. headquarters is located at POB 8096, Falls Church, VA 22041, telephone number [REDACTED] (P) WAMY's U.S. business address is 4300 Evergreen Lane, Annadale, Virginia 22003. Further analysis revealed that WAMY presents itself as an individual and family services organization and youth center. Additional analysis revealed that WAMY's U.S. director is a member of the BIN LADIN family, nfi.

Also, analysis has revealed that [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAMY is believed to be a subsidiary or affiliate of the MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE, aka Rabitat al'Alam al-Islami, headquartered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia; the INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC RELIEF ORGANIZATION, aka Hay'at al-Igathat al-Islamiyya al-'Alamiyah, headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC STUDENTS ORGANIZATION, headquartered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC CHARITY COMMITTEE, aka Lajnat al-Birr al-Islami, headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; ISLAMIC CENTER SOCIETY, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; AL-WAIF FOUNDATION, aka al-Waif al-Islami, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; the SAUDI HIGH COMMISSION FOR RELIEF, headquartered in Saudi Arabia; and, the KUWAITI JOINT RELIEF COMMITTEE, headquartered in Kuwait.

WAMY first appears in FBI electronic indices as a lead to FBI from Legat [REDACTED] (G) from 1995/1996:

[REDACTED] (F) : [REDACTED] The French National Police Renseignements Generaux (RG) has established that Mokhtar Jaballah, a Tunisian national residing in France, member of the Ennahda, and president of the G.I.F.--an association RG describes as supporting the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood--has been in contact with the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. This organization has an office in the U.S., at the address: WAMY Regional Office in VA--America, P.O. Box 8096, Falls Church, VA 22041-8096; telephone [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P); fax [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (F) (4) The translation of a publication entitled "WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH", which gives information of the methods and teachings on terrorism.

[REDACTED] The publication entitled "WORLD ASSEMBLY OF MUSLIM YOUTH" lays out in great detail the fundamentals, tactics, and logistics of waging a war on ones enemies through acts of terrorism.

[REDACTED] In particular, the publication lists duties, requirements, and responsibilities including: (1) collecting information on the enemy and his neighborhood, (2) removing soldiers from the enemy; taking its documents, secrets and weapons, (3) killing the enemy's personnel as well as foreign tourists, (4) releasing our brothers imprisoned by the enemy, (5) spreading rumors and communiques to turn the population against the enemy, and (6) causing the explosion, the destruction and the

[REDACTED]

sabotage of entertainment spots, immoral and debauched areas.

[REDACTED] Other sections in the document refer to members' essential and typical qualities, methods of communication, travel, security measures, meetings, and the purchase and transport of weapons.

[REDACTED] (A),(G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] . According to ACS/TA, BINLADEN has been in contact with the telephone number for [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] . One of the telephone numbers used by [REDACTED] (P) at his current address is registered to the AOU. THE AOU is a correspondence school for Islamic studies which may be connected to the Muslim Brotherhood.

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] indicates that the AOU allegedly arranges paramilitary training in Pakistan and is partially funded by the Saudi Club [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[SA (S) Note: [REDACTED] (G) ([REDACTED] (G)) . [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(see

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (G)

Mohammed Harunani]

[See page 432 of 9/11 Commission Report - " 28 pages "]

[REDACTED]
(O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED] FBI toll records indicate that on June 21, 2000, TRANSCOM INTERNATIONAL was in telephonic with a telephone number in Hamburg, Germany. This German telephone number was listed in FBI telephone applications (ACS) from toll records taken from the PENTTBOMB investigation. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED] On 10/12/2001, [REDACTED] (P) who is a Teacher's Assistant at [REDACTED] (P) School, told the FBI she recognized one of the 09/11/2001 hijackers after his picture was displayed on television. [REDACTED] (P) was introduced (in early June 2001) to Marwan Al-Shehhi by Harunani. Harunani's children had been enrolled at the school. MARWAN Al-Shehhi had accompanied Harunani as he was picking his children up from school. [REDACTED] (P) stated she remembered the name because the name was so unusual.

[REDACTED] On 10/15/2001, [REDACTED] (P) was shown a photographic lineup which consisted of only the photographs of MARWAN AL-SHEHHI, HAMZA S. ALGHAMDI, MOHAND AL-SHERRI, and AHMED AL-GHAMDI from United Flight 175 with no names or any other identifying data. [REDACTED] (P) immediately, and without hesitation, pointed to the photograph of MARWAN AL-SHEHHI as being with the man she saw with Mohammed Harunani at the [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Virginia in early June 2001.

[REDACTED]

International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)

(G)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Summary: The IIRO office [REDACTED] (G) morphed into an [REDACTED] (G) into the Success Foundation (Mohammed Salem Omeish) which did not note a confirmed tie to the EKSA. It is believed that this organization was originally created as IIRO within the same offices of MWL but then some of the personnel moved and created a separate organization. Listed herein as it was originally listed as an office of the EKSA [REDACTED] (G). The history of IIRO related to the purpose of this document focuses more on the time period prior to the 9/11 attacks.

[REDACTED] IIRO was established in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1978. The IIRO has been identified as the "social arm" or "operating arm" of the Muslim World League. The Secretary General of the Muslim World League said it provides "humanitarian assistance" through the IIRO. (FTAT-G)

[REDACTED] As noted above (see under MWL), the IIRO was originally listed as being located at the [REDACTED] (P) address which was later assumed by MWL. Although listed herein, the relevance of the IIRO office to the 9/11 investigation would most likely be from the 1990s and prior to its move to the [REDACTED] (P) address [REDACTED] (G) Mohamed Salem Omeish [REDACTED] (G) appeared to alter IIRO into the Success Foundation [REDACTED] (G). Thereafter it appeared to be primarily associated with HAMAS/MB support. Its alienation away from Saudi Arabia is highlighted by the fact that Omeish shared office space with Abdulrahman Alamoudi who was convicted of attempting to assassinate then Crown Prince (later King) Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in coordination with Libya. Prior to the Omeish, the director of the IIRO office appeared to be Kuwaiti Tariq Alsuwaidan.

Tareq AlSuwaidan - per Wikipedia, Tareq Al-Suwaidan is a Kuwaiti writer, historian , businessman, and Muslim scholar. Al-Suwaidan is believed to be the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and has "extremist inclinations." Al-Suwaidan was banned from the US in 2000 following his comments "Palestine will not be liberated but through Jihad. Nothing can be achieved without sacrificing blood. The Jews

[REDACTED]

will meet their end at our hands." In 2007, Al-Suwaidan was listed by the U.S. federal prosecutors, along with a group of U.S. Muslim Brotherhood members, as an unindicted co-conspirator in the terrorism financing case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development which was convicted along with its leaders of financing Hamas. Al-Suwaidan is known for his anti-Semitic remarks, hate for Jews, and push for electronic Jihad among youth.

[REDACTED] AlSuwaidan is listed in Public Records as the Secretary/Treasurer for the International Relief Organization' (IRO) [REDACTED] (G) located in Falls Church, VA, (with the President listed as Sulaiman AlAli and the Vice President as Abdullah M. AlMahdi). Chicago provided information in [REDACTED] (F) (an ec dated 11/7/96 to OKC) that AlSuwaidan is known to have received at least \$11,000 from the IRO and that ABRAR Investments, of which AlSuwaidan was once an officer, provided \$60,000 to the IRO.

[REDACTED] Finally, [REDACTED] (F) indicates potential ties by AlSuwaidan to Mohammed Saleh [REDACTED] (G) incarcerated in Leavenworth, KS for his part in the TERRSTOP case which involved plans to bomb the United Nations building and other targets in New York. "Umar Al-Utaibah / Tariq Suwaidan" (believed to be a reference to Tareq AlSuwaidan) was found (during the period March 14 - May 8, 1997) on a document in Saleh's cell written in Arabic with telephone number [REDACTED] (P) beside the entry. Saleh also had ABRAR Investment Inc.', (for which AlSuwaidan was alleged to be an officer) listed in the documents with telephone number [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] Tareq Mohammad AlSuwaidan, aka Tariq Mohamed AlSuwaidain; Tariq Swidan; DOB [REDACTED] (P-1) is of Kuwaitian nationality and is a non-US person. His SSAN is [REDACTED] (P-1). According to the address book of Marzook, AlSuwaidan "heads a group of gulf companies that belong to the Muslim Brotherhood." He was formerly affiliated with the Islamic Relief Organization (IRO), Falls Church, VA; Abrar Investments; and Solidarity International for Kuwait. He allegedly has a cousin who was the Deputy Head of the Kuwaiti Air Force in 1990. AlSuwaidan is credited with providing the money for the land purchase on which the Tulsa mosque and school now stand. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) AlSuwaidan currently provides \$50,000 per month to the Tulsa mosque, 20% of which is taken off the top for the benefit of HAMAS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is known from [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that IIRO was located for a period of time at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Washington, D.C. During this time it was co-located with the organization Solidarity International for Kuwait that was started by Tareq Al-Suwaidan.

1. Incorporation Records:

[REDACTED] A 1992 Annual Report for IRO [REDACTED] (P-1) listed the following:

Sulaiman Al Ali President [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi VP [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Tareq M. Al-Swaidan S/T [REDACTED] (P) Alex, Va.

Principal Address: [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

[REDACTED] A 1993 Annual Report for IRO [REDACTED] (P-1) listed the following:

Sulaiman Al-Ali President [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Tareq M. Al-Swaiden S/T [REDACTED] (P) Alex, Va.

Abdul Al-Moslah Officer [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Freed Qurash Officer [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Salah Badahdh Officer [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

[REDACTED] A 1994 Annual report for IRO was similar to the 1993 report except listing all addresses as [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P), Falls Church, Va.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A 1995 Annual Report for IRO [REDACTED] (P-1) listed the following:

Sulaiman Al-Ali President [REDACTED] (P)
Falls Church, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President

Tareq M. Al-Mahdi S/T

Abdul Al-Moslah Director

Salah Badahdh Director

Freed Qurashdi Director

Principal Address: [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

[REDACTED] In 1998, IRO offices were searched in relation to Chicago FBI's [REDACTED] (G) with which IRO had invested. Shortly afterward, Sulaiman Al-Ali suddenly returned to Saudi Arabia in August 1998.

[REDACTED] The IRO was ordered dissolved on 08/19/1998. All asset and liabilities were transferred to the Success Foundation, Inc.

[REDACTED] On 03/23/1999, IRO (corporate ID [REDACTED] (P-1), primary address [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va., was ordered re-instated. The new officers were listed as follows:

Sulaiman Al Ali Removed [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, Va.

Mohamed S. Omeish President [REDACTED] (P)
Alexandria, Va.

Abdullah M. Al-Mahdi Vice President [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) Falls Church,
Va.

Tareq M. Al-Suwaiden S/T [REDACTED] (P)

Abdul Al-Moslah Director [REDACTED] (P)

Salah Badahdah Director [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A filing dated 07/22/2000 for IRO [REDACTED] (P-1) listed the primary address as [REDACTED] (P) and the only officer as Mohamed S. Omeish, [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sulaiman Alali (Soliman Ali Elay / Sulaiman Ali Alali / Sulaiman Kabbala / Sulaiman Kabrara / Soliman Elay)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3) Va ID and two SSNs.

Per PPT entered the US as Elay on 09/03/1998 on Saudi Airlines and last departed as Elay on 08/08/1999 on Malaysian Airlines.

Va Drivers license was issued in 1995 under Sulaiman Alali

Associated with Sanabell, IIRO, Global Chemical and Albayoumi.

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Sulaiman Alali was associated with IIRO and other "charities" and global investment entities such as Global Chemical [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G). Alali was paid by Sanabell and had a physical and financial connection to Omar Albayoumi. Alali returned to Saudi

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Arabia prior to 9/11 but has at least one son, Amro, who joined Al Qaeda. According to open source, Alali was the president of IRO and a major shareholder of Global Chemical. Alali's son Amro is a known AQAP member.

[(F) [REDACTED] dated 05/23/1997] [REDACTED] Reference Butel advised of the possible location of Suleiman Al-Ali, who is the Director of the International Islamic Relief Organization's (IIRO) in the United States. Al-Ali is believed to be a friend of Al-Gama al-Islamiyya supporter Zahir 'Abd Al-'Aziz, who reportedly has ties to Islamic extremist circles throughout the Balkans. Al-Ali reportedly maintains a telephone number of [REDACTED] (P), which is subscribed to by the "International Relief Organization," [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, VA 22046-4417.

[(F) [REDACTED]] [REDACTED] A corporate record for INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATION INC., at [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, VA 22041 with [REDACTED] (G) (Alali) listed as President. Incorporated 7/22/91 in Virginia, status is active. Enclosed is a D & B report for INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATION INC., [REDACTED] (P) Falls Church, VA 22046, Telephone number [REDACTED] (P) This organization provides humanitarian aid.

[(F) [REDACTED] Serial (F) [REDACTED] Dated 11/02/2001] [REDACTED] Alali used an address associated with Albayoumi on banking information in 1998. At a business in La Jolla, CA Alali listed Albayoumi (Omar Baymi) as his emergency POC. While residing in California at one address Albayoumi was listed on Alali's rental application as a co-tenant/friend. During this time Albayoumi and Alali listed their employment with Dalla Company, Saudi Arabia.

[(F) [REDACTED] Serial (F) [REDACTED] dated 11/21/2002 as well as above serial] [REDACTED] Banking records from 10/21/1998 to 08/05/1999 noted that Alali deposited 32 checks from Sanabell totaling over \$128,000. Sanabell also directly paid rent and other expenses. During same period Alali paid Albayoumi almost \$7000.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Alali has multiple children who were [REDACTED] (J-3) Alali's son Amro Syliman Alali (Amro Alali) was a known AQAP member (see [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). After a short incarceration, Amro Aalali was released by Saudi authorities.

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

Amro Alali - AQAP Member / Son of Sulaiman Alali

[REDACTED]

U.S. Based Clerics Paid by Saudi Arabia

Summary: As part of Saudi proselytizing efforts, Saudi Arabia supported many U.S. based clerics either directly via training and funding (via the EKSA) or via charities and schools (IIASA).

[REDACTED] (F) Serial [REDACTED] (F) (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) dated 2003] The original list provided the following names:

[REDACTED] Names Salary

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] At the time this list was provided [REDACTED] (G) had [REDACTED] (G) Abuelgasim Osman Ramadan [REDACTED] (G), KHALED I. Al-SOWEILEM [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) Abdel-Moniem M. El-Hillali [REDACTED] (G), Abdullah Arafa [REDACTED] (G), Nasser F. Almogbel [REDACTED] (G), and Fareed S. Ajlan [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) were identified as employees at the EKSAB in the Islamic Affairs Office. Preliminary Inquiries were conducted on [REDACTED] (G) to better identify their function at the EKSAB. All were confirmed as employees at the SAEMB by the United State Department of State list of Embassy employees. [REDACTED] (G) has [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) will continue with [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] The list of individuals were all queried through ACS revealing [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G). The following are possible matches with individuals [REDACTED] (G): Ali Sulaiman Ali [REDACTED] (G), Jamal Mohammad Abdellatif [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G), Tajuddin Bin Shu'aib [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(G) [REDACTED], Omar Abdi Mohamed (G) [REDACTED] Nizam
A. Rouf Zaman (G) [REDACTED] Salah Al-Rashood (G) [REDACTED]
Monir Yasin Al Farra (G) [REDACTED] Jameel A. Ahmen (G) [REDACTED]
Mohammed Al Mohanna (G) [REDACTED] and Abdulaziz Ahmed (G) [REDACTED]
(G) [REDACTED] Omar Al-Khatab (G) [REDACTED] Ridwan Aremu
Yussuf (G) [REDACTED] Mohamed Munaf Mohamed (G) [REDACTED]
(G) [REDACTED] Sulaiman Al-Bali (G) [REDACTED]

(G) [REDACTED] revealed the following additional names of interest as receiving a stipend from the EKSA (only relevant individuals are noted herein):

[REDACTED] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY departed the USA for Saudi Arabia on 02/14/2002. While in the USA he resided at (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Culver City, CA. In 1998, per direction of the Da'wa Office of EKSA, AL-THUMAIRY owned and operated a bookstore near the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, CA, in an effort to oversee Islamic propagators in California. AL-THUMAIRY was also a member of the KFM.

Name: FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
Aliases: Fahd Ibrahim Abdullah Althumairy,
Sheikh Fahd Bin Ibrahim Al Thumairy
SSN: (P-1) [REDACTED]
DOB: (P-1) [REDACTED]
POB: SAUDI ARABIA
INS Status: (J-3) [REDACTED];
(J-3) [REDACTED]
Case #: (F) [REDACTED]
IFTA funds: \$4,837.31 (2002)
\$4,305.13 (2003)

(P) [REDACTED], (P) [REDACTED] San Diego, CA, (P) [REDACTED] Islamic Center of San Diego and (P) [REDACTED] the Islamic Services Foundation. (P) [REDACTED] is a member (P) [REDACTED] of the Muslim Brotherhood in the USA, and (P) [REDACTED] the HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT (HLF). The HLF was shut down by the US government on 12/04/2001 due to its fund-raising connections to Harakat Al-Mugawamat Al-Islamayya (HAMAS). (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] for HLF, traveling throughout the US for this purpose. (P) [REDACTED] was interviewed on 7/8/04, prior to the arrest of several HLF leaders for material support to terrorism ((F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). (P) [REDACTED] has received various checks from FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, and is (P) [REDACTED] in the San Diego (P) [REDACTED] system.

[REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED] (P)
Aliases: [REDACTED] (P)
SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)
DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
[REDACTED] (P-1)
POB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
INS Status: USPER since 1991
Case #: [REDACTED] (F)
IFTA funds: \$533.33 (2002)

[REDACTED] ADEL M. AL-SADHAN departed the USA on 10/25/01. While in the USA, AL-SADHAN resided at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) LAWRENCE, KS; and shared a post office box address with MUTAIB AL-SUDAIRY, [REDACTED] (P) Columbia, MO. AL-SADHAN was employed at the EKSA until [REDACTED] (J-3) Choicepoint now shows a possible new address, as of 1/1/05, as [REDACTED] (P) JERSEY CITY, NJ.

Name: ADEL M. AL-SADHAN
SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)
DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
POB: SAUDI ARABIA
INS Status: [REDACTED] (J-3) Departed USA (?)
Case #: [REDACTED] (F)
IFTA funds: \$100.55 (2002)

[REDACTED] MUTAIB A. AL-SUDAIRY resided at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) Fairfax, VA, and was employed as an Administrative Officer for EKSA until [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) AL-SUDAIRY departed the USA on 5/1/01 and re-entered on 6/6/01. AL-SUDAIRY was detained and charged as an immigrant without documents subject to deportation. AL-SUDAIRY departed the USA on 10/25/01. [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) and has since been linked to suspected Al-Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia.

Name: Mutaib A. Al-Sudairy
Alias: Mutaib A. Al-Sudairi
Muteb Al-Sudairy
Moteb Al-Sudairy
Motaib Alsudairy
SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)
DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Other Saudi Arabian entities and personnel who formed the core of the Saudi proselytizing and intelligence gathering community during the time period leading to 9/11.

Islamic Foundation of America (IFA)

Ibrahim Binkulaib (Ibrahim Almogherah)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

(F)

[REDACTED]

Abdullah Alkhwyter

(G)

[REDACTED]

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The IFA was first known as the GLORIOUS KORAN, originally located on George Mason Drive, Falls Church, VA, was established in 1996 in order to teach the Koran in the

[REDACTED]

Northern VA area. The school subsequently relocated and began to rent a space located at 6606 Electronic Drive, Springfield, VA 22151. This building was later purchased by the EKSA for \$6,000,000 and taken over by ZAM ZAM INTERNATIONAL INC. which is synonymous with the IFA. Source further reported that the IFA had routinely received funding from the EKSA.

[REDACTED] The IFA was operated by Ibrahim Almogherah (aka Ibrahim Binkulaib) who also operated alongside of [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Saudi Naval Attache Abdullah Alkhwyter. Alkhwyter was known to be associated with the address of Alelm (Al Elm Research and Development) in Norfolk, Virginia - [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). [NOTE: Alajroush (herein) was also listed as an officer of Alelm. (The uses [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) may be similar to Albayoumi's use of a [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) for his expenses/payments during his time in California.) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] IBRAHIM A. ALMOGHERAH, DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1), was listed under the Administrative and Technical Staff as an Administrative Officer of the Embassy of the Government of Saudi Arabia (EKSA), who assumed his duties on 05/13/1991, but was named (by the names of AL-KULAIB, BINKULAIB and AL-MOGHERAH) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) the primary Saudi based financier of the IFA was Abdulaziz bin Fahad Alsaud. [REDACTED] (F) Abdulaziz bin Fahad was known to support the funding of students at the IIASA.

[REDACTED] In March, 2006, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) BINKULAIB and AL SAWY are still in negotiations regarding the future of IFA, however, AL-SAWY is losing faith in the possibility that it will work out. iIn the meantime, the IFA is being run by GAMAL HELMY and MOHAMED AFIFI (aka HUSSEIN AFEEFY). SAUD AL-SUWELIM, head of Islamic:Affairs at the EKSA, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) who runs Friday

[REDACTED]

prayers, was in Sudan caring for his sick father, MOHAMED IBRAHIM was still teaching the small kids Quranic Studies, and SAEED AL HURAIISHI (aka SAID AL-HURCHI) was active behind the scenes during prayers. AL-HURAIISHI is Syrian and owns an Islamic publishing company on Edsall Road in Springfield, VA.: A-HURAIISHI is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] On 01/08/2013 [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) tweets for Alsaud (using [REDACTED] (G) account) in which he spoke with Sulaiman Ahmed Aldweesh during which Alsaud stated that the death penalty should be applied to the arrested Saudi writer Turki Alhamad. In another tweet Alsaud stated that jihad was the greatest pinnacle of Islam. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Ayed Alqarni is a personal sheikh of Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahad Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud.

[REDACTED]

American Open University (AOU)

[REDACTED] (G)

Jaafar Sheikh Idris

[REDACTED] (G)

Jaafar Sheikh Idris (Jaafar Idris / Gafar Idris)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

Under Gafar Idris and Jaafar Idris, Idris had [REDACTED] (J-3)
[REDACTED] (J-3)

Sons Yousef Idris [REDACTED] (G) and Abdulrahman Idris and
Abdalmoneim Idris.

Associated with MWL and Ali Altimimi.

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Jaafar Idris is the father of Yousef Idris (an associate of the Northern Virginia Jihad group) and Abdulrahman and Abdalmoneim Idris. Abdulrahman was utilized to teach Arabic culture/language to US Special Forces in Limerick, Maine. Jaafar Idris, [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) was a close associate of jihadi groups operating within the U.S. such as Ali Altamimi and the "Northern Virginia Jihad Group."

[REDACTED]

(S)

(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

according to an

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

American Open University, 3400 Payne Street, Suite 200, Falls Church, Virginia, 22041; telephone [REDACTED]

(P)

(P)

[REDACTED], fax [REDACTED], is connected to the Moslem Brotherhood and arranges for paramilitary training in Pakistan. At the time, Salah El-Sawi, PHD, was the President of American Open University.

[REDACTED] In 1998, a group of individuals began attending lectures provided by Sheikh Jaafar Idris (hereinafter Sheikh Jaafar). These lectures were typically provided at the residence of Sheikh Jaafar and occasionally featured a guest lecturer named Sheikh Ali Al-Timimi (Al-Timimi). Over time these lectures attracted large crowds and were eventually moved to a more accommodating location, American Open University (AOU), located in Falls Church, Virginia. After the lectures were moved to AOU, Sheikh Al-Timimi started offering more frequent and regular lectures. Sheikh Al-Timimi's lectures became so popular and so well attended that in 1999, some of Al-Timimi's followers opened the Dar al Arqam Islamic Center. Once at the Dar al Arqam, Sheikh Al-Timimi assumed the role of the primary lecturer. Al-Timimi became very popular and was well-respected for his knowledge about the topic of jihad and his outspoken views. Al-Timimi was willing to discuss the topic of jihad openly while other speakers were not. Once the lectures were moved to the Dar al Arqam, a smaller core group of followers emerged. After Al-Timimi's lectures, typically delivered on Friday nights at the Dar al Arqam, this small group of individuals would meet for hours into the night to discuss various topics with Sheikh Al-Timimi.

During these closed discussions, Sheikh Al-Timimi frequently would provide his personal opinions on the topic of jihad, particularly the need for his followers to prepare themselves so that they would be ready for the day when their service in support of jihad would be needed.

In response to Sheikh Al-Timimi's guidance on the topic of jihad, a few members from the core group decided to organize regular paramilitary training using the cover of apparently innocuous endeavor, recreational paint-ball activities. The organizers of the jihad training group (Yong Kwon, Nabil Gharbieh, Ibrahim Hamdi, and Hammad Abdur-Raheem) established rules and procedures to ensure operational security and secrecy. Members of the group were

[REDACTED]

well versed on the rules, and new members were required to acknowledge their acceptance of such rules. Weekly jihad training sessions were organized and conducted on private land owned by the uncle of Abdullah Zikria, one of the jihad training group members. The weekly training consisted of physical para-military training using paint-ball as a means of instruction and religious instruction on the topics of jihad, typically through the readings of certain hadith related to jihad. The jihad training sessions were led primarily by those with prior United States military experience, such as Idris Surratt (USMC), Saif Chapman (USMC), and Hammad Abdur-Raheem (U.S. Army), and those with prior jihad military training, such as Ismail Royer and Ibrahim Hamdi. In addition to the weekly jihad training sessions, many of the group's members purchased AK-47 type rifles, the primary weapon used by mujahideen throughout the world, and began to practice their firearms proficiency and marksmanship. The group also kept abreast of the current events related to ongoing jihad, in areas such as Chechnya or Kashmir, and discussed these events during their weekly training sessions.

Interviews have revealed that the core group of participants in the jihad training group had aspirations of eventually fighting in actual jihad and dying shaheed (a martyr). The lectures at Dar al Arqam became a common meeting place for those participating in the jihad training. Members of the group would meet at the Dar al Arqam on Friday night and would discuss their plans for meeting the next morning and traveling to the jihad training. Members of the jihad training group would often meet at members' homes and watch video tapes depicting jihad in regions such as Kashmir and Chechnya. Soon after Sheikh Al-Timimi's lectures moved to the Dar al Arqam, many member's of the core group became acquainted with an individual named Ismail Royer (aka Randall Todd Royer). Royer would attend Al-Timimi's lectures and would sometimes stay for the closed discussions with Al-Timimi. Royer became well known for his experiences fighting jihad in Bosnia. In April 2000, believed to be prior to the initiation of the weekly jihad training activities, Royer traveled to Pakistan to attend an Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) training camp. As of the current date, it is unclear who facilitated Royer's travel to the LET camp. Investigation indicates that Royer may have used his own contacts, possibly developed through his past experiences in Bosnia; may have used contacts provided by Shiekh Al-Timimi; or may have used others, yet unknown, to facilitate his travels. Sometime around July 2001, Saif Chapman embarked on his own trip to the same LET training camp that Royer had attended. It is unclear at this time who facilitated Chapman's travel to the camp. Chapman is believed to have been at the LET camp on September 11, 2001. Travel records indicate that Chapman returned to the United States on September 19, 2001. Upon his return to the United States, Chapman discussed his travels with

[REDACTED]

several others from the jihad training group. Chapman indicated to some that he had purchased some land near the camp so that he and his family could move there. In August, 2002, Chapman left the United States for Saudi Arabia, apparently at the guidance of Sheikh Al-Timimi. Chapman is a current resident of Saudi Arabia and is believed to be working for the Saudi Ministry of Education as an English teacher. As a result of his activities in this investigation, Chapman was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury of the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on June 25, 2003. Chapman has been detained by the Saudi government. During the year 2000, the paint-ball group used to meet in the parking lot of the **INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC AND ARABIC STUDIES IN AMERICA (IIASA), aka THE MAHAD.**

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

IDRIS is of Sudanese origin who came to the U.S. in the 1980's as a student when Dr. HASSAN TURABI, an Islamic fundamentalist, became Minister of Justice in Sudan. Sudan was proclaimed an Islamic state abolishing the Constitution and implementing Sharia (Islamic) laws. He was sent to the U.S. along with 14 other individuals for post-graduate studies in Islam. They joined the Islamic center in Houston, Texas, which later was transferred to Fairfax, Virginia (A), (G), (J-1) this is the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences of America). These students were a back-up for TURABI who had dreams of becoming a leader in the Islamic world. The 15 obeyed TURABI blindly as he gave them the scholarships in the U.S. Many of the 15 worked in the Saudi embassy as the Saudis trusted the Sudanese.

(G) [REDACTED] had contact with OMAR AHMED ALI ABDEL RAHMAN (aka: the blind Sheikh) who was found guilty of being involved with the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993.

(G) [REDACTED] was in contact with a Sudanese intelligence officer under [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

NOTE: (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] that revealed that several (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) were involved with the first attack on the World Trade Center as well as a plot to bomb several prominent New York City landmarks [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] IDRIS and ALI AL-TIMIMI [REDACTED] (G)

(G) [REDACTED] co founded the DAR AL-ARQAM mosque which grew out of Muslim Student's Association at George Mason University and Northern Virginia Community College. This mosque now operates out of 360 South Washington Street, Falls Church,

[REDACTED]

Virginia which is also the home of several Hamas front organizations as well as the Muslim World League (MWL) the subject of another FBI full investigation. This building is also owned by Sanabel Al-Kheer which is the investment arm of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) AL-TIMIMI is a known radical Islamist [REDACTED] (G) supporting several individuals who are believed to have left the U.S. shortly after 09/11/2001 to fight for the Taliban against the U.S.

[REDACTED] Al-Timimi started weekly Islamic study sessions Friday evenings after general prayer at Dar Al Archem. The study sessions evolved into in depth discussions of jihad, or holy war, against unbelievers. The sessions, were originally held at the Dar al Arqam, 360 South Washington Street, Falls Church, VA (a two-story office building) and began around 8:00 PM. The study session would meet after the general session, after most of the congregation had left, around 11:30 PM. The study sessions were not open to the public and only certain members were invited. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) The meetings are now even more private and held at the individual residences of the members, not at the mosque.

[REDACTED] This group/study session identify themselves as "wahabi's", though they do not state that publically. The 'wahabi" group is lead by Ali Al-Timimi, Yousef Idris and Mohamed Al-Kahtani. Other members of the group include: [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (P)

Select members of this group have also participated in Jihad training exercises. On [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) chart depicting the primary leadership and participants in jihad training exercises which included the following:

ADMINISTRATORS:

[REDACTED] (P)

VISITOR:

[REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Alharamain)

Suliman Al Buthe (aka Soliman Albuthe / Suliman Albuthe / Soliman Albutti)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (G)

Related: [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F) herein)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Alharamain foundation is a Saudi Arabian Islamic "NGO" or "charity" who had multiple offices worldwide designated as terrorist supporting entities by the United States for their support of AQ related groups. Within the U.S. the Alharamain office was located in Portlan, Oregon and was later specifically designated along with its primary operator Suliman Albuthe.

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] The Al Haramayn or Al Haramain Islamic Foundation(AIF) has been reported as a Saudi Arabian funded Islamic charitable organization that distributes books, video/cassette tapes and leaflets which espouse radical Islamic thoughts. AIF has been utilized as a front organization for supporting and facilitating

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the movement of Islamic Mujahadin into areas of Kosovo, Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bosnia. A French National Police report about Islamic humanitarian organizations described the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation as having ties to the members of extremist Islamic organizations (Gamaa Islamiya in Egypt and I.S.F. in Algeria) and as serving as a cover/point of logistical support for the Arab Mujahadin in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bosnia.

In [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) is identified as [REDACTED] (P) of the Al Haramain Foundation. It is further stated in [REDACTED] (P) that "an African chapter of the Jedda, based group was identified in a 1999 State Department report as one of the suspect terrorist groups operating in Nairobi, Kenya, before the bombing of the U.S. Embassy there in 1998." [REDACTED] (P) also states the group has a chapter in Ashland, Oregon and has an account at the Bank of America.

[REDACTED] An inquiry through the Oregon Secretary of State Corporate Records database revealed the Al Haramain Foundation, 1257 Siskiyou Blvd, #224, Ashland, Oregon, Business Identification Number, 60062388, is an assumed business name with an active status. The original filing date for the entity was 10/22/97. The business license was renewed on 10/18/99 and changed with renewal on 10/27/99. [REDACTED] (P) is listed as [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) using the same address as the foundation. Soliman H. Albut'he was [REDACTED] (P) as a [REDACTED] (P) using the same address.

[REDACTED] On 12/31/97, the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation purchased the residence at [REDACTED] (P) Ashland, Oregon, for \$190,162 in cash. Review of documents obtained from Jackson County Title pursuant to the issuance of a grand jury subpoena revealed the registered agent signing on behalf of the foundation was Soliman Al Buthe.

[REDACTED] For information, as described in referenced [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) Soliman H. Albut'he is further identified in [REDACTED] (F) as being Soliman Albut'he, aka Soliman H. S. Albut'he, date of birth [REDACTED] (P-1) citizen of Saudi Arabia, passport number [REDACTED] (P-1) using [REDACTED] (P) 's mail drop address of [REDACTED] (P) and the address of [REDACTED] (P) 's residence and local mosque at [REDACTED] (P). This serial referenced a [REDACTED] (O-1) document identifying Albut'he as a Saudi national entering the United States with \$200,000 in U.S. Currency in 1997.

[REDACTED] Soliman H. Albut'he is believed to currently be in Saudi

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Arabia and in daily telephonic contact with (P) Based on source information, it is believed that Albut'he is utilizing Saudi Arabia cellular telephone number (P-1) and is associated with (P-1) (P-1) Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. It is further believed that Albut'he is the money supply for the Al Haramain Foundation, (P) (P) Albut'he is further believed to be involved with (P) an ISP with access to a high speed data line. Albut'he has been identified with website (P-1) Reportedly, Albut'he is the source of income related to (P) (P) which was co-owned by (P) and Ferhad Erdogan. Erdogan indicated in a recent interview that (P) is now in complete control of (P).

[REDACTED]

Other Individuals Associated with Saudi Arabia as well as the 9/11 Investigation:

Saleh Alhussayen (Saleh A A Al Husayen / Saleh Alhusayen)

DOB: (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Saudi cleric and Saudi government official Saleh Alhussayen entered the U.S. prior to the 9/11 attacks. According to statements by he and his wife, Alhussayen was in the U.S. to visit mosques and Islamic organizations who were provided funding from Saudi Arabia. According to an interview of Alhussayen's wife, Alhussayen was invited by and visited Mohammed Alahmari. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Alhussayen was staying at the same Northern Virginia hotel as Nawaf Alhazmi on the evening prior to the attacks. Alhussayen's nephew, Sami Alhussayen, was a Saudi Arabian student arrested for providing material support to AQ.

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] dated 2002] [REDACTED] As a matter of background, FBI Seattle has identified

[REDACTED]

SALEH ALHUSSAYEN as an official or employee of the Saudi (government). SALEH ALHUSSAYEN and his wife, FADDIAH PETERSEN, traveled to the United States from Saudi Arabia in August, 2001 and remained in the U.S. until mid-September. On 9/17/2001, both ALHUSSAYEN and his wife were interviewed by FBI WFO. This interview and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) was prompted by the fact that hijacker NAWAF AL-HAZMI had checked into the same Marriott Residence Inn in Herndon, Virginia on 9/10/2001 in which SALEH ALHUSSAYEN was staying. During said interview, SALEH ALHUSSAYEN advised that he had only traveled to the U.S. on one other occasion approximately twenty two (22) years ago. **He claimed no knowledge of the hijackers and stated that he had come to the U.S. via JFK IA on 8/20/2001 at the request of his friend IANA leader MOHAMMED AL-AHMARI. (See below Salah Alrashood)**

[REDACTED] As part of our investigation into the attacks of September 11, 2001 FBI Agents from Washington Field Office interviewed SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN. The interview was conducted due to the fact that he was a registered guest in the same hotel the hijackers from Flight 77 stayed in on September 10, 2001, the night before the attacks. SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN informed the Agents he was a retired Saudi Government Official and currently worked at fund raising for charity organizations. SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN informed the Agents he was in the United States to visit some Mosques that had been built with charity funds. He stated he did not know the hijackers and was only staying at that hotel because it had a kitchen which allowed him to make his own food.

(F) [REDACTED] An interview was conducted of Alhussayan's wife (Faddiah Peterson) after Alhussayan experienced the medical emergency. Peterson advised that Alhussaysn had visited while in the US the offices/personnel of IANA, Global Relief Foundation and IIIT. Peterson advised that they visited Michigan, Chicago, Pittsburgh and Canada prior to Virginia.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (The above mentioned) Mohamed Al-Ahmari, the leader of the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) in Ypsilanti Twp., Michigan, is a leading Salafi figure and Saudi dissident. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

Of interest is that Saleh Alhussayen is the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) a Saudi student living in the U.S.

Sami Alhussayen

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Related: islamtoday

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] FBI Seattle identifies Sami Al-Hussayen as a citizen of Saudi Arabia and a non-USPER currently enrolled in the College of Graduate Studies, Department of Computer Science at the University of Idaho (U of I) in Moscow, Idaho. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is also important to note that a connection between Al-Timimi and **Mohammed Al-Ahmari** has been established (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1). Al-Ahmari is a close associate of Al-Hussayen. Al-Ahmari is a leading Salafist and former president of the IANA. Al-Ahmari is very supportive of USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that actively support Jihad against the United States. AL-AHMARI (recently departed the United States for Qatar in an effort to start an IANA branch there.

[REDACTED] On September 24, 2001, the Washington Field Office (WFO) received documents from a search related to a visit to the U.S. of Saleh Al-Husayen. The documents indicate that Al-Husayen is promoting the use of the media to present the Arab world in a favorable view. He is also promoting the formation of Islamic organizations in the U.S. to pursue political agendas.

[REDACTED] On page 1 of the document, under Page 3, the name Saleh Al Husayen appears. A review of ACS indicates one reference to Al Husayen, indexed on 9/27/01. He was born on 1/1/31 in Sharqua, Saudi Arabia and has Saudi Arabian passport number [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P-1) Special/Official passport. A review of serial [REDACTED] (F), an FD-302, indicates Al-Husayen was interviewed by the FBI in Herndon, Vi(S) The next name on the document is Shaikh Khalid Al-Swailim, Washington, D.C., work telephone [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) and fax number [REDACTED] (P). A review of ACS was negative on Al-Swailim. A review of Telephone FOIMS indicates [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

The second name on page 78 of the document is [REDACTED] (P)

(P)

[REDACTED] (P) Springfield, Virginia, work telephone [REDACTED] (P), fax number [REDACTED] (P) and mobile number [REDACTED] (P). A review of ACS indicates an [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) indexed on 10/13/98.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Salah Alrashood

Name: Salah Alrashood

SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Phone: [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Per above, Alrashood is a Saudi Arabian diplomat and paid cleric who operated in the Pittsburgh area. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Relevant Serials:

[REDACTED] (G) SALAH AL-RASHOOD, dob [REDACTED] (P-1), the

Executive Manager of the ATTAWHEED FOUNDATION (AF), revealed his association with many individuals who have been the subjects of FBI full field terrorism investigations in the US including

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) After the September 11, 2001, attacks, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SALAH AL-RASHOOD departed the USA on 12/15/2002; he later attempted to return but was denied re-entry into the USA. While in the USA, AL-RASHOOD resided at [REDACTED] (P) Pittsburgh, PA, and was the head of the AL-TAWHEED ISLAMIC CENTER, a/k/a ATTAWHEED FOUNDATION, which provided financial support to the Mujhadeen in Chechnya. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] Alrashood was paid approximately \$55,000 in 2002 by the EKSA.

[REDACTED] The number [REDACTED] (P) is subscribed to Salah AL-RASHOOD, [REDACTED] (P) Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. AL-RASHOOD is [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] The word "marriage" is a word used by terrorists to denote martyrdom or attack. FBIHQ

[REDACTED]

reported that an

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(F)

ALRASHOOD

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) which has had

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Ahmed Kattan (Ahmed Qattan / Ahmad Kattan / Ahmed Khattan)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Summary: Ahmed Kattan was [REDACTED] (J-3) and high level official at the EKSA. Presently he is the Minister of African Affairs. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] : [REDACTED] KATTAN has been identified as a [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) who works closely with Ambassador Prince BANDAR. KATTAN, [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] : Kattan was from a poor family but had been with Prince Bandar for 20 years (as of 2003). [REDACTED] (O-1) Kattan was responsible for the departure of the Bin Laden family members following 9/11.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[(F)] (O-1)
(A), (G), (J-1) (O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1) | (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

(D)

(D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED]

(F)

[REDACTED] Hassan Noor

Malim Kumbi was involved sometime around 09/10/1998 with planning a terrorist attack against U.S. interests in Kampala. Kumbi was arrested after KENBOMB and had explosive residue at his residence. Evidence indicated Kumbi was related to the Kisauni Islamic Institute. According to same serial, [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

According to [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] a Ali

Humeid, brother in law of 2002 bombing suspect Hassan Said Omar, is a teacher at Kisauni Islamic Institute.

According to [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] a Shaykh

Siraj Rahman Nadwi Al-Qadhi - a principal at the Kisauni Islamic Institute - helped facilitate the movement of students to Afghanistan.

According to [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Shaykh

Rahman Nadwi Al-Qadhi assisted in the placement of a member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) - Shaykh Ahmad LNU - as the director of the Tawhid Islamic Center. Prior to his arrival, Ahmad reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan. Based on recommendations from Saudi financiers of the Al-Haramain organization.

[REDACTED] The above is deemed important as it shows a direct transfer of funds from a Ministry of the Government of Saudi Arabia, through the EKSA, to the IIASA for forwarding to a foreign entity associated with terrorism. It should also be

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

noted that the Ministry of Defense and Aviation has been associated with the financing of other "charities" such as MWL and IIRO (see [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] which provides more evidence against the Saudi claim that these organizations are NON-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

[REDACTED]

Khaled Alsowailem (Khaled Al Sowailem)

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Memo: works at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs

Telephone: [REDACTED] (P-1)

Email: [REDACTED] (P-1) [NOTE: In the past writer has noted the use of 911 in various emails of [REDACTED] (J-3) Writer cannot confirm if this is a reference to the 9/11 attacks.]

Wife: Bushra Alkhamais

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Telephone [REDACTED] (P) Mobile [REDACTED] (P) Fax [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Summary: Alsowailem was a high level employee of the Saudi Dawa office as a diplomat at the EKSA.

[REDACTED] Alsowailem was interviewed by FBI on 10/08/2001 but claimed diplomatic immunity.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In November, 2004 FBIHQ requested that a [REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

AL-SOWAILEM left

Washington, DC in June 2003

to take a position as the General Director of Da'wa Abroad in Saudi Arabia effective 8/30/2003.

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] detail that DA'WA is an Arabic word which means "the calling" as in the preaching of Islam, in this case, Wahhabi Islam. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) head of the DA'WA office at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a posting which he held until June 2003 at which time he departed for Saudi Arabia. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

the DA'WA office, one of their responsibilities was to handle the logistics for the annual Muslim pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. DA'WA was also responsible for the salaries of Islamic preachers in the United States and for the shipment of religious books and copies of the Koran to those that request them. The majority of those requesting copies of the Koran were affiliated with the prison chaplain program. Investigation has shown that the DA'WA responsibilities are now handled by the Islamic Affairs office at the EKSA.

[REDACTED] From the time AL-SOWAILEM left the EKSA until March 2005, he kept in contact with MUSAED AL-JARRAH [REDACTED] (G) who began handling the business previously handled by AL-SOWAILEM at the EKSA.

[REDACTED]

Possible Pre 9/11 Test of Airline Security

Muhammad Alqudhiheen

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

Hamdan Alshalawi

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Summary: Mohammed Alqudhaieen and Hamdan Alshalawi were Saudi nationals and [REDACTED] (J-3) who conducted activities on a U.S. based flight that were deemed by FBI Phoenix as being potential case activity for the 9/11 attacks. Alshalawi is a known AQ operative.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Muhammad Abdullah Ibrahim Al-Qudhaieen, DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1), [REDACTED] (P) Tucson, Arizona; [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Al-Qudhaieen at that time utilized a slightly different DOB of [REDACTED] (P-1). Al-Qudhaieen is [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) on 11/19/1999, Al-Qudhaieen and his associate Hamdan Ghareeb Al-Shalawi, address [REDACTED] (P) Tempe, Arizona

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

85283, telephone [REDACTED] (P), were aboard America West Airlines flight #90 from Phoenix to Washington D.C. with one stop in Port Columbus, Ohio. During the flight, Al-Qudhaieen, according to the flight crew, acted agitated, spoke very loudly in Arabic and asked repeated specific questions about flight times, stop times on the flight and the plane causing the flight crew to become suspicious of him. Flight Attendant [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) advised Al-Qudhaieen tried to open the cockpit door "on two occasions." The pilot, Captain [REDACTED] (P) ordered an emergency runway evacuation, notifying ground personnel of two suspicious men on board, before they reached the Columbus airport. In accordance with the pilot's wishes, security teams and the local police removed the two men in handcuffs from the plane and swept the plane with bomb sniffing dogs. Both men were interviewed separately by Cincinnati FBI. Al-Qudhaieen said he believed he never touched the pilot's cockpit door but that he was searching for a bathroom and he might have inadvertently touched the pilot's cockpit door. In a separate interview, Al-Shalawi advised Cincinnati FBI that Al-Qudhaieen did ask him where the bathroom was and Al-Shalawi related that he told Al-Qudhaieen to go to the rear of the aircraft to use the bathroom. However, Al-Qudhaieen disappeared from Al-Shalawi's view toward the front of the plane and was gone for several minutes.

[REDACTED] U.S. District Court transcripts revealed the following information: Al-Qudhaieen and Al-Shalawi were traveling to Washington D.C. to a reception being hosted by the President of Imam University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Both men are alumni of Imam Mohammed Bin Saud Islamic University, [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P-1) Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, telephone: [REDACTED] (P-1). Al-Qudhaieen graduated with a B.A. in English and then spent several years on staff there as a teacher's assistant.

[REDACTED] On 10/22/2001, the [REDACTED] (O-1) following information: In late 2000, Hamdan Bin Ghareeb Abdullah Al-Shalawi, DOB [REDACTED] (P-1), POB [REDACTED] (P-1) Saudi Arabia, married with five children; was traveling to Saudi Arabia through Pakistan. **Al-Shalawi is known to have received training in Afghan terrorist camps and intended to conduct Al-Khobar type bombings.** No further specifics were available [REDACTED] (O-1) Al-Shalawi left the U.S. to return to Saudi Arabia in August 2001. [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3) Based upon this information received on Al-Shalawi, he was designated [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G) In light of the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, this incident is being re-examined to determine whether Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were conducting a dry run and/or test of

[REDACTED]

America West Airlines in-flight security procedures.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] Based on analysis of reporting that AL-QAEDA operatives do extensive research and testing prior to actual terrorist attacks, and Al-Shalawi's terrorist training, Phoenix believes this represented a test or trial run in preparation for 09/11/2001.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Militant proselytizing within the U.S., the movement of individuals involved in such activity into the U.S. and the existence of AQ members amongst identified Saudi Arabian government personnel [REDACTED] (J-3) continued post 9/11.

[REDACTED] (G) identified extremist Saudi clerics attempting to or having entered the U.S. and were involved with Saudi Arabian student gatherings in the United States. Despite open social media posts advocating jihadi activity [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (G) were forwarded to [REDACTED] (J-3) - thus eliminating the threat posed by these individuals to the U.S.

Mohammed Mousa

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] WFO identified Mousa based [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and subsequent review of open source social media information identifying Mousa as a pro-AQ Saudi Airlines pilot. Mousa also appeared to be entering the U.S. for training and to visit Saudi Arabian students. WFO [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (J-3) and forwarded requests for information to various foreign governments.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(F)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] One of the attendees to the ABAAD organized event was Mohammed Hassan Mousa (who uses the name Alshareef to denote a possible relation to Mohammed). Mousa is a Saudi Arabian airlines pilot but also a religious scholar who has openly advocated jihad in Mali/Israel/Iraq and has eulogized UBL. [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

(F)

[REDACTED] Saudi cleric named Mohammed Hassan Mousa (who utilizes Internet name Mohammed Musa Aqeel Alshareef) (NOTE: Alshareef is a term utilized by descendants of Mohammed and may or may not be an official last name utilized on a passport) (DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)), a Saudi airlines pilot who had studied in Florida (according to article "Days in America"), had entered the US and had attended the Dar Alhijra as well as a Saudi student meeting in Chicago. Mousa supports jihad in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Mali and other countries against "Crusaders" and claimed to have wanted to go to fight in Iraq but was persuaded by Iraqi fighters not to go but to raise money in Saudi Arabia instead. Mousa was once in WAMY magazine stating that he would not return to the US as the US was an enemy of Islam. [NOTE: Based on an initial review of the websites [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) identified Mousa as Mohammed Musa Aqeel Alshareef but writer was able to later determine that name Mohammed Mousa and DOB of [REDACTED] (P-1) .]

[REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

INFORMATION

INDICATING A DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TRAINING OF THE TERRORIST AIRPLANE HIJACKERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 11 SEPTEMBER

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ATTACKS IN THE U.S. AND A CERTAIN MOHAMED MOUSSA. MOUSSA, AGE 35-38, DOB [REDACTED] (P-1), A SAUDI, DOCTOR OF ISLAMIC RELIGION AND IMAM OF A MOSQUE IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHO [REDACTED] (O-1) COMPLETED HIS STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF RIYADH, WAS A PILOT INSTRUCTOR WITH SAUDIA AIRLINES. MOUSSA WAS A CONVINCED FUNDAMENTALIST WHO PARTICIPATED IN 2000 IN A SAUDI TELEVISION PROGRAM ON WHICH HE HOSTED DEBATES (A SORT OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE/DEBATE). HE REFUSED TO FLY HEAVY AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO REMAIN ON AIRBUS TYPES. THIS ALLOWED HIM TO REMAIN IN SAUDI ARABIA AND AVOID CONTACT WITH "IMPIOUS" WESTERNERS. AT THE SAME TIME THIS ALLOWED HIM TO DEVOTE HIMSELF TO HIS RELIGION AND TO THE MOSQUE OF WHICH HE WAS THE IMAM.

PROBABLY IN THE MONTH OF JULY 2000, MOUSSA WAS AN INSTRUCTOR ON FLIGHT SIMULATORS IN JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA. SEVERAL MONTHS LATER, (NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2000), [REDACTED] (O-1) MOUSSA LEFT FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR TRAINING ON HEAVY AIRCRAFT (747-400) AT BOEING IN SEATTLE.

[REDACTED] A review of travel noted that Mousa was reportedly encountered entering the U.S. as airline crew from 1998 to 2001 with the last encounter as inbound on 08/27/2001.

[REDACTED]

Ayid Alqarni

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F) On [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) 2012 [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) a known extremist Saudi cleric named

Ayid Abdullah Alqarni (ph) would be traveling to the US to attend the ICNA/MSA Conference in Chicago in December 2012. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Alqarni had a DOB [REDACTED] (P-1) On 12/12/2012 [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Alqarni could be located on the following youtube videos:

<http://youtu.be/wrEEu-Fjzqk>

<http://youtu.be/L2Q3A5XaTxE>

[REDACTED] The first video is titled "Ayid Alqarni - Jihad the Path to Victory" and is dated 2004. In this video Alqarni - recognizable as the individual [REDACTED] (J-3) - laments the death of Abdalaziz Alrantisi and Ahmad Yassin and praises jihad in Iraq against the "occupiers".

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) open source information found on the ICNA website, exact matches of biographical information as well as a review of the available video writer concludes that the Ayid Abdullah Alqarni who [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(J-3) [REDACTED] is the same as the Ayid Abdullah Alqarni who is noted in the videos calling for jihad against American soldiers in Iraq and the "slitting of throats". In addition, the confirmed telephone numbers of Alqarni are described as having Alqaeda connections and have contacts with multiple FBI terrorism investigations.

[REDACTED] According to (G) [REDACTED] Alqarni is a personal sheikh of Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahad Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud. [Noted herein]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Other Saudi Arabian Government Officials - Known or Suspected AQ Members

[REDACTED] Summary: The influence of militant AQ ideology within Saudi government personnel can also be demonstrated by the identification of AQ members within Saudi Arabian military members who entered the U.S. for military training. Among these are Faisal Alshehri, Mohammad Alkahtani, Naif Alfallaj and the recent student Mohammed Alshamrani (Pensacola). [This is in addition to the known 120 or more Saudi Arabian (J-3) who departed the U.S. to join ISIS.] Saudi naval officers lafi Alharbi (DOB: (P-1)) and Osama Nooh (possible DOB: (P-1))((F)) were in contact were in contact with Alhazmi and Almihdar.

Mustafa Alshehri

(aka Mustafa Mohammed Mubarak Alshehri / aka Mustafa Aljubairi)

DOB: (P-1)

Entered US on (J-3) July 2001

(G)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Summary: Mustafa Alshehri was a Saudi Arabian national and government official in the Saudi Ministry of Interior passport office. Alshehri is an admitted AQ member as were several members of his immediate family (one of whom served time at GTMO). Alshehri entered the U.S. just prior to the 9/11 attacks and visited New York along with other individuals of the Saudi Embassy.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] and other serials] Mustafa Alshehri was a Ministry of Interior employee in the passport section and an identified AQ member who had traveled to Afghanistan in approximately 2000-2001 and underwent weapons training at the Faruq camp. Subsequently he was utilized to transfer large sums of money to other AQ members. Alshehri was subsequently arrested by the Mabahith and the Mabahith reported that Alshehri had three brothers - all of whom were involved with AQ. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) Yousef was subsequently released and became a leader of AQAP before being killed in 2009.) According to records and Alshehri's statements he traveled to the US for medical reasons [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3) and actually entered on 09/01/2001 with intended stay [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3) Alshehri had also provided at least one stolen passport to one of three individuals captured by Saudi authorities entered Saudi Arabia from Iraq with the expressed purpose of attacks on Americans. One of these three had a telephone that contained the Pakistani cell number of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). During interrogation, Alshehri claimed that while in the US he had traveled to NYC along with a employees of the Saudi Embassy to meet with a Saudi delegation. Alshehri had several associates in the EKSA to include Yousef Zakri [REDACTED] (G) who was a long term EKSA employee who had a close relationship with known AQI member Shawki Omar [REDACTED] (G) who was subsequently arrested in Iraq. Another associate was believed to be Fahad Alotaibi (DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)) of the Military Attache office. While in the DC area Alshehri lived with Mohammed Ali Alqahtani [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Mohammed Amer

Alshehri [REDACTED] (G) a diplomat at the EKSA, is a known relative and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) noted his association with multiple [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and that he was involved with retrieving Yousef Alshehri's body. Ali Al Nafisah [REDACTED] (G), another EKSA diplomat, was a close associate of both Omar, Zakri and Alshehri.

[REDACTED]

Faisal Ahmed Alshehri

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] On May 9, 2003, FBIHQ notified the Dallas Division
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Initial investigation revealed that the user of the email address was located at Sheppard Air force Base, Wichita Falls, Texas. Soon thereafter, this individual was identified as Faisal Ahmed Al-Shehri. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] At approximately 6:00 p.m., Al-Shehri was approached by Dallas FBI agents. The agents advised Al-Shehri that there was a possible security issue with his luggage and wanted to talk to

[REDACTED]

him for a couple of minutes. Al-Shehri and the interviewing agents went to the business lounge area and began to question Al-Shehri. After a short time, the interviewing agents questioned Al-Shehri regarding his knowledge of Al-Yari. Al-Shehri denied any knowledge of Al-Yari and advised the interviewing agents that he had never met or seen him before. Al-Shehri was told by the interviewing agents that his phone number had been found on Al-Yari's body after he had been killed in a shootout with Saudi authorities. Al-Shehri continued to deny his knowledge of Al-Yari. During this time, Al-Shehri provided biographical information and consented to a search of all his carry-on items. After approximately six hours, Al-Shehri finally admitted that he had designed and built a computer for Al-Yari several years ago. Also, Al-Shehri advised that he had a long standing and close relationship with Al-Yari. Al-Shehri explained how he was recruited by Al-Qa'ida and eventually became a financial supporter and recruiter for the organization. Also, Al-Shehri explained how he frequently communicated with Al-Yari and had traveled to meet him on many occasions. Al-Shehri was debriefed from June 5, 2003 until July 8, 2003. During this time, Al-Shehri provided invaluable intelligence information regarding Al-Qa'ida members, Al-Qa'ida trade craft, and Al-Qa'ida recruitment within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

(A), (G), (J-1)

(F) (A), (G), (J-1) On December 8, 2001 a search was conducted of AlMari's apartment which revealed photocopies of what appeared to be valid passports assigned to many different individuals. The passports were issued in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Also discovered during the search was flight training literature, literature detailing seating capacities and fuel capacities for large jetliners, several photographs of the World Trade Center towers, an aerial photo of the Pentagon, and overdue video tapes borrowed from the Boston Public Library. One of the video tapes was entitled "Major Air Disasters" and another was entitled "Major Water Disasters". Many documents were discovered during the search of the apartment

[REDACTED]

to include telephone bills, bank statements, shipping receipts, hotel receipts, airline receipts, and many handwritten notes. [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) noted some secondary connections between phone numbers within this case and phone numbers in contact with Albayoumi.]

[REDACTED]

Mohammad Alkahtani

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that AL-KAHTANI indicated he has friends in Saudi Arabia with connections to AL-QAEDA.

Furthermore AL-KAHTANI has indicated he has TALIBAN contacts in Saudi Arabia who came from Afghanistan. In private settings, AL-KAHTANI has expressed his support of violent jihad for the propagation of Islam. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Virginia home, AL-KAHTANI has been vocal about his support for AL-QAEDA and UBL.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Investigation has revealed Al-Kahtani, a citizen of Saudi Arabia, is in the United States [REDACTED] (J-3) and is working on his PhD in Information Technology at George Mason University (GMU). He teaches a Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) class at GMU and is a prominent lecturer and leader at the Center For Islamic Information and Education (CIIE), aka Dar al Arqam Islamic Center, in Annandale, Virginia. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Al-Kahtani has indicated he is planning on returning to Saudi Arabia as soon as he completes his PhD, probably sometime before the end of this year.

[REDACTED] Several regular attendees of Dar al Arqam conducted paintball training in Northern Virginia in preparation for participation in jihad and/or jihad training overseas. Several members of the group traveled to Pakistan prior to, and after 09/11/2001, to attend Lashkar-E Taiba jihad training camp. Among those involved in the jihad group are [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Ali Al-Timimi, a former lecturer at Dar al Arqam, has been a spiritual advisor to many in this group and has publically advocated violent jihad. The activities of [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) . [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G) two of Al-Kahtani's sons attended the paintball training, however they were not part of the core jihad group. Additionally, after 09/11/2001 Al-Timimi was asked to leave Dar al Arqam by the Dar al Arqam leadership (Haythem Abu Hantash, Jaf'far Idris and AL-Kahtani) because Al-Timimi openly supported the 09/11/2001 terrorist attacks against the U.S. As a result, Al-Kahtani took a greater leadership/lecturer role at Dar al Arqam.

[REDACTED] Alkahtani [REDACTED] (J-3) despite the above information. Alkahtani noted that he was traveling with a "prince" and was working for Saudi Military Industries. Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) is a state owned [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3) defense company launched in May 2017 by Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF). SAMI is lead by Ahmed Alkhateeb and Walid Abukhaled. Its subsidiaries is Advanced Electronics Company and Military Industries Corporation (MIC) per Wiki which is lead by Mohamed Almaday. [REDACTED] (J-3) .

[REDACTED]

Abdullah Mohamed Alshehri

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] Alshehri is mentioned herein due to the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) officer being affiliated with Islamic militants and also being utilized as a local POC for the Saudi population. Alshehri was conducting this business while a student.

[REDACTED] (G)

(G) ALSHEHRI was favorable toward USAMA BIN LADEN and upon his documented connection to MULHIM ELTAYEB [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (G). While in Pittsburgh, ALSHEHRI apparently acted as liaison between the Saudi Arabian embassy and the Saudi community in Pittsburgh.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
On 03/18/2002, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) a young Yemeni immigrant to Pittsburgh had recently been invited to an apartment with a group of Saudi Arabians. The immigrant had been invited by "ABO NORA" (or ABU NORA) (determined [REDACTED] (G) to be [REDACTED] (G) ABDULLAH ALSHEHRI). While at this gathering, the Saudis were speaking favorably about USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL). When the Yemeni immigrant voiced his opinion that the events of September 11th were murder, "ABO NORA" indicated to the group to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

change the subject and not speak further about it in front of the Yemeni.

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G)

Investigation at the CARRIAGE PARK APARTMENTS determined that MULHIM ELTAYEB, a Sudanese national, departed Pittsburgh in January 1999, allegedly to return to the Sudan. On his exit papers with CARRIAGE PARK APARTMENTS, ELTAYEB gave a forwarding address of [REDACTED] (P) Pittsburgh, telephone [REDACTED] (P). Follow-up investigation at the GREENBRIAR APARTMENTS determined that, at the time of ELTAYEB's departure, [REDACTED] (P) was leased by ABDULLAH MOHAMMED ALSHEHRI, with the same telephone number. ELTAYEB was obviously using ALSHEHRI's address as a mail forwarding point. MULHIM ELTAYEB re-surfaced on 09/09/2001 at Timber, OR, where he was found engaged in paramilitary training with other Arab males. Portland believes that ELTAYEB is part of a suspected Al Qaeda cell operating in the Portland area.

[REDACTED]

Islamic Saudi Academy (ISA)

King Abdullah Academy

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] The Islamic Saudi Academy, now known as the King Abdullah Academy, is a K-12 school located in Northern Virginia that provides education for the children of Saudi Arabian diplomats as well as other individuals. The school is supported by the Saudi Arabian government and the Embassy and the SACM Director and Saudi Ambassador are known to sit on the board of directors. The school has faced charges of teaching hatred within its Islamic education department and one of its students, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, was convicted of being an AQ operative planning to assassinate President George Bush. [REDACTED] (P) was a teacher at the Islamic education department.

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Since 2001 there have been many independent analysis conducted of the teaching curriculum in Saudi Arabia and at the ISA. These reports include the Freedom House report and the recent report from the United States Commission of International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). In addition, reports have been written on similar schools in foreign nations such as a report in Britain on the King Fahd Academy in London (a school similar to the ISA) titled "The Hijacking of British Islam".

[REDACTED] All of the reports by independent scholars and linguists have arrived at similar conclusions. The specific statements listed in these reports have been well documented in the press and need not be mentioned in this memorandum. However, these multiple and independent analysis have been confirmed via translations done by the FBI. Many of the passages in question were Saudi interpretations of Koranic passages or of the Hadith and were similar to the interpretation provided by Elyacoubi mentioned above.

[REDACTED] According to open source reporting, in 2002, Saudi Foreign

[REDACTED]

Minister Prince Saud

Al-Faisal stated that "our schools and our faith teach peace and tolerance." In March 2006, Prince

Turki Al-Faisal stated that the Saudis had removed all of the inflammatory content in their school textbooks but quickly backed off and stated they needed more time after the Freedom House report.

Recent open source reporting noted that Saudi Embassy officials have denied the existence of derogatory material in the ISA's present curriculum.

■ The 2007/2008 USCIRF study revealed that the changes have not been completed. An FBI review of the 2007 curriculum textbooks also revealed the continuing use of passages that are considered to be defamatory to other religions and that could be construed to encourage violence.

[REDACTED]

Saudi Arabian Student Population

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F)

Serials with LHMS to USDS:

[REDACTED] (F) (2014/2017/2018)

[REDACTED] (F)

Summary: The effect of the Saudi Arabian education system is evident within high number of terrorism investigations related to the Saudi Arabian student population. This population has fluctuated over the years but increased greatly after 2005 but has recently sharply declined. Various AQ related terrorism investigation was opened prior to and following the 9/11 attacks such as (A), (G), (J-1) ([REDACTED] (F) and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (F). Following the creation and growth of ISIS there were at least 120 Saudi students who traveled to Syria from the U.S. to join AQ and/or ISIS forces.

(J-3)
[REDACTED]

Homaidan Alturki Saudi [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] As is known, the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 individuals - 15 of them being of Saudi nationality (the possible 20th - Alqahtani who is held in GTMO - is also of Saudi origin). Saudi Arabian

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

perception management campaigns have worked to convince Americans that UBL used the 15 Saudis in order to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia - thus presenting the case for closer bonds and more lax requirements for entry into the U.S. Per the 9/11 Commission Report, the interrogations of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed revealed that the true reason for the use of so many young Saudi males for the 9/11 attacks was due to the large numbers of willing participants amongst the Saudi population as well as the easy visa requirements then in place for Saudi Arabian citizens to obtain visas to travel to the U.S. Prior to 9/11 it was much harder for a citizen of Yemen or Sudan to obtain a visa whereas citizens of Saudi Arabia were not viewed as a "security risk" and obtained their visas under the Visa Express program. (See 9/11 Commission Report - Pages 232-233 and 9/11 and Terrorist Travel Pages 116-130.)

[REDACTED] Shortly after 9/11 a spotlight was shown on the teaching material utilized in Saudi K-12 schooling as well as within Saudi schools and Saudi funded and run mosques in the U.S. and elsewhere. Facing strong criticism the Saudis launched various public relations campaigns to discredit these reports. Despite repeated promises and claims to the contrary, within the U.S. the teaching material at the Saudi funded Islamic Saudi Academy (ISA) was not altered until approximately eight years after 9/11. An unclassified report (O-1) [REDACTED] regarding Saudi education and textbooks utilized within Saudi Arabia (elementary and middle school curriculum 2009-2010) revealed that - despite claims to the contrary - that the Saudi Arabian Government had not removed or altered the offensive material found in previous editions. According to the CIA report "the monotheism texts teach hatred as part of the doctrine of disavowal which promotes hostility toward non-Muslims. This doctrine, which jihadists often advocate, is included throughout many other books in the curriculum." The report continues: "The monotheism textbooks for all five grades also stress the theme of religious violence". The report concludes "Even if the Saudis moderate some of the offending passages in the higher-grade textbooks, the youngest and most impressionable segment of Saudi society will still have been exposed to this incitement to religious hatred and violence, and many will have already internalized these teachings." This analysis as well as more recent open source reports regarding the Saudi clerical establishment highlight that the extremist nature of Saudi society is still prevalent. For example, in December 2013 a large group of Saudi clerics publicly endorsed the Islamist Front in Syria. These clerics are increasingly using social media to reach out to Saudi society - in Saudi Arabia or overseas. The recent edict by King Abdullah to criminalize the participation of Saudi citizens in fighting with the jihadi groups in Syria is believed to have little effect on those individuals who are motivated by the AQ element within these clerical establishments.

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) This was highlighted by the recent death in Saudi Arabia of an ISIS bomb maker who was a student in New Zealand. Additional Saudi Arabian students are voicing encouragement and support and multiple Saudi Arabian students are under terrorism investigation by the FBI. In addition, it is known via FBI investigation, that radical Saudi based clerics and religious authorities are traveling to the U.S. to visit with the U.S. based Saudi population. In December 2012 a Saudi cleric who had openly called for jihad against the U.S. was granted a visa to enter the U.S. FBI investigation prevented his entry and his intended destination was an Islamic conference in Chicago. In December 2013 investigation revealed a large student gathering in Chicago that included a presentation by a Saudi cleric who has openly supported jihad activities and who eulogized Osama Bin Laden. This cleric is also a Saudi Airlines pilot and wrote of meeting Saudi Arabian students in various locations in the United States. In December 2016 a Saudi Arabian national who was a professor for a Saudi military academy and a supporter of militant ideology was granted a visa to the U.S. [REDACTED] (J-3).

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Homaidan Alturki is noted above due to his operating an Islamic bookstore (Albasheer Publications) while on [REDACTED] (J-3) status; his connections to Anwar Aulaqi (aka Abu Attiq) ([REDACTED] (F) (see [REDACTED] (F) (see herein)' Mohammed Alahmari (IANA) (see herein); and the EKSA's/SAG's attempts to obtain his release from prison despite his being convicted of abuse of an [REDACTED] (J-3) holder.

[REDACTED] (A),(G), (J-1) is noted herein due to the [REDACTED] (A),(G), (J-1) centering on a group of Saudi Arabian students who were committing [REDACTED] (J-3) fraud. During a search of their apartment photocopies of what appeared to be valid passports assigned to many different individuals. The passports were issued in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Also discovered during the search was flight training literature, literature detailing seating capacities and fuel capacities for large jetliners, several photographs of the World Trade Center towers, an aerial photo of the Pentagon, and overdue video tapes borrowed from the Boston Public Library. One of the video tapes was entitled "Major Air Disasters" and another was entitled "Major Water Disasters".

[REDACTED]

Ziyad Khaleel (Ziyad Sadaqa)

(G) [REDACTED]

Summary: Noted herein due to references above.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The above referenced serial (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1) Investigation by Phoenix has indicated that all of these individuals may have a current or former association with Michigan State University (MSU).

[REDACTED] Al-Shalawi [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(G) [REDACTED] and is believed by Phoenix to be an operative of Al Qaeda. Al-Shalawi obtained a PhD in Linguistics from Arizona State University (ASU).

[REDACTED] Al-Shalawi and Muhammad Al-Qudhaieen (G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] were involved in an incident aboard an America West airlines flight on November 19, 1999. Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were traveling from Phoenix to Washington, DC via Columbus, Ohio. During the flight, Al-Qudhaieen was observed by the flight crew attempting to access the cockpit. When the flight landed in Columbus, Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen were detained by FBI Cincinnati and interviewed (F) [REDACTED]. No charges were filed against Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen.

[REDACTED] Based on (G) [REDACTED] regarding the association of Al-Shalawi and Al-Qudhaieen with Al Qaeda subjects and the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001, Phoenix has developed an investigative theory that this incident was an intelligence gathering mission for use in future terrorist operations.

(O-1) [REDACTED] Al-Shalawi obtained training at an Afghanistan terror camp in late 2000.



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Newark, N.J. 07102

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

April 21, 2008

(P)
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - (A), (G), (J-1)

Full Investigation Initiated: (A), (G), (J-1)

Annual Letterhead Memorandum

This document is classified [redacted] in its entirety.

Office of Origin:

Newark, New Jersey

Date Investigative Summary Prepared: 04/21/2008

Basis of Investigation:

[redacted] Captioned investigation is based upon specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that [redacted] (P) [redacted] (P) is engaged in international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor, pursuant to FCIG, Section III.C.1.b.6. AL-QAEDA is considered a "foreign power" as it engages in "international terrorism" or activities in preparation thereof.

[redacted] (P) [redacted] was the subject of a Preliminary Investigation by the Newark Division opened on or about [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) subsequent investigation under the PENTTBOM case which revealed some of [redacted] (P) involvement with several of the known hijackers responsible for the events on 09/11/2001. [redacted] (P) is believed to have had contact with HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAZMI, MAJED MOQED, and AHMED ALGHAMDI. The former Preliminary Investigation expired on [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) and was subsequently closed.

[redacted] A Preliminary Investigation was opened on or about [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) due to the belief that [redacted] (P) had provided false information [redacted] (O-1) to United States (U.S.) authorities and had not cooperated with the U.S. government concerning his relationship with the aforementioned

[REDACTED]

hijackers. The second Preliminary Investigation was set to expire on or about (A), (G), (J-1).

[REDACTED] On or about (A), (G), (J-1), a Full Investigation was initiated due to (P) false statements (O-1) (O-1), lack of cooperation with U.S. authorities in regards to his knowledge of the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001 and his knowledge of the individuals responsible for those attacks, and (P) association with individuals known to be members of terrorist organizations or supporters of terrorist organizations.

[REDACTED] For background information the following information is provided: (P) arrived in the U.S. on 07/03/2000, with a tourist visa. His Syrian passport (J-3) (P) stayed in the U.S. past the expiration of his U.S. visa and was subsequently arrested by what is now known as the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for being "out of status" in the U.S.

[REDACTED] (P) was later arrested as a Material Witness in connection with the PENTTBOM investigation, but he only agreed to be interviewed and (D) (D). (P) was also subjected to a polygraph on 01/24/2002, in which he appeared to be deceptive when answering questions about his prior knowledge of the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001.

(O-1)
(O-1)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A number of requests have been sent to the Syrian government, via Interpol, for any information that illustrated that (P) was wanted by the Syrian authorities. (C-2) (C-2)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Subsequent investigation of [REDACTED] (P) has revealed that he is believed to have had contact with other individuals of interest to the FBI:

1. [REDACTED] (P), also known as (aka) [REDACTED] (P), aka, [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] During the TERRSTOP investigation, communications occurring over CLEMENT HAMPTON-EL's [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) The TERRSTOP investigation pertained to individuals involved in a conspiracy to blow up New York City landmarks, including the Holland Tunnel and the New York Office of the FBI. The [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) that occurred over HAMPTON-EL's telephone were [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) used at trial.

[REDACTED] Portions of the aforementioned declassified telephone communications occurred between the following subjects of investigation; HAMPTON-EL and [REDACTED] (P) HAMPTON-EL and [REDACTED] (P), and HAMPTON-EL and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) The aforementioned communications illustrated that HAMPTON-EL, [REDACTED] (P), and [REDACTED] (P) were involved in money transfers intended to support training and the purchase of weapons in support of terrorist acts. HAMPTON-EL's communications with [REDACTED] (P) illustrated that [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) was interested in training in support of violent jihad.

2. [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] The entry, [REDACTED] (P), was noted in the [REDACTED] (P) address book and is of interest to the Newark Division. A query of the ACS database revealed that the telephone number, [REDACTED] (P), is subscribed to by [REDACTED] (P), the father of [REDACTED] (P), a self admitted member of AL-QAEDA and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1).

[REDACTED] (P) is a U.S. citizen by birth who was arrested by the Saudi Mabahith in 05/2003 in connection with the 05/2003 bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. [REDACTED] (P) has admitted to the FBI, Secret

[REDACTED]

Service, and Mabahith to being a member of the Medina Al-Qaeda terrorist cell. Subsequent investigation revealed [REDACTED] (P) involvement in activities on the behalf of AL-QAEDA and he was charged and convicted in U.S. federal court on 9 terrorism charges. [REDACTED] (P) was later sentenced to 30 years in prison and 30 years probation.

3. [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] On 01/14/2002, [REDACTED] (P) was interviewed as part of a proffer agreement at the United States Attorneys Office (USAO), Eastern District of Virginia. The interpreter for 1 of the proffer sessions was [REDACTED] (S). [REDACTED] (P) was not cooperative in that he did not provide any specifics concerning his interaction with the aforementioned hijackers.

[REDACTED] Toll records for [REDACTED] (P) cellular telephones, past and present, have been obtained by the writer from T-MOBILE INC. via Grand Jury subpoena. A review of [REDACTED] (P) toll records has revealed that [REDACTED] (P) has been in contact with at least 2 cellular telephones possibly utilized by [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) appeared to have had contact on numerous occasions.

[REDACTED] It should be noted that [REDACTED] (P) is currently a [REDACTED] (P) of the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Federal Courts in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Federal Courts in New York, New York.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (P) was interviewed by agents from the Washington Field Office of the FBI on the morning of 07/20/2006 and questioned about her associations with a number of individuals including [REDACTED] (P). It is believed that [REDACTED] (P) contacted [REDACTED] (P) subsequent this interview and advised him about the FBI interest in him.

[REDACTED] On 07/24/2006, [REDACTED] (P) contacted the Newark Division of the FBI asking "if there was anything going on" and appeared to be extremely nervous on the telephone to the agents who spoke with him.

[REDACTED] Newark's investigation has determined that [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

4. [REDACTED] (P)

The [REDACTED] (O-1) in Iraq reviewed documents recovered from government offices in Iraq. One recovered document, marked "Top Secret" with heading "[REDACTED]" (A), (G), (J-1) listed (P) or (P) (O-1)

[REDACTED] (P) was [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) (P), a (then) (P) to the United Nations, offered to provide an Iraqi Intelligence Officer with any information she obtained related to then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher's meeting with various Arab countries regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (P) had also worked at the [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] During an interview of [REDACTED] (P) on 12/04/1998, (P) acknowledged providing various newspapers to Iraqi officials when she was a [REDACTED] (P), however, she never admitted to providing information regarding the Secretary of State's meetings, or engaging in any such illegal activity during her employment at the [REDACTED] (P). She stated that she no longer worked at any of the [REDACTED] (P) and was employed by [REDACTED] (P) located in [REDACTED] (P) New Jersey. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Subsequent investigation has revealed that [REDACTED] (P) is associated with [REDACTED] (P) and members of [REDACTED] (P) family. It is unknown how these relationships developed or what is the true nature of the relationships.

5. [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 08/04/2006, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (P-1) and [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (P-1). Both number were provided to the source [REDACTED] (O-1) and were reported to be associated with an individual named ABU MUTHANNA. ABU MUTHANNA is believed to be ABDULLAH AL-ARIFI, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and an alleged leader of an AL-QAEDA cell in Iraq.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (P) is believed to be an alias for [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P), address [REDACTED] (P), SSN [REDACTED] (P-1), DOB [REDACTED] (P-1), Alexandria, VA.

[REDACTED] The Newark Division has not determined the true purpose for the aforementioned contacts of [REDACTED] (P). It appears that [REDACTED] (P) maintains contact with individuals that potentially have access to information that may be of interest to terrorist organizations. It also appears that [REDACTED] (P) maintains contact with individuals that are either associated with terrorist organizations or foreign intelligence services.

6. [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] Another contact of [REDACTED] (P) that should be noted is an individual named [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P), date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED] (P-1), has been interviewed by the FBI on several occasions. [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), became a subject of interest to the FBI due to his association with [REDACTED] (P) and recent activity.

[REDACTED] In early 05/2005, [REDACTED] (P) was stopped by the police in Clifton, New Jersey because of traffic violations. At the time, he claimed to be too poor to afford an apartment and was living in his vehicle. [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) used to work together selling ice cream out of trucks with another individual named [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P), and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) have lived together at a number of locations in the past. [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) were questioned by the FBI

[REDACTED]

subsequent the events of 09/11/2001. As stated above, (P) was questioned about his contact with a number of the 19 hijackers.

On 06/19/2001, at approximately 11:03 pm, HANI HANJOUR conducted a transaction at the aforementioned PNC Bank ATM. A review of all transactions conducted 30 minutes prior and 30 minutes after HANJOUR's transaction, revealed four individuals who were believed to possibly be associated with HANJOUR. The individuals were (P), DOB (P-1), FAYEZ I.A. ABUTALEB, aka FAYEZ ABUTALEB, DOB (P-1), (P) (P), aka (P), DOB (P-1), and (P), DOB (P-1).

(P), ABUTALEB, (P), and (P) all lived together at one time. (P) was interviewed by the FBI because of the aforementioned automatic teller machine (ATM) transaction at the PNC Bank in Paterson, New Jersey. (P) was present at the time of (P) interview with the FBI, but portrayed himself as an associate that was present to assist with interpretation, if needed. (P) speaks sufficient English and did not need an interpreter at the aforementioned interview.

On 05/29/2005, (P) was stopped by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) while attempting to cross the border into Canada. (P) was denied entry by the Canadian authorities and subsequently interviewed by SA (S) from the Seattle Division and CBP agents. (P) advised the interviewers that he was on his way to Alaska to fly and he had a number of flight training materials in his possession.

On 10/12/2005, (P) was interviewed by SA (S) and Port Authority Police Detective (S) from the New York Division at his parent's home in (P), New York. (P) advised the interviewers that he had worked on a commercial fishing boat in Alaska fishing for salmon. (P) had advised the interviewers that he had gone to Alaska to fish and did not reiterate his previous reason for his travel to Alaska.

On 11/02/2005, (P) was interviewed by SA (S) (S), FBI Language Specialist (LS) (S), SA (S) from the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Detective (S) at (P) residence, (P) (P), (P), New York. During the interview, (P)

[REDACTED]

advised the interviewers that he had traveled to Alaska to fish. After being reminded that he was detained en route to Canada with flight materials, (P) advised that he has always wanted to fly and threw away the flight materials after being detained.

(P) did not have a consistent or logical story concerning his travel to Alaska and the purpose for the trip. (P) was also not cooperative when discussing his past activities and appeared to have had a selective memory for things he was willing to discuss. Subsequent investigation revealed that (P) also had computer disks and satellite installation equipment with him when he was detained at the Canadian border.

Additionally, investigation revealed that (P) utilized a laptop computer while on board the fishing boat, expressed interest in and studied the nautical charts on the boat, and attempted to steer the boat on at least 1 occasion. (P), by his own admission, has no prior fishing experience and was apparently out of his element. Additionally, the boats that (P) worked on utilized routes frequented by a number of cruise ship lines.

(P) had a pamphlet from the HOLLAND AMERICA CRUISE LINE in his possession when he was detained at the Canadian border. When questioned as to why he possessed the HOLLAND AMERICA pamphlet, (P) advised that he contacted the cruise line to ask questions about Alaska.

In the past, (P) has made his living selling ice cream in New Jersey with (P) and others. (P) aforementioned trip took place at a time when he would have been in the middle of the season for selling ice cream. In fact, (P) was interviewed just prior to his departure for Alaska and he was selling ice cream at the time. (P) did not appear to make any profit from the aforementioned trip which appears significant in that he supports his family that resides in (P).

At the present time, it is not known why (P) took the aforementioned trip. However, considering the fact that (P) was a close associate of (P) at the time (P) interacted with the hijackers and that (P) has not been cooperative with law enforcement when questioned about the aforementioned trip necessitated further investigation of (P).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Further investigation of [REDACTED] (P) has revealed strange behavior and has not revealed a logical reason for his trip to Alaska. During the 11/02/2005 interview, [REDACTED] (P) advised that he lived with [REDACTED] (P) after his return from the Falls Church area of Virginia and before the attacks on 09/11/2001. [REDACTED] (P) also advised that 2 unknown men arrived at the residence one day and that there was discussion of [REDACTED] (P) moving out so that the 2 men could stay at the residence. [REDACTED] (P) discussion of the 2 men was in response to questions associated with the 19 hijackers responsible for the attacks on 09/11/2001.

7. [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (P), DOB [REDACTED] (P-1), is an [REDACTED] (P) that formerly worked for [REDACTED] (P) at [REDACTED] (P) in New York, New York. [REDACTED] (P) represented [REDACTED] (P) pro bono during the BIA appeal process concerning his possible deportation [REDACTED] (O-1).

[REDACTED] (P) was interviewed by the FBI on 06/19/2006 and he advised that he was contacted by [REDACTED] (P) a number of times at his office at [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) advised that his office number was the only contact number [REDACTED] (P) had for him and this was the only way he contacted him. [REDACTED] (P) also advised that the only outside contact he had with [REDACTED] (P) was he had dinner with [REDACTED] (P) one night and he brought [REDACTED] (P) to the hospital on several occasions.

[REDACTED] (P) was asked if he traveled to the Syrian Consulate in New York with [REDACTED] (P) in the past. [REDACTED] (P) advised that he could not recall if he had done that. [REDACTED] (P) was advised that [REDACTED] (P) had told the FBI that they had both gone to the Syrian consulate to renew [REDACTED] (P) Syrian passport. [REDACTED] (P) again advised that "he could not recall" if he had gone to the Syrian consulate with [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] Subsequent investigation revealed that [REDACTED] (P) had been in contact with [REDACTED] (P) via [REDACTED] (P) work telephone number, cellular telephone number, and home telephone.

[REDACTED] (P) was re-interviewed on 03/26/2008 regarding [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) advised that he now worked at the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) located at [REDACTED] (P) Street, New York, NY 10021, telephone [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) described the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) as a "think tank" type of organization.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (P) was advised that the FBI had reviewed phone records and that it appeared that he had previously lied to FBI agents when he advised that he only spoke to [REDACTED] (P) from his office on several occasions. [REDACTED] (P) advised that he did not recall giving [REDACTED] (P) his home number or his cellular telephone number and that he did not recall more extensive contact between [REDACTED] (P) and himself.

[REDACTED] (P) was asked if he went to the Syrian Consulate with [REDACTED] (P) in the past. [REDACTED] (P) reiterated his past answer to this question and advised that he did not recall going to the consulate with [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] (P) appears to be lying to cover some actions that he and/or [REDACTED] (P) have conducted. [REDACTED] (P) was advised that stating that "he did not recall" something was not the same as saying he didn't do it. [REDACTED] (P) answer to this statement was that he did not recall doing it. The Newark Division believes [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and will document this in an EC and forward the information to the New York Office to pursue.

[REDACTED] On or about 03/27/2007, [REDACTED] (P) was arrested by the Paterson Police Department for [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P-1) The final disposition is unknown at this time.

[REDACTED] The FBI was advised by ICE representatives that on or about 12/13/2007, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) made a decision [REDACTED] (O-1) based on new evidence presented to them from the FBI and [REDACTED] (G) BIA decided to "reopen the proceedings and remand the record to the Immigration Court for a new hearing before a different Immigration judge".

[REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1). The order goes on to state that ICE submitted a declaration submitted to them by the FBI which indicates that [REDACTED] (P) lived with EYAD ALRABABAH who assisted 2 of the hijackers responsible for the events on 09/11/2001.

[REDACTED] The order continues in which it states that ALRABABAH introduced the aforementioned hijackers to [REDACTED] (P) in Falls Church, Virginia. The aforementioned facts along with the fact that the FBI had advised that it is unable to rule out [REDACTED] (P) as a threat to security [REDACTED] (O-1).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Additionally, the order states that there were accusations that the Immigration Judge was not conducting the hearings in a generally fair manner and indicated that there are instances in the record that are sufficient to justify a remand to another Immigration Judge. Ultimately, BIA also ruled to remand the record to the Immigration Court for a new hearing before a different Immigration Judge.

[REDACTED] The declaration mentioned in the BIA order advised that [REDACTED] (P) should be removed from the U.S. and could not be ruled out as a threat to national security for the following reasons:

1. [REDACTED] (P) was encountered by the FBI investigating the terrorists attacks that took place on 09/11/2001.
2. [REDACTED] (P) had direct contact with several of the hijackers responsible for the attacks that took place on 09/11/2001.
3. [REDACTED] (P), through a number of documents and interviews, misrepresented facts and deceived the government.
4. [REDACTED] (P) illegally remained in the U.S. after he was supposed to depart the U.S. and he has admitted that he is an overstay.

[REDACTED] The preceding information suggests that the captioned subject has associations with members of and/or supports the terrorist activity associated with AL-QAEDA and other terrorists organizations. As a result of the relationships, circumstances and information set forth, [REDACTED] (G), Newark authorized a Full Investigation to fully identify [REDACTED] (P) and investigate the level of his involvement in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof and/or his knowingly aiding or abetting any person in the conduct of these activities.

Objective(s) :

[REDACTED] The captioned investigation was authorized to further investigate the level of [REDACTED] (P) involvement in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof and/or his knowingly aiding or abetting any person in the conduct of these activities.

[REDACTED] At the current time, the Newark Division is continuing to investigate [REDACTED] (P) activities and contacts. The Newark Division has also been working with ICE to facilitate the deportation of [REDACTED] (P). Additionally, the Newark Division will attempt to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)



█ Current and future investigative objectives seek to further characterize the United States based AL-QAEDA support network. Investigative targets include, but are not limited to, the United States based AL-QAEDA core leadership and membership structure, AL-QAEDA logistical and financial networks, and overseas connections with AL-QAEDA political/military elements. The captioned investigation will continue to further identify █ (P) █ role in the identified United States based AL-QAEDA support network as well as his role in other international terrorist organizations.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/25/2007

To: New York
(G)

Attn: (G), (S)

From: New York
(G)

Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (F)

Title: PENTTBOM
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: Analytical Support: (G)
A set of questions to pose to (P) for his interview on 7/26/2007 with members of NYO (G).

(G)

Reference: (F)

Administrative: Captioned EC is in response to collection requirement detailed in (F).

This analysis addresses the following intelligence requirements as outlined in the FBI's IT Standing Intelligence Requirements Set:

Section (G) (A), (G), (J-1)

To: New York From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 07/25/2007

Section [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Executive Summary: [REDACTED] Questions for [REDACTED] (P) resident [REDACTED] (P) were compiled based on a review of serials and phone data involving his current [REDACTED] (P) and prior [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) was one of a number of mostly [REDACTED] (P) emigres in the San Diego area who provided support to 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI from February to December 2000.

Details: [REDACTED] On 7/23/2007, SA [REDACTED] (S) and Detective [REDACTED] (S) of the NYO [REDACTED] (G) Squad [REDACTED] (G), requested that the author provide a list of questions that might be posed to [REDACTED] (P). In response, I researched the FBI's Telephone Application (TA) and Automated Case System (ACS), as well as Intelligence community databases ([REDACTED] (O-1), (G), (J-1) TIDE) and open source (GOOGLE, Lexis-Nexis, ChoicePoint, etc.). Biographical information as well as derogatory information was collated into a string of questions in more or less temporal order. The questions I framed arose out of [REDACTED] (P) continuous association, via personal friendships, a shared community of interest and direct/ indirect telephonic connections with known terrorists and their support networks here and abroad. The questions were sometimes written in a conversational style so as to convey a context for the question that would be memorable.

PEDIGREE:

NAME: [REDACTED] (P)
DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1)
SSAN: [REDACTED] (issued [REDACTED] (P-1))
Current ADDRESS: [REDACTED] (P)
(short drive from [REDACTED] (P))
PREVIOUS ADDRESS: [REDACTED] (P) SAN DIEGO 92117
PREVIOUS ADDRESS: [REDACTED] SAN DIEGO 92117
PREVIOUS ADDRESS: [REDACTED] SAN DIEGO 92117
Wife: [REDACTED] (P)
Passport: [REDACTED] (P) # [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] 1) With respect to your relocation to [REDACTED] (P) can you tell us more about that? Why in the Summer of [REDACTED] (P) did you leave San Diego?

Background: [REDACTED] (P) told Agents who interviewed him last Fall that he left San Diego in [REDACTED] (P) and then received his "green card" establishing him as a permanent legal resident of the US (A# [REDACTED] (P-1) issued [REDACTED] (P) via mail in [REDACTED] (P), presumably via his [REDACTED] (P) PO Box. Did he move because he did not anticipate his green card arriving and he was out of status on the H1B visa? He also told Agents he relocated to [REDACTED] (P) for the [REDACTED] (P-1) -- and yet, [REDACTED] (P) has a branch office in Phoenix, Arizona, which would appear a much more appealing climate.

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Re: (F) , 07/25/2007

2) (P) : What's Your Middle/or Any Other Names (P-1)
Background: " (P) " was associated with (P) number (P-1) possessed by a Saudi AL-QA'IDA recruiter incarcerated in April 2006 named KHALID "AL-TURKISTANI" (Khalid 'Abd Al-Jalil Ghulam Muhammad, DOB (P-1), At Taif, Saudi Arabia). The same number was called by (P) on December 5, 1999, two months after he left (P) for San Diego, and one month before the San Diego hijackers arrived in the US. (P) is Arabic and it means (P) whereas (P), also Arabic, means (P) I would ask: "Do you have a middle name you use? (" (P) sounds too much like ' (P) and I don't want to insult you" or "We spoke to some folks who know you as (P))"

3) What was it like growing up in (P)
Background: Claimed to FBI in two interviews (2001 and 2006) to have grown up there, and left at age (P) for (P) in (P). (P) was (P) (P) in (P) which fits this migration (as he likely knew - this refugee status also a gambit used by Yemeni Mohdar Abdullah to gain entry). Ask him these questions which he should know if he actually grew up there:

Who was the President of (P)? (Answer: (P)). When did President (P) flee the country? (Answer: (P)). Where did President (P) go? (Answer: (P)). Who took over (P) then? (Answer: (P) or (P)). When did (P) come to (P)? (Answer: (P) -- this was supposedly after (P) left). (P) came to help the UN peacekeeping forces and a few months later, the (P) (P) of (P) occurred, so ask him: Do you remember any movies about your old home town? (ANSWER: (P) released (P)). For purposes of impeachment, features of (P) per Internet sources include the (P), the (P), and the former resort of (P) (P). The (P) comes within 19 miles of the (P) (P) near (P) it provides water essential for the cultivation of (P) Roads link (P) with many (P) locales and with (P) Private airlines service (P) at various airports within and around the city; the intense fighting largely destroyed the old (P) International Airport.

4) What language did you speak up until age (P) Must have been tough landing in (P) as a refuge (P) with no English, huh? Yet in 3 years, you were in college in (P) studying (P). Amazing!

5) Are you Kurdish?
Since the honorific bestowed on the afore-mentioned mujahadeen "AL-TURKISTANI" suggests he might have been Kurd, and if (P) admits to being (P) or (P) (or even if he insists he's (P) which is simply a nationality, not an ethnicity): Are you an ethnic Kurd?
BACKGROUND: Many of the San Diego Muslims who befriended ALHAMZI and ALMIHDHAR were Kurdish or supporting Kurds (Al-Bayoumi was caretaker of Kurdish Mosque; (P) was/is Kurdish; so is his father, (P) (P) who is active in Kurdish politics; and so was (P),

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the cousin of [REDACTED] (P) and nephew of [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) should remember [REDACTED] (P) because [REDACTED] (P). And there is also [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1).

6) If you are [REDACTED] (P) how often do you call [REDACTED] (P) Can you give us a number to check?

BACKGROUND: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) An associate of [REDACTED] (P), MOHDAR ABDULLAH, who possessed a phone number subscribed to [REDACTED] (P) when he was arrested as a material witness in the wake of 9/11, claimed to be Somali in order to gain asylum in the US, but he subsequently admitted to being from Yemen. Also, [REDACTED] (P), another friend of [REDACTED] (P), traveling with a Saudi passport, and a likely Yemeni, claimed in 2001 that [REDACTED] (P) was [REDACTED] (P).

7) What college did you attend in [REDACTED] (P) Did your family move with you? Who did you live with? Major was [REDACTED] (P), right? Did you work your way through college? How did your folks get by? Did you work with computers at all? Is it possible you worked for an electrical supply house? [REDACTED] (P) If [REDACTED] (P) worked at a company that had access to transistors, this might be significant given that AL-TURKISTANI reportedly distributed transistors to bomb makers in Chechniya.

8) A phone is presently listed for [REDACTED] (P) at [REDACTED] (P) current home in [REDACTED] (P) -- [REDACTED] (P) -- is he [REDACTED] (P) FATHER? When did [REDACTED] (P) arrive in [REDACTED] (P)? Was he ever in the US?

ANALYST NOTE: A [REDACTED] (O-1) record entered on 10/6/2006 for [REDACTED] (P), DOB [REDACTED] (P-1), recorded the issuance of a [REDACTED] (J-3) on [REDACTED] (J-3) in [REDACTED] (J-3) to expire [REDACTED] (J-3), with a US address of [REDACTED] (P), SILVER SPRING MD 20906. The same record notes a father's name of [REDACTED] (P) and a mother's name as [REDACTED] (P) with a maiden name of [REDACTED] (P). The POB is given as [REDACTED] (P-1).

9) While you attended college in [REDACTED] (P) from [REDACTED] (P) to [REDACTED] (P), how often did you drive across the border with pals? Did you ever fly across? What names did you use? Ever drive an hour East to [REDACTED] (P) and visit with jihadis there? Ever meet the Millennium Bomber, Ahmed Ressaym? He was from [REDACTED] (P) (Algerian - unlikely but you never know since he [REDACTED] (P) for California in the Fall of 1999 after getting AQ training overseas). Did you ever travel back to the Middle East during college?

10) **TRAVEL** According to travel records, you entered the US at OGDENSBURG, New York, on 10/23/1999, with a destination address of [REDACTED] (P) in San Diego. Did you enter with a H1B Specialty Occupation Visa as a computer

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worker and stay here with that? Did it ever lapse (I see it expired in Dec 2006 - is that what really prompted you to leave San Diego and the green card came as an unexpected surprise in October?) Did you ever have to leave the US and then come back because of issues with that Visa? On October 23, 1999, did you drive to the US? Who were you with? Were you planning to drive all the way to San Diego? We know you were there by mid- November. Did you stop off along the way? Maybe visit LA? Why so many trips back and forth across the border in 2006?

10/07/06 - ENTERED US AT NIAGARA FALLS (VEHICLE)
09/16/06 - ENTERED US AT NIAGARA FALLS (VEHICLE)
08/15/06 - ENTERED US AT NIAGARA FALLS (VEHICLE)
07/26/06 - ENTERED US AT NIAGARA FALLS (VEHICLE)

[REDACTED] Did you visit with [REDACTED] (P) of [REDACTED] (P) in Dallas? (see below) on the following trip:

04/09/06 - ENTERED US AT BOSTON FROM TORONTO (AIR)
04/05/06 - DEPARTED US AT DALLAS FOR TORONTO (AIR)

[REDACTED] Who did you visit overseas for 6 weeks on this trip?

02/05/06 - ENTERED US AT LOS ANGELES FROM LONDON (AIR)
12/24/05 - DEPARTED US AT LOS ANGELES FOR LONDON (AIR)

[REDACTED] Who did you visit on these brief trips?

11/29/05 - ARRIVED AT TORONTO/PEARSON (AIR)
11/24/05 - DEPARTED US AT CHICAGO FOR TORONTO (AIR)

10/04/05 - ENTERED US AT LOS ANGELES FROM LONDON (AIR)
09/19/05 - DEPARTED US AT LOS ANGELES FOR LONDON (AIR)

[REDACTED] Who did you visit overseas for two weeks on this trip?

06/03/04 - ARRIVED US AT LOS ANGELES
05/20/04 - DEPARTED US

[REDACTED] When you re-entered the US on 3/7/2004, where were you coming from?

03/07/04 - ENTERED US AT PHILADELPHIA (From where?)

[REDACTED] 11) Who invited you to San Diego in [REDACTED] (P)? You didn't pick it out of a hat, right? Clark Security sponsored your entry for the H1B Specialty Occupation visa? How did you get wind of that? Upon arriving in San Diego, how did you land the job with [REDACTED] (P), then [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED]? Somebody working there already, right? We notice you lived in a hotel before moving to that apartment at [REDACTED] (P) -- who was living at that apartment?

[REDACTED] 12) Phones in temporal order in case an issue arises:

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] This phone was in contact with [REDACTED] (P) -- your new San Diego landline -- on 11/13/99.

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[REDACTED] (P) Pacific Bell - Active by [REDACTED] (P) -- [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) -- and subscribed to [REDACTED] (P) at [REDACTED] (P); stopped using this about June 2005.

[REDACTED] (P) Landline; work number at [REDACTED] (P), subsidiary of [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] (P) Pacific Bell - Formerly [REDACTED] (P); [REDACTED] (P) used this phone located at [REDACTED] (P), Apartment [REDACTED] (P) San Diego and claimed it as his area code when interviewed by San Diego FBI on [REDACTED] (P); this number was found in the wallet of Mohdar Abdullah at the time of his arrest on 9/24/01 and it was also in contact with Omar Al-Bayoumi, Faisal Almuhana, and Fahad Althumairy.

[REDACTED] (P) MCI was carrier.

[REDACTED] (P) Pacific Bell. [REDACTED] (P). Beginning 02/14/2004, ending July 2006, with a forwarding address of [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] (P) T-Mobile. [REDACTED] (P) used this phone until moving to [REDACTED] (P) in July 2006.

[REDACTED] (P-) [REDACTED] (P) landline since Oct 2006 for [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P-).
[REDACTED] (P-) business fax since Oct 2006.
[REDACTED] (P-) business # on web site.
(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] TA reports these totals for the above-listed phones:

- [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (G) calls
- [REDACTED] (G) calls 04/11/2001-04/11/2001
- [REDACTED] (G) calls 03/05/2001-03/05/2001
- [REDACTED] (G) calls 07/10/2006-07/10/2006
- [REDACTED] (G) calls 12/02/2004-06/06/2006
- [REDACTED] (G) calls 12/27/1999-06/25/2000
- [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (G) calls 07/26/2000-01/20/2004
- [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (G) calls 01/21/2004-05/07/2006
- [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (G) calls
- [REDACTED] (P-) [REDACTED] (G) calls
- [REDACTED] (G) calls
- [REDACTED] (G) calls
- [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (G) calls
- [REDACTED] (G) calls

13) Tell us how well you knew, and how often you saw, the following people:
Khalid 'Abd Al-Jalil Ghulam Muhammad, DOB [REDACTED] (P-1), Saudi Arabia (aka Khalid Al-Turkistani)

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Re: (F) , 07/25/2007

BACKGROUND: This Saudi AL QAEDA recruiter possessed a Canadian number called by (P) in 1999 as discussed above.

Anwar Aulaqi - fiery Imam/scholar at Al-Ribat aka Ar-Ribat Mosque at (P) in San Diego.

(P) aka (P) Aka (P)
- he served as the mosque (P) at the (P)
on (P). He lives at 5606 Amaya Dr, Apt (P), La Mesa, CA.

BACKGROUND: Reportedly, (P) was in contact with Anwar Aulaqi in Yemen prior to Aulaqi's arrest.

(P) aka (P) aka (P) : he
used to live at (P), Apt (P) El Cajon and
let your pal Mohdar Abdullah live there too. Is (P) related
to your wife, (P)?

Imam (P) - Over in Germany. Ask how often he
has visited Germany and in which cities there has he stayed.

BACKGROUND: (P) had (P) San Diego number and name along
with (P) and (P) when the Germans raided his place in December 2005.

(P), aka (P) aka (P) from
Germany.

BACKGROUND: Another German associated with Imam (P).

Mohdar Abdullah

BACKGROUND: He drove the hijackers to LAX so Al-MIHDHAR
could catch a flight home. He had one of (P) phone
numbers in his possession when he was arrested. MOHDAR ABDULLAH
introduced (P) to hijackers NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID
AL-MIDHDAR. And Mohdar resided with the (P) family at the
(P) at the invitation of (P). (P)
(P) resided at this address before (P) when
he left San Diego to study in (P). On his way to (P)
in 2001, (P) stopped in (P) to obtain a visa.

Omar Al-Bayoumi -- what do you think his story was? Just a
kindly student-holy man? Did you ever think he might be spying
on you all for the Saudi MABAHITH? According to the best-selling book
by Lawrence Wright, "The Looming Tower" (paraphrasing): "Bayoumi
was probably a Saudi intelligence asset [who spied on possible
Saudi dissidents in the San Diego area]. He was likely tasked to
look after the hijackers so Saudi Intelligence would know what
Al Qaeda was up to."

(P) -- he was (P).

To: New York From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 07/25/2007

[REDACTED] **BACKGROUND:** [REDACTED] (P) is a [REDACTED] (P) who went to Yemen to attend AULAQI's masjid and then [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) where [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1).

[REDACTED] (P) -- he was [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) who was friendly with the hijackers, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) in [REDACTED] (P).

[REDACTED] 14) Did you know [REDACTED] (P) from Sana'a, Yemen.

[REDACTED] 15) Did Khalid Al-Mihdhar or Nawaf Al-Hazmi ever visit your apt on [REDACTED] (P)?

[REDACTED] 16) Did anyone else use your phone in that apartment on [REDACTED] (P)?

[REDACTED] **BACKGROUND:** Phone records show [REDACTED] (P) land line phone [REDACTED] (P) called AL-HADA on March 2, 2000. AL-HADA was AL- MIHDHAR's father-in-law and a known AL-QA'IDA asset whose phone was in contact with known AL-QA'IDA operatives. More specifically, on 3/20/2000, phone [REDACTED] (P), used by KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI at their Parkwood apartment (6401 Mount Ada Road), called [REDACTED] (P) in Sana'a, Yemen, the telephone number of AL-MIHDHAR'S father-in-law. The same YEMENI number had been called earlier that month, on 3/2/2000, from [REDACTED] (P), with a connect time in excess of 20 minutes. [REDACTED] (P) was a phone used by [REDACTED] (P), at [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) (per [REDACTED] (F), Serial [REDACTED] (F) and [REDACTED] (F), Serial [REDACTED] (F)). [REDACTED] (P) also had contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, [REDACTED] (P) and FAYAD AL-THUMAIRY (aka FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY, DOB [REDACTED] (P-1)) from 12/27/1999 to 06/25/2000.

[REDACTED] 17) Did you actually establish that [REDACTED] (P) in San Diego in [REDACTED] (P)? Why not? What were you going to sell? Who was your supplier?

[REDACTED] 18) Do you know [REDACTED] (P) and his [REDACTED] (P) company? Do you know anybody who does work for [REDACTED] (P)? Do you know what [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) is?

[REDACTED] **BACKGROUND:** [REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P) have all been employed by [REDACTED] (P), a Dallas company which is owned by [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) has common contact with [REDACTED] (P) ([REDACTED] (F))'s (C-2) phone ([REDACTED] (C-1)) and with [REDACTED] (P) aka [REDACTED] (P) ([REDACTED] (G)) at his Florida number [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) also has contact with [REDACTED] (P). [REDACTED] (P) (DOB [REDACTED] (P-1) or [REDACTED] (P-1)) - [REDACTED] (G) a 7/6/2007 (A), (G), (J-1) EC ([REDACTED] (F), Serial [REDACTED] (F)) has contact with both ELARBI and KARIM and [REDACTED] (P) is also associated with a wireless business.

[REDACTED] 19) Since you're familiar with computers, ever hear of "War Plugging"? When you want to communicate via Wi-Fi without being detected? What can you tell us about this as it relates to your security business at all?

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20) Did you attend Mosque every week?

MORE BACKGROUND:

The investigation of the San Diego subjects commenced within hours of Flight 77 crashing into the Pentagon, when a car was found parked at the hourly lot in Dulles International Airport on 9/11/2001 that was registered to NAWAF AL-HAZMI, one of the passengers on Flight 77. It was quickly determined that the vehicle was registered by AL-HAZMI at (P) , in Lemon Grove, a suburb of San Diego, California. Investigation by San Diego FO found the building was owned by ABDUSSATTAR SHAIKH, who was renting a room therein to OMER SALMAIN SALEH BAKARBASHAT (aka OMAR BAKARBASHAT), DOB (P-1) , SSAN (P-1) . BAKARBASHAT, a foreign student from Yemen who had dropped out of college and was out-of-status, admitted to associating with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR and was arrested (D) and later deported for immigration fraud. BAKARBASHAT further identified MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID (aka MOHDAR MOHAMED ABDOULAH, aka MOHDAR ABDULLAH), DOB (P-1) , as a close associate of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. ABDULLAH in turn admitted meeting the hijackers at a San Diego mosque in early 2000, where OMAR AL-BAYOUMI tasked ABDULLAH with acclimating them to the U.S. At the time, ABDULLAH was residing at (P) St, (P) , La Mesa, another San Diego suburb, with several others.

The hijackers were housed, through AL-BAYOUMI, at the Parkwood Apartments, 6401 Mt. Ada Rd, (P) San Diego, CA 97111, just off Balboa Avenue, in an apartment in the same complex where AL-BAYOUMI had been residing with his wife and three children (in Apt (P) at 6333 Mount Ada Rd) since September 1999. AL-BAYOUMI was a Saudi national who entered the U.S. in 1993 (J-3) attending school in San Diego. He acted as manager/facilities supervisor for the MASJID AL-MADINA AL-MUNAWAR MOSQUE, 511 Magnolia Ave. South, El Cajon, California (aka the Kurdish Community Islamic Center, or KCIA), but claimed on his rental paperwork at Parkwood to be a student supported by his family (F) , Serials (F) (F) (F)

As noted above, at AL-BAYOUMI's request, MOHDAR ABDULLAH helped AL-HAZMI obtain a driver's license, a car, a Social Security number and enrollment in a Florida flight training school and arranged local instruction in English. ABDULLAH also accompanied AL-HAZMI on June 10, 2000 as he drove KHALID AL-MIHDHAR to the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) to catch a flight to Muscat, Oman via Frankfurt, Germany, to visit his wife and new-born daughter. AL-HAZMI then moved out of the Parkwood Apartments into the afore-mentioned (P) building owned by SHAIKH, which SHAIKH claims the hijackers found via an ad he had placed at the Islamic Center of San Diego ((F) , Serial (F)). AL-HAZMI and ABDULLAH continued to maintain close contact, visiting each other, dining and even working together washing cars at a Texaco gas station at (P) , La Mesa, CA 91941. BAKARBASHAT also worked at the same gas station. Soon after the arrival of the eventual

[REDACTED]

To: New York From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 07/25/2007

Flight 77 hijacker/pilot, HANI HANJOUR, on 12/8/2000, AL-HAZMI introduced HANJOUR to ABDULLAH and the hijackers departed for La Mesa, Arizona days after HANJOUR's San Diego arrival.

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI introduced AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR to the Saudi-Yemeni community in San Diego during a party at his apartment and brought them to the AL-RIBAT AL-ISLAMI CENTER, a mosque at 7173 Saranac St, La Mesa, CA 92115. The Imam of the Mosque was ANWAR NASSER AULAQI (aka SHEIKH ANWAR AL-AWLAKI, aka ABU BAKR AL SIDDIQ, aka ANWAR AL-AWLAKI) DOB [REDACTED] (P-1), the subject of [REDACTED] (F), and as it was later discovered, a childhood neighbor of MOHDAR ABDULLAH in Yemen. In January of 2006, the FBI learned via photo comparison that AULAQI was also identical with Yemeni Extremist ANWAR AL-AWLAKI ABU ATIQ, who was incarcerated in June 2006 by the Government of Yemen in connection with a plot to attack oil interests.

[REDACTED] AULAQI was born in Las Cruces, New Mexico to immigrant Yemeni parents, who returned with him to their native land when AULAQI was about 11 years old. AULAQI's father, NASSER AL-AULAQI, eventually became the President of Sana'a University and visited the U.S. [REDACTED] (J-3).

ANWAR AULAQI meanwhile, returned to the U.S. in 1990 to attend school in Colorado and moved to San Diego in late 1995. AULAQI resided in San Diego, preaching at the AL-RIBAT Mosque, until at least August 2000, then traveled to Yemen and returned to California on 10/23/2000 -- two weeks after the Cole bombing -- and moved to Virginia in March, 2001. AULAQI served as Imam of the DAR AL-HIJRAH Mosque in Falls Church, before returning to Yemen in March, 2002, where he has remained aside from a brief sojourn in October-November 2002 in Virginia, Santa Clara and San Diego, California. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] While it is known that AULAQI had contacts with NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR in San Diego, California and may have had contacts with AL-HAZMI and HANI HANJOUR at the DAR AL-HIJRAH Mosque in Virginia, AULAQI's exact relationship with the hijackers remains unclear.

[REDACTED]

To: New York From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 07/25/2007

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1
Type: [REDACTED] (G)
ITU: [REDACTED]
ITU: TOLLS/PEN REGISTERS
Claimed By:
SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)
Name: [REDACTED] (S)
Squad: [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED]
To: New York From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 07/25/2007

Set Lead 1: (Info)

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

[REDACTED] (G). Read and clear.

◆◆