

REDACTION KEY

- A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.
- C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING FURTHER CONSULTATION TO BE COMPLETED BY THE DEADLINE IN EO 14040 SECTION 2(D).
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- G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.
- J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).
- J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT (BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.
- J-3. INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).
- O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.
- P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.
- P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.
- S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.

NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted without a code throughout the release.

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Report

A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks

Issued July 2004

The following pages were deemed responsive in discovery in MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) and are within the scope of Section 2(b) of Executive Order 14040. The remaining pages in the Inspector General's report were determined in the course of the litigation not to be responsive in discovery and therefore are outside the scope of the executive order.

A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks [REDACTED]



Office of the Inspector General
July 2004

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]

We consider it a significant failure for this CIR not to be sent to the FBI.

[REDACTED]

In addition, the evidence shows that the limited information that was provided to FBI Headquarters – that Mihdhar traveled to Malaysia and met with other suspected al Qaeda operatives – was never documented by the FBI in any system that was retrievable or searchable, thus limiting the usefulness of the information that was shared. The FBI's only official record of having received this information was in the hard copies of the January 5 threat update, which was attached to the January 6 executive briefing, and [REDACTED] (S) e-mail summarizing information from his discussion with the CIA employee. We discuss this and other systemic problems in our analysis section below.

[REDACTED]


Hazmi and Mihdhar in San Diego

1. Introduction

The second set of events that may have led the FBI to discover Mihdhar and Hazmi's presence in the United States related to their stay in San Diego. As noted above, on January 15, 2000, Mihdhar and Hazmi boarded a flight in Bangkok, Thailand, for Los Angeles. They were admitted to the United States on non-immigrant visitor visas and authorized to remain in the U.S. until July 14, 2000. Shortly after arriving in Los Angeles, they traveled to San Diego, California, where they were aided in finding a place to stay by Omar al-Bayoumi. Bayoumi had been the subject of an FBI preliminary intelligence investigation that had been closed.

In late May 2000, Hazmi and Mihdhar rented a room in the residence of a long-time FBI [REDACTED] (G) asset.¹⁹³ Mihdhar remained in San Diego until

¹⁹³ This kind of individual is often referred to as an "informant" - the common vernacular for an individual providing information to an investigative agency. Within the FBI's foreign intelligence program, they are known as assets. The FBI designates assets as [REDACTED] (G) asset is a person the FBI debriefs for information, or someone who the FBI asks to obtain information as a result (continued)



2. Hazmi and Mihdhar's association with Bayoumi

Omar al-Bayoumi is a Saudi Arabian national who came to the United States in 1993. In early 2000 he had been living with his wife and four children in San Diego for at least four years. Although he described himself to others in San Diego as a graduate student in business administration, he took classes intermittently and was not enrolled in a program of study. He did not work in the United States and received a monthly stipend of \$4,000 plus "other allowances," ranging from \$465 to \$3,800 each month, from Dallah/Avco, a Saudi contractor to the Presidency of Civil Aviation.¹⁹⁵ Bayoumi was active in the San Diego Muslim community and was involved in the establishment of several mosques in the United States.

In September 1998, the FBI's San Diego Field Office opened a preliminary inquiry on Bayoumi based on allegations raised by the manager in the apartment complex where he was living at the time. The manager alleged that Bayoumi had received a suspicious package from the Middle East, and the maintenance worker for the apartment complex had noted strange wires in Bayoumi's bathroom. In addition, the manager reported frequent gatherings of young Middle Eastern males at Bayoumi's apartment on weekend nights.

The FBI case agent conducted a limited investigation of Bayoumi, but the preliminary inquiry was closed in June 1999 and was not converted to a full field investigation.¹⁹⁶ As a result, the FBI was no longer investigating Bayoumi at the time that Hazmi and Mihdhar met Bayoumi in February 2000. However, the following paragraphs describe what was later learned about Bayoumi's interactions with Hazmi and Mihdhar.

On February 1, 2000, Bayoumi traveled by car from San Diego to Los Angeles, to resolve a visa issue at the Saudi consulate. Bayoumi invited an

¹⁹⁵ Bayoumi was employed by the Saudi Presidency of Civil Aviation from 1975 until 1995 and became a contractor for the organization beginning in 1995.

¹⁹⁶ In Section IV B 1 (a) of this chapter, we examine the investigative steps taken by the FBI in this preliminary inquiry and assess the appropriateness of the decision to close the inquiry.

[REDACTED]

associate, Isama Dyson, to accompany him.¹⁹⁷ Dyson provided the following account to the FBI of the trip with Bayoumi.¹⁹⁸ [REDACTED]

Dyson said that at the time of the invitation, Bayoumi mentioned a Los Angeles restaurant serving halal food where they could eat lunch after Bayoumi's meeting at the consulate.¹⁹⁹ After Bayoumi spent approximately one hour at the Saudi consulate, he and Dyson went to the restaurant but discovered it had been converted to a butcher shop. The butcher shop employees recommended another nearby halal restaurant, the "Mediterranean Gourmet." Bayoumi and Dyson walked to that restaurant. While they were eating there, Hazmi and Mihdhar entered the restaurant and the four talked in Arabic. Although Dyson had limited Arabic language skills, he said that Bayoumi kept him apprised of the content of the conversation. Hazmi and Mihdhar told Bayoumi that they were in the United States to study English, but they did not like living in Los Angeles. Bayoumi invited the men to visit San Diego and offered to assist them. Bayoumi provided the men with his phone number. Bayoumi and Dyson left the restaurant, and after stopping at a nearby mosque for sunset prayers, returned to San Diego. Dyson asserted that the encounter with Hazmi and Mihdhar seemed to be a coincidental meeting. [REDACTED]

Within several days of the meeting, Hazmi and Mihdhar accepted Bayoumi's invitation and traveled to San Diego. In San Diego, Bayoumi arranged for Hazmi and Mihdhar to rent an apartment on Mount Ada road in the same apartment complex where Bayoumi lived. Bayoumi also co-signed

¹⁹⁷ Dyson is an (P) [REDACTED]

¹⁹⁸ Dyson provided the information to the FBI in an interview after September 11. After the attacks, the FBI opened an investigation on Bayoumi, who no longer resided in the United States, to determine whether he had knowledge of the September 11 plot or had knowingly supported the hijackers. Based on that investigation, Bayoumi was indicted on a visa fraud charge. Bayoumi was outside of the United States at the time of the indictment and has not returned. [REDACTED]

¹⁹⁹ Halal is an Arabic word meaning "lawful" or "permitted." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

their lease. Shortly after Hazmi and Mihdhar moved into the apartment, Bayoumi hosted a party to introduce them to the local Muslim community. [REDACTED]

Within a few weeks of moving into the apartment, Hazmi and Mihdhar filed a 30-day notice to vacate the apartment, apparently to move to another apartment. However, they later rescinded the vacate notice and continued to lease the apartment until June 2, 2000.²⁰⁰ [REDACTED]

The apartment manager told the FBI that Bayoumi paid Hazmi and Mihdhar's first month's rent and security deposit because they had not yet established a local bank account and the apartment complex would not accept cash. A review of Bayoumi and Mihdhar's financial records after September 11, 2001, indicate that Bayoumi was reimbursed for this expense on the same day it was paid.²⁰¹ [REDACTED]

3. Telephone call to Yemen from Hazmi and Mihdhar's apartment [REDACTED]

On March 20, 2000, a long distance telephone call was placed from Mihdhar and Hazmi's Mount Ada apartment to the known terrorist logistics phone number in Yemen [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1) (See section III, A, 2 above.) (O-1) NSA had been monitoring the Yemen logistics phone, [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) a record of the

²⁰⁰ Bayoumi left the United States for some of the time Hazmi and Mihdhar lived in the apartment. INS records do not indicate when Bayoumi left the country, but the records indicate that he obtained a United States visa in Jeddah on May 10, 2000, and returned to the United States on May 31, 2000. Bayoumi left the United States permanently in July 2001 and was living in England on September 11, 2001. [REDACTED]

²⁰¹ [REDACTED] (D) [REDACTED] (D) Mihdhar's financial records also indicate that he opened an account with a deposit of \$9,900 in cash within seven minutes of Bayoumi's cash deposit, which suggests that they were in the bank together. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

call was captured in the toll records. After the September 11 attacks, the call was identified through a record check. [REDACTED]

4. Hazmi and Mihdhar's association with an FBI asset beginning in May 2000 [REDACTED]

Sometime in May 2000, Hazmi and Mihdhar moved out of the apartment Bayoumi had found for them on Mount Ada Road and moved as boarders into the home of a long-time, paid^(G) [REDACTED] asset of the FBI's San Diego Field Office.²⁰² Hazmi and Mihdhar met the asset at the mosque they attended.²⁰³ Mihdhar stayed at the asset's residence until June 10, 2000, when he left the United States. Hazmi resided in the asset's house until December 10, 2000, when he moved to Arizona. [REDACTED]

a. Background on the FBI asset [REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

²⁰² The OIG was not able to interview the asset. The Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry had attempted to interview the asset without success. The Committee then submitted interrogatories that the asset declined to answer, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege. The asset indicated through his attorney that if subpoenaed by the Committee, he would not testify without a grant of immunity. [REDACTED]

²⁰³ There is some dispute about whether Hazmi and Mihdhar actually responded to an advertisement for boarders posted by the asset or whether they were introduced to the asset. The OIG did not have access to the witnesses who could address this issue. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Information deemed not responsive in discovery in MDL 03-1570 and outside the scope of Executive Order 14040.

[REDACTED]

5. **OIG conclusion** [REDACTED]

In sum, the FBI did not obtain information about Mihdhar's and Hazmi's time in San Diego, either as a result of the Bayoumi preliminary inquiry or from the asset. In the analysis section of this chapter, we evaluate [REDACTED] (S) actions with regard to Hazmi and Mihdhar and whether he should have pursued additional information about who was living with one of his assets. [REDACTED]

C. **Mihdhar's association with Khallad, the purported mastermind of the Cole attack** [REDACTED]

The third potential opportunity for the FBI to acquire information about Hazmi and Mihdhar occurred in January 2001, when a joint FBI/CIA source identified an al Qaeda operative in photographs of the January 2000 Malaysian meetings that Hazmi and Mihdhar had attended. However, the FBI has asserted that it did not learn of the source's identification of the al Qaeda operative at the Malaysian meetings until much later in 2001, just before the September 11 attacks. This section of the report describes the events surrounding this third opportunity for the FBI to focus on Hazmi and Mihdhar. [REDACTED]

1. **Background** [REDACTED]

In May 2000, the CIA and the FBI began debriefing a source (A), (G), (J-1) who provided significant information on operatives and operations related to Usama Bin Laden. The source gave the CIA and the FBI information about an al Qaeda operative known as "Khallad" and described him as being involved

[REDACTED]

Although these systemic problems affected the flow of information between the FBI and CIA, we do not believe they fully explain the FBI's failure to obtain the critical information on Hazmi and Mihdhar. Employees at both the CIA and the FBI failed to provide or seek important information about Hazmi and Mihdhar, despite numerous interactions between them on issues related to Hazmi and Mihdhar from January 2000 through August 2001. We found these interactions were substantive and that much of the information about Mihdhar and Hazmi was exchanged through these ongoing efforts. Unfortunately, the critical pieces of information relating to Hazmi and Mihdhar did not become known to the FBI until shortly prior to September 11. As a former CTC ALEC Station Deputy Chief aptly summarized it to us, "information that should have been shared was not, repeatedly." [REDACTED]

B. The actions of the San Diego FBI [REDACTED]

In addition to issues that affected information sharing between the FBI and the CIA, the FBI had other opportunities to find information about Hazmi and Mihdhar before the September 11 attacks. The time that Hazmi and Mihdhar spent in San Diego was an opportunity during which the FBI could have obtained information about them but did not. As discussed above, Hazmi and Mihdhar entered the United States in January 2000 and moved to San Diego in February 2000, where they resided unbeknownst to the FBI. While in San Diego, Hazmi and Mihdhar associated with Omar al-Bayoumi, a person whom the FBI had previously investigated, and they also lived with an active, FBI informational asset. Yet, the FBI did not become aware of their presence in San Diego until after September 11, 2001. [REDACTED]

Because Bayoumi spent a significant amount of time with Hazmi and Mihdhar in early 2000, it is possible that – had a full field investigation of Bayoumi been open at the time – the FBI could have discovered Mihdhar and Hazmi's presence in San Diego and also uncovered the CIA information about their attendance at the Malaysia meetings. Because Hazmi and Mihdhar lived with an FBI asset, it is also possible that if the FBI had documented their presence in San Diego, it would have provided additional investigative leads that could have aided the New York FBI in locating them in August 2001. We therefore evaluated the San Diego FBI's investigation of Bayoumi and the

[REDACTED]

decision to close its preliminary inquiry on him in June 1999. We also examined the San Diego FBI control agent's decision not to obtain or document information from his information asset about Hazmi and Mihdhar, who were boarders in the asset's house. [REDACTED]

In examining the San Diego Field Office's handling of the Bayoumi investigation and the informational asset, we also found that, despite the fact that FBI Headquarters had established counterterrorism as a top priority of the FBI in 1998, the San Diego Field Office was continuing to pursue drug trafficking as its top priority in 2001. While the FBI made counterterrorism its top priority on paper, the FBI took few steps to ensure that field offices complied with this directive. We discuss this issue at the end of this section. [REDACTED]

1. The San Diego FBI's preliminary investigation of Bayoumi

As discussed above, Bayoumi is a Saudi national who in January 2000 had been living in the United States for approximately six years, was well-paid by a Saudi company that contracted with the Saudi government, and was involved in setting up mosques in the San Diego area. Hazmi and Mihdhar met Bayoumi in Los Angeles approximately two weeks after entering the United States in January 2000. A few days later they moved to San Diego, where Bayoumi assisted them in obtaining an apartment in the complex where he lived. They lived in this complex for four months. [REDACTED]

FBI databases show that Bayoumi's name had first surfaced at the FBI in 1995 when he made a \$100 contribution to the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, which allegedly was a front organization for HAMAS. The FBI had an ongoing investigation of the Holy Land Foundation.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

Bayoumi's name resurfaced at the FBI on August 31, 1998, when his apartment manager contacted the FBI to report her suspicions regarding Bayoumi's activities. The manager reported that she had been notified by the U.S. Postal Inspection Service in March 1998 that Bayoumi had been sent a

[REDACTED]

“suspicious” package from the Middle East. According to the manager, the package had broken open and had a number of wires protruding from it. She reported further that the apartment complex maintenance man had noticed a number of wires protruding beneath the bathroom sink in Bayoumi’s master bedroom. She reported that there had been large meetings of men, who based upon their dress appeared to be Middle Eastern, gathering in Bayoumi’s apartment on weekend evenings. She also complained that several parking spots were being illegally used by the people gathering at Bayoumi’s apartment. [REDACTED]

On September 8, 1998, the San Diego FBI opened a preliminary inquiry on Bayoumi.²⁷⁸ The assigned agent checked FBI indices for further information regarding Bayoumi and asked the CIA to run traces, but she received no further information from these checks. The agent obtained Bayoumi’s rental application and resident file from the apartment complex. [REDACTED]

The agent contacted the U.S. Postal Inspection Service in reference to the alleged “suspicious” package sent to Bayoumi. A postal inspector advised the FBI agent that “suspicious” did not necessarily mean “nefarious,” and the vast majority of suspicious packages were benign. The postal inspector reviewed the report relating to the Bayoumi package and told the agent that the package had been deemed “suspicious” because it had no customs papers or appropriate postage and originated in Saudi Arabia. According to the report, there was no record of any wires protruding from the package, Bayoumi had retrieved the package, and it was no longer called a “suspect parcel.” [REDACTED]

According to the FBI agent, the apartment manager agreed to record the license plate numbers of the meeting participants. However, the manager later

²⁷⁸ As discussed in Chapter Two, in accordance with the Attorney General’s Foreign Counterintelligence Guidelines, a preliminary inquiry could be opened when there was information or allegations indicating that an individual is or may have been an international terrorist or a recruitment target of an international terrorist organization. Preliminary inquiries were permitted to remain open for 120 days and had to be closed unless the FBI obtained sufficient evidence to open a full field investigation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

advised the agent that meetings had dwindled to a few participants and then stopped all together. [REDACTED]

The agent asked fellow FBI agents to ask their "logical sources" for information regarding Bayoumi. The sources related the following concerning Bayoumi:

- Bayoumi was married with small children and had recently completed a master's degree program and he was looking for a Ph. D. program, but his test scores were too low. He was approximately 30 years old and unemployed. [REDACTED]
- Bayoumi was a Saudi who regularly attended the ICSD (Islamic Center of San Diego). He was married with children and was working on a master's or other advanced degree. [REDACTED]
- Bayoumi reportedly delivered \$400,000 to the Islamic Kurdish community in El Cajon, California in order to build a mosque. Source opined Bayoumi "must be an agent of a foreign power or an agent of Saudi Arabia." [REDACTED]
- Bayoumi was in the U.S. on a student visa but was applying for a green card. Bayoumi claimed to have a master's degree and was working on a Ph. D. His father was sending him \$3,000 a month for support while he was in school. [REDACTED]

The FBI agent also contacted the INS in reference to Bayoumi's immigration status. An INS special agent advised that Bayoumi was in the U.S. on an F-1 student visa, but his work visa had expired. However, the INS reported that his visa could be renewed. [REDACTED]

The FBI agent [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] preliminary investigation of Bayoumi to await the results of various information checks but received no further substantive information. According to the agent, the only remaining option was to conduct an interview of Bayoumi. After her supervisor consulted with fellow FBI agents who were working on a large, sensitive counterterrorism investigation involving the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the supervisor instructed the agent not to conduct the subject

[REDACTED]

interview of Bayoumi.²⁷⁹ The agent told the OIG that she did not believe the decision was inappropriate based on the potential effect of such an interview on the other sensitive investigation.²⁸⁰ [REDACTED]

On June 10, 1999, the FBI closed its preliminary inquiry on Bayoumi, and he was no longer actively under investigation by the FBI. [REDACTED]

The FBI case agent told the OIG that she had no concrete information linking Bayoumi to any terrorist activities. She stated that the allegations that gave rise to the preliminary investigation were not substantiated. With respect to the source reporting that Bayoumi had received large sums of money from overseas, the case agent explained it was not unusual for foreign students, especially from Saudi Arabia, to regularly receive money, even large sums of money. Therefore, the case agent did not consider this to be inherently suspicious. The agent's squad supervisor at the time and other agents on the squad also told the OIG that it was not unusual or suspicious for Saudi students to have received large sums of money from Saudi Arabia. [REDACTED]

As stated above, one source had provided unverified information that Bayoumi could potentially be a Saudi intelligence operative or source. According to the agent, Bayoumi was allegedly very involved and interested in Saudi affairs in San Diego, and this probably led to the suspicions about Bayoumi's connection to the Saudi government. However, the agent told the OIG that Saudi Arabia was not listed as a threat country and the Saudis were considered allies of the United States.²⁸¹ Therefore, Bayoumi's potential

²⁷⁹ The file indicates that the decision not to conduct an interview was due to the (A), (G), (J-1) investigation. This investigation into the Holy Land Foundation included a (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Because Bayoumi had previously made a small contribution to the Holy Land Foundation, and he was very active in the community, the FBI believed that the benefits of interviewing Bayoumi did not justify the risk to the proposed operation. [REDACTED]

²⁸⁰ The case agent explained that subject interviews are (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) to obtain information that could produce further investigative leads [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]

²⁸¹ Country threats are defined by the FBI as foreign governments or entities whose intelligence activities are so hostile, or of such concern, to the national security of the United (continued)

[REDACTED]

involvement with the Saudi Arabian government would not have affected the FBI's decision to close the preliminary inquiry. ■

The squad supervisor at the time of our investigation, who had been an agent on the squad for several years, told the OIG that before September 11, the Saudi Arabian government was considered an ally of the United States and that a report of an individual being an agent of the Saudi government would not have been considered a priority. Other agents on the squad also said that a source reporting that an individual was an agent of the Saudi government would not have been cause for concern because the Saudi government was considered an ally of the United States. ■

In addition, the case agent explained that with only a preliminary inquiry open, more intrusive investigative techniques could not be conducted because of the restrictions of the Attorney General FCI Guidelines in effect at the time. No meaningful surveillance could be conducted, no bank records or other financial records could be sought, and very little investigative activity beyond fully identifying the individual could be done under the portion of the Guidelines that covered preliminary inquiries. The case agent contended that it was not uncommon for preliminary inquiries to be closed without sufficient information to justify the opening of a full field investigation. ■

In sum, we do not believe that the FBI's actions with regard to Bayoumi and its decision to close the preliminary inquiry were inappropriate. The agent conducted logical investigative steps that were permitted under the Attorney General Guidelines in effect at the time, such as checking FBI records for information, asking other intelligence agencies for information about the subject, and asking agents to query their sources about the subject, but the agent did not uncover any information to support the allegations. The Guidelines did not permit the case agent to engage in more intrusive investigative techniques, such as a clandestine search of Bayoumi's property,

(continued)

States that counterintelligence or monitoring activities directed against such countries are warranted. ■

[REDACTED]

obtaining his telephone or financial records, or secretly recording his conversations. [REDACTED]

Although the Attorney General Guidelines would have permitted a subject interview of Bayoumi prior to closing the preliminary inquiry, the decision not to conduct an interview appeared warranted, given its possible effect on an ongoing significant investigation. [REDACTED]

2. The FBI's handling of the informational asset [REDACTED]

As described above, in May 2000 Hazmi and Mihdhar began renting a room in the home of an FBI informational asset. FBI San Diego Special Agent (S) [REDACTED] was the asset's control agent since the asset was opened in 1994. The asset had provided the FBI with significant information over the years and was considered a reliable source. He was well known in the Muslim community, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]. He often rented rooms in his house to Muslim men in the community who needed temporary housing. At the time that Hazmi and Mihdhar moved in with him, he had two other individuals renting rooms in his house. Mihdhar lived with the asset until June 10, 2000, when he left the United States, and Hazmi remained as a boarder at the asset's home until December 2000. [REDACTED]

According to (S) [REDACTED] the asset told (S) [REDACTED] that two young Saudis who had recently come to the United States to visit and study had moved in as boarders. The asset described them as good Muslims who often went to the mosque and prayed. The asset provided (S) [REDACTED] with their first names but little other identifying information. (S) [REDACTED] did not obtain any additional information from the asset about the boarders, such as their last names, and he did not conduct any investigation of them. [REDACTED]

Had (S) [REDACTED] pursued information about Hazmi and Mihdhar, he might have uncovered the CIA information about them. In addition, he might have created a record in FBI computer systems about Hazmi and Mihdhar's presence in San Diego, which would have provided the FBI with additional information and avenues of investigation when it began to search for them in

[REDACTED]

should have been obtained and documented. Some agents stated that they would have pursued more information about boarders living with an informational asset, while others stated that they would not have. Some of the agents stated that they would have noted the fact of the informational asset having boarders in his file. Some agents stated that they would have documented the identities of the roommates in an EC that would have been uploaded to ACS. However, former San Diego Division Special Agent in Charge William Gore told the OIG that he "did not believe anything had been done wrong" in the handling of the informational asset and he did not fault (S) for not obtaining the information. [REDACTED]

While we recognize that no FBI policy addressed this issue and there was a lack of consensus on what should have been done in a situation like this, we believe that it would have been a better practice for (S) to have questioned the informational asset about his boarders and obtained their full identities. (S) was aware that Hazmi and Mihdhar were relative strangers to the informational asset, and that they were not friends, family, or long-time associates of the asset. (S) also was aware that the asset had no direct knowledge of Hazmi and Mihdhar's backgrounds and could not vouch for their character. Moreover, the boarders in the asset's home were in a position to put the asset and the information he supplied to the FBI in jeopardy. Therefore, prudence and operational security would suggest that information about persons living with the asset should have been sought, at least to the extent of learning and documenting their names, and perhaps running a records check on them. [REDACTED]

If (S) had asked more questions about the asset's boarders, he also may have acquired enough information to pursue further inquiry. For example, the asset has stated after the September 11 attacks that Hazmi and Mihdhar did not make telephone calls from his house, and that in retrospect he found this behavior to be suspicious. The asset also stated after September 11 that he had told Hazmi to stay away from Bayoumi because of his alleged association with the Saudi government. Therefore, if (S) had asked the asset a few more questions about Hazmi and Mihdhar and acquired this kind of information, it

[REDACTED]

may have led (S) to conduct further inquiries, particularly since Bayoumi had been the subject of an FBI preliminary inquiry.²⁸⁴ [REDACTED]

Moreover, while no specific FBI policy required agents to obtain information about persons living in a house with an informational asset, FBI policies required control agents to continuously evaluate the credibility of their informational assets. Before informational assets are approved, they are required to undergo a background investigation to assess their suitability, credibility, and "bona fides."²⁸⁵ Certain minimum checks were required, such as a check of FBI indices, local criminal checks, and CIA traces. The policy provided that additional checks "may be deemed necessary," such as querying other assets and running indices checks on immediate family members. In addition, FBI policy provided that an asset's bona fides "should be continually addressed," even after the initial assessment was completed. [REDACTED]

More specifically, the FBI field office is required to conduct a yearly evaluation of each informational asset and provide the evaluation report to FBI Headquarters. This report is required to contain, among other things, the FBI's number of contacts with the informational asset during the reporting period, a summary of the most significant information furnished by the informational asset, the number of preliminary inquiries and full investigations that were opened based on information provided by the informational asset, and "steps that have been taken to establish asset bona fides since last evaluation." Although (S) would not have been required to obtain additional information about his informational asset's boarders to complete this report, the FBI's policy of continually vetting the credibility of its assets permitted (S) to seek more information about Hazmi and Mihdhar and the other boarders from

²⁸⁴ The (A), (G), (J-1) asset was one of the sources who had been queried as part of the Bayoumi preliminary inquiry. Thus, the (A), (G), (J-1) asset knew that Bayoumi had at one time been a person of interest to the FBI. [REDACTED]

²⁸⁵ The FBI defines "bona fides" to mean that the asset or informational asset "is who he/she says he/she is;" that the asset "has the position or access the asset claims to have;" and that the asset "is not working for or reporting to a foreign intelligence service or international terrorist organization without the knowledge of the FBI." [REDACTED]

Primary Case: [REDACTED] (F)
Case Title: [REDACTED] OPERATION ENCORE - MOHDAR
Serial Number: (F) [REDACTED]

Serialized: 09/14/2017

Category: Full Investigation
Initiated: 10/26/2007

Serial #: (F) [REDACTED]
Type: FD542

From: NEW YORK
To: COUNTERTERRORISM
NEW YORK
(A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]
LOS ANGELES
SAN DIEGO

Document Title:
[REDACTED] TO REPORT INFORMATION GARNERED DURING A DEBRIEFING

Approval Date: (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Contents

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism Attn: [REDACTED] (G)
[REDACTED] (S)

(A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] Attn: [REDACTED] (S)

San Diego Attn: [REDACTED] (S)

Los Angeles Attn: [REDACTED] (S)

New York Attn: [REDACTED] (G)

From: New York
(G) [REDACTED]
Contact: Det. [REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (S)

Approved By: [REDACTED] (S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED] (S)

Case ID #: [REDACTED] (F)
[REDACTED] (F)

Title: [REDACTED] OPERATION ENCORE
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [REDACTED] To report information garnered during a debriefing
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) confidential human source [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) (CHS).

[REDACTED] (G)

Enclosure(s): [REDACTED] Photocopy of photographs of [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) KHALLAD BIN ATTASH, OMAR AL-BAYOUMI and ANWAR
AULAQI.

Details: [REDACTED] On [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) CHS was debriefed in [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (S) and [REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (S) and FBI New York JTTF TFO [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] Los Angeles and the King Fahad Mosque

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)
[REDACTED] (O-1)

In response to their request, FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY was sent to be the head imam at the KFM (NFI). Although the request for an imam appears to have been channeled through the Saudi Arabian government, it is unclear at this point the exact succession of events.

[REDACTED] To facilitate AL-THUMAIRY's entry into the U.S., AL-THUMAIRY was designated an Islamic Affairs Attache in the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs Office at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C.

(O-1)

By the latter half of 1999, CHS advised that the KFM and its members had started to become more "radical." AL-THUMAIRY had brought in another imam, MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA, who according to CHS was "extremely radical" in his religious views. Around this same time, i.e the end of 1999, the KFM received a phone call from an individual in Malaysia. According to (O-1)

(O-1) the caller wanted to speak with AL-THUMAIRY. (O-1)

(O-1) this phone call was regarding the imminent arrival of "two brothers...who needed their assistance." Those "two brothers" were, according to CHS, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR.

CHS advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were picked up from the airport by an individual that CHS called the (A),(G),(J-1) Although, according to CHS, this individual was (A),(G),(J-1) but merely an individual who, when tasked by AL-THUMAIRY, would often provide transportation or perform other small tasks for individuals visiting the KFM (O-1)

(P) NOTE: the photograph is of (P) and is attached hereto).

Prior to the arrival of AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, AL-THUMAIRY provided (P) their flight information. (P) picked AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR up from the airport and brought them to the KFM, where they first met AL-THUMAIRY. (A),(G),(J-1)

(A),(G),(J-1) (O-1) (A),(G),(J-1) (A),(G),(J-1) During AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR's time in Los Angeles, (P) was asked by AL-THUMAIRY to provide assistance to them in whatever capacity they should need it.

According to CHS, members of the KFM would often

use the MEDITERRANEAN RESTAURANT and a nearby (to the KFM) STARBUCKS COFFEE as meeting places. (O-1) (O-1) showing AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR the location of the MEDITERRANEAN RESTAURANT (see recent interview of (P) by FBI New York on (P) (F)

CHS did not have a clear understanding of AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR's progression from Los Angeles to San Diego nor the reasons behind such a move. (O-1)

CHS positively identified the individual in the second photo as someone who had been to Los Angeles and the KFM (NOTE: the photograph is of KHALLAD BIN ATTASH and is attached hereto). (O-1)

(O-1) CHS stated that this individual in the photograph had a "limp" or a "bad leg" (NOTE: BIN ATTASH has a prosthetic leg.)

San Diego

CHS positively identified the individual in the third photograph as AL-BAYOUMI (NOTE: the photograph is of OMAR AL-BAYOUMI and is attached hereto). CHS stated that AL-BAYOUMI was at the KFM every Friday for prayers, adding that AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMAIRY were acquaintances. CHS advised that AL-THUMAIRY asked AL-BAYOUMI to take care of AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI was with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR on multiple occasions while AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were living in Los Angeles. (O-1) (O-1) AL-BAYOUMI, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were together at the MEDITERRANEAN RESTAURANT and also at the nearby STARBUCKS COFFEE. (O-1)

CHS positively identified the individual in the fourth photograph as ANWAR AULAQI (NOTE: the photograph is of ANWAR AULAQI and is attached hereto). CHS advised that AL-THUMAIRY also asked AULAQI to assist AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR while they were in San Diego. (O-1)

Accomplishment Information:

(G)

Claimed By:

SSN: (S)

Name: (S)

Squad: (G)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

(G)

Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

(A), (G), (J-1)

AT (G)

Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

SAN DIEGO

AT (G)

Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

LOS ANGELES

(G)

Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Discretionary)

NEW YORK

(G)

Consider information contained herein for possible IIR dissemination; coordinate with (G)

Serial #: (F)

Type: (G)

From: WASHINGTON FIELD

To: NEW YORK

Document Title: (A), (G), (J-1)

Approval Date: (A), (G), (J-1)/2009

Classification: (G)

Contents

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(A), (G), (J-1) DOCUMENT

Form Classification: (G)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Date: 2009-(G)

Case Agent Name: (S)

Field Office: Washington

Squad: (G)

Date of Contact: (A), (G), (J-1)

Participants/Witnesses: (S)

Type of Contact: In Person

Location

Country: UNITED STATES

City (G)

State: (G)

Date of Report (A), (G), (J-1)

Substantive Case File Number: (F)

(A), (G), (J-1) Reporting:

(A), (G), (J-1) MUSSAED AL-JARRAH was at the EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

(EKSA) starting in the early 1990s. He was assigned to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. Originally AL-JARRAH started at the EKSA as an administrative person

(A), (G), (J-1)

EO14040-000524

[REDACTED] In 1995, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) IT was at this point that AL-JARRAH
became very engaged with U.S. Islamic centers throughout the U.S. (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) and also became very involved in the dealing of the
ISLAMIC INSTITUTE OF ARABIC AND ISLAMIC STUDIES (IIASA), a Saudi university in
Falls Church, VA that was sponsored by the EKSA, but was owned and managed by
IMAM UNIVESITY in Riyadh.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AL-JARRAH dealt with KHALIL KHALIL with regard to building and
management of the KING FAHD mosque in Los Angles, CA. AL-JARRAH was very close
to him, and coordinated everything through him with regard to the mosque and
the EKSA.

[REDACTED] AL-JARRAH was also dealing with someone in San Diego with regard to the
Saudi sponsored mosque there, but [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) doesnt recall his name.

[REDACTED] On 01/21/2004, AL-JARRAH was stopped and held in secondary inspection at
JFK airport in New York for eight hours. This was the day before the Saudi 16,
which were sixteen Saudi teachers that were at the IIASA who [REDACTED] (J-3)
but were stripped of their diplomatic status by the USG and sent back to Saudi
Arabia. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] After this encounter in New York, AL-JARRAH felt he was being watched,
and in early 2005, he was re-assigned back to Saudi Arabia.

[REDACTED] From 2004-2006, AL-JARRAH traveled to and from the U.S several times and
in particular traveled to California and Oregon. AL-JARRAH claimed to have
relatives in both states, and [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) believes that AL-JARRAH has a brother in
Oregon.

AL-JARRAH utilized (P) a Palestinian national residing in Virginia, to facilitate things for him in his travels to the U.S. (A), (G), (J-1) believes that AL-JARRAH had a romantic relationship with (P) sister in the U.S.

AL-JARRAH is now currently assigned to the Saudi embassy in Kula Lumpur, Maylasia. He is in charge of Saudi student groups.

AL-JARRAHs current contact information:

(P) (Malaysia cell phone)

(P) (Saudi cell phone)

(P)

Serial #: (F)
Type: TELETYPE

From: COUNTERTERRORISM
To: (O-1)

Document Title: TO REQUEST ACCESS TO (O-1)

Approval Date: (A, G, J-1) 2010

Classification: (O-1)

Contents

VZCZCFBA685

PP RUEAIIA

DE RUCNFB #0017 0631550

ZNY SSSSS

(A),(G),(J-1) 10

FM FBI WASHINGTON DC

(O-1)

BT

(A), (G), (J-1)

(O-1)

SUBJECT: (A),(G),(J-1) TO REQUEST FBI ACCESS
(O-1) IN FURTHERANCE OF OPERATION ENCORE.

DETAILS: (O-1) ON (A),(G),(J-1) 2010, JOINT (O-1) SOURCE (O-1)
(O-1) WAS DEBRIEFED BY THE FBI. (O-1)
(O-1) OF OPERATION ENCORE SUBJECT MUSAED AL-JARRAH. (O-1)
(O-1) AL-JARRAH USED TO WORK IN THE ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON,
D.C. AL-JARRAH WAS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY,
PREVIOUSLY IMAM AT THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE IN CALIFORNIA, DURING
THEIR TIME IN THE UNITED STATES. AL-THUMAIRY WAS DESCRIBED BY
(O-1) AS BEING KIND, KNOWLEDGEABLE, AND SMART, AND THAT HE DID
NOT
APPEAR TO BE AN EXTREMIST.
HOWEVER, AL-THUMAIRY DID HELP TO BRING A MORE RADICAL INDIVIDUAL
INTO THE MOSQUE, MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA, IN LATE 2000 OR 2001.
(NOTE: MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA WAS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER AT THE
SAUDI ARABIAN CONSULATE IN LOS ANGELES. HE WAS ALSO A CLOSE
ASSOCIATE OF OPERATION ENCORE SUBJECT FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, FORMER
IMAM AT THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE IN CALIFORNIA.
AL-MUHANNA DEPARTED THE US IN 2003.)

EO14040-000527

(O-1) RECOGNIZED PHOTOGRAPHS OF OPERATION ENCORE SUBJECTS ADEL AL SADHAN AND MUTAIB AL SUDAIRY, BUT WAS UNABLE TO RECALL THEIR NAMES. (O-1) STATED AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY WORKED FOR AL-JARRAH, AND (O-1) BELIEVES THEY SPOKE ENGLISH WELL. DURING THE 2000-2001 TIME FRAME, THERE WERE SEVERAL SAUDI MALES, LIKE AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY, WHO WOULD TRAVEL TO CALIFORNIA PERIODICALLY. MANY OF THEM WOULD GO TO CAMPS IN ARIZONA (NFI); SOME OF THEM CAME DIRECTLY FROM SAUDI ARABIA, WHILE OTHERS CAME FROM OTHER LOCATIONS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. (O-1) ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 17 INDIVIDUALS IN THIS GROUP. AL-THUMAIRY ALWAYS MET THEM AT A HOUSE TO PRAY, BUT NOT AT THE MOSQUE, EXCEPT FOR FRIDAY PRAYERS. MANY AT THE KING FAHD MOSQUE BECAME CONCERNED ABOUT THIS UNUSUAL TREND, AND THE FACT THAT THE MOSQUE HAD NO CONTROL OVER THE TRAVELERS.

(O-1) (O-1) MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT AL SADHAN, AL SUDAIRY, AL-JARRAH AND THEIR ASSOCIATES DURING THE TIME THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, COINCIDING WITH EVENTS SURROUNDING HIJACKERS AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR'S PRE-9/11 ACTIVITIES.

(O-1)

(NOTE: ACCORDING TO HIS I-94 RECORD, ABDULLAH AL-JRAITHEN, DATE OF BIRTH (P) 1961, COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP AND RESIDENCE SAUDI ARABIA, PASSPORT NUMBER (P) TRAVELED BY AIR TO PORT OF ENTRY NEW YORK ON 12 DECEMBER 1999. (J-3)

(J-3) AL-JRAITHEN CONTINUED TO LOS ANGELES, LISTING "HOLIDAY INN, LOS ANGELES" AS HIS INTENDED DESTINATION. AL-JRAITHEN AND OPERATION ENCORE SUBJECT OMAR AL-BAYOUMI CHECKED INTO A TRAVELODGE HOTEL TOGETHER IN CULVER CITY, CALIFORNIA ON 20 DECEMBER 1999 AND CHECKED OUT THE NEXT DAY. THIS TRAVELODGE HOTEL WAS REPORTEDLY OFTEN USED BY THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE TO HOUSE VISITORS. TO DATE, NO DEPARTURE INFORMATION HAS BEEN LOCATED FOR AL-JRAITHEN. NO FURTHER EVIDENCE

OF HIS PRESENCE IN THE U.S. OR OVERSEAS EXISTS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ABDULLAH AL-JRAITHEN IS A FICTITIOUS NAME.)

(O-1)

CONSEQUENTLY, THE FBI IS SEEKING TO IMMEDIATELY CONDUCT A JOINT INTERVIEW WITH (O-1) FOR (A),(G),(J-1) PURPOSES, FACILITATED AND ATTENDED BY (O-1)

(O-1) THE FBI IS WILLING TO CONDUCT THE (A),(G),(J-1) OF (A),(G),(J-1)

THE FBI IS PROVIDING THIS INFORMATION TO YOUR AGENCY FOR LEAD PURPOSES. AUTHORIZATION FOR FURTHER DISSEMINATION TO OTHER US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND/OR FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS MUST BE PROVIDED BY FBI HEADQUARTERS.

POC FOR THIS MATTER AT THE FBI IS IA (S) AT (G) OR SSA (S)

(F)



[Redacted]

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

File No. [Redacted] (F)

Office of the Legal Attaché
United States Embassy

[Redacted] (G)

28 March 2011

[Redacted] (G)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Re: Mohdar Abdullah

Dear Liaison Officer,

[Redacted] (F)

[Redacted] The FBI would like to inform your service of a [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) for an ongoing investigation who has requested to meet with the FBI in the near future. The FBI requests your cooperation in allowing us to conduct this interview in [Redacted] (G) in approximately two (2) weeks.

[Redacted] For background, [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Mohdar Abdullah, aka Mihdar Mohammad al-Mihdar Zaid, hereinafter Mohdar, met and became acquainted with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar in the year 2000 while residing in San Diego, California. Mohdar alleged that he was introduced to the hijackers by Saudi citizen Omar al-Bayoumi at a mosque in San Diego. Mohdar was tasked by al-Bayoumi to acclimate the hijackers to United States, particularly San Diego, and help them in their personal affairs.

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

When al-Bayoumi was interviewed in 2003, he claimed that he did not introduce either al-Mihdhar or al-Hazmi to Mohdar, but believed that they knew each other from the Masjid al-Ribat in San Diego, California.

[REDACTED] According to information provided to the FBI during a series of interviews with Mohdar between 2001 and 2004, which has been neither corroborated nor disproved, Mohdar helped al-Hazmi acquire a California drivers license, made inquiries in obtaining a social security card, made telephone calls on behalf of both hijackers to enroll in flight lessons at a flight school in Florida, made calls to a community college in San Diego to enroll al-Hazmi in a computer class, and helped al-Hazmi enroll in an English language school in San Diego. Mohdar was also employed at a Texaco gas station in San Diego, which was the same gas station where al-Hazmi worked for a three week period in September of 2000.

[REDACTED] On 09/21/2001, Mohdar was arrested on a material witness warrant regarding his association with and assistance to the hijackers. [REDACTED] (D)

[REDACTED] Subsequently, the FBI took Mohdar into custody and named him in a two-count indictment, charging him with making false statements on U.S. immigration documents and to immigration officials. Mohdar entered into a guilty plea, which was used in a U.S. immigration removal proceeding. On 05/21/2004, Mohdar was removed from the United States and deported to Sanaa, Yemen, where he presently resides.

[REDACTED] The FBI has been in recent discussions with Mohdar, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) to arrange an interview. With the assistance of [REDACTED] (G) authorities, the FBI intends to interview Mohdar in [REDACTED] (G) to gain additional information regarding his past activity related to terrorism and in an effort to obtain criminal indictments against other 9/11 related individuals. The interview will cover a variety of topics not previously known to the FBI, to include the activities and facilitation of the 9/11 hijackers while in Southern California.

[REDACTED] The FBI proposes this interview be conducted in [REDACTED] (G) by FBI agents and in conjunction with our Legat office in [REDACTED] (G). [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Further, the FBI will address any of your service's questions, concerns, or requirements as they relate to Mohdar and our requested interview.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As always, your assistance in counterterrorism matters is greatly appreciated. We would welcome any additional information your Government has developed in regards to this matter.

Sincerely,

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)
Legal Attache

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: (A), (G), (J-1) / 2003

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: (S), (G)

(A), (G), (J-1)
Los Angeles

From: Washington Field

(G)
(S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: To provide information from (O-1) source.

(G)

Preliminary Inquiry Instituted: 02/24/2003, set to expire 06/22/2003.

Details: The following information was provided to WFO on or about (A), (G), (J-1) / 03 from a representative of the (O-1)

(O-1) asset reported in March 2003 that MUSAED AL-JARRAH is the assistant director of Islamic Affairs at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) in WDC.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

To: C From: Washington Field
Re: (F) [REDACTED], (A), (G), (J-1) 2003

(O-1) that AL-JARRAH is heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the U.S., specifically with the Southern California based network of MUHAMMAD AL-MUHANNAH and FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH is in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the U.S. The recent removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1) AL-JARRAH may be trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the U.S. through his position at the EKSA. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) into the U.S. and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the U.S. through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the U.S. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the U.S. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) AL-JARRAH travels in and around the U.S. visiting the Saudi imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the U.S. Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

Source is a (O-1) source operated by SA (A), (G), (J-1), (S)

No dissemination outside the FBI should occur without first consulting (S)

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] nterintelligence, Washington Field
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], (A), (G), (J-1), 2003

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Discretionary)

(A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] For information. File copy of communication (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED], if desired.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CA

[REDACTED] For information. Read and clear.

◆◆

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/12/2009

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: (G) [Redacted]
(S) [Redacted]
(S) [Redacted]

International Operations

Attn: (G) [Redacted]

Riyadh

Attn: (G) [Redacted]

San Diego

Attn: (S) [Redacted]

New York

Attn: (S) [Redacted]

From: New York

(G) [Redacted]
Contact: (S) [Redacted]

Approved By: (S) [Redacted]

Drafted By: (S) [Redacted]

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F) [Redacted]

Title: [Redacted] OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI
(A), (G), (J-1) [Redacted]

[Redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
(A), (G), (J-1) [Redacted]

[Redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
(A), (G), (J-1) [Redacted]

Synopsis: [Redacted] Initiate a Full Investigation (FI) on OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI.

[Redacted] (G) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Enclosure(s): [REDACTED] 1 - Opening LHM

Full Investigation Initiated: 08/12/2009

Reference: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] -OPERATION ENCORE, (F) [REDACTED]
(F) [REDACTED] - FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, (F) [REDACTED]

Details: [REDACTED] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case.

[REDACTED] Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened. Writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[REDACTED] Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[REDACTED] Results: Over the past two years, writers have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] /2009

plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

Exploitation of Muslim Community: (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-providing individual, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see [REDACTED] (F)

(F) [REDACTED] At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-providing individual or to whom the tazkia would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] believed that it likely would have involved someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] It is important to note that the individual to whom the tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, [REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[REDACTED] One individual meeting such description who is also reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, (F) [REDACTED] AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F) [REDACTED] Additional

documentation [REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AL-THUMARY was previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division based on his association with another individual believed to have provided assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI identified as OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. Telephone analysis shows a connection between AL-THUMAIRY, the two hijackers, and AL-BAYOUMI. A review of PENTTBOM case file does

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000538

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY or AL BAYOUMI as a potential "tazkia" contacts for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to have been unknown at such time.

[REDACTED] OMAR AHMED MUSTAFA AL-BAYOUMI, date of birth (P-1) 1957, place of birth Alhajra, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian passport (P-1) [REDACTED] social security account number (P-1) [REDACTED] first came to the attention of the FBI in 1998 when a complainant telephonically contacted FBI San Diego on 08/31/1998 to report information regarding AL-BAYOUMI and his wife MANAL BAGADER (reference (F) [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] The complainant advised that AL-BAYOUMI had received a suspicious package from the Middle East on 03/03/1998. In addition, the complainant advised that there had been large gatherings of males in the apartment of AL-BAYOUMI. As a result of these reports, a preliminary inquiry was initiated on AL-BAYOUMI on 09/08/1998.

[REDACTED] The preliminary inquiry did not uncover any information regarding AL-BAYOUMI to justify conversion into a full investigation. When interviewed, the local Postal Inspector advised that the package was listed as "suspicious" because it arrived without postage or paperwork. Therefore, upon completion of the preliminary inquiry, the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI was closed on 06/07/1999 (reference (F) [REDACTED]).

[REDACTED] Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that two of the hijackers aboard AA77, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, had resided at Parkwood Apartments, (P) [REDACTED], 6401 Mount Ada Road (also listed as 6333 Mount Ada Road), San Diego, California, between 02/2000 and 05/2000. Rental records obtained from Parkwood Apartments revealed that AL-BAYOUMI had co-signed the apartment lease agreement for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR.

Upon receipt of this information, efforts commenced to fully identify and locate AL-BAYOUMI. AL-BAYOUMI was located in

(C-1) [REDACTED]

(C-1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000539

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 08/12/2009

(C-1)

AL-BAYOUMI moved from England to Saudi Arabia in 08/2002 and was interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith in approximately 10/2002. In 08/2003, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed in Saudi Arabia by members of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team (reference (F)). AL-BAYOUMI was also interviewed in Saudi Arabia by representatives of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission"), in the presence of the FBI, in 10/2003.

FBI investigation has determined that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI possibly assisted NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) upon their arrival in the San Diego, California, area in early 02/2000. In response to interviews conducted and intelligence gathering, and to provide a comprehensive summary of the investigation to date, the following details of the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI are provided. These details include information garnered from the interviews of AL-BAYOUMI conducted by the FBI, the Saudi Mabahith, and (C-1) as well as independent investigation into the associations and activities of AL-BAYOUMI while residing in the United States.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

AL-BAYOUMI first traveled to the United States on 08/01/1993 using Saudi Arabian passport # (P-1). On 06/06/1995, AL-BAYOUMI returned to the United States at Los Angeles, California. AL-BAYOUMI entered at that time on a (J-3) using Saudi Arabian passport # (P-1) with an intended address of (P) Beadnell Way, Apartment (P), San Diego, California (reference (F)). AL-BAYOUMI and his family resided at this address until relocating to (P) Beadnell Way, Apartment (P) San Diego, California, in 02/1996. In the summer of 1999, AL-BAYOUMI and his family moved to Parkwood Apartments, (P) (P) Mount Ada Road, San Diego, California.

AL-BAYOUMI returned to Saudi Arabia from 03/21/2000 to 05/31/2000. AL-BAYOUMI then resided with his family in San Diego until the fall of 2000, at which time he relocated to England and enrolled at Aston University in Birmingham. AL-BAYOUMI's wife and children remained in San Diego until 06/2001 when they moved to join AL-BAYOUMI in England. AL-BAYOUMI again traveled to Saudi Arabia from 06/26/2001 to 07/16/2001, then returned to Birmingham, England,

EO14040-000540

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

where he and his family resided until moving to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 08/2002.

EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION OF AL-BAYOUMI

[REDACTED] Since approximately 1977, AL-BAYOUMI has been employed with the Saudi Arabian Presidency of Civil Aviation (PCA). Employment records indicate that AL-BAYOUMI was employed from 1977 to 1981 as an Aviation Fees Checker; from 1981 to 1982 as a Budget Clerk; from 1982 to 1986 as an Accounts Checker; from 1986 to 1992 as a Section Head; and from 1992 to 1995 as an Accountant (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). In 1995, AL-BAYOUMI traveled to the United States to attend English language school and graduate school in California. While in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI retained his employment with the PCA through a process known as "Saudization", a national initiative in Saudi Arabia to educate Saudi Arabian citizens in order for citizens to retain and/or assume positions within the workforce (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). Based on this program, AL-BAYOUMI was reassigned as a Senior Data Processing Technician at the Dallah Avco Trans Arabia Company (Dallah Avco), a contractor of the PCA.

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI had graduated from King Abdul Aziz University in 08/1988 with a Bachelor's degree in Administrative Science. Upon his arrival in the United States in 1995, AL-BAYOUMI attended English classes at the American Language Institute at San Diego State University and then enrolled at West Coast University (WCU). After WCU closed down, AL-BAYOUMI enrolled at United States International University (now known as Alliant International University) in 01/1997. AL-BAYOUMI graduated from United States International University in 12/1997 with a Master's degree in International Business Administration (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). [REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI subsequently enrolled in the Keller Graduate School/Becker CPA Review, where he attended CPA review classes in 1998 and 1999 (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). [REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI did not complete either of these classes and therefore did not receive any credits. In 03/2000, AL-BAYOUMI obtained a certificate for attendance at George Washington University, ESI International Project Management seminar.

[REDACTED] While attending school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive a salary. In addition to his base salary, AL-BAYOUMI also received an allowance for housing, transportation, and other expenses. In 04/2000, this allowance increased from 1,742 Saudi Riyals (USD 465) to 14,271 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,805), and stayed at that level until 12/2000. In 01/2001, the allowance was slightly reduced to 12,852 Saudi Riyals (USD 3,427),

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000541

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

and remained at this level until the allowance payments ceased in 08/2001 [Note: the time frame of increased payments to AL-BAYOUMI does not correspond to the dates that hijackers NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR resided in San Diego]. Review of employment records obtained from the PCA indicates that AL-BAYOUMI received a promotion in 04/2000, and his contract status also was changed from "single" to "married" at that time. As a result, his salary and allowance were both increased.

[REDACTED] When applying for school in the United States, AL-BAYOUMI had provided a letter from [REDACTED] (P) stating that AL-BAYOUMI was being supported while in the United States. (P) [REDACTED] was also listed as "sponsor" on AL-BAYOUMI's Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Form I-20. When interviewed, [REDACTED] (P) owner of [REDACTED] (P), advised that [REDACTED] (P) had been a subcontractor of Dallah Avco and the PCA and that he was asked to provide the letter of support concerning AL-BAYOUMI. Review of employment records during the time that AL-BAYOUMI was in the United States indicated that AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive his salary and allowance through Dallah Avco.

[REDACTED] In addition to attending school in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI acted as the manager/facilities supervisor of the Al Medina Al-Munarawah Mosque, also known as the Kurdish Islamic Center, 511 South Magnolia, El Cajon, California. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he had been contacted by SAAD AL-HABIB regarding the local mosque used by the Kurdish population. AL-HABIB, a Saudi Arabian who had attended school in San Diego, informed AL-BAYOUMI that he was interested in funding a new mosque for the Kurdish community because the mosque was located in a small building without a parking lot. AL-HABIB asked AL-BAYOUMI to assist in acquiring a larger building to house the mosque, to which AL-BAYOUMI agreed. AL-BAYOUMI subsequently looked for and obtained a building in El Cajon, California, that included a parking lot. AL-HABIB provided all of the money to AL-BAYOUMI to purchase the building, to include the USD 10,000 for which AL-BAYOUMI then wrote a check for the initial down payment. As manager/facilities supervisor, AL-BAYOUMI kept an office at the mosque. AL-BAYOUMI advised that the position was on a volunteer basis and that he was not paid for his work at the mosque.

VISIT TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN CONSULATE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

[REDACTED] On approximately 02/01/2000, AL-BAYOUMI traveled by car from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles in order to renew his passport. AL-BAYOUMI was accompanied on this trip by KAYSAN BIN DON, an associate from San Diego. BIN DON, (P) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000542

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

(P) [REDACTED], was invited by AL-BAYOUMI on the previous day to travel with him to Los Angeles (reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). A day or so before traveling to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI asked BIN DON if he wanted to accompany him, so that AL-BAYOUMI could take BIN DON to visit the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) (a well-known mosque, according to BIN DON). BIN DON stated that this trip would have been around the end of January as it was soon after the end of Ramadan (which ended in the middle of January in 2000) when they went to Los Angeles. Upon arriving at the Consulate, AL-BAYOUMI submitted his passport renewal documents and also obtained some Islamic books from the Islamic Affairs section to bring back to the mosque that he managed in San Diego. To date, the individual(s) with whom AL-BAYOUMI met at the Consulate are not known.

[REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] reference [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]

THE MEDITERRANEAN GOURMET RESTAURANT

[REDACTED] When inviting BIN DON to accompany him to Los Angeles, AL-BAYOUMI told BIN DON of a halal restaurant at which they could eat lunch following their visit to the Consulate. After leaving the Consulate the following day, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON went to the restaurant where they discovered that the restaurant had been converted into a Middle Eastern butcher shop that no longer served meals. The butcher shop employees recommended another nearby halal restaurant, the Mediterranean Gourmet, to which AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON proceeded on foot.

[REDACTED] While eating lunch at this second restaurant, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON met AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he overheard two males speaking Arabic in the restaurant. Thinking that they sounded from the Gulf region, AL-BAYOUMI introduced himself and asked the two males where they were from. The two males introduced themselves as KHALID and NAWAF, and stated that they were from Saudi Arabia and were in the United States to learn English but did not like living in Los Angeles because they were having a difficult time and did not know anyone. AL-BAYOUMI recommended San Diego as a nice place to live; he provided AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR with his telephone number and offered to help them if they ever traveled there. AL-BAYOUMI stated the meeting was approximately 5 minutes in length.

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

[REDACTED] During an interview of KAYSAN BIN DON by the writer on 8/2/2007 he advised that he and AL-BAYOUMI did the first prayer of the day at the ICSD and then around 10am or so they left for Los Angeles. BIN DON stated that he is sure they didn't get to Los Angeles until after 12 because he remembers discussing with AL-BAYOUMI a special allowance for traveling Muslims, which allows them to combine the second prayer (which takes place after the apex of the sun, i.e. around noon) and third prayer (which takes place a few hours after that during the winter months) of the day. BIN DON stated that they assumed they would have to do this since they were still on the road when they should have performed their second prayer.

[REDACTED] BIN DON stated that when they arrived in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, AL-BAYOUMI first drove around Santa Monica looking for a halal restaurant AL-BAYOUMI had eaten at before with his son. After failing to locate it, AL-BAYOUMI drove to the Saudi Consulate. At the consulate AL-BAYOUMI met with a male individual unknown to BIN DON and spoke with him in Arabic. BIN DON described this individual as being in his 40s or 50s, bald, a Tunisian citizen, and at that time was giving lectures at the KFM. BIN DON stated this unknown individual and AL-BAYOUMI embraced and then went into a room and closed the door. After approximately twenty minutes, AL-BAYOUMI emerged from the room and he and BIN DON subsequently left. BIN DON did not recall seeing AL-BAYOUMI's passport at such time but assumes he had it as that was the stated purpose of their trip to Los Angeles.

[REDACTED] Writers queried BIN DON to give an honest assessment of his Arabic language skills at the time. BIN DON in response held up his hand in the shape of a "zero." BIN DON added that he had basically no understanding besides being able to exchange "hello's" and "good bye's."

(P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After visiting the consulate, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON proceeded to the KFM. BIN DON advised that they did not attend an organized prayer session but merely prayed alone for five or ten minutes. Writers queried if AL-BAYOUMI showed BIN DON around the KFM, as that was ostensibly the reason BIN DON came to Los Angeles. BIN DON commented that they were in "hurry" because it had taken

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000544

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

so long to drive up to Los Angeles, so there wasn't time. Writers queried if BIN DON or AL-BAYOUMI was in "hurry," to which BIN DON replied, "I guess AL-BAYOUMI." BIN DON could not fully explain why they were in a hurry since they had already taken care of the visa issue, but offered that they had not eaten yet so they needed to hurry. Before leaving the KFM, AL-BAYOUMI spoke with an unknown individual. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON, stating that AL-BAYOUMI was asking for a suggestion of where to eat. AL-BAYOUMI translated that AL-BAYOUMI had been told there was a restaurant on "Venice Boulevard right around here."

[REDACTED] BIN DON and AL-BAYOUMI left the KFM and parked off of Venice Boulevard, just to the east of the two restaurants they entered. The first restaurant they entered was named, "something like 'Mediterranean Deli.'" Upon entering, AL-BAYOUMI spoke to the proprietor of the establishment in Arabic, which AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON as "he said they 'don't serve sit down meals.'"

AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON then walked a "couple of store fronts" to another restaurant that BIN DON believed was "in the same building" as the first restaurant. This restaurant was named "Mediterranean Restaurant," according to BIN DON. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON entered, went up to the counter, ordered and then sat at a table next to the front window while they waited for their food to be prepared.

[REDACTED] After approximately five to ten minutes, two men, BIN DON now knows to be AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR entered the restaurant and proceeded to the front counter. BIN DON described the front counter as being about "30 to 40 feet" away from the table at which he and AL-BAYOUMI were sitting. BIN DON advised that neither he nor AL-BAYOUMI could hear AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR talking from where they were sitting. BIN DON indicated that AL-BAYOUMI was staring at them from the time they entered the restaurant. BIN DON stated that he believed that this was because AL-BAYOUMI could not tell if the two men were Arab or Hispanic. Writers queried whether AL-BAYOUMI ever stated this or gave any information to indicate that this is why he was staring. BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI did not give any such indication but added that "that must have been why he was staring."

[REDACTED] BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI then went up to the counter and began talking with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. The three of them then proceeded to the front table near the window and sat down with BIN DON. BIN DON indicated that the entire conversation was in Arabic and so he was dependent on AL-BAYOUMI for any information as to topics being discussed. The three talked for thirty minutes to an hour and then exchanged telephone numbers. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were currently

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000545

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 08/12/2009

living in an apartment nearby but that he had invited them to come to San Diego since AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR did not like Los Angeles.

BIN DON added that he believed that AL-BAYOUMI gave his cell phone number and AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR gave a land-line number. These assumptions are based on the fact that "most Muslim men only give their cell numbers out," because they don't want to risk someone calling their home and their wife answering and the fact that BIN DON did not believe AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR had time to get a cell phone as they had been in the U.S. "only a couple of days."

[REDACTED] After exchanging phone numbers, the four separated with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR walking off together and AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON returning to their car. BIN DON stated that he did not see where or which direction AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR went. However, before returning to the car, AL-BAYOUMI wanted to stop at a small grocery store that was about fifty yards from the car. They walked around inside for a few minutes and then without buying anything, returned to the car.

[REDACTED] AL-BAYOUMI then drove back to the KFM, where he and BIN DON prayed for five to ten minutes. Again, this prayer was not part of an organized prayer session at the KFM. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON prayed alone and then left the KFM to return to San Diego. BIN DON guessed that it would have been after five o'clock and probably closer to six, as it was "fully dark" outside when they began the trip back to San Diego.

[REDACTED] These events are significant because it shows inconsistencies with AL-BAYOUMI'S account of the meeting between himself and the two hijackers. the most important of these is that during AL-BAYOUMI interview with the PENTTBOM team in Saudi Arabia, he states that he didn't know where the King Fahad Mosque was, and had never been there. The time of the meeting is in question also.

ARRIVAL OF AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR IN SAN DIEGO

[REDACTED] AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived in San Diego a few days after meeting AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON in the restaurant. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), 7050 Eckstrom Avenue, San Diego, California, and asked for him. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR informed AL-BAYOUMI that they were looking to obtain an apartment in the area. AL-BAYOUMI then directed them to the nearby Parkwood Apartment complex at which he resided with his family.

[REDACTED] Investigation has determined that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI initially attempted to obtain an apartment at Parkwood

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000546

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

Apartments on their own with cash, but could not because they did not have a credit history and because the leasing company did not accept cash payments. On 02/04/2000, AL-BAYOUMI signed as a guarantor and obtained a cashier's check drawn on his Bank of America checking account in the amount of USD 1,558 for their security deposit and first month's rent of Apartment #150. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR immediately provided him with the same amount of cash as the bank check and he then deposited the cash into his account. Financial records indicate [REDACTED]

(D)

[REDACTED] When interviewed, the bank teller who assisted with these transactions was able to corroborate the same information as obtained from the financial records (reference [REDACTED] (F))

[REDACTED] A review of rental records from Parkwood Apartments indicated that in addition to AL-BAYOUMI's signature as guarantor, both AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR listed AL-BAYOUMI's residence (Apartment [REDACTED] (P)) as their last address; In addition, the review of rental records as well as bank records indicate that all rental payments (subsequent to the initial security deposit and first month's rent paid by cashier's check from AL-BAYOUMI's bank account.

INSTRUCTION RECEIVED BY AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR

[REDACTED] Information received from KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED (KSM) indicates that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were complying with the directions given to them prior to departing for the United States.

According to KSM, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were instructed to make contacts at the local mosques and to request assistance from members of the Muslim community after their arrival in the United States.

KSM advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were given such guidance because, unlike some of the other hijackers who spoke English and had spent time in western cultures, neither AL-HAZMI nor AL-MIHDHAR had such language skill and experience (reference [REDACTED] (F)).

DINNER PARTY HELD AT PARKWOOD APARTMENT #150

[REDACTED] A few days after arriving in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI had a "welcoming party," as described by BIN DON, for AL-HAZMI and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000547

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

AL-MIHDHAR. BIN DON stated that this was the only party AL-BAYOUMI had even organized before and after. Around twenty guests in total attended the party, however, not all were present at the same time.

BIN DON video taped the party at AL-BAYOUMI's request. During the taping, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR stayed behind BIN DON, as "they didn't want to be on film," NFI. However, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR, talked and ate with the other guests. (P)

(P) [REDACTED] however, the real purpose was for people "to meet AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR." BIN DON stated that through translation AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR told BIN DON that they were in the U.S. to attend flight school. (P)

(P)

(P)

(P)

[REDACTED] If AL-THUMARY and AL-BAYOUMI played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY or AL-BAYOUMI and such unknown individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[REDACTED] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

<u>TO</u>	<u>PHONE #</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000548

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

[REDACTED] Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(A), (G), (J-1), (D) However, the contact between [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] telephone

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000549

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[REDACTED] According to TA, AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/[REDACTED] 1998. After which, for almost [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED] In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMAIRY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMAIRY also worked at the Consulate (F) [REDACTED] .

[REDACTED] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99 (possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] . In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE (F) [REDACTED] . In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[REDACTED] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F) [REDACTED] . The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his [REDACTED]

EO14040-000550

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] AL-JARRAH travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) [REDACTED] on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000551

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California"

(F) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED], reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few items seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulates that distributed funds and support to extremists, and, it appears in some case, terrorist organizations; 2) there were inexplicable, at least currently, telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI particular OMAR AL-BAYOUMI ; 3) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[REDACTED] **Recruitment:** Although, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, may not have arrived in southern California with an active support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those individual's willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000552

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

[REDACTED] Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

Predication for the Investigation

[REDACTED] As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) [REDACTED] established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia. This methodology could possibly be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

[REDACTED] At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

[REDACTED] Main Subject

Name -	
Last:	AL-BAYOUMI
First:	OMAR
Middle:	AHMED
Race:	W
Sex:	M
DOB:	(P-1) [REDACTED] 1957
POB:	Saudi Arabia
SOC:	(P-1) [REDACTED]
Alias(es) -	
Last:	AL-BAYOUMI
First:	O
Middle:	A
Current Location:	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Miscellaneous:	Subject is a non-USPER.
(G) [REDACTED]	(G) [REDACTED]

LEAD(s) :

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000554

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 08/12/2009

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Coordinate (G) [REDACTED] as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to process (G) [REDACTED] which is being submitted via email to the (G) [REDACTED] and appropriate supported systems.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/19/2009

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

International Operations

Attn: [Redacted] (G)

Riyadh

Attn: [Redacted] (G)

San Diego

Attn: [Redacted] (S)

New York

Attn: [Redacted] (S)

From: New York

[Redacted] (G)
Contact: [Redacted] (S)

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

OPERATION ENCORE
[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [Redacted] Initiate a Full Investigation (FI) on FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY

[Redacted] (G)
[Redacted]

Enclosure(s): [Redacted] 1 - Opening LHM

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 02/19/2009

Full Investigation Initiated: 02/12/2009

Reference: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]-OPERATION ENCORE, [REDACTED] (F)

Details: [REDACTED] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case.

[REDACTED] Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened. Writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[REDACTED] Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[REDACTED] Results: Over the past two years, writers have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000557

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

Exploitation of Muslim Community: Multiple (A)(G)(J-1) and other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A),(G),(J-1), AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-providing individual, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (F) (F). At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-providing individual or to whom the tazkia would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it likely would have involved someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F) serial). It is important to note that the individual to whom the tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, (A),(G),(J-1), the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

(G) One individual meeting such description who is also reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case# (F). AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F) Additional documentation from (C-1)

EO14040-000558

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 02/19/2009

[REDACTED] (C-1)
[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. AL-THUMARY was previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI through phone calls and AL-THUMARY's potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. According to the closing EC [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) and supplemental closing EC [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and practical intelligence collection methods". However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to have been unknown at such time.

[REDACTED] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and such unknown individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[REDACTED] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000559

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(P) Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with (P) (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D) located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

(P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

() Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, (A), (G), (J-1), (D) (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

EO14040-000560

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F),(G), 02/19/2009

[REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1),(D)

[REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1),(D) However, the contact between [REDACTED] (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[REDACTED] According to TA, AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/ [REDACTED] 1998. After which, for almost [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1),(D)

[REDACTED] the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring [REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1),(D) In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ([REDACTED] (F)).

[REDACTED] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1),(D)

[REDACTED] During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY [REDACTED] (F).

[REDACTED] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM ([REDACTED] (F)). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F)). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000561

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. (O-1)

(O-1), AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States

(A), (G), (J-1)

AL-JARRAH travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1)

(O-1)

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

(O-1)

On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1) prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients" (F). (F) The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F). (F) During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P) (F), associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), an officer/owner of (P) and president of (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) on his person.

EO14040-000563

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

(A), (G), (J-1) indicated that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, a Somali extremist (O-1) (O-1) case # (F) and was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. NOTE: "AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG)" (F) MOHAMMED, (A), (G), (J-1) received a stipend of approximately (A), (G), (J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F). This stipend was likely administered, because of his particular position by either AL-JARRAH, or one of his subordinates, possibly AL-THUMARY as MOHAMED was located in California.

However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1), "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F)

Finally, the Saudi Arabian telephone number 966-55-857311 is included merely because of its temporal proximity to the other telephone numbers called by AL-THUMARY. At this time the significance of the telephone number or of such contact is unknown.

The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few items seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulates that distributed funds and support to extremists, and, it appears in some case, terrorist organizations; 2) there were inexplicable, at least currently, telephonic connections between AL-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and

EO14040-000564

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 02/19/2009

AL-HAZMI; 3) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

Recruitment: Although, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, may not have arrived in southern California with an active support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those individual's willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

Predication for the Investigation

As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) [REDACTED] established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia. This methodology could possible be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

Main Subject

Name -
Last: AL-THUMARY
First: FAHAD
Middle: I. A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P) 1971
POB: Saudi Arabia
PNO: (P) Official)
SOC: (P)
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-THUMAIRY
First: FN
Middle: MN
Phone #: (P)
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 02/19/2009

Miscellaneous:
[REDACTED] (G)

Subject is a non-USPER.
[REDACTED] (G)

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Coordinate [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 02/19/2009

AT WASHINGTON, DC

The [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED]
is requested to process the [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] which is being submitted via
email to the [REDACTED] (G) mailbox at [REDACTED] (G)
[REDACTED] (G)
(G) [REDACTED] and appropriate supported systems.

◆◆

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/27/2009

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [Redacted] (G)

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

Intelligence Directorate

Attn:

Attn:

From: New York

[Redacted] (G)

Contact: [Redacted] (S)

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] MUSAED AL-JARRAH [Redacted] (A)(G)(J-1)
[Redacted] [Redacted] (A)(G)(J-1)

Synopsis: [Redacted] To open captioned Full Investigation, document transmission of [Redacted] (G) and request a [Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

Enclosure(s): [Redacted] (1)the electronic [Redacted] (F)

Full Investigation Initiated: 10/27/2009

Details: [Redacted] New York Office opened captioned Full Investigation based on information that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, former director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian Embassy, is or was part of a group that may have provided support to two (2) of the 9/11 hijackers. Through NYO Operation Encore investigation, more information has surfaced indicating AL-JARRAH's connection to international terrorism.

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

[REDACTED] By way of background, over the past two years under Operation Encore, NYO sought to gain a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[REDACTED] As a result, NYO Agents interviewed multiple individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1) [REDACTED] other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. [REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1) [REDACTED] AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-provider, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-provider or to whom the tazkia-provider would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] believed that it was likely a person or multiple persons who had access to both the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). It is important to note that the individual to whom AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were directed, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000570

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/27/2009

[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1), the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[REDACTED] One individual reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case # [REDACTED] (F). Above captioned subject, AL-JARRAH, has multiple telephonic contacts, with AL-THUMARY. AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) ([REDACTED] (F)). Additional documentation from the [REDACTED] (C-1)

[REDACTED] ([REDACTED] (F)). AL-THUMARY was previously a main subject of an FI based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (through phone connectivity) and his (AL-THUMARY's) potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ([REDACTED] (F)).

[REDACTED] According to the closing EC for AL-THUMARY ([REDACTED] (F)) and supplemental closing EC [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and practical intelligence collection methods" and iii) the U.S. Attorney's Office conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute AL-THUMARY at such time. However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol, as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community, appears to have been unknown at such time.

[REDACTED] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another individual(s), there may have been telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and such individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY's known telephone records for the time period immediately

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[REDACTED] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (main subject of [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). [REDACTED] (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED] located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000572

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/27/2009

(P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the main PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D) However, the contact between (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

According to Telephone Applications (TA), AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/ 1998. After which, for almost (D), (A), (G), (J-1)

the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring (A), (G), (J-1), (D) In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate (F)

ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

EO14040-000573

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/27/2009

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY (F).

The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM (F). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE (F). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. AL-JARRAH currently believed to be residing in Malaysia. (O-1)

(O-1) AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States

(A), (G), (J-1)

AL-JARRAH

EO14040-000574

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/27/2009

travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1)

(O-1)

On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F).

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1) prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi

EO14040-000575

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/27/2009

Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients" (F)
(F) The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F)
(A), (G), (J-1) During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P)
(A), (G), (J-1) and the (P) owned by (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. (P) also the president of (P) had previously been associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI). At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) (P) on his person.

(A), (G), (J-1) indicated that MOHAMED, a Somali extremist who immigrated from Toronto, Canada to San Diego, California in 1995 (case # (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. MOHAMED was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F). NOTE: AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization which rose to power in the early 1990s (according to DHS's Terrorist Reference Guide from 2004) and is designated a (G) terrorist group on the FBI's (G) MOHAMMED (A), (G), (J-1) received a stipend of approximately (A), (G), (J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F) (F) Based on some of the above (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) it seems likely this stipend was administered by AL-THUMARY or AL-JARRAH.

However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F)

EO14040-000576

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

[REDACTED] The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few things seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulate(s); 2) this network is reported to have had the purpose of distributing funds and support to sunni salafist extremists; 3) there were inexplicable telephonic connections between AL-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI; and 4) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[REDACTED] AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI do not appear to have arrived in southern California with an active local support network. However, it appears that once AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were vouched for, via tazkia, they may have begun to assess individual's suitability for recruitment. Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]).

Predication for the Investigation

[REDACTED] The above information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals, including AL-JARRAH, compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Suspected Foreign Power

[REDACTED] At this point in the investigation, there are a number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Pertinent Sensitive Investigative Matters:

[REDACTED] Not Applicable


(G)



Number of Subjects: 1

(G) Code:

(G)



Descriptive Data:

[REDACTED] Main Subject

Name -

Last: AL-JARRAH

First: MUSAED

Middle: A.

Race: W

Sex: M

DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) 1960

POB: Saudi Arabia

Phone #: Previous -

202-342-3700, 202-944-3192.

(P)

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

Current -

[REDACTED] (P-1)

Current Location:
Miscellaneous -
[REDACTED] (G)
E-mail Addresses:

Malaysia
Subject is a non-USPER.
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (P-1)

Additional Information/ Intelligence:

[REDACTED] Not Applicable

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] To notify of the initiation of captioned FI.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Coordinate [REDACTED] (G) as required based on information in the Details above.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(G) [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Action)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/27/2009

COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) Process the [REDACTED] (G) which is being submitted via email to the [REDACTED] (G) mailbox at [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] and appropriate supported systems.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G): Read and clear.

Set Lead 8: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
AT WASHINGTON, DC


[REDACTED] (G) Read and clear.

◆◆



OPERATION ENCORE/

(A),(G),(J-1)





[REDACTED]

Operation Encore (A),(G),(J-1) **Overview**

Although (A), (J-1), (G) [REDACTED] Operation Encore are separate investigations, understanding the links between the two cases is important to the overall strategy of (A),(G),(J-1) [REDACTED]. (A),(G),(J-1) This paper will lay out (A),(G),(J-1) [REDACTED] key players, associations, communications, and provide an overview of Op Encore. This paper will also explain how the key players, communications, and logistics from both (A),(G),(J-1) [REDACTED] Op Encore overlap. Finally, this paper will provide an outlook on (A) (G) (J-1) [REDACTED] and briefly cover the strategy moving forward.

(A), (J-1), (G)

(A),(G),(J-1) [REDACTED] centers on two Saudi nationals Adel al-Sadhan (F) [REDACTED] and Mutaib al-Sudairy (F) [REDACTED]. Al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy previously visited San Diego, California for approximately six weeks in the summer of 1999 and were hosted by Omar al-Bayoumi²—and are assessed to be part of a network of individuals connected to the facilitation of two 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. (J-3) [REDACTED]

Based on their activity patterns in 1999 and 2000, al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy possibly served in the capacity of an advance intelligence team involved in laying the groundwork for 9/11 hijackers al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, before their arrival in Southern California in early 2000. There is no indication al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy had direct contact with the hijackers, however similar associations, communications, and logistics mirror those of the hijackers upon their arrival.

- ([REDACTED] According to the US State Department Office of Foreign Missions, al-Sudairy worked as an administrative officer from June 1999 to April 2001 and al-Sadhan worked at the Islamic Affairs Department at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) in Washington, DC; both working under Musaid al-Jarrah.³
- [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED]

¹ [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED]

² Al-Bayoumi (F) [REDACTED] attended multiple graduate schools in California between 1995 and 2000 and performed administrative duties as the Masjid Al-Madina Al-Munawara, aka Kurdish Community Islamic Center of Greater San Diego. Al-Bayoumi left San Diego in fall 2000 to attend Aston University in Birmingham, England. He relocated to Saudi Arabia (KSA) in August 2002 where he is currently located.

³ Al-Jarrah (F) [REDACTED] former Director of the Islamic Affairs Department in the Saudi Arabian Embassy who left his post in 2005—is currently working in the Cultural Affairs Office in the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Malaysia. While in the US, (O-1) [REDACTED] he was responsible for placing Saudi Imams around the US and was purposefully selecting extremists for the positions. (O-1) [REDACTED] al-Jarrah was funding and controlling al-Thumairy's southern California network.

[REDACTED]

Operation Encore

[REDACTED] Operation Encore, opened in October 2007, is an investigation to determine how two of the 9/11 hijackers—Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi—integrated into and were supported by the local Muslim community where they lived in southern California in 2000.ⁱ Fahad al-Thumairy⁴ and Omar al-Bayoumi were key figures in assisting al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi after their arrival in southern California. Analysis of al-Bayoumi and al-Thumairy's call activity indicates that the assistance provided to the hijackers likely involved a network of people including al-Bayoumi, al-Thumairy, Anwar Aulaqi and an individual at the EKSA in Washington D.C.; however, it is unclear if any of the individuals involved had pre-knowledge of 9/11 or of al-Mihdhar's and al Hazmi's role in 9/11.

- [REDACTED] Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi did not speak English and were not familiar with Western culture which made them reliant on individuals for assistance while in the US.
- [REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1), [REDACTED] (P) was tasked by al-Thumairy to pick up al Mihdhar and al-Hazmi from the airport and to take care of them while they were in Los Angeles.ⁱⁱ However, in FBI interviews with Johar, he never admitted to directly being tasked by al-Thumairy but he did admit to spending time with and assisting al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi with various things during their time in Los Angeles.ⁱⁱⁱ
- [REDACTED] During an FBI interview with [REDACTED] (P), he admitted to being instructed by al-Bayoumi to assist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar during their stay in San Diego. Al-Bayoumi also told [REDACTED] (P) that he, al-Bayoumi, was responsible for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar.^{iv}
- [REDACTED] According to a proffer interview of Mohdar Mohammad al-Mohdar Zeid, aka Mohdar Mohammed Abdullah, he was tasked by al-Bayoumi to look after al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi during their time in San Diego.^v It remains unclear as to why Mohdar or [REDACTED] (P) were chosen by al-Bayoumi.

Common Associates

- [REDACTED] Al-Mihdhar and al Hazmi stayed in Los Angles for approximately one to two weeks after their arrival in the US.^{vi} Several days after their arrival at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) on 15 January 2000, al Mihdhar and al-Hazmi went to the King Fahad Mosque where they met with al Thumairy for five to ten minutes.^{vii} [REDACTED] (J-3)
[REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (G), (J-3)
[REDACTED] (G), (J-3)
- [REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1), al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy met with and received help finding lodging from al-Bayoumi in San Diego in 1999. For approximately six weeks while they were in San Diego, al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy lived at a Lemon Grove residence with an individual [REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1) also later hosted hijackers al Hazmi and al-Mihdhar when they were in San Diego.

⁴ [REDACTED] Al-Thumairy [REDACTED] (F) was Imam at the King Fahd Mosque in Culver City, CA and is described in a US State Department document as Administrative Officer at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles, CA in 1999.

⁵ [REDACTED] (O-1)

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi first met with al-Bayoumi around the beginning of February at a Mediterranean restaurant in Culver City, California.^{viii} Shortly after this meeting, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi relocated to San Diego, California around February 4, 2000. Upon their arrival in San Diego, al-Bayoumi assisted al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi with establishing living arrangements and opening a bank account. Mohdar Abdullah also reported that al-Bayoumi tasked him with assisting the two with their daily affairs.

Phone links

- [REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1),(D)
- [REDACTED] (G),(D)
- [REDACTED] Between 31 January 2000 and 3 February 2000, al-Bayoumi calls the EKSA seven times.^x *Note: Musaid al-Jarrah and Mutaib al-Sudairy were working at the embassy during this time.*
- [REDACTED] On 4 February 2000, al-Bayoumi assisted al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi establish a Bank of America account at approximately 1:30pm. [REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1)
[REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1),(D)

Outlook

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1)

[REDACTED] surround al-Sadhan and Al-Sudairy's nexus to al-Qa'ida and their activities since departing from the US in 2001. Beyond their suspicious activity patterns involving the hijackers' southern California support network before 9/11 and their questionable associates, there is no independent [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) information that they were working at the behest of a terrorist network.

- [REDACTED] The only identified direct link to al-Qa'ida or any other terrorist group beyond the San Diego network is through Ziyad Khaleel, a former naturalized US citizen who

[REDACTED]

was killed in Saudi Arabia in 2002 and supplied Usama bin Laden with satellite phone equipment in the mid-1990s.

- [REDACTED] During the summer of 2000, al-Sudairy moved to Columbus, Missouri where he lived with Ziyad Khaleel for approximately four months. Khaleel and al-Sudairy met twice in Saudi Arabia after October 2001, however the FBI has no information about the context of Khaleel and al-Sadhan's relationship.

[Redacted]

i [Redacted] FBI Communication [Redacted] (F)

ii [Redacted] (F)

iii [Redacted] (F)

iv [Redacted] (F)

v [Redacted] (F)

vi [Redacted] (F)

vii [Redacted] (F)

viii [Redacted] (F)

ix FBI Telephone Applications

x FBI Telephone Applications

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 09/28/2010

To: [Redacted] (G)
International Operations
Counterterrorism

Attn: [Redacted] (S)
Attn: [Redacted] (G)
Attn: [Redacted]

Oklahoma City

Attn: [Redacted]

Indianapolis
New York

Attn: [Redacted]
Attn: [Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

From: Counterterrorism

[Redacted] (G)

Contact: [Redacted] (S)

Approved By:

[Redacted] (S)

Drafted By:

[Redacted] (S)

Case ID #:

[Redacted] (F)

Title:

[Redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
ADEL MOHAMMAD A AL-SADHAN
[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
MUTAIB A A AL-SUDAIRY
[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) 09/28/2010
(A), (G), (J-1)

OPERATION ENCORE
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (J-1), (G)

DESIGNATED INTELLIGENCE DISCLOSURE OFFICIAL
DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

(A), (G), (J-1)

FOREIGN DISSEMINATIONS

(G)

(G)

Synopsis: (S), (G) provides authority to disseminate the enclosed (G) tearline to the appropriate (A), (G), (J-1) authorities.

(G)

Full Investigation Initiated: (A), (G), (J-1)

Administrative: Pursuant to Attorney General Guidelines, for Domestic FBI Operations (AGG-Dom), Part VI.B.1.d., the dissemination of the enclosed information is in the interest of national security of the United States. The information is relevant to the recipient's authorized responsibilities, its dissemination is consistent with the National Security interests of the United States, and the FBI has considered the effect such dissemination may reasonably be expected to have on any identifiable U.S. person.

(G) has reviewed the information contained in the enclosed communication. Passage of this information is consistent with the standards for dissemination of U.S. person and non-U.S. person information to foreign authorities as authorized in the AGG-Dom.

The FBI will undertake reasonable steps to ensure that any intelligence information that the FBI disseminates to the appropriate (A), (G), (J-1) authorities pursuant to this authorization is not and will not be used for either assassination prohibited under Executive Order 12333 or torture, as defined in U.S. criminal law. To this end, the FBI shall take the following actions:

1. The FBI shall notify the recipient agency that the information in this document is for intelligence and lead purposes only. The information in this document may not be used in any legal proceedings or disseminated to any other agency within the recipient's government without the advanced authorization of the FBI. The FBI shall direct the recipient agency to not take any overt investigative steps (including but not limited to any type of formal legal process or direct

EO14040-000589

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) 09/28/2010
contact with the subject) based on the information in this communication without first coordinating with the FBI;

2 As required by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1) of the Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI MOU, (O-1) [REDACTED] (O-1)

3. Legat shall report to CTD and OIO any indication that the recipient agency to whom this information has been provided did not honor the caveat regarding use or dissemination of this information, or used the information for either assassination or torture.

Details: [REDACTED] Legat (G) has requested CTD provide (A), (G), (J-1) authority to disseminate (G) [REDACTED] derived information to the appropriate (A), (G), (J-1) authorities to provide information regarding captioned subject Ahmed Mosa Alzahrani's (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] For background, Operation Encore is an FBI NY investigation of Fahad al-Thumairy, Omar al-Bayoumi, and Musaed al-Jarrah due to their past association with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Information uncovered through phone analysis, financial analysis, and numerous interviews suggests the aforementioned subjects assisted the hijackers, wittingly or unwittingly, in a support/logistics role while they were in the United States.

[REDACTED] FBI investigation conducted through Operation Encore uncovered two additional individuals, Adel Al Sadhan and Mutaib Al Sudairy, with a past connection to the subjects of Operation Encore. (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] along with telephone and financial analysis, indicates Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy may have assisted in laying the groundwork for the arrival of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in southern California and served as an advance team to vet those who would later assist both hijackers.

[REDACTED] Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy previously came to the US in June 1999 as employees of the Islamic Affairs Office at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC and had direct contact with Operation Encore subjects Fahad Al-Thumairy and Omar Al-Bayoumi who assisted two 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar, with living, financial and travel arrangements while they were in southern California in early 2000. Although Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy never had direct contact with the 9/11 hijackers, Al Sadhan likely met with Al-Thumairy in person in 1998, approximately one year before the hijackers arrived in the US, and both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy met with Al-Bayoumi in 1999 who assisted them during their six week stay in San Diego approximately six months before the arrival of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. This contact, paired with analysis of call records and travel patterns during the time the two hijackers were

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism

Re: (F), 09/28/2010

in southern California, indicates Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy may have served as an advance team who helped to arrange people to assist Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar during their time in southern California.

(J-3)
[REDACTED]
(J-3)
[REDACTED] FBI (G)
initiated (A), (J-1), (G) to investigate both subjects'
(J-3) The FBI subsequently requested and received approved
(J-3), (O-1)

The FBI has no information to suggest that either Al Sadhan or Al Sudairy is an operator - that is, that they present a direct threat of violent terrorist activity. However, if Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy are currently involved with facilitation efforts on behalf of al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliates, the FBI has assessed that allowing them to travel to
(A), (G), (J-1)

Background on Operation Encore

According to I-94 information, Adil Alsadhan (believed to be identifiable with Adel Al Sadhan) entered Los Angeles on 15 December 1998 (J-3)

(J-3) His intended address was the Hilton Hotel, Los Angeles and he listed a contact telephone number on his I-94 that was subscribed to Fahad Al-Thumairy, Imam at the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) in Culver (O-1) The purpose for Al Sadhan's visit in 1998 is unknown, though it establishes the first known contact between Al Sadhan and Al-Thumairy. Investigators believe his visit was to begin preparations for Al-Thumairy's subsequent assistance to Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. Al Sadhan departed Los Angeles on 20 January 1999.

Al Sadhan returned to the US on 13 June 1999, this time accompanied by an associate, Mutaib Al Sudairy. Both men entered via Washington, DC on the same flight (J-3)

(O-1)

Musaed Al-Jarrah was then director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, DC. Al-Jarrah was stationed in Washington, DC from 1991 to 2005. Al-Jarrah's official responsibilities were to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams in the United States and facilitate the issuance of their diplomatic visas. (O-1) Al-Jarrah may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the Embassy. It was Al-Jarrah

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism

Re: (F), 09/28/2010

who determined Al-Thumairy's assignment, placing him in Southern California at the King Fahad Mosque during this time. (J-3)

(J-3) He had a reputation for being a "Salafi fanatic" and as a possible source of motivation for violent or terrorist activity.

NOTE: (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) in 1992 or 1994 he was tasked by Usama Bin Laden (UBL) to get a list of all Saudi Embassy employees in the United States. (A), (G), (J-1) the reason for this was to find and recruit a sympathizer within the Saudi Embassy. (A), (G), (J-1) he went to a local library and photocopied a list of Embassy employees from a book in the reference section and hand-delivered the list to UBL. Al-Jarrah began working at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC in 1991. During the time frame of (A), (G), (J-1) tasking from UBL, Al-Jarrah would have been on the photocopied list.

(A), (G), (J-1) In 1999, both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy traveled to San Diego where they stayed for approximately 6 weeks (approximately July 1999 to August 1999) and met with Omar Al-Bayoumi, a Saudi student who had resided in San Diego since 1995. Al-Bayoumi greeted them and, (A), (G), (J-1) provided a place to live and looked after them. FBI investigation indicates Al-Bayoumi may have provided them with a cell phone. (A), (G), (J-1) for a period of time Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy lived at the same address in San Diego where Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar would later stay near the Al-Ribat mosque.

(A), (G), (J-1) In December 1999/January 2000, several of the 9/11 hijackers met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia prior to arriving in the US. During this same time frame, numerous telephone calls occurred between main Operation Encore subjects Fahad Al-Thumairy, Omar Al-Bayoumi, and Musaed Al-Jarrah.

(A), (G), (J-1) On 15 January 2000, 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi arrived in Los Angeles, CA via LAX airport on a flight from Bangkok originating from Malaysia. The first place they visited was the King Fahad Mosque where Fahad Al-Thumairy was the Imam.

(A), (G), (J-1) Al-Thumairy tasked an associate to look after Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi during their time in Los Angeles, to include transportation, lodging, etc. In subsequent interviews with the FBI, the associate stated that the hijackers asked him specifically where the "Mediterranean restaurant" was. Approximately one week later, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi went to the Mediterranean restaurant where they met with Omar Al-Bayoumi.

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000592

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 09/28/2010

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi invited the two to move to San Diego, CA. Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi moved to San Diego sometime in late January/early February 2000. At this time, Al-Bayoumi's telephonic contact with Musaed Al-Jarrah increased. Once the hijackers moved from Los Angeles to San Diego, Al-Thumairy's telephonic contact with Al-Jarrah was diminished.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers in renting an apartment in San Diego, co-signing a lease agreement with them. He also assisted them in opening a bank account. Of note, approximately 1 hour before taking the hijackers to the bank, Anwar Aulaqi called that specific bank location and had a 2 minute conversation with an unknown individual. Approximately 1 hour after setting up the accounts and leaving the bank, Al-Bayoumi placed a call to Aulaqi.

[REDACTED] While in San Diego, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi attended the Al-Ribat mosque where Aulaqi was the Imam.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi called Al Sudairy five (5) times while the hijackers were in San Diego with Al-Bayoumi. The dates of the calls are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January, 26 January, and 30 January 2000 - this was the week Al-Bayoumi met the hijackers in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming to San Diego. The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4 February 2000 Al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment he obtained for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America to assist them in opening a bank account. The last call occurred on 7 February 2000. By this date, the hijackers' affairs were in order and a "welcoming party" for the hijackers was coordinated by Al-Bayoumi and likely held on 17 February 2000.

[REDACTED] In June 2000, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi left San Diego and drove to Los Angeles. Al-Mihdhar was scheduled to leave the US and return to Yemen. They drove to the King Fahad Mosque where Al-Thumairy said goodbye to Al-Mihdhar. Al-Mihdhar departed via LAX on 20 June 2000. Al-Hazmi continued to reside in San Diego.

[REDACTED] On 8 December 2000, another hijacker, Hani Hanjour, arrived in San Diego and joined Al-Hazmi. They immediately left for Phoenix, AZ where Hanjour began flight lessons.

[REDACTED] In April of 2001, Al-Hazmi and Hanjour arrived in Falls Church, VA and established residence. They attended the Dar al Hijra mosque where Aulaqi was now the Imam.

[REDACTED] In May 2001, two additional hijackers arrived in the US - Ahmed Al-Ghambi and Majed Moqed. The four drove to Connecticut where they checked into a Fairfield Inn and then immediately drove to Patterson, NJ to look for a place to live. Within 3 days, they began renting rooms at a house in Patterson. Al-Mihdhar also arrived

[REDACTED]

SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism

Re: (F), 09/28/2010

at the Patterson location in May. All of the hijackers stayed at this Patterson location until days before 11 September 2001.

Background on Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy

After their time in San Diego in 1999, Al Sudairy subsequently moved to Columbus, Missouri and Al Sadhan moved to Lawrence, Kansas. While in Missouri, Al Sudairy lived with Ziyad Khaleel for about four months in 2000. Khaleel was a known key communications equipment procurement officer for Usama Bin Laden and provided satellite phones used in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa. Following Al Sudairy's return to Saudi Arabia in 2001 he met with Khaleel twice.

In April 2001, both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy were terminated from their responsibilities at the Islamic Affairs Department at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. The two men, at this point, were living in Washington, DC. At the same time, two of the hijackers, Al-Hazmi and Hanjour, arrived in Falls Church, VA and attended the mosque of Anwar Aulaqi.

Al Sudairy and Al Sadhan both left the United States on 25 October 2001.

While in Missouri, Al Sudairy attended University of Missouri - Columbia's Intensive English program. In October 2001, faculty members alerted the FBI as they had been suspicious of him since he didn't appear interested in learning English. His peers believed he was a Saudi Arabian Intelligence officer.

Al Sadhan was previously the subject of (A)(G)(J-1) investigation was opened based on (A)(G)(J-1) This that Al Sadhan worked under (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) Musaed Al-Jarrah (F) t the Islamic Affairs Section of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC helping Al-Jarrah coordinate/direct all Saudi Imams assigned to and/or financially supported by the Saudi government in the US. Al Sadhan reportedly helped Al-Jarrah support extremist Saudi Sunnis in the United States. Al Sadhan was (O-1) as a believer in a radical form of Sunni Salarism and reportedly traveled frequently within the United States. However, because records checks indicated Al Sadhan left the US on 25 October 2001 and had not returned, the (G) case was closed in 2004.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (J-1), (G), (D)

(A), (J-1), (G), (D)

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 09/28/2010
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] FBIHQ notifies Legat [REDACTED] (G) that DIDO authority has been granted to disseminate the enclosed CTD approved tearline to the appropriate [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) authorities.

-----Begin Tearline-----

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] The following individuals are subjects of a pending FBI counterterrorism investigation:

Adel Mohammed A. Al Sadhan

Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
Date of Birth: [REDACTED] (P-1) 1973
Passport #s: Saudi Arabia [REDACTED] (P-1)

Mutaib A.A. Al Sudairy

Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
Date of Birth: [REDACTED] (P-1) 1971
Passport #s: Saudi Arabia [REDACTED] (P-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
Date of Birth: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
Passport #s: Saudi Arabia [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] For background, Operation Encore is an FBI investigation of Fahad al-Thumairy, Omar al-Bayoumi, and Mused al-Jarrah due to their past association with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Information uncovered through phone analysis, financial analysis, and numerous interviews suggests the aforementioned subjects assisted the hijackers, wittingly or unwittingly, in a support/logistics role while they were in the United States.

[REDACTED] FBI investigation conducted through Operation Encore uncovered two additional individuals, Adel Al Sadhan

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism

Re: (F), 09/28/2010

and Mutaib Al Sudairy, with a past connection to the subjects of Operation Encore. (A), (G), (J-1) along with telephone and financial analysis, indicates Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy may have assisted in laying the groundwork for the arrival of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in southern California and served as an advance team to vet those who would later assist both hijackers.

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1) in Washington, DC and had direct contact with Operation Encore subjects Fahad Al-Thumairy and Omar Al-Bayoumi who assisted two 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar, with living, financial and travel arrangements while they were in southern California in early 2000. Although Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy never had direct contact with the 9/11 hijackers, Al Sadhan likely met with Al-Thumairy in person in 1998, approximately one year before the hijackers arrived in the US, and both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy met with Al-Bayoumi in 1999 who assisted them during their six week stay in San Diego approximately six months before the arrival of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. This contact, paired with analysis of call records and travel patterns during the time the two hijackers were in southern California, indicates Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy may have served as an advance team who helped to arrange people to assist Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar during their time in southern California.

[REDACTED] (J-3)

The FBI then began to investigate both subjects' return to the US.

[REDACTED] The FBI has no information to suggest that either Al Sadhan or Al Sudairy is an operator - that is, that they present a direct threat of violent terrorist activity. However, if Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy are currently involved with facilitation efforts on behalf of al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliates, the FBI has assessed that allowing them to travel to the US will provide a unique opportunity to collect intelligence on their activities and contacts while in the US, potentially including unknown US-based individuals tied to terrorism.

Background on Operation Encore

[REDACTED] According to US travel information Adel Al Sadhan entered Los Angeles, California on 15 December 1998 on [REDACTED] (J-3) His intended address was the Hilton Hotel, Los Angeles and he listed a contact telephone number on his travel documents that was subscribed to Fahad Al-Thumairy, Imam at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA. The purpose for Al Sadhan's visit in 1998 is unknown, though

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000596

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism

Re: (F), 09/28/2010

it establishes the first known contact between Al Sadhan and Al-Thumairy. Investigators believe his visit was to begin preparations for Al-Thumairy's subsequent assistance to Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. Al Sadhan departed Los Angeles on 20 January 1999.

[REDACTED] Al Sadhan returned to the US on 13 June 1999, this time accompanied by an associate, Mutaib Al Sudairy. Both men entered via Washington, DC on the same flight [REDACTED]

(J-3)

[REDACTED] Musaed Al-Jarrah was then director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, DC. Al-Jarrah was stationed in Washington, DC from 1991 to 2005. Al-Jarrah's official responsibilities were to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams in the United States and facilitate the issuance of their diplomatic visas. Sources reported that Al-Jarrah may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the Embassy. It was Al-Jarrah who determined Al-Thumairy's assignment, placing him in Southern California at the King Fahad Mosque during this time.

(J-3)

[REDACTED] He had a reputation for being a "Salafi fanatic" and as a possible source of motivation for violent or terrorist activity.

[REDACTED] NOTE: During interviews with detained al-Qaeda member Ali Mohammed, Mohammed stated that in 1992 or 1994 he was tasked by Usama Bin Laden (UBL) to get a list of all Saudi Embassy employees in the United States. Mohammed stated that the reason for this was to find and recruit a sympathizer within the Saudi Embassy. Mohammed claimed that he went to a local library and photocopied a list of Embassy employees from a book in the reference section and hand-delivered the list to UBL. Al-Jarrah began working at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC in 1991. During the time frame of Mohammed's tasking from UBL, Al-Jarrah would have been on the photocopied list.

[REDACTED] In 1999, both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy traveled to San Diego where they stayed for approximately 6 weeks (approximately July 1999 to August 1999) and met with Omar Al-Bayoumi, a Saudi student who had resided in San Diego since 1995. Al-Bayoumi greeted them and, (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED], provided a place to live and looked after them. FBI investigation indicates Al-Bayoumi may have provided them with a cell phone. (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] for a period of time Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy lived at the same address in San Diego where Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar would later stay near the Al-Ribat mosque.

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000597

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) 09/28/2010

[REDACTED] In December 1999/January 2000, several of the 9/11 hijackers met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia prior to arriving in the US. During this same time frame, numerous telephone calls occurred between main Operation Encore subjects Fahad Al-Thumairy, Omar Al-Bayoumi, and Musaed Al-Jarrah.

[REDACTED] On 15 January 2000, 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi arrived in Los Angeles on a flight from Bangkok originating from Malaysia. The first place they visited was the King Fahad Mosque where Fahad Al-Thumairy was the Imam.

[REDACTED] Al-Thumairy tasked an associate to look after Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi during their time in Los Angeles, to include transportation, lodging, etc. In subsequent interviews with the FBI, the associate stated that the hijackers asked him specifically where the "Mediterranean restaurant" was. Approximately one week later, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi went to the Mediterranean restaurant where they met with Omar Al-Bayoumi.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi invited the two to move to San Diego, CA. Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi moved to San Diego sometime in late January/early February 2000. At this time, Al-Bayoumi's telephonic contact with Musaed Al-Jarrah increased. Once the hijackers moved from Los Angeles to San Diego, Al-Thumairy's telephonic contact with Al-Jarrah was diminished.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers in renting an apartment in San Diego, co-signing a lease agreement with them. He also assisted them in opening a bank account. Of note, approximately 1 hour before taking the hijackers to the bank, Anwar Aulaqi called that specific bank location and had a 2 minute conversation with an unknown individual. Approximately 1 hour after setting up the accounts and leaving the bank, Al-Bayoumi placed a call to Aulaqi.

[REDACTED] While in San Diego, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi attended the Al-Ribat mosque where Aulaqi was the Imam.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi called Al Sudairy five (5) times while the hijackers were in San Diego with Al-Bayoumi. The dates of the calls are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January, 26 January, and 30 January 2000 - this was the week Al-Bayoumi met the hijackers in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming to San Diego. The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4 February 2000 Al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment he obtained for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America to assist them in opening a bank account. The last call occurred on 7 February 2000. By this date, the hijackers' affairs were in

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000598

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism

Re: (F), 09/28/2010

order and a "welcoming party" for the hijackers was coordinated by Al-Bayoumi and likely held on 17 February 2000.

[REDACTED] In June 2000, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi left San Diego and drove to Los Angeles. Al-Mihdhar was scheduled to leave the US and return to Yemen. They drove to the King Fahad Mosque where Al-Thumairy said goodbye to Al-Mihdhar. Al-Mihdhar departed the US on 20 June 2000. Al-Hazmi continued to reside in San Diego.

[REDACTED] On 8 December 2000, another hijacker, Hani Hanjour, arrived in San Diego and joined Al-Hazmi. They immediately left for Phoenix, AZ where Hanjour began flight lessons.

[REDACTED] In April of 2001, Al-Hazmi and Hanjour arrived in Falls Church, VA and established residence. They attended the Dar al Hijra mosque where Aulagi was now the Imam.

Background on Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy

[REDACTED] After their time in San Diego in 1999, Al Sudairy subsequently moved to Columbus, Missouri and Al Sadhan moved to Lawrence, Kansas. While in Missouri, Al Sudairy lived with Ziyad Khaleel for about four months in 2000. Khaleel was a known key communications equipment procurement officer for Usama Bin Laden and provided satellite phones used in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa. Following Al Sudairy's return to Saudi Arabia in 2001 he met with Khaleel twice.

[REDACTED] In April 2001, both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy were terminated from their responsibilities at the Islamic Affairs Department at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. The two men, at this point, were living in Washington, DC. At the same time, two of the hijackers, Al-Hazmi and Hanjour, arrived in Falls Church, VA and attended the mosque of Anwar Aulagi. Al Sudairy and Al Sadhan both left the United States on 25 October 2001.

[REDACTED] While in Missouri, Al Sudairy attended University of Missouri - Columbia's Intensive English program. In October 2001, faculty members alerted the FBI as they had been suspicious of him since he didn't appear interested in learning English. His peers believed he was a Saudi Arabian Intelligence officer.

Current Travel to the US

[REDACTED] Recent information obtained by the FBI revealed that [REDACTED]

(J-3)

(J-3)

(J-3)

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F), 09/28/2010

(J-3)
(P-1)

Background on Al-Zahrani

The FBI initiated an investigation of Saudi Arabia-based Ahmed Mosa Al-Zahrani after determining he was an associate and possible student of Al Sudairy. Al-Zahrani previously applied to attend English classes at Ball State University in Indiana around the same time.

(J-3)
(J-3)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) We have not identified any familial relation between Al-Zahrani and Al Sudairy, and have no indication that Al Sudairy is providing (A), (G), (J-1) to any other individuals.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

Al Sudairy's Interest in (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

Request for Meeting

The FBI respectfully requests a meeting with your service to provide an in-depth briefing regarding all aspects of this FBI investigation. Please coordinate with the Legal Attache to determine a time and place suitable for your service.

As always, your assistance in counterterrorism matters is greatly appreciated. We welcome any additional information your Government has developed regarding this matter.

-----End Tearline-----

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/28/2010
[REDACTED] Questions regarding this communication should be directed
to SSA [REDACTED] (S), IA [REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (S), or SOS [REDACTED] (S).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/28/2010

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

[REDACTED] (G)
[REDACTED] (G)
[REDACTED] (G) requests [REDACTED] (G) to pass the attached tearline to the appropriate [REDACTED] (G) authorities. Please report any non-compliance with the tearline caveat, in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Administrative Section of the EC. Legat is also requested to coordinate a meeting between FBI NY, CTD, and representatives of [REDACTED] (G) regarding this investigation.

[REDACTED] As required by the Memorandum of Understanding Concerning [REDACTED] (O-1) of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (MOU),
(O-1)

[REDACTED]

Set Lead 2: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[REDACTED] Read and clear.

◆◆

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000602

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/28/2009

To: Counterterrorism:

Attn:

(G), (S)

[Redacted]

New York:

Attn:

(S)

[Redacted]

From: New York

(G)

Contact:

(S)

[Redacted]

Approved By:

(S)

[Redacted]

Drafted By:

(S)

[Redacted]

Case ID #:

(F)

[Redacted]

Title:

[Redacted]

OPERATION ENCORE
FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI
MUSAED AL-JARRAH
IYAD MAHMUD MUHAMMAD MUSTAFA AL RABABAH

Synopsis: Disseminate working document outlining the
aforementioned investigations. Request [Redacted] (G)
disseminate document to (A),(G),(J-1)

(G)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[REDACTED] **Full Investigation Initiated:** 08/28/2007

Details: [REDACTED] Documented below is the contents of a working document outlining the results of the captioned investigations. It is important to note that this is a document that is currently being worked on by investigators and analytical staff and should be viewed currently as a incomplete document.

For Background

[REDACTED] On 06/28/2007, a subfile under the PENTTBOM investigation was opened by NYO to contain information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, NYO opined that certain Al Qaeda (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[REDACTED] Specifically, the NYO was interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[REDACTED] Operation Encore (FI) was eventually opened in New York to fully investigate the emerging network uncovered during the initial investigation conducted under PENTTBOM.

[REDACTED] Further, full investigations were initiated to investigate Fahad Al-Thumairy, Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi, and Musaed Al-Jarrah, due to their association with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar. There is a significant amount of information uncovered through phone analysis, financial analysis, and numerous interviews that suggests the aforementioned subjects assisted the hijackers, in a support/logistics role while they were in the United States, preparing for the 9/11 attacks. They are suspected of providing

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism:

Attn:

(G)

(S)

(S)

From: New York

Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 01/15/2010

the hijackers with financial assistance, obtaining drivers licenses and living quarters, spiritual guidance, and locating flight schools.

[REDACTED] Logical investigation conducted through Operation Encore, Fahad Al-Thumairy, Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi, and separately Musaed Al-Jarrah, it has been uncovered that Musaed Al Jarrah may have played a leadership role in the overall coordination of logistics support for 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar. This was possible through Al-Jarrah's position as Head of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington D.C. Al-Jarrah oversaw the handling of the hijackers through his subordinates Fahad Al-Thumairy and Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi and by personal contact with the hijackers on numerous occasions.

[REDACTED] It has come to the attention of the NYO that Musaed Al-Jarrah currently holds the position of Head of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It was further uncovered that Al-Jarrah has concentrated his attention on the assistance of Youth Groups during his tenure at the Saudi Arabian Embassy, Kuala Lumpur.

[REDACTED] Operation Encore has identified Adel Al-Sadhan and Mutaib Al-Sudairy as facilitators to the 9/11/2001 hijackers. [REDACTED] (J-3)

(J-3)

Working Document

[REDACTED] On or about April 3, 1999, NAWAF ALHAZMI was issued a B-2 visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. His intended address was Sheraton, LA, CA (I94 Form Record #I9449747518).

[REDACTED] On or about May 6, 1999, KHALID ALMIHDHAR was issued Saudi passport #B721156, and on or about April 7, 1999, was issued a B-1/B-2 visa [REDACTED] (F)
note: wouldn't the passport need to be issued before the visa? - this info should be confirmed).

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
EO14040-000605

To: Counterterrorism:

Attn:

(G)

(S)

(S)

From: New York

Re: (F)

01/15/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH was allegedly an accountant at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C. since 1991. However, (S-1), he was actually the head of the Islamic Affairs Section. He coordinated the activity of Saudi Salafi imams in the U.S., including FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY. AL-JARRAH left the U.S. in 2006.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

To: Counterterrorism:

Attn: (G)

(S)

(S)

From: New York

Re: (F) 01/15/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

On December 12, 1999, ABDULLAH A S AL JRAITHEN arrived at 0742 per (O-1). According to I-94 record (P-1) he arrived at port of entry New York, intended address Holiday Inn, Los Angeles, (J-3)

(J-3)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

EO14040-000607

To: Counterterrorism:

Attn: (G)

(S)

(S)

From: New York

Re: (F)

01/15/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

On December 20, 1999, BAYOUMI registered at the Travelodge, 11180 Washington Place, Culver City, CA along with ABDULLAH A S AL JRAITHEN. They checked in at 10:43 and checked out the next day at 13:22 (FD-302 dated 1/15/2002, (F)

(F) ALJRAITHEN's travel documents indicated he traveled by air to New York on December 12, 1999 on (J-3)

(J-3)

(J-3) He is a Saudi Arabian citizen and resident. He listed his intended address as Holiday Inn, Los Angeles, CA (per I-94 record (P-1) .

On or about January 4, 2000, ALMIHDHAR left for KL (need citation)

From about January 4, 2000 through about January 8, 2000, ALHAZMI and ALMIHDHAR met with other UBL associates in Kuala Lumpur (KL), Malaysia and in Bangkok, Thailand. Their associates included "KHALLAD" (WALID BIN ATTASH), planner of the U.S.S. Cole bombing (October 12, 2000).

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

EO14040-000608

SECRET//NOFORN

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: [redacted] (G)
[redacted] (S) [redacted] (S)
From: New York
Re: [redacted] (F) 01/15/2010

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] On January 5, 2000, ALMIHDHAR arrived in KL (from Yemen, via Dubai)

[redacted] (A),(G),(J-1), (D)

[redacted] On January 8, 2000, NAWAF ALHAZMI AND KHALID ALMIDHAR arrived in Bangkok.

[redacted] On January 9, 2000, ALBAYOUMI registered at the Travelodge, 11180 Washington Place, Culver City, CA, and checked out about 20 minutes later (FD-302 dated 1/15/2002, [redacted] (F) [redacted] (F) When registering he utilized the address [redacted] (P) San Diego, CA (his old address). On the same date, apparently after having gone to the wrong hotel, ALBAYOUMI registered at the Half Moon Hotel, 3958 South Sepulveda Blvd., Culver City, CA. No check-in time was noted on the receipt. When registering he utilized the address [redacted] (P) [redacted] San Diego, CA.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted] On January 13, 2000, On January 15, 2000, ALHAZMI and ALMIHDHAR arrived at Los Angeles International Airport at 13:27 on United Airlines flight 2 (a connecting flight from Bangkok).

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism:

Attn:

(G)

(S)

(S)

From: New York

Re:

(F)

01/15/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(P) (P) (deposited at bank with ABA# (P) received one check in the amount of \$300 from ALTHUMAIRY which cleared on 02/02/2000. (Analyst note: Records for Wells Fargo Bank account number (P) for the period 06/10/1999 through 11/15/2002 were reviewed. The account was held in the name FAHAD AL THUMAIRY, ALBER ACCOUNT. The address (P) Los Angeles; note that (P) recently wrote a letter, indicating extremist views, to (A), (G), (J-1) (P) - maybe (P) knows him, timing of the payment interesting, there weren't typically such small payments from this account).

(D)

(D)

(D)

(ALSUDAIRY worked at the embassy and was a visitor to San Diego who stayed at ABDUSATTAR SHAIKH's house).

On or about February 1, 2000, OMAR ALBAYOUMI and (P) traveled to Los Angeles, ostensibly for ALBAYOUMI to deal with passport issues at the Saudi Consulate.

Also on

(D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

EO14040-000610

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism:

Attn: [REDACTED] (G)

(S)

(S)

From: New York

Re: [REDACTED] (F)

01/15/2010

[REDACTED] On or about February 3, 2000, an unknown male and OMAR ALBAYOUMI assisted NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIHDHAR in obtaining a lease at the Parkwood Apartments in San Diego, CA. The next day, ALHAZMI and ALMIHDHAR attempted to pay for the apartment with cash, but were advised by the rental office that they would need to use a cashier's check. (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] According to an interview of [REDACTED] (P) (FD-302 dated 8/16/2002): "Initially, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar came into the rental office of the Parkwood Apartment Complex with an unknown middle eastern male, looking for a two-bedroom apartment sometime during the end of January 2000 or beginning of February 2000. Because Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar did not speak English well they needed someone to interpret for them. [REDACTED] (P) believed that this unknown male was employed by Alliant University in San Diego, California, as an aide or counselor in the International Studies Department. This unknown male was described as being approximately in his 30's or 40's, 5'9"-5'11", skull cap." Additionally, "Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar wanted to move into an apartment the same day that they walked into the rental office, however [REDACTED] (P) advised them that they needed a co-signer/guarantor and a bank statement showing that they had enough assets to pay for the rent." Since "Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar did not have a credit history, and according to Al-Bayoumi they were staying with him because they just came into the country, he would be the co-signer and act as the guarantor. Al-Bayoumi emphasized that they needed to get an apartment right away. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar came into the rental office on three different days prior to actually moving into the apartment on February 5, 2000." "On the second occasion when Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar came into the rental office they had a 'wad of cash' to pay for the first month's rent, deposit and insurance.

[REDACTED] (P) re-advised them that they had to have a bank account statement to show that they can pay for the rent since they did not have any employment or credit history. Additionally, they were told that [REDACTED] (P) could not accept cash on the first payment and would need a certified check, cashier's check or money order." "It was on February 4, 2000, that Al-Hazmi and Al-

[REDACTED]
EO14040-000611

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism:

Attn: [REDACTED] (G)

(S)

(S)

From: New York

Re: [REDACTED] (F)

01/15/2010

Mihdhar came into the office with a bank statement and cash."
"On February 5, 2002 [sic], Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar came into the Parkwood office however, they did not have enough cash with them to pay for the apartment. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar left and returned with Al-Bayoumi, who filled out the section on the rental agreement as the co-signer and guarantor. Since Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar did not have enough cash nor did they have a cashier's check, money order or certified check, Al-Bayoumi left and returned with a cashier's check, in his name, made payable to the Parkwood Apartments in the amount of \$1,558.00."

According to an interview of [REDACTED] (P) (FD-302 dated 9/18/2001), [REDACTED] (P) "remembers renting an apartment to two Middle Eastern men in approximately January to March 2000." [REDACTED] (P) reported that there was "another male individual who acted as a translator on approximately four occasions for Almihdar and Alhazmi. He was described as a light-complected Middle Eastern male, approximately 5'6", 160 pounds, 27-28 years of age, wore glasses and a jewish yamaka (sic)."

[REDACTED] On February 4, 2000, Bayoumi obtained a cashier's check payable to the Parkwood Apartments for \$1,558 and deposited the same amount in cash to his Bank of America account [REDACTED] (P) reportedly was in the bank with Khalid and Nawaf around 1:30-1:40pm ([REDACTED] (F)).

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
EO14040-000612

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism:

Attn: [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

From: New York

Re: [REDACTED] (F)

01/15/2010

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] LAFI H. ALHARBI. ALHARBI was a Lieutenant in the Saudi Arabian Navy at the time, and was in San Diego attending training [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) .

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

OMAR ALBAYOUMI's phone also had interesting activity on this day.

[REDACTED]
EO14040-000613

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism:

Attn:

(G)

(G)

(S)

(S)

(S)

From: New York

Re:

(F)

01/15/2010
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: [REDACTED] (G)
[REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] (S)
From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 01/15/2010

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G) Is respectfully requested that [REDACTED] (G)
[REDACTED] (G) disseminate this document to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1).

◆◆

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 2/18/2010

To: Counterterrorism:

Attn:

(S)
[Redacted]

New York:
Oklahoma City:

SSA [Redacted] (S)

Attn:

(S)
[Redacted]

Attn:

SA [Redacted] (S)

From: New York

(G)

Contact: SA [Redacted] (S)

Approved By:

(S)
[Redacted]

Drafted By:

(S)
[Redacted]

Case ID #:

(F)
[Redacted]

Title:

[Redacted] OPERATION ENCORE
FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI
MUSAED AL-JARRAH
IYAD MAHMUD MUHAMMAD MUSTAFA AL RABABAH
(A), (J-1), (G)

Synopsis:

[Redacted] Summary of investigative findings regarding Operation ENCORE [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [Redacted] subjects Adel Al-Sadhan and Mutaib Al-Sudairy. [Redacted] (A), (J-1), (G)

(G)
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
Re: (F) 02/18/2010

Full Investigation Initiated: (A), (G), (J-1)

Details: New York is working under the operational hypothesis that Saudi nationals Adel Al-Sadhan and Mutaib Al-Sudairy, are possibly connected to the 9/11/01 terrorist attacks.

(J-3)

(J-3) The NYO believes that this is an opportunity to collect information about any possible terrorism related connections that these two Saudi nationals may have.

Background:

On 06/28/2007, a subfile under the PENTTBOM investigation was opened by NYO to contain information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value.

Specifically, the NYO was interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

Operation Encore (FI) was eventually opened in New York to fully investigate the emerging network uncovered during the initial investigation conducted under PENTBOM.

Further, full investigations were initiated to investigate Fahad Al-Thumairy, Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi, and Musaed Al-Jarrah, due to their association with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar. There is a significant amount of information uncovered through phone analysis, financial analysis, and numerous interviews that suggests the aforementioned subjects assisted the hijackers, in a support/logistics role while they were in the United States, preparing for the 9/11 attacks. They are suspected of providing the hijackers with financial assistance,

EO14040-000617

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: [REDACTED] (G)
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 02/18/2010

obtaining drivers licenses and living quarters, spiritual guidance, and locating flight schools.

[REDACTED] Logical investigation conducted through Operation Encore, Fahad Al-Thumairy, Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi, and separately Musaed Al-Jarrah, it has been uncovered that Musaed Al Jarrah may have played a leadership role in the overall coordination of logistics support for 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar. This was possible through Al-Jarrah's position as Head of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington D.C. Al-Jarrah oversaw the handling of the hijackers through his subordinates Fahad Al-Thumairy and Omar Ahmed Al-Bayoumi and by personal contact with the hijackers on numerous occasions.

Timeline:

[REDACTED] On or about April 3, 1999, NAWAF ALHAZMI was issued a B-2 visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. His intended address was Sheraton, LA, CA (I94 Form Record #I9449747518).

[REDACTED] On or about May 6, 1999, KHALID ALMIHDHAR was issued Saudi passport #B721156, and on or about April 7, 1999, was issued a B-1/B-2 visa [REDACTED] (F) note: wouldn't the passport need to be issued before the visa? - this info should be confirmed).

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH was allegedly an accountant at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C. since 1991. However, [REDACTED] (O-1) he was actually the head of the Islamic Affairs Section. He coordinated the activity of Saudi Salafi imams in the U.S., including FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY. AL-JARRAH left the U.S. in 2006.

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

To: Counterterrorism:

Attn:

(G)

Re:

(F)

02/18/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

EO14040-000619

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
Re: (F), 02/18/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

On December 12, 1999, ABDULLAH A S AL JRAITHEN arrived at 0742 per (O-1) According to I-94 record (P-1) he arrived at port of entry New York, intended address Holiday Inn, Los Angeles, (J-3)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

On December 20, 1999, BAYOUMI registered at the Travelodge, 11180 Washington Place, Culver City, CA along with ABDULLAH A S AL JRAITHEN. They checked in at 10:43 and checked out the next day at 13:22 (FD-302 dated 1/15/2002, (F), serial (F) ALJRAITHEN's travel documents indicated he traveled by air to New York on December 12, 1999 (J-3)

. He is a Saudi Arabian citizen and resident. He listed his intended address as Holiday Inn, Los Angeles, CA (per I-94 record (P-1)

On or about January 4, 2000, ALMIHDHAR left for KL (need citation)

From about January 4, 2000 through about January 8, 2000, ALHAZMI and ALMIHDHAR met with other UBL associates in Kuala Lumpur (KL), Malaysia and in Bangkok, Thailand. Their associates included "KHALLAD" (WALID BIN ATTASH), planner of the U.S.S. Cole bombing (October 12, 2000).

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

EO14040-000620

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
Re: (F), 02/18/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

On January 5, 2000, ALMIHDHAR arrived in KL (from Yemen, via Dubai)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

On January 8, 2000, NAWAF ALHAZMI AND KHALID ALMIDHAR arrived in Bangkok.

On January 9, 2000, ALBAYOUMI registered at the Travelodge, 11180 Washington Place, Culver City, CA, and checked out about 20 minutes later (FD-302 dated 1/15/2002, (F), (F)). When registering he utilized the address (P) San Diego, CA (his old address). On the same date, apparently after having gone to the wrong hotel, ALBAYOUMI registered at the Half Moon Hotel, 3958 South Sepulveda Blvd., Culver City, CA. No check-in time was noted on the receipt. When registering he utilized the address (P) San Diego, CA.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

On January 13, 2000, On January 15, 2000, ALHAZMI and ALMIHDHAR arrived at Los Angeles International Airport at 13:27 on United Airlines flight 2 (a connecting flight from Bangkok).

EO14040-000621

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: [REDACTED] (G)
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 02/18/2010

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] (D)

[REDACTED] note that [REDACTED] (P) recently wrote a letter, indicating extremist views, to [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (P) - maybe [REDACTED] (P) knows him, timing of the payment interesting, there weren't typically such small payments from this account).

[REDACTED] (D)

[REDACTED] (D) (ALSUDAIRY worked at the embassy and was a visitor to San Diego who stayed at ABDUSATTAR SHAIKH's house).

[REDACTED] On or about February 1, 2000, OMAR ALBAYOUMI and BIN DON traveled to Los Angeles, ostensibly for ALBAYOUMI to deal with passport issues at the Saudi Consulate.

[REDACTED] (D)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] On or about February 3, 2000, an unknown male and OMAR ALBAYOUMI assisted NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIHDHAR in obtaining a lease at the Parkwood Apartments in San Diego, CA. The next day, ALHAZMI and ALMIHDHAR attempted to pay for the apartment with cash, but were advised by the rental office that they would need to use a cashier's check. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000622

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
Re: (F), 02/18/2010

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

According to an interview of (P) (FD-302 dated 8/16/2002): "Initially, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar came into the rental office of the Parkwood Apartment Complex with an unknown middle eastern male, looking for a two-bedroom apartment sometime during the end of January 2000 or beginning of February 2000. Because Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar did not speak English well they needed someone to interpret for them. (P) believed that this unknown male was employed by Alliant University in San Diego, California, as an aide or counselor in the International Studies Department. This unknown male was described as being approximately in his 30's or 40's, 5'9"-5'11", skull cap." Additionally, "Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar wanted to move into an apartment the same day that they walked into the rental office, however (P) advised them that they needed a co-signer/guarantor and a bank statement showing that they had enough assets to pay for the rent." Since "Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar did not have a credit history, and according to Al-Bayoumi they were staying with him because they just came into the country, he would be the co-signer and act as the guarantor. Al-Bayoumi emphasized that they needed to get an apartment right away. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar came into the rental office on three different days prior to actually moving into the apartment on February 5, 2000." "On the second occasion when Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar came into the rental office they had a 'wad of cash' to pay for the first month's rent, deposit and insurance. (P) re-advised them that they had to have a bank account statement to show that they can pay for the rent since they did not have any employment or credit history. Additionally, they were told that (P) could not accept cash on the first payment and would need a certified check, cashier's check or money order." "It was on February 4, 2000, that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar came into the office with a bank statement and cash." "On February 5, 2002 [sic], Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar came into the Parkwood office however, they did not have enough cash with them to pay for the apartment. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar left and returned with Al-Bayoumi, who filled out the section on the rental agreement as the co-signer and guarantor. Since Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar did not have enough cash nor did they have a cashier's check, money order or certified check, Al-Bayoumi left and returned with a cashier's check, in his name, made payable to the Parkwood Apartments in the amount of \$1,558.00."

According to an interview of (P) (FD-302 dated 9/18/2001), (P) "remembers renting an apartment to two Middle Eastern men in approximately January to March 2000." (P) reported that there

EO14040-000623

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: [REDACTED] (G)
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 02/18/2010

was "another male individual who acted as a translator on approximately four occasions for Almihdar and Alhazmi. He was described as a light-complected Middle Eastern male, approximately 5'6", 160 pounds, 27-28 years of age, wore glasses and a jewish yamaka (sic)."

[REDACTED] On February 4, 2000, Bayoumi obtained a cashier's check payable to the Parkwood Apartments for \$1,558 and deposited the same amount in cash to his Bank of America account [REDACTED] (D), (P-1) reportedly was in the bank with Khalid and Nawaf around 1:30-1:40pm ([REDACTED] (F)).

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1) LAFI H. ALHARBI. ALHARBI was a [REDACTED] (O-1) in the Saudi Arabian

EO14040-000624

To: Counterterrorism: Attn: (G)
Re: (F), 02/18/2010

(O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(O-1)

(O-1) reporting indicated that in November 2009, Omar Al-Bayoumi had wired \$6000.00 to a flight school located in the Philippines who specialize in small aircraft (Cessna) flight training. Al-Bayoumi had provided a list of identifiers for this monetary transaction, to include, a P.O. Box located in Saudi Arabia, as well as, two Saudi telephone numbers.

(O-1)

(O-1)

According to FBI San Diego, (P) The (P) located in San Diego, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) is in contact with Al-Sudairy and (P) (A), (G), (J-1), (P) a Medical Doctor who cared for Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar, and an unidentified Saudi, have been having private meetings within the library of (P) Mosque.

(O-1)

EO14040-000625

To: Counterterrorism:

Attn: (G)

Re: (F), 02/18/2010

(O-1)

(O-1)

It has come to the attention of the NYO that Musaed Al-Jarrah currently holds the position of Head of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It was further uncovered that Al-Jarrah has concentrated his attention on the assistance of Youth Groups during his tenure at the Saudi Arabian Embassy, Kuala Lumpur.

The two Saudi nationals, Adel Al-Sadhan and Mutaib Al-Sudairy, were associated with individuals who had direct contact with Al-Midhar and Al-Hazmi in southern California. Although there is no indication that Al-Sadhan or Al-Sudairy had direct contact with the hijackers, Al-Sadhan likely met with Al-Thumairy in person approximately a year before the hijackers arrived in the US. Moreover, Al-Sadhan and Al-Sudairy received assistance from Al-Bayoumi during their six week stay in San Diego approximately six months before the arrival of the hijackers. This, paired with telephonic communication between Al-Bayoumi and Al-Sudairy on significant dates, suggests that Al-Sudairy and Al-Sadhan may have assisted the hijackers during their time in southern California.

(J-3)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

EO14040-000626

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism: [REDACTED] Attn: [REDACTED] (G)
(G) Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 02/18/2010

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED]

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[REDACTED] Read and Clear.

◆◆

[REDACTED]
EO14040-000627

(G)

FM FBI WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
BT

CITE: (G)
PASS:

SUBJECT: INEXORABLE/POSTDILUVIAN - TO REPORT INFORMATION
ON OPERATION ENCORE.

DEATILS: ON 24 FEBRUARY 2010, THE FBI BRIEFED
REPRESENTATIVES FROM CTC/GJ AT LANGLEY REGARDING OPERATION ENCORE
(J-3)

(J-3) THE BELOW INFORMATION
SERVES TO SUMMARIZE THIS BRIEFING.

ON 28 JUNE 2007, A SUBFILE UNDER THE PENTTBOM
INVESTIGATION WAS OPENED BY FBI NEW YORK TO CONTAIN INFORMATION
GARNERED FROM THE PLANNED EXPLOITATION OF INTELLIGENCE TARGETS
PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED DURING THE PENTTBOM INVESTIGATION.
THE PENTTBOM INVESTIGATION FUNCTIONED AS BOTH A CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION AND AN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING OPERATION INTO THE
9/11 TERRORIST ATTACKS. HOWEVER, THERE REMAINED INDIVIDUALS WITH
VARIOUS LEVELS OF CONNECTIVITY TO THE 9/11 HIJACKERS WHOM COULD
BE FURTHER EXPLOITED FOR ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE. BY
REVISITING SOME ASPECTS OF THE PENTTBOM INVESTIGATION, THE FBI
BELIEVED THAT CERTAIN AL-QAEDA TACTICS AND TRADECRAFT COULD BE
REVEALED.

SPECIFICALLY, THE FBI WAS INTERESTED IN GAINING A GREATER
UNDERSTANDING OF 9/11 HIJACKERS KHALID AL-MIHDHAR AND NAWAF
AL-HAZMI'S PAST INTERACTION WITH AND CONNECTIVITY TO THE LOCAL
(SOUTHERN CALIFORNIAN) MUSLIM COMMUNITY. SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING
WOULD ASSIST IN EXPLAINING THE APPARENT EASE WITH WHICH
AL-MIHDHAR AND AL-HAZMI EXPLOITED THAT COMMUNITY TO GAIN
ASSISTANCE AND SAFE HARBOR.

OPERATION ENCORE WAS EVENTUALLY OPENED BY FBI NEW YORK TO
FULLY INVESTIGATE THE NETWORK UNCOVERED DURING THE INITIAL

EO14040-000628

INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER PENTBOM.

■ ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS WERE INITIATED ON FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI, AND MUSAED AL-JARRAH DUE TO THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH 9/11 HIJACKERS NAWAF AL-HAZMI AND KHALID AL-MIHDHAR. THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF INFORMATION UNCOVERED THROUGH PHONE ANALYSIS, FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, AND NUMEROUS INTERVIEWS THAT SUGGESTS THE AFOREMENTIONED SUBJECTS ASSISTED THE HIJACKERS IN A SUPPORT/LOGISTICS ROLE WHILE THEY WERE IN THE U.S. THEY ARE SUSPECTED OF PROVIDING THE HIJACKERS WITH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, OBTAINING DRIVERS LICENSES AND LIVING QUARTERS, PROVIDING SPIRITUAL GUIDANCE, AND LOCATING FLIGHT SCHOOLS.

■ DURING THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION IT WAS REVEALED THAT TWO ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUALS WITH LINKS TO AL-THUMAIRY, AL-BAYOUMI, AND AL-JARRAH - (J-3)

(J-3) (J-3) ALTHOUGH AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY NEVER HAD DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE 9/11 HIJACKERS, AL SADHAN LIKELY MET WITH AL-THUMAIRY IN PERSON IN 1998, APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR BEFORE THE HIJACKERS ARRIVED IN THE US, AND BOTH AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY MET WITH AL-BAYOUMI IN 1999 WHO ASSISTED THEM DURING THEIR SIX WEEK STAY IN SAN DIEGO APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR. THIS CONTACT, PAIRED WITH ANALYSIS OF CALL RECORDS AND TRAVEL PATTERNS DURING THE TIME THE TWO HIJACKERS WERE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, INDICATES AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY MAY HAVE SERVED AS AN ADVANCE TEAM WHO HELPED TO ARRANGE PEOPLE TO ASSIST AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR DURING THEIR TIME IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA.

■ FOR BACKGROUND, PRIOR TO AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR'S ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES IN JANUARY 2000, A SERIES OF EVENTS TOOK PLACE IN THE US TO LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR A NETWORK THAT WOULD SOON PROVIDE THEM LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE.

■ ACCORDING TO I-94 INFORMATION, ADIL ALSADHAN (BELIEVED TO BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH ADEL AL SADHAN) ENTERED LOS ANGELES ON 15 DECEMBER 1998 ON (J-3)

(J-3) HIS INTENDED ADDRESS WAS THE HILTON HOTEL, LOS ANGELES AND HE LISTED A CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER ON HIS I-94 THAT WAS SUBSCRIBED TO FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, IMAM AT THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE IN CULVER CITY, CA. THE PURPOSE FOR AL SADHAN'S VISIT IN 1998 IS UNKNOWN, THOUGH IT ESTABLISHES THE FIRST KNOWN CONTACT BETWEEN AL SADHAN AND AL-THUMAIRY. INVESTIGATORS BELIEVE HIS

EO14040-000629

VISIT WAS TO BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR AL- THUMAIRY'S SUBSEQUENT ASSISTANCE TO AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR. AL SADHAN DEPARTED LOS ANGELES ON 20 JANUARY 1999.

AL SADHAN RETURNED TO THE US ON 13 JUNE 1999, THIS TIME ACCOMPANIED BY AN ASSOCIATE, MUTAIB AL SUDAIRY. BOTH MEN ENTERED VIA WASHINGTON, DC ON THE SAME FLIGHT AND

(J-3)

MUSAED AL-JARRAH, THEN DIRECTOR OF THE ISLAMIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, DC, MAY HAVE MANAGED THE NETWORK THAT WOULD ASSIST AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR, THOUGH HE NEVER HAD DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE HIJACKERS. AL-JARRAH WAS STATIONED IN WASHINGTON, DC FROM 1991 TO 2005. AL-JARRAH'S OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES WERE TO MANAGE AND CONTROL ALL ASSIGNMENTS OF SAUDI IMAMS IN THE U.S. AND FACILITATE THE ISSUANCE OF THEIR DIPLOMATIC VISAS. SOURCES REPORTED THAT AL-JARRAH MAY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO BRING OTHER SAUDI SUNNI SALAFI EXTREMISTS INTO THE U.S. THROUGH HIS POSITION AT THE EMBASSY. IT WAS AL-JARRAH WHO DETERMINED AL-THUMAIRY'S ASSIGNMENT, PLACING HIM IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AT THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE DURING THIS TIME. AL-THUMAIRY WAS IN THE US ON A DIPLOMATIC VISA AND WAS ASSIGNED TO THE SAUDI CONSULATE IN LOS ANGELES. HE HAD A REPUTATION FOR BEING A "SALAFI FANATIC" AND AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF MOTIVATION FOR VIOLENT OR TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

(A),(G),(J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

IN 1992 OR 1994 HE WAS TASKED BY USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) TO GET A LIST OF ALL SAUDI EMBASSY EMPLOYEES IN THE UNITED STATES. (A), (G), (J-1) THE REASON FOR THIS WAS TO FIND AND RECRUIT A SYMPATHIZER WITHIN THE SAUDI EMBASSY. (A), (G), (J-1) HE WENT TO A LOCAL LIBRARY AND PHOTOCOPIED A LIST OF EMBASSY EMPLOYEES FROM A BOOK IN THE REFERENCE SECTION AND HAND-DELIVERED THE LIST TO UBL. AL-JARRAH BEGAN WORKING AT THE SAUDI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, DC IN 1991. DURING THE TIME FRAME OF (A), (G), (J-1) TASKING FROM UBL, AL-JARRAH WOULD HAVE BEEN ON THE PHOTOCOPIED LIST.

IN 1999, BOTH AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY TRAVELED TO SAN DIEGO WHERE THEY STAYED FOR APPROXIMATELY 6 WEEKS (APPROXIMATELY JULY 1999 TO AUGUST 1999) AND MET WITH OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, A SAUDI STUDENT WHO HAD RESIDED IN SAN DIEGO SINCE 1995. AL-BAYOUMI

EO14040-000630

(O-1) AND, ACCORDING TO (A),(G),(J-1) PROVIDED A PLACE TO LIVE AND LOOKED AFTER THEM. FBI INVESTIGATION INDICATES AL-BAYOUMI MAY HAVE PROVIDED THEM WITH A CELL PHONE. (A),(G),(J-1) (A),(G),(J-1) ALSO INDICATES THAT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY LIVED AT THE SAME ADDRESS IN SAN DIEGO WHERE AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR WOULD LATER STAY.

THE COMMUNICATIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF AL-THUMAIRY, AL-JARRAH, AND AL-BAYOUMI IN THE WEEKS PRECEDING THE HIJACKERS' ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES ON 15 JANUARY 2000 IS TELLING. SPECIFICALLY, IN DECEMBER 1999 THERE WAS A UNIQUE PATTERN OF TELEPHONIC CONTACT THAT OPERATION ENCORE INVESTIGATORS REFER TO AS "THE SET-UP CALLS" CALLS THAT OCCURRED BETWEEN A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD LATER PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ASSISTING THE HIJACKERS.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

ON 12 DECEMBER 1999 ABDULLAH AL-JRAITHEN, A SAUDI RELIGIOUS SCHOLAR, ENTERED THE US IN NEW YORK AND CONTINUED TO LOS ANGELES, LISTING "HOLIDAY INN, LOS ANGELES" AS HIS INTENDED DESTINATION. AL-JRAITHEN AND AL-BAYOUMI CHECKED INTO A TRAVELODGE HOTEL TOGETHER IN CULVER CITY, CA ON 20 DECEMBER 1999 AND CHECKED OUT THE NEXT DAY. THIS TRAVELODGE HOTEL WAS REPORTEDLY OFTEN USED BY THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE TO HOUSE VISITORS. (NOTE: AN ADDITIONAL HOTEL REGISTRATION WAS FOUND AT THIS SAME TRAVELODGE FOR ABDULLAH ALGHAMDI WHO STAYED AT THE HOTEL FROM 8 MAY 2001 TO 15 MAY 2001. AHMED ALGHAMDI AND HAZMA ALGHAMDI WERE TWO OF THE HIJACKERS ON UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 175 AND SAEED ALGHAMDI WAS ONE OF THE HIJACKERS ON UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 93.) AL-BAYOUMI CHECKED INTO THIS SAME TRAVELODGE HOTEL AGAIN ON 9 JANUARY 2000, THE NEXT MONTH, ABOUT A WEEK PRIOR TO THE HIJACKERS' ARRIVAL. AL-BAYOUMI CHECKED IN AND THEN CHECKED OUT AFTER APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MINUTES. HE THEN CHECKED INTO THE HALF-MOON HOTEL FOR ONE NIGHT. THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SEEMS TO IMPLY HE CONFUSED THE HOTELS.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

WHICH INVESTIGATORS BELIEVE INDICATES AL-BAYOUMI WAS EITHER CHECKING THE MINUTES THAT WERE UNUSED ON THE CARDS OR LEARNING HOW TO USE THEM BY LISTENING TO THE AUTOMATED PROMPTS.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

HIJACKERS AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR LANDED IN LOS ANGELES ON 15 JANUARY 2000. THE FIRST PLACE THEY VISITED WAS THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE IN CULVER CITY, CA WHERE AL-THUMAIRY WAS THE IMAM. IN LATE JANUARY 2000, THEY MET OMAR AL-BAYOUMI IN LOS ANGELES AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER MOVED TO SAN DIEGO, WHERE AL-BAYOUMI RESIDED. AL-BAYOUMI CO-SIGNED A RENTAL LEASE AGREEMENT FOR THE HIJACKERS IN SAN DIEGO AND ASSISTED THEM IN SETTING UP BANK ACCOUNTS.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

TELEPHONE RECORDS SHOW THAT AL-BAYOUMI CALLED MUTAIB AL SUDAIRY FIVE TIMES SUBSEQUENT TO MEETING THE HIJACKERS IN LOS ANGELES. THE DATES OF THE CALLS ARE SIGNIFICANT. THE FIRST SET OF CALLS OCCURRED ON 24 JANUARY, 26 JANUARY, AND 30 JANUARY 2000 ON THESE PARTICULAR DAYS AL-BAYOUMI MET THE HIJACKERS IN CULVER CITY, CA AND TALKED TO THEM ABOUT COMING TO SAN DIEGO. THE NEXT CALL OCCURRED ON 2 FEBRUARY 2000. ON 4 FEBRUARY 2000 AL-BAYOUMI CO-SIGNED THE LEASE AGREEMENT FOR THE HIJACKERS' APARTMENT AND BROUGHT THEM TO A BANK OF AMERICA TO ASSIST IN OPENING A BANK ACCOUNT. THE LAST CALL OCCURRED ON 7 FEBRUARY 2000. BY THIS DATE, ALL OF AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR'S AFFAIRS WERE IN ORDER.

SOMETIME IN 2000, AL SADHAN MOVED TO LAWRENCE, KANSAS AND AL SUDAIRY MOVED TO COLUMBUS, MISSOURI. WHILE IN MISSOURI, AL SUDAIRY LIVED WITH ZIYAD KHALEEL FOR ABOUT FOUR MONTHS IN 2000. KHALEEL WAS A KNOWN KEY COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT OFFICER FOR UBL AND PROVIDED SATELLITE PHONES USED IN THE 1998 US EMBASSY BOMBINGS IN AFRICA. DURING HIS TIME IN MISSOURI, AL SUDAIRY ATTENDED THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI - COLUMBIA'S INTENSIVE ENGLISH PROGRAM. ACCORDING TO (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) FACULTY MEMBERS WERE SUSPICIOUS OF HIM SINCE HE DIDN'T APPEAR INTERESTED IN LEARNING ENGLISH AND HIS PEERS BELIEVED HE WAS A SAUDI ARABIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICER.

ON 12/8/2000, A THIRD HIJACKER, HANI HANJOUR, ARRIVED IN SAN DIEGO AND LEFT WITH AL-HAZMI FOR PHOENIX, ARIZONA.

IN EARLY APRIL OF 2001, AL-HAZMI AND HANJOUR ARRIVED IN FALLS CHURCH, VA. THEY ATTENDED THE DAR AL HIJRA MOSQUE, WHERE

EO14040-000632

ANWAR AULAQI WAS NOW THE IMAM. ALSO IN APRIL OF 2001, BOTH AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY WERE TERMINATED FROM THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE ISLAMIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT AT THE SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY (NFI). THE TWO MEN, AT THIS POINT, WERE LIVING IN WASHINGTON, DC. FBI HAS NO INFORMATION TO SUGGEST THAT AL SADHAN AND/OR AL SUDAIRY HAD CONTACT WITH THE HIJACKERS OR AULAQI DURING THIS TIME. AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY BOTH LEFT THE UNITED STATES AND RETURNED TO SAUDI ARABIA ON 10/25/2001.

RECENT INFORMATION/INVESTIGATION

[REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] BECAUSE THE FBI ASSESSES THAT AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY MAY STILL MAINTAIN TIES TO AL-QAEDA AND MAY BE [REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] FOR FACILITATION OR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING PURPOSES ON BEHALF OF AL-QAEDA,

[REDACTED] (J-3), (O-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] SURROUND AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY'S CURRENT NEXUS TO AL-QAEDA AND THEIR ACTIVITIES SINCE DEPARTING THE US IN 2001. BEYOND THEIR SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY PATTERNS PRIOR TO 9/11, THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] INFORMATION THAT THEY WERE WORKING AT THE BEHEST OF AL-QAEDA. THE ONLY IDENTIFIED DIRECT LINK TO AL- QAEDA BEYOND THE OPERATION ENCORE NETWORK IS THROUGH AL SUAIDRY'S ASSOCIATION WITH ZIYAD KHALEEL, WHO WAS KILLED IN SAUDI ARABIA IN 2002. SUBSEQUENT TO AL SUDAIRY'S DEPARTURE FROM THE US IN 2001, HE MET WITH KHALEEL TWICE IN SAUDI ARABIA FOR UNKNOWN REASONS.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3) [REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1)

[REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1) HE HAS NEVER TRAVELED TO THE US BEFORE.

[REDACTED] IN ADDITION, [REDACTED] (O-1) REPORTING INDICATES THAT IN NOVEMBER 2009, AL-BAYOUMI WIRED \$6,000.00 TO A FLIGHT SCHOOL LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES WHICH SPECIALIZES IN SMALL AIRCRAFT (CESSNA) FLIGHT TRAINING. AL-BAYOUMI PROVIDED A LIST OF IDENTIFIERS FOR THIS MONETARY TRANSACTION, TO INCLUDE A P.O. BOX LOCATED IN SAUDI ARABIA AS WELL AS TWO SAUDI TELEPHONE NUMBERS. ONE OF THESE NUMBERS APPEARS TO BE LINKED TO A CIVIL AVIATION AGENCY IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHOM AL-BAYOUMI MAY WORK FOR. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM A CURRENT LINK BETWEEN AL-BAYOUMI AND AL SADHAN OR AL SUDAIRY, THE ABOVE INFORMATION REMAINS OF CONCERN TO OUR BUREAU.

[REDACTED] THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION OUTLINES [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY'S PREVIOUS VISIT TO THE US, IN WHICH THEY VISITED VIRGINIA, CALIFORNIA, AND KANSAS/MISSOURI.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(J-3)

(J-3) THE FBI BELIEVES THAT TO BE AN UNLIKELY SCENARIO, AND THAT BOTH SUBJECTS WILL LIKELY OBTAIN (J-3) HOUSING. REGARDLESS, WHEN SUBJECTS ESTABLISH A RESIDENCE,

(A),(G),(J-1)

HUMINT

FBI

(A), (G), (J-1)

(J-3)

TO FUNCTION AS AN EXTENSION OF THE SURVEILLANCE TEAMS.

FBI (G) SOURCE COVERAGE WILL LARGELY DEPEND ON THE BEHAVIOR OF THE SUBJECTS UPON ARRIVAL, E.G. IF THEY ATTEND MOSQUE AND WHAT HUMINT COVERAGE IS ALREADY IN PLACE IN THAT LOCATION. CURRENT (A),(G),(J-1) WILL BE QUERIED.

ADDITIONALLY, (G) IS CONDUCTING A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI INVESTIGATION TO LOOK FOR CONTACTS AND LOCATIONS FREQUENTED DURING THE TIME HE SPENT IN (G)

ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS

GIVEN THE SUBJECTS' SUSPECTED HISTORY OF FACILITATION, THE FBI ANTICIPATES OPENING ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS BASED ON ANY US-BASED ASSOCIATES WHO ARE IDENTIFIED BY INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THOSE MENTIONED ABOVE.

(A), (G), (J-1)

CONCLUSION

THE FBI ASSESSES THAT

(A), (G), (J-1)

THE FBI APPRECIATES YOUR AGENCY'S ASSISTANCE IN THIS ONGOING INVESTIGATION AND WELCOMES ANY INFORMATION YOUR AGENCY MAY HAVE IN RELATION TO THE SUBJECTS OF OPERATION ENCORE.

THE FBI IS PROVIDING THIS INFORMATION TO YOUR AGENCY FOR LEAD PURPOSES. AUTHORIZATION FOR FURTHER DISSEMINATION TO OTHER US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND/OR FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS MUST BE PROVIDED BY FBI HEADQUARTERS.

POC FOR THIS MATTER AT THE FBI IS IA (S) AT

(S) OR SSA (G),(S)

(G)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/16/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

(G), (S)



New York

Attn:

Oklahoma City

Attn:

San Diego

Attn:

Washington Field


Attn:

From: San Diego


Squad (G)

Contact: (S)


Approved By:



Drafted By:



Case ID #:



Title:

MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL MIHDAR ZAID
aka MOHDAR ABDULLAH
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

OPERATION ENCORE

(A), (G), (J-1)

FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY



To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F) 06/16/2010

(A), (G), (J-1)

OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI
(A), (G), (J-1)

MUSAED AL-JARRAH
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

ADIL ALSADHAN
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

MUTAIB A A ALSUDAIRY
(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: Additional information regarding ABDULLAH A S ALJRAITHEN.

(G)

Reference: (F)

Details: As outlined by writer in referenced serial, ABDULLAH ALJRAITHEN registered at the Travelodge Hotel in Culver City, California with OMAR AHMED ALBAYOUMI on 12/20/1999 and checked out the following day. Little additional information was located regarding ALJRAITHEN at the time referenced serial was written.

After the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, ALBAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY), his apartment was searched and documents were seized. A recent review by (S) of documents obtained by NYO-JTTF from NSY yielded further information regarding ALJRAITHEN (this information is also described on (F) ALBAYOUMI's telephone book contained an entry for Dr. ABDULLAH ALJOAITHEN, with the numbers 325 0877 and C (cell) 55154240. (Analyst note: the first number

EO14040-000638

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 06/16/2010

is presumed to be a Saudi number, the second number appears to be a Saudi cell phone number given the code "5" followed by a 7-digit number; neither number was found in the Telephone Application.)

[REDACTED] ECF searches on "3250877" and "55154240" both yielded a hit on [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (O-1), which describes reporting from a foreign government service regarding "names and telephone numbers appearing on a laminated card retrieved from the villa in Madinah, Saudi Arabia, where SHAYKH 'ALI KHUDAYR FAHD ALKHUDAYR AND SHAYKH AHMAD HAMUD MUFARRIJ ALKHALIDI were arrested during a raid conducted in late May 2003. The relevant entry on this contact list was for ABDALLAH BIN 'ALI AL-J'AYTHAN 3250877 and cell 55154240. An IDW search on 3250877 yielded additional other government service information [REDACTED] (O-1) "DR. 'ABDALLAH AL-JUHAYN 3250877" was found on a confiscated hard-drive from an October 6, 2001 raid on the Al-Haramayn offices in [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] According to a (G) [REDACTED] report on ABDALLAH BIN ALI ALJAYTHAN: (G) Intelligence Assessment: Shaykh Ali KHUDAIR is a probable terrorist supporter (Financier). KHUDAIR was believed to be the source of weapons, passports, money and supplies for ANSAR AL-ISLAM operations in Iraq. Ali KHUDAIR is believed to be detained in Saudi Arabia.

[REDACTED] Also according to the (G) [REDACTED] report, a 22-page Arabic language document containing instructions for making a variety of improvised explosives devices (IEDs) was found on a hard drive seized during the 05/27/2003 arrests of radical clerics and extremist shaykhs Ali KHUDAIR and Ahmad Humud AL-KHALIDI in Medinah, Saudi Arabia. Much of the material in the document closely parallels that in an explosives manual handwritten by Abu Khabab AL-MASRI, the former explosives and poisons trainer at the AL-QAIDA associated DERUNTA TRAINING CAMP in Afghanistan. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] KHUDAIR appears to have at least indirect links to ABU ZUBAYDAH via AL QAEDA in IRAQ (AQI) member Abu Muhammad AL-NAJRANI. NAJRANI was reportedly an instructor at Al Qaeda's Camp Khaldan (ZUBAYDAH indicated he was trained by NAJRANI) and later became KHUDAIR's student [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000639

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 06/16/2010

[REDACTED] A UNI search on the name variant ALJUAYTHIN yielded a hit on DR. ABD ALLAH B ALI AL-JU'AYTHIN in [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) subject [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Virginia Jihad member) regarding intercepted emails being submitted to the file (NFI).

[REDACTED] It is worth noting that another name on the seized laminated card along with ALJAYTHAN's was SALMAN BIN FAHD AL-AWDA. AWDA is a well-known Salafi cleric who has been identified in the past as a terrorism supporter. AWDA openly criticized USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) a few years ago, apparently supporting a less violent type of jihad. An extensive amount of information about AL-AWDA is available in [REDACTED] (G). AWDA has a relatively recent connection to OP ENCORE subject FAHAD ALTHUMAIRY and his associate MOHAMMED ALMUHANNA [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] as described below.

[REDACTED] According to [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] as of late May 2009, SHAYKH SALMAN ODEH, VARIANT DR. SALMAN AL-AWDAH, was the shaykh of Saudi-based Salafi extremists MOHAMMAD AL-MUHANNA and FAHD AL-THUMAIRY, AKA FAHD AL-THUMAIRI. ODEH was a MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (MB) leader who was detained by Saudi Arabian authorities for plotting against the Royal Family (NFI).

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Analyst note: The Imam University referred to above is likely Imam Muhammad Bin Sa'ud University, which was attended by OP ENCORE subject THUMAIRY, as well as [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] subject ADEL ALSADHAN and possibly MUTAIB ALSUDAIRY. The Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America (IIASA) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] was a subsidiary of this university.

(J-2)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000640

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 06/16/2010

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 06/16/2010

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

[REDACTED] For information.

◆◆

[REDACTED]
EO14040-000642




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 11/26/2001

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: (S)



From: San

(G)

(S)

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

(S)

Case ID #:

(F)

Title:

OMAR ABDI MOHAME
OMAR KHADIB; (A), (J-1), (G)

(A), (G), (J-1) San Diego requests (A), (G), (J-1) Experian for financial and credit records regarding captioned subject.

(G)

Full Field Investigation Instituted: (A), (J-1), (G)

Details:

Request Of Bureau:

(A), (G), (J-1) Bureau is requested (A), (G), (J-1) Experian for financial and credit records regarding captioned subject.

On (A), (G) 2000, (A), (G), (J-1) advised that Omar Mohamed of San Diego was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States approximately six months ago. (A), (G), (J-1) stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. (A), (G), (J-1) that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia using (A), (G), (J-1).



To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F) 11/26/2001

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(O-1)

OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: (P-1) On January

EO14040-000644

To: [REDACTED] nt [REDACTED] : San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 11/26/2001

25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[REDACTED] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community [REDACTED] ders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[REDACTED] San Diego appreciates FBIHQ's assistance in this matter.

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC.

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000645

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 11/26/2001

[REDACTED] FBIHQ is requested [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Experian for credit
informa aining to Omar Abdi Mohame ib, date of
birth, [REDACTED] (P-1) 1960, SSAN [REDACTED] (P-1), [REDACTED] (P-1) La Mesa, CA.
91941

◆◆

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000646



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/16/2001

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: (S)
(G)

From: San Diego

(G)
Contact: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, aka
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: San Diego requests (A), (G), (J-1)
for toll records for captioned subject.

(G)

Full Field Investigation Instituted: (A), (G), (J-1) (USPER)

(F) Bureau is requested to direct responses to

Details: Request of the Bureau:

Bureau is requested to (A), (G), (J-1) requests for telephone toll records for the following telephone numbers and associated addresses for the period of 09/01/2000 to the present:

1. (P)
Subject's residence: (P)
La Mesa, CA. 91941

2. (P)
Western Somali Relief Agency (WESRA)
4979 University Avenue, Suite C, San Diego, CA. 92105. Subject is the

Director of WESRA.



To: Coun [redacted] m: San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) [redacted] 11/16/2001

3. [redacted] (P)

Somali and East African Youth Center,
4979 University Avenue, Suite D, San Diego
CA. 92105. Subject is President of the
Youth Center.

[redacted] NOTE: [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) and public source information indicates that KHADIB is in charge of both WESRA and the Youth Center. The request should include language which would request tolls for any and all telephone lines at the above addresses in anticipation of other telephone numbers being present at the addresses.

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) request for the above numbers should be directed to :

[redacted] (P)

[redacted] Khadib's pager number is [redacted] (P) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) request for the pager number records from 09/01/2000 to the present should be directed to:

[redacted] (P)

[redacted] On [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) 2000, [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Omar Mohamed of San Diego, was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Is [redacted] (AIAI) leader in the United States approximately six months ago. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) AIAI raises large amount [redacted] ited States and transfers it to Somalia using [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

To: [redacted] n : San Diego
Re: [redacted] (F) [redacted] 11/16/2001

[redacted]
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted]
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[redacted]
(A), (G), (J-1)

[redacted]
(C-1)

[redacted] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[redacted] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers [redacted] (P) and [redacted] (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, [redacted] (P) and [redacted] (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: [redacted] (P-1). On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to [redacted] (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[redacted] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings,

[redacted]

EO14040-000649

[REDACTED]

To: C uninterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 11/16/2001

insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[REDACTED] San Diego appreciates FBIHQ's assistance in this matter.

◆◆

[REDACTED]

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of

Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California 92123
February 10, 2004

OMAR ABDI MOHAMED,

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] Investigative Summary: (G)

(G) [REDACTED], advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, also known as Omar Abdi Mohamed AlKhadib, was born on [REDACTED] (P-1), in Mogadishu, Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was [REDACTED] (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was [REDACTED] (P-1). MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by [REDACTED] (P). On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that OMAR MOHAMED of San Diego, was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States in early 2000. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. A close friend of [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1).

[REDACTED] AIAI is an international terrorist organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

[REDACTED] AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia. [REDACTED] (G), has reported that

[REDACTED]

AIAI makes extensive use of non-government organizations (NGOs) for its money laundering and fund-raising activities.

[REDACTED] According to FBIHQ, AIAI believes the U.S. and other western nations support the Ethiopian Government. Therefore, attacks on U.S. citizens and Western interests overseas are possibilities. Intelligence also reports that AIAI threatened unspecified attacks on [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) in Addis Ababa in December 1996.

(C-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] UBL purchased shares in the Al-Barakat company currently managed by AIAI. AIAI is believed to use Al-Barakaat to finance its operations. UBL asked SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AHMAD GASSIM (OR QASIM), who resides in Saudi Arabia, and SHAYKH MUHAMMAD UTHAM, who owns the Amal Bank, to take over the management of the Al Barakat company as they are both high-ranking members with AIAI. The Al-Barakat company owns the Halima Rouge Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya and uses it as a clearing station for weapons to be sent to the various AIAI groups. The AIAI fighters and group members use the hotel as a base until they are given their travel orders.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB and [REDACTED] (P) among others attended the meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB was a close associate of [REDACTED] (P) (A), (G), (J-1) advised that [REDACTED] (P) sponsored MOHAMED when he came to San Diego from Canada. The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including fund-raising for Islamic causes. These causes include building more mosques in the U.S. and supporting Islamic groups in foreign countries such as Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon and Afghanistan. It was also discussed that America is an

[REDACTED]

enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[REDACTED] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that a prominent Somali community leader, [REDACTED] (P) alleged that KHADIB was actively providing financial support to an unnamed terrorist organization outside the U.S. [REDACTED] (P) was astounded that the FBI had not arrested KHADIB and guessed that KHADIB must

(O-1)

(C-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) In [REDACTED] (O-1) in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[REDACTED] WALI, a Somali national, was described as 38 - 40 years old, tall, thin, bowlegged, strong hands and legs. He has a gray patch of hair in the front of his scalp, which was surrounded by dark hair. He is married and has five children. He has a Master's Degree and is working on his PhD in economics. He lives in the northeast section of Mecca, called Azizia.

[REDACTED] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year

[REDACTED]

in places such as Mecca and Nairobi Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to (O-1) and told (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, (O-1) and KADIB are from the Ogaden tribe.

(O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) identified ABDIAZIZ LNU another AL-QAEDA member who lived in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. (O-1) met ABDIAZIZ at WALI's house in Mecca during the Hajj.

[REDACTED] Minneapolis FBI advised that the AIAI had a meeting of its United States leaders in Minneapolis, Minnesota over the September 2001, Labor Day weekend. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[REDACTED] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: (P). On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P), which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[REDACTED] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions. (A), (G), (J-1) advised that KHADIB received a monthly stipend (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown to (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000654

(A), (G), (J-1), (O-1)

[REDACTED] has indicated that KHADIB closed the Western Somali Relief Agency (WESRA), but still operates the East African Youth Center in San Diego, California. The closing of WESRA appeared to coincide with the shutdown of the Chicago-based Global Relief Foundation (GRF) by the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), Department of Treasury. (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] Investigation at San Diego determined that MOHAMED has a wife and child in Australia. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) the possible name of MOHAMED's wife as Reisa Bannerman.

During a recent interview with MOHAMED, he admitted to having family in Australia. MOHAMED also stated that he often traveled to Australia, and most recently, used Australia as a stop-over point while he applied for travel Visa's to Africa. (MOHAMED did not state which African countries he was attempting to visit.)

[REDACTED] Financial investigation into any possible financial transactions between MOHAMED and Australia are currently ongoing and have not been fully analyzed.

[REDACTED] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex: [REDACTED]
Date of Birth: (P-1) 1960
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: (P-1) [REDACTED]
CADLN: (P-1) [REDACTED]
INS A#: (P-1) [REDACTED]
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes: Black
Residence: (P) [REDACTED] La Mesa, CA 91941
(P) [REDACTED]
Occupation: President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

EO14040-000655

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

TRANSMIT VIA:

PRECEDENCE:

CLASSIFICATION:

SAMNET

IMMEDIATE

NEPTUNE

PRIORITY

IIR SENT VIA ACS

ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

F T O

PAGE 1 OF 6

Date

12/20/2004

Approved by:

Case ID #/Serial:

Original Filename:

FM DIRECTOR FBI ***** FOR SAMNET OPERATIONS USE ONLY

***** TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES/PRIORITY/

Time Received

Time of Transmission

SAMNET filename:

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BTG

- LEGAT LONDON/PRIORITY/
- LEGAT CANBERRA/PRIORITY/
- INFO DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
- LEGAT RIYADH/PRIORITY/
- LEGAT CAIRO/PRIORITY/
- LEGAT NAIROBI/PRIORITY/
- BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
- CIA WASHINGTON DC//CTC//PRIORITY/
- COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
- DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
- DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
- DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
- DEPT OF JUSTICE COMMAND CENTER WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
- DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC//COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION// PRIORITY/
- DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
- DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
- DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
- DIA WASHINGTON DC//JITF-CT//PRIORITY/
- DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD/PRIORITY/
- DIDIR USINS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
- DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC//OI//PRIORITY/
- FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC//ACI-100//PRIORITY/
- HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
- NGA NAVY YARD WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/

[REDACTED]

NSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//F3//PRIORITY/
NRO WASHINGTON DC//OS-HCO//PRIORITY/
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//INR//PRIORITY/
AMEMBASSY LONDON/PRIORITY/
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA/PRIORITY/
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA/PRIORITY/
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI/PRIORITY/
AMEMBASSY RIYADH/PRIORITY/
TTIC WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC//HQ INTEL//PRIORITY/
US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC//OHS BOX//PRIORITY/ BT

SERIAL: [REDACTED] (F)
COUNTRY: SAUDI ARABIA (SA);SOMALIA (SO);UNITED STATES
(US);ETHIOPIA (ET).
IPSP: IFC2400.
SUBJ: SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (IFTA) SUPPORT
FOR ISLAMIC ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND ASSISTANCE TO THE
SOMALI COM[REDACTED] ITY [REDACTED]
WARNING: (S) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE
REPORT CLASS [REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[REDACTED] (G)

SOURCE: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. THE SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND
ISLAMIC AFFAIRS OFFICE SUPPORTED THE KING FAHD MOSQUE IN SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA. POSSIBLE SAUDI SUPPORT OF THE SOMALI COMMUNITY IN SAN
DIEGO HAD BEEN PROVIDED THROUGH A FORMER LOCAL LEADER OF AL-ITTIHAD
AL-ISLAMI (AIAI).

[REDACTED]

WARNING: (S) THIS INFORMATION IS BEING RELEASED TO [REDACTED] (G) ONLY.
IT MAY NOT TO BE SHARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WITHOUT PRIOR CONSENT
OF THE FBI.

SERIAL: [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000657

SUBJ: SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (IFTA) SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIC ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND ASSISTANCE TO THE SOMALI COMMUNITY

DATE: 20041220.

COUNTRY: SAUDI ARABIA (SAU); SOMALIA (SOM); UNITED STATES (USA); ETHIOPIA (ETH)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

TEXT: 1. THE EMIR OF THE KING FAHD MOSQUE

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, DR. KHALIL KHALIL, (O-1)

(O-1)

(NFI) AND PREVIOUSLY LIVED IN SAUDI ARABIA. ALTHOUGH KHALIL OCCASIONALLY VISITED THE UNITED STATES, HE CONTINUED TO OVERSEE MANY ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF RUNNING THE MOSQUE. (A), (G), (J-1)

KHALIL WAS A SECULAR LEADER MORE INVOLVED WITH THE OPERATIONS OF THE MOSQUE THAN IN SPREADING ISLAM.) KHALIL'S PROTEGE IN THE MOSQUE WAS U.S. PERSON, (P) WITH WHOM HE WORKED VERY CLOSELY. TOGETHER THEY WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN FINDING A LOCATION AND SECURING FUNDING FROM THE PRINCE TO BUILD KING FAHD MOSQUE. WHEN THE PRINCE TRAVELED TO THE UNITED STATES, (P) AND KHALIL WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING THE PRINCE'S LODGING AND TRAVEL. AS OF OCTOBER 2004, KHALIL AND (P) CONTINUED TO SECURE FUNDS FOR THE MOSQUE FROM THE PRINCE. KHALIL AND (P) WERE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS (IFTA). (FBI COMMENT. (P) WAS BORN IN (P) AND ALLEGEDLY HELPED MUSLIMS WHO WERE DEDICATING THEMSELVES TO JIHAD TRAVEL INTO SAUDI ARABIA OR YEMEN FOR ADVANCED INDOCTRINATION.)

2. SPIRITUAL ACTIVITIES FOR THE KING FAHD MOSQUE PREVIOUSLY WERE DIRECTED BY ITS IMAM, IBRAHIM AL-HIBER, WHO WORKED FOR IFTA. AL-HIBER ARRIVED IN LOS ANGELES CIRCA 1997 AND FREQUENTLY TRAVELED OUTSIDE THE LOS ANGELES AREA TO COORDINATE DONATING KORANS AND ISLAMIC LITERATURE TO SMALLER MOSQUES. AL-HIBER ALSO WAS ACTIVE IN COORDINATING THE VISITS OF SAUDI ISLAMIC SCHOLARS TO AREA MOSQUES. AFTER BEING REPLACED BY FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, AL-HIBER WORKED FOR THE IFTA OFFICE IN ETHIOPIA (NFI). (A), (G), (J-1)

AL-HIBER WAS AN ISLAMIC POLITICAL ACTIVIST WHO WAS VERY POLITICALLY ADEPT AND EXCELLENT AT MAKING SPEECHES. AL-HIBER SUPPORTED THE SPREAD OF RADICAL FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM.)

3. [REDACTED] AL-THUMAIRY ALSO WORKED FOR THE IFTA AS IMAM AT KING FAHD MOSQUE. AL-THUMAIRY DISLIKED AL-HIBER, KHALIL, AND [REDACTED] (P) CONSIDERING AL-HIBER TOO POLITICAL FOR A RELIGIOUS OFFICE. RARELY DID AL-THUMAIRY ALLOW HIS IFTA RESPONSIBILITIES TO TAKE HIM OUT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA. ALTHOUGH AL-THUMAIRY ASSOCIATED WITH SOME EXTREMISTS, HE DID NOT SHARE THEIR ISLAMIC VIEWS NOR WAS HE EVER HEARD TO PREACH JIHAD OR ANTI-WESTERN SERMONS. IT WAS DUE TO LEADERSHIP ISSUES WITH KHALIL AND [REDACTED] (P), RATHER THAN BEING CONSIDERED AN EXTREMIST, THAT AL-THUMAIRY WAS SUBSEQUENTLY EXPELLED FROM KING FAHD MOSQUE. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) AL-THUMAIRY WAS VERY FUNDAMENTALIST (STRICT SALAFI) IN HIS BELIEFS, BUT WAS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE RADICAL OR EXTREMIST.)

4. [REDACTED] AL-THUMAIRY AND OMAR AL-BAYOUMI DISLIKED EACH OTHER BECAUSE AS WITH THE DISAGREEMENT WITH KHALIL AND [REDACTED] (P), AL-BAYOUMI WAS NOT A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SAUDI IFTA OFFICE. AL-BAYOUMI REPRESENTED A DIFFERENT PART OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT (NFI). AL BAYOUMI FOUGHT WITH AL-THUMAIRY BECAUSE AL-BAYOUMI WANTED TO BE THE POINT OF CONTACT FOR DISBURSING IFTA MONEY TO MOSQUES.

5. [REDACTED] AL-THUMAIRY REPRESENTED IFTA, AND KHALIL AND [REDACTED] (P) REPRESENTED THE PRINCE. THIS RESULTED IN CONFLICTS REGARDING WHICH SEGMENT OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONTROL KING FAHD MOSQUE. A BREAKING POINT CAME WHEN KHALIL AND [REDACTED] (P) BANNED SOME MUSLIMS FROM WORSHIPING AT THE MOSQUE. AL-THUMAIRY BELIEVED IT WAS COMPLETELY UN-ISLAMIC TO PROHIBIT BELIEVERS FROM WORSHIPING REGARDLESS OF THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS. ALTHOUGH KHALIL AND [REDACTED] (P) BANNED AL-THUMAIRY FROM THE MOSQUE, THEY ALLOWED HIM TO GIVE THE FRIDAY WORSHIP SERMONS. AFTER BEING BANNED FROM THE MOSQUE, AL-THUMAIRY JOINED WITH SOME EXTREMISTS AND STARTED ANOTHER U.S. MOSQUE, DAR AL QUARAN (HOUSE OF KORAN), AKA OVERLAND MOSQUE.

([REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) THE ONLY THING AL-THUMAIRY HAD IN COMMON WITH THE EXTREMISTS AT DAR AL QUARAN WAS A DISLIKE OF THE LEADERSHIP AT KING FAHD MOSQUE.)

6. [REDACTED] (FBI COMMENT. IN AUGUST 2002, AL-THUMAIRY WAS ASSOCIATED WITH DAR AL QUARAN WHERE HE PROMULGATED ISLAMIC EXTREMIST VIEWS TO THE FOLLOWERS. THE BELIEF THAT THE KING FAHD MOSQUE LEADERSHIP MISMANAGED FUNDS LED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DAR AL QUARAN.)

7. [REDACTED] AL-THUMAIRY HAD CONTACT WITH U.S. PERSON, OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB (NFI). WHEN THE PRINCE OPENED KING FAHD MOSQUE, MOHAMED PETITIONED THE PRINCE AND WAS GRANTED ASSISTANCE FROM SAUDI ARABIA FOR A SOMALI OUTREACH PROGRAM. MOHAMED MADE HIMSELF THE POINT OF CONTACT FOR DISTRIBUTING THE ASSISTANCE IN

8. [REDACTED] (FBI COMMENT. MOHAMED ESTABLISHED THE WESTERN SOMALI RELIEF AGENCY (WSRA), A U.S. ORGANIZATION AND AN ALLEGED HUMANITARIAN AID FOUNDATION FOR PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA, ETHIOPIA, AND PARTS OF KENYA. WSRA RECEIVED FUNDING FROM THE GLOBAL RELIEF FOUNDATION, AN ORGANIZATION DESIGNATED BY THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY AS PROVIDING FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. MOHAMED WAS A FORMER LEA [REDACTED] -ITTIHAD AL-ISLAMI.)

9. [REDACTED] (FBI COMMENT. AL-THUMAIRY WAS LINKED TO OMAR AL-BAYOUMI WHO UNWITTINGLY HELPED AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77 HIJACKERS NAWAF AL-HAZMI AND KHALID AL-MIHDHAR SETTLE IN SAN DIEGO.)

[REDACTED]

----- END TEAR LINE -----

COMMENTS: 1. [REDACTED] FBI COMMENTS. SOURCE IS AVAILABLE FOR RECO

2. [REDACTED] THE PRECEDING TEARLINE HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR RELEASE TO [REDACTED] (G)

3. [REDACTED] CITE [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] FOR MORE INFORMATION ON FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY AND USPER 2.

4. [REDACTED] THE FOLLOWING NAMES ARE PROVIDED FOR INDEXING PURPOSES: DR. KHALIL ((KHALIL)); PRINCE ABDUL AZIZ BIN ((FAHD)); FAHAD

[REDACTED]

((AL-THUMAIRY)); OMAR ((AL-BAYOUMI)); NAWAF ((AL-HAZMI)); KHALID
((AL-MIHDHAR)); AND IMAM IBRAHIM ((AL-HIBER))

INSTR: U.S. YES. CO

PREP: (G) POC (S)

ACQ: (G)

DISSEM: FIELD: NONE

WARNING: (F)

(G)

BT

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ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE/TICKLER COUNT:

(F)

THE RAW INTELLIGENCE SET FORTH IN THIS IIR IS BEING PUBLISHED AS A RESULT OF AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES. UPON REVIEW, THIS PREVIOUSLY ACQUIRED INFORMATION, THOUGH NOT CONSIDERED CURRENT, WAS DEEMED PERTINENT AND RELEVANT FOR THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. NO OVERT THREAT HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THIS INFORMATION.

(S) COMMUNICATION WAS APPROVED BY (G), (S) PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION. THIS COMMUNICATION WAS REVIEWED (A), (G), (J-1), (F), (S)

SUBJECT: IIR: SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (IFTA) SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIC ACTIVITY TERN CALIFORNIA AND ASSISTANCE TO THE SOMALI COMMUNITY

FIELD OFFICE: [REDACTED]
COUNTRY: [REDACTED] ETHIOPIA (ET); SAUDI ARABIA (SA); SOMALIA (SO); UNITED STATES (US).

(A) (G) (J-1)

[REDACTED]

THREAT: NO

AGENT: SA [REDACTED] (S)

TERRORIST [REDACTED] D AL-ISLAMI (AIAI)

SERIAL: [REDACTED] (F)

LIAISON: [REDACTED] (G)

DRAFTED BY: [REDACTED] (S)

COPY DESIGNATIONS:

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S), (G)

COPY RECEIVED WITHOUT ADMINISTRATIVE TICKLER:
(S), (G)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/17/2002

To: General Counsel

Attn:

(S), (G)

San Diego

Los Angeles



From: San Diego

(S)
Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: OMAR ABDI MOHAME
OMAR KHADIB; (A) (G) (J-1)

Synopsis: (A), (G), (J-1)

(G)

Full Investigation Instituted: (A) (G) (J-1) (USPER)

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for Los Angeles is an original and a copy of a letter dated 01/17/2002, addressed to (P) Regulatory Compliance, Experian, 505 City Parkway West, Orange,



[REDACTED]

To: General Counsel From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 01/17/2002

California, requesting consumer identifying information limited to name, address, former addresses, places of employment, or former places of employment and the names and addresses of all financial institutions at which the subject maintains or has maintained an account.

Details: [REDACTED] A full international terrorism investigation of subject, a U.S. person, was authorized in accordance with the Attorney General Guidelines because subject was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States in early 2000. The AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization closely linked to Usama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network.

(C-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000.

[REDACTED] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: [REDACTED] (P-1). On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to [REDACTED] (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[REDACTED] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000666

To: General Counsel From: San Diego
Re: (F) 01/17/2002

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

The consumer identifying information and identity of financial institutions information are being requested to determine subject's associates at current and former places of employment and determine subject's financial activity and his link to other terrorism subjects in the United States and overseas.

(A), (G), (J-1)

A representative of the Los Angeles office who has liaison with the consumer reporting agency should deliver (A), (G), (J-1) to (P)

(G)

Los Angeles should remind Experian that, (G) (G) it is prohibited from disclosing that the FBI has made this request. In addition, Experian is prohibited from including in any consumer report any information that would indicate that the FBI has sought or obtained such information.

EO14040-000667

[REDACTED]

To: General Counsel From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 01/17/2002

[REDACTED] Arrangements should be made with Experian to provide the records personally to a representative of your office. Experian should neither send the records through the mail nor utilize the name of the subject in any telephone calls to your office. Experian should not contact FBIHQ directly in any manner.

[REDACTED] Consumer reports received from a consumer reporting agency must be clearly identified when reported in any Bureau communication. Subsequent dissemination of such information is prohibited, except to other Federal agencies or military investigative entities as may be necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign counterintelligence investigation.

[REDACTED] Any questions regarding the above can be directed to San Diego Division, Attention: [REDACTED] (S) .

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000668

To: General Counsel From: San Diego
Re: (F), 01/17/2002

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1:

Los Angeles Division

AT SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

Deliver the attached (G) as indicated above. Upon receipt of information from the carrier, Los Angeles Division is requested to submit results to San Diego Division.

Set Lead 2:

GENERAL COUNSEL

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(G)

◆◆

EO14040-000669

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/05/2002

To: San Diego

From: San Diego

(G)
Contact: [Redacted] (S)

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] OMAR KHADIB; [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [Redacted] Asset reporting on Khadib and other radical Islamic fundamentalists.

[Redacted] (G)

Full Field Instituted: [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) .

Details: [Redacted] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2002, [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [Redacted] (A)(G)(J-1)
[Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted] In (A), (G), (J-1) , 2002, an old Algerian male stayed at a shelter on 48th Street in San Diego run by Attiqullah Ahmadi. The Algerian male stayed at the shelter for 3-4 days and appeared to have very little money. He did not appear to be a religious leader. He was driven to LAX in early morning, then departed the country. Asset did not know the male's name and had no indication that he was a radical Muslim. Ahmadi appears to house 5-7 males at any one time at the shelter. Asset is not sure where Ahmadi gets the money to run the shelter. [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) Ahmadi had recently shaved his beard.

[Redacted]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: (F) 06/05/2002

Asset advised that Dr. Abusattar Shaikh has been depressed lately. He thinks the FBI is following him. Dr. Shaikh's home served as a residence for the hijackers Al Hazmi and Al Midhar during most of 2000.

On (A), (G), (J-1) 2002, (P) and (P) visited (P) on El Cajon Blvd., in San Diego. (P) was seeking (P) assistance to obtain welfare benefits for himself and his family since his employment was terminated when the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) was shut down. (P) advised that (P) (A), (G), (J-1) (P) is a close friend of (P) and worked as (P) for HLF prior to its closure.

Asset advised that (P) wife is pregnant. (P) has a very radical mind and looks down at the leadership of other mosques in the San Diego area because they are corrupted by Western influences. On (G) 2002, asset advised that (P) was a very close friend of Mohamad Zaky (A), (G), (J-1) who was killed by the Russians in Chechnya). Zaky was responsible for bringing (P) into the U.S.

(P) is Imam of the Somali mosque at 4014 Winona Ave., San Diego. (P) is a (P) national and received his religious training in Pakistan. Leaders of the mosque have been raising money to pay off a \$200,000.00 bank note used to purchase the mosque.

Asset advised that the Somali-based terrorist group Al Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI) is not very prevalent in the current Somali government; however, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has a very strong presence in the current government. Asset advised that the Bush administration is relying too much on the Ethiopian government for information on Somalia. Ethiopia has a vested interest in keeping Somalia weak and ineffective as a country.

Omar Khadib has been very quiet lately and asset does not know the reason for the change in behavior. (P) an elderly male, has served as (P) for Khadib to overseas destinations. Another good friend of Khadib is a taxi driver named (P) allegedly has been interviewed by the FBI. One of Khadib's employees at the Somali Youth Center is a male teacher, name unknown, who has received asylum in the U.S. He is from Djibouti, but actually may be from Somalia. He studied extensively in Saudi Arabia where he received a Sharia degree. He

EO14040-000671

[REDACTED]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 06/05/2002

has been asked to teach at the mosque, but has declined because he wants to keep a low profile.

◆◆

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000672

TEMPLATE (NEW 7-04).wpd

SBX001S0.184

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

TRANSMIT VIA:

PRECEDENCE:

MNET

IMMEDIATE

NEPTUNE

PRIORITY

1 OF 7
IR SENT VIA ACS

ROUTINE

F T O

FM DIRECTOR FBI
TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES/PRIORITY/
Date LEGAT XXXX/PRIORITY/
LEGAT XXXX/PRIORITY/

Approved by:

INFO DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
LEGAT XXXX/PRIORITY/
LEGAT XXXX/PRIORITY/

Case ID #/Serial:

Original Filename:

***** FOR SAMNET OPERATIONS USE ONLY
CIA WASHINGTON DC//CTC//PRIORITY/

Time Received

DIA WASHINGTON DC//JITF-CT//PRIORITY/ SAMNET filename:

Time of Transmission

DEFNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD/PRIORITY/ MRI/JUL/ISN

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//INR//PRIORITY/ DTG

AMEMBASSY XXXXXX/PRIORITY/

AMCONSUL XXXXXX/PRIORITY/

AFIAA AMHS BOLLING AFB DC/PRIORITY/

CDR902DMIGP FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//IAMG-OP-CM//PRIORITY/

CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//IAOP-OR-HCM//PRIORITY/

CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAHINGEN GE/PRIORITY/

CDR USTRANSCOM INTEL CELL SCOTT AFB IL/PRIORITY/

CIFA WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/

COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/

COMBINED INTEL AND FUSION CENTER PETERSON AFB CO//CIFCC//PRIORITY/

COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC/PRIORITY/

DA WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/

DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/

DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/

DEPT OF JUSTICE COMMAND CENTER WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/

DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/

DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/

DIDIR USINS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/

DIRACIC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//IAMG-C-ACIC/PRIORITY/

DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC//22A/NAVATAC-22A4//PRIORITY/

FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC//ACI-100//PRIORITY/

[REDACTED]

HQ AFOSI ANDREWS AFB MD/PRIORITY/
HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL/PRIORITY/
HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL/PRIORITY/
HQ USSOCOM INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL/PRIORITY/
HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL/PRIORITY/
HQ USPACOM HONONLULU/PRIORITY/
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK/PRIORITY/
JFIC NORFOLK VA/PRIORITY/
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//J3DDAT-FP/PRIORITY/
NSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//F3//PRIORITY/
ONI WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
SSO DA//DAMI-CDC/PRIORITY/
TTIC WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC//HQ INTEL//PRIORITY/
US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE//CS551//PRIORITY/
WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC//OHS BOX//PRIORITY/

BT

[REDACTED] (G)

SERIAL: [REDACTED] IIR XXXYYY
COUNTRY: [REDACTED] UNITED STATES (US); CANADA (CA); SOMALIA (SO); ETHIOPIA
(ET); YE
IPSP: [REDACTED] (G)
SUBJ: 1. INFORMATION ON SOMALI COMMUNITY IN SAN DIEGO [REDACTED]

(F)

REPORT CLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000674

(A), (G), (J-1)

TEXT: 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. SOURCE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON CURRENT ACTIVITIE

MOHDAR ABDULLAH, (A), (G), (J-1), (P)

2. WHEN OMAR ABDI ((MOHAMED)), AKA OMAR KHADIB, LIVED IN CANADA, HE WAS AN OUTSPOKEN PROPONENT OF JIHAD AGAINST NON-MUSLIM MOVEMENTS IN SOMALIA. (FBI COMMENT: MOHAMED LIVED IN CANADA FROM 1990 TO 1995.) SPECIFICALLY, MOHAMED SUPPORTED ARMED ACTIONS AGAINST ETHIOPIA AND CHRISTIAN ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS IN SOMALIA. MOHAMED BELIEVED JIHAD WAS THE ONLY WAY TO UNITE SOMALIS BEHIND FORMING A UNIFIED ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT.

3. AFTER MOVING TO SAN DIEGO IN 1995, MOHAMED BRAGGED TO THE CITY'S SOMALI COMMUNITY ABOUT WORKING FOR THE SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS. (SOURCE COMMENT: WORKING FOR THE MINISTRY WAS PRESTIGIOUS BECAUSE ONE WAS PAID DIRECTLY BY THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT, AS OPPOSED TO INDIRECTLY THROUGH SAUDI-SUPPORTED CHARITIES. IN ORDER TO WORK FOR THE MINISTRY ONE HAD TO HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN A SAUDI-SUPPORTED MADRASSA AND RECOMMENDED BY AN INFLUENTIAL ISLAMIC SCHOLAR. THE MINISTRY ALLOWED ONE TO CHOOSE THE COMMUNITY IN WHICH TO WORK. IN THE UNITED STATES, MINISTRY WORKERS REPORTED DIRECTLY TO THE SAUDI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, D.C.)

4. MOHAMED'S POINT OF CONTACT AT THE MINISTRY WAS KHALED ((AL-SOWA)). AL-SO OF ABOUT (A)(G)(J-1) PEOPLE. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

6. (FBI COMMENT: MOHAMED WAS ARRESTED ON 20 JANUARY 2004 FOR IMMIGRATION FRAUD. MOHAMED ORIGINALLY CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS AGENCY IN 2000 WHEN HE WAS IDENTIFIED BY (A), (G), (J-1) RELIABLE SOURCES AS A LEADER OF THE AL-ITTIHAD AL ISLAMIA TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES. HE WAS LATER REMOVED FROM THIS POSITION OF LEADERSHIP BECAUSE HE WAS VIEWED BY OTHER MEMBERS AS TOO RADICAL.)

7. [REDACTED] A NON-USPER IN SAN DIEGO WAS ALSO PAID BY THE SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS. (FBI COMMENT: THIS INDIVIDUAL IS BELIEVED TO BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH THE SUBJECT OF AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION.) THE NON-USPER IS A SOMALI WHO WAS BORN IN THE OGADEN REGION OF ETHIOPIA. HIS FATHER IS A PROMINENT ISLAMIC SCHOLAR IN DJIBOUTI, AND HE STUDIED ISLAM IN A MADRASSA IN SAUDI ARABIA. HE CAME TO THE UNITED STATES IN SEPTEMBER 2001 AND REQUESTED POLITICAL ASYLUM. A LAWYER, FNU ((JABREEL)), HELPED HIM TO FILL OUT HIS ASYLUM CLAIM AND CONVINCED HIM TO CLAIM THAT HE WAS FROM DJIBOUTI, NOT ETHIOPIA. IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE IN THE SOMALI COMMUNITY THAT THE NON-USPER IS ACTUALLY FROM ETHIOPIA. JABREEL HAS SINCE BEEN DEPORTED FROM THE US.

8. [REDACTED] THE NON-USPER USED TO REPORT TO A SAUDI MINISTRY OFFICER NAMED FAHAD ((ALTHUMAIRY)). ALTHUMAIRY WORKED OUT OF THE SAUDI CONSULATE IN LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, AND OVERSAW THE DISBURSEMENT OF SAUDI MONEY TO SAUDI RELIGIOUS WORKERS IN SAN DIEGO. AT ONE POINT ALTHUMAIRY BECAME ANGRY WITH THE NON-USPER BECAUSE THE LATTER HAD A JOB, IN ADDITION TO BEING PAID BY THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT. ALTHUMAIRY BELIEVED THAT THE NON-USPER SHOULD ONLY WORK FOR THE MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC AFFAIRS. (FBI COMMENT: ALTHUMAIRY LEFT THE UNITED STATES FOR SAUDI ARABIA IN FEBRUARY 2003. IN MAY 2003 HE ATTEMPTED TO RE-ENTER THE UNITED STATES BUT WAS DENIED ENTRY.)

9. [REDACTED] MOHDAR ((ABDULLAH)) WAS DEPORTED TO YEMEN. (FBI COMMENT: MOHDAR

[REDACTED]
(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (P) WAS AN ASSOCIATE OF 9/11 HIJACKERS KHALID ((AL-MIDHAR)) AND NAWAF ((AL-HAZMI)) WHEN THEY LIVED IN SAN DIEGO. [REDACTED] (P) MOHDAR HAD RENTED AN APARTMENT FROM [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) WHEN HE WAS LIVING IN SAN DIEGO. MOHDAR CALLED [REDACTED] (P) SEVERAL TIMES AT HIS HOME AND ON HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE. HE WANTED [REDACTED] (P) TO JOIN HIM AS A PARTNER IN AN IMPORT/EXPORT BUSINESS. [REDACTED] (P) WAS VERY ANGRY THAT MOHDAR KEPT TRYING TO CONTACT [REDACTED] (P) AND FORBID [REDACTED] (P) TO COMMUNICATE WITH HIM. ((G)) COMMENT: MANY PEOPLE IN THE SAN DIEGO MUSLIM COMMUNITY FEEL THAT MOHDAR IS NOTHING BUT TROUBLE AND SHOULD BE LEFT ALONE.)

10. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] IS RUNNING A CHARITY CALLED [REDACTED] (P) HE WANTED TO CLOSE THE CHARITY DOWN, BUT WAS URGED BY [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) TO KEEP IT OPERATIONAL. [REDACTED] (P) HIMSELF HAD BEEN DENIED HIS APPLICATION TO OPEN A TAX EXEMPT NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION AND WANTED TO USE [REDACTED] (P) AND [REDACTED] (P)

AS HIS PERSONAL FUND RAISING ORGANIZATION. (P) WAS RESISTANT TO THE IDEA OF BEING (P) PUPPET BUT (P) CONVINCED HIS FATHER TO KEEP (P) OPEN FOR (P) BECAUS (P) WORKED FOR (P) AT HIS (P) AND THOUGHT (P) WAS A GOOD GUY. (SOURCE COMMENT: (P) IS VERY INVOLVED IN FUND RAISING AND CHARITABLE CAUSES, BUT HE IS NOT A RADICAL. HE IS VERY NAIVE AND EASILY MANIPULATED OUT OF HIS DESIRE TO HELP POOR AND NEEDY MUSLIMS WORLDWIDE.)

COMMENTS: 1. (P) FBI COMMENTS: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED IS THE SUBJECT OF (F) (P), (A), (G), (J-1) (P).

2. (P) FBI COMMENTS. (G)

INST: US YES. CONTACT FBIHQ POC FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

PREP: FBIHQ POC (S)

(G)

[Redacted]

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE/TICKLER COUNT:

THIS COMMUNICATION WAS COORDINATED WITH
(A), (F), (G), (J-1), (S)

DRAFTED BY: (S)

SUBJECT: IIR: XXX.
FIELD OFFICE: SAN DIEGO.
COUNTRY: UNITED STATES (US); CANADA (CA); SOMALIA (SO); ETHIOPIA (ET); YEMEN (YM).

AGENT: (S)
HQ OPERATIONAL UNIT: (G)
(A) (G) (J-1)

THE IDENTIFICATION OF U.S. PERSONS IS PLACED HERE FOR RECORD KEEPING PURPOSES AND MUST BE HELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH FEDERAL AGENCY PRIVACY REGULATIONS. FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF U.S. PERSON IDENTITY OR IDENTIFIERS MUST BE APPROVED BY FBIHQ.

US PERSON: (P) (A), (G), (J-1)
NON-US PERSON: ABDIMAGID MOHAMED ((OMAR)), (A)(G)(J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1). HIS NAME APPEARED ON THE LIST OF FIFTY CLERICS FUNDED BY SAUDI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, DC, THAT WAS OBTAINED BY THE FBI IN (A)(G)(J-1) (A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)

TERRORIST GROUP: AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISLAMIA
SERIAL: XXXXXXXXX
THREAT: NO
LIAISON: NONE

COPY DESIGNATIONS:
(S)

(S)

(A)(F)(G)(J-1)

BT

////

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/09/2002

To: San Diego

From: San Diego

(G)

Contact: [REDACTED] (S)

Approved By: [REDACTED] (S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED] (S)

Case ID #: [REDACTED] (F)

Title: [REDACTED] OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA,

[REDACTED] OMAR KHADIB;

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (F)

Synopsis: [REDACTED] Information obtained as the result of asset interview conducted on [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), 2002. [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G)

Full Field Investigation Instituted: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Details: [REDACTED] On [REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1) 2002, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) stated that [REDACTED] (P) was at the Balboa Mosque (Islamic Center of San Diego) on Friday, July 5. [REDACTED] (P) translates official documents (marriage certificates, birth certificates, etc.) from Somali to English. [REDACTED] (P) used to be an Imam at the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) was discharged from his position at [REDACTED] (P) Mosque because he [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) is very good friends with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) is very radical and anti-United States. [REDACTED] (P) is pro-Palestinian.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 08/09/2002

(P) [REDACTED] travels to Riverside, Orange County, Los Angeles and Chicago. He travels to those locations to preach Muslim radical fundamentalism.

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] prepared the declarations for Mihdar, the Arab man who posed as a Somali (Mohdar Mohamed ABDULLAH). The Arab man paid [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1) for his services. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] paid [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1) for (P) [REDACTED] to stamp and sign the false declaration for the Arab man. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] was at the La Mesa Mosque (Masjid Al-Ribat Al-Islami) on Friday, July 12.

[REDACTED] The asset observed [REDACTED] (P-1) at the Afrique Restaurant. The Afrique Restaurant is located at 50th and University..

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] has a brother named Ahmed. Ahmed is also known as [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Ahmed came to the United States from the United Kingdom. Ahmed used to work as a translator for the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] "SHEIK HASSAN" and Hassan Turki , located in Somalia, are now working with AL QAIDA. Hassan Turki frequently travels to Ethiopia. Hassan Turki also has connections with Saudi Arabia. Hassan Turki received money from AL QAIDA. "SHEIK HASSAN" is now located in Mogadishu.

[REDACTED] "JAMALE," owner of [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) has moved all of his equipment and weapons from Mogadishu. "JAMALE" did so because he fears an American invasion. "JAMALE" moved the equipment and weapons North of Obbia. Obbia is a small seaport East of Mogadishu.

[REDACTED] Five men are Imams at the Al Ansar Mosque (Masjid Omar). "KHADAR," "FARAH," SHEIK ALI ABDI, "RASHID" and "SHEIK ALI BUUL." "SHEIK ALI BUUL" is very good friends with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (J-1), (G) [REDACTED] . ,

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000681

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/30/2005

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [Redacted] (S)
[Redacted] (G)

San Diego

Attn: [Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

From: San Diego

[Redacted] (S)
Contact: [Redacted] (S)

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID,
aka Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah;
[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [Redacted] Interview and debrief of [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), hereinafter
Asset, on [Redacted] (A)(G)(J-1)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] **Full Investigation Initiated:** [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted] (F)

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 08/30/2005

[REDACTED] (F)

Details: [REDACTED] An Asset, [REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1)

[REDACTED] voluntarily provided the following information:

[REDACTED] (P) As previously reported, [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P), [REDACTED] (F), made an inquiry with individuals at the
Masjid Ar Ribat regarding serving in a position as Prison Imam at
the Metropolitan Correctional Center, MCC, in downtown San Diego,
California. [REDACTED] (P) indicated that the project was urgent on his,
[REDACTED] (P) agenda.

[REDACTED] It is known that the Prison Chaplain's Office at
MCC may be hostile towards Muslim Imam's and may not be in favor
of having a Muslim Imam in the local jails and prisons. [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) previously identified, has made comments of going to the
Chaplain's Office at MCC to complain. Additionally, several members
of the Masjid Ar Ribat and the Islamic Center of San Diego would
be writing letters in support of the Imam position. [REDACTED] (P)
project has received support from the two prior Prison Imam's, [REDACTED] (P)
[REDACTED] (P) (A), (G), (J-1), and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) telephone
number was [REDACTED] (P) NFI.

[REDACTED] Muslim prayer services at the Metropolitan
Correctional Center have been taking place. The Friday service
prayer served as a meet and greet type sessions and Islamic service
for the Inmates. Approximately, seven of the seventeen current
Muslim inmates attend prayer service. Omar Mohammad, has been acting
as an Imam for some time and was possibly an Imam before being
incarcerated at MCC. Omar is originally from Africa and is fluent
in the Arabic language. (San Diego believes Omar mentioned above
to be San Diego Full Field Subject, Omar Abdi Mohammad,
[REDACTED] (F). Friday prayer service, also called Juma, are held
in the chapel area at MCC without a prison guard present.

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000683

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 08/30/2005

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] For information only.

◆◆

[REDACTED]
EO14040-000684

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/06/2006

To: San Diego

From: San Diego

(G)

Contact: [Redacted] (S)

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID, aka Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah;

[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted] OMAR ABDI MOHAMMAD (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [Redacted] Claiming statistical accomplishments.

[Redacted] (G)

Details: [Redacted] Case agent met with and debriefed [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), hereinafter Asset, on [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)/2005.

[Redacted] Asset provided intelligence information and reported on the activities of Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah, [Redacted] (P) and Omar Abdi Mohammad.

[Redacted]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: (F) , 03/06/2006

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1
Type: (G)
ITU: (G)
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI
ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW
Claimed By:
SSN: (P-1)
Name: (G)
Squad: (G)

Number: 1
Type: (G)
ITU: (G)
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI
ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW
Claimed By:
SSN: (P-1)
Name: (S)
Squad: (G)

◆◆

[REDACTED]

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of

Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California 92123
March 1, 2004

OMAR ABDI MOHAMED,

[REDACTED]
(A) (G) (J-1)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On January 20, 2004, Omar Abdi Mohamed was arrested for immigration fraud. Investigation by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) determined that Mohamed was in charge of the "Western Somali Relief Agency" (WSRA). WSRA was a fund raising entity that allegedly provided drought and humanitarian relief money to the people of Somalia and Ethiopia. During a US naturalization interview, Mohamed lied about receiving approximately \$350,000 from Global Relief Foundation. The US Treasury Department has frozen the Global Relief Foundation's assets and accused it of providing financial support to terrorism. Mohamed is currently in Federal custody in San Diego.

[REDACTED] Mohamed was identified by [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) reliable (A), (G), (J-1) sources as the leader of the Al-Ittihad al Islamia (AIAI) in the United States. AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. Later investigation indicated that Mohamed was removed from leadership of the AIAI because he was too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues.

[REDACTED] A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia.

[REDACTED] Mohamed has maintained a low profile since the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) closed down the Global Relief Foundation (GRF) in Chicago, Illinois. [REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As Mohamed was arrested, a search warrant was served on his residence. In this search several Arabic language documents on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, IFTA Office,

letterhead with address 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington DC 20037, Telephone (202) 342-3700, were seized by investigating agents.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These documents were subsequently translated. Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar Abdi Mohamed to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel changes within the American Dawa Office.

[REDACTED] These Ministry letters to Muslim "Propagators" in General, and "Propagator Mohamed" in specific, document requests dating in the mid 1990's from the Saudi Government Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance for information collection on Muslims and the Muslim community in Canada, America, and the Carribean. The seized documents do not indicate the end use of the information collected by the Ministry.

[REDACTED] For the purposes of captioned investigation, Mohamed received, by his own admission, over \$100,000 from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was recently receiving \$1,750.00 USD a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.

[REDACTED] One letter from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance that was addressed to Mohamed indicated that a housing and travel ticket allowance and a salary was to be paid to those Propagators working under contract outside their countries of origin. The Propagators would loose their housing and travel benefits if they became citizens of the country in which they were working. In several different letters, the Ministry indicates that Mohamed's "contract will be renewed" and provides him with raises or bonuses to "encourage you to double your effort and propagation related activities." One such letter from the Ministry had an enclosed check "as a financial award granted by his Royal Highness Prince Sultan Bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud, Second Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Aviation, which he (ALSAUD) has authorized for all propagators belonging to this office" (Dawa office in America). This letter provided contact email addresses of ifta@resa.org, www.islamicpage.org, and www.islam.org.sa. The letters were signed by the Director of the Dawa office in America Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[REDACTED] An indication of the extent of Saudi control over their Propagators is given in a letter from the Ministry dated November 18, 1996. The letter was issued by the Ministry "affirming that no propagator should leave his post or take leave without first obtaining a written authorization from the relevant authority. Whoever violates this guideline will be subject to disciplinary action to include termination of service." The letter was signed by the Director of the Dawa office in America Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] With regards to the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance requesting information about Muslim converts in the Islamic community: an undated and unsigned letter noted that the Director of Dawa activities conducted abroad received information that "during the past few years a number of Christian clerics and well known personalities have converted to Islam. The Director of Dawa is requesting that you provide him with the names of individuals who have converted to Islam in you locality." The letter requests the Muslim converts previous name, occupation and social status; the Islamic name that the person has acquired and the personal attributes of the individual that may be conducive to using him in propagation activities; the type of services that the individual has received and the party that provided the services; the languages in which the individual is proficient; the address of the individual where he can be reached; (the Propagators) impression about how to deal with the individuals who have converted to Islam and what services might benefit them.

[REDACTED] With specific regards to captioned subject, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[REDACTED] Another Letter dated November 22, 1995, from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance addressed to "Propagator: Omar Abdo Al-Khatib" requests that Mohamed comply with the Ministry's solicitation of information regarding "certain parties and communities." According to the letter, the Ministry was interested in the Somali and Arab communities of Canada and San Diego. The request was signed by Khalid bin Ibrahim Al-Suwaylim. According to the letter, the report should cover the following points:

- 1-Description of Community and it's size.
- 2-History of the community and its areas of presence.
- 3-Reason why the community immigrated.
- 4-The leaders of the community and its well known figures.
- 5-Religious dogma of the community.
- 6-Organizational structure of the community.
- 7-Financial condition of the community.

- [REDACTED]
- 8-Literacy rate and educational level of the community.
 - 9-Schools and mosques of the community.
 - 10-Organizations established by the community.
 - 11-Organizations that cooperate with the community.
 - 12-Influence that the community has in its locality.
 - 13-Other observations about the community

[REDACTED] In one undated letter from the Ministry to Propagators the conversion of non-Muslims is stressed. According to the letter, "Conversion of non-Muslims who are living in non-Muslim countries into the faith takes on critical importance since they are the inhabitants of the land. Among them is the doctor, the engineer, and the pilot, as well as others. By having these people convert to Islam, the effort to propagate the faith gains a tremendous boost in the country where this activity is being conducted."

[REDACTED] With regards to the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance requesting information about the activities of local mosques, a letter dated March 20, 1996, and addressed to "all Propagators in America, Canada and the Islands of the Caribbean Sea" states "due to the fact that a number of Islamic magazines are being published by Islamic centers that you are working with, and in order to strengthen the relation with these centers and to become acquainted with all the various Islamic activities that you are engaged in, we are requesting that you provide us with all the various publications or magazines or newsletters that are being published by the Islamic center or Association that you are working with." The requested material was asked to be sent to the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Islamic Affairs, IFTA Office, 601 New Hampshire Avenue N.W., Washington DC 20037. The letter was signed by the Director of the Dawa office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[REDACTED] A second letter written in February 22, 1997, and also signed by AlSuwaylim, requested that all Propagators in America and the Caribbean, "provide the Ministry with everything that is being published in your locality about Islam and Muslims in general and about the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particular, such as books, research papers, articles and media programs."

[REDACTED] The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.

[REDACTED] In a letter from the Ministry dated December 17, 1996, from Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim, an advisory was sent to all

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Propagators in America and the Islands of the Caribbean Sea. This letter advised that the Ministry "approved the absence of Sheik Fahd bin Ali AlSuwaylim to study English. Sheik Abdulrahman bin Mohammad AlBalihi has been designated to address matters relating to propagation and the propagators. He can be reached at his private telephone number [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] or through the switchboard number (202) 342-3700, extension [REDACTED] (P) and extension [REDACTED] (P) "

[REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED] (C-1)
[REDACTED] (C-1) Raisah Douglas. ICE records indicate that Douglas, born [REDACTED] (P-1), was admitted into the United State on March 22, 2001, until May 21, 2001. Douglas' port of entry was Los Angeles, California, and she arrived on American Airlines flight 7365. Douglas' passport number was [REDACTED] (P-1). Asset reporting placed Douglas with Mohamed in San Diego, California, during that time frame.

[REDACTED] To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his frequent domestic and international travel.

[REDACTED] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex: Male
Date of Birth: [REDACTED] (P-1)
Place of Birth: Somalia
SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1)
CADLN: [REDACTED] (P-1)
INS A#: [REDACTED] (P-1)
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes: Black
Residence: [REDACTED] (P) La Mesa, CA 91941
[REDACTED] (P)
Occupation: President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Ave. Suite D San Diego, CA 92105
Telephone: (619) 282-0711

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/18/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

[Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

From: San Diego

[Redacted] (G)

Contact: [Redacted] (S)

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [Redacted] San Diego portion of lead 21.1 covered

[Redacted] (G)

Reference: [Redacted] (F)

Details: [Redacted] Reference above captioned case and serial which set forth lead to advise [Redacted] (G) of action pertaining to identified Saudi government supported propagators in San Diego division.

[Redacted] (P) [Redacted] (G) identified Omar Abdi Mohamed, [Redacted] (P) and Abdimagid M. Omar, as three Saudi supported propagators living in San Diego Division. Investigative updates for mentioned propagators follows:

[Redacted] (P)

[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [Redacted] (P) is currently [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [Redacted] (P) [Redacted] (P) had been, through his fund raising activities for [Redacted] (P),

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 06/18/2004

actively participating in the financial and material support of Hamas in violation of the Anti Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. [REDACTED] (P) had been a paid fund raiser for [REDACTED] (P) traveling throughout the U.S. for this purpose. The [REDACTED] (P) was shut down by the USG on 12/04/2001 due to its Hamas fund-raising connections.

[REDACTED] The FBI Los Angeles division is investigating source allegations that the King Fahd Mosque and/or some of its leaders received UBL money, then sent the money to San Diego, including to [REDACTED] (P). These funds were distributed through LA subject Fahd Al Thumairy. Financial records for [REDACTED] (P)'s personal and business accounts have been requested, received and analyzed, to determine the money trail of these funds. Financial information has been uploaded [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] The financial analysis of the [REDACTED] (P) personal and business bank records has indicated at least one source of funds from Saudi Arabia, and a lead to Riyadh was sent to identify the originator individual or organization. The analysis also revealed funds received by [REDACTED] (P) from LA subject Al Thumairy, referenced above.

[REDACTED] SD is awaiting response from leads sent to Riyadh and to LA to follow up on the source of the Saudi funds, and the veracity of the original LA source allegation regarding the involvement of UBL money funneled through LA subject Al Thumairy and the Kind Fahd Mosque.

Omar Abdi Mohamed

[REDACTED] Omar Abdi Mohamed is the current subject of a San Diego FFI. This FFI was initiated on information that (A), (G), (J-1) reliable [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) sources identified Mohamed as the leader of the Al-Ittihad al Islamia (AIAI) in the United States. AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. Later investigation indicated that Mohamed was removed from leadership of the AIAI because he was too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues.

[REDACTED] On January 20, 2004, Mohamed was arrested for immigration fraud. Investigation by San Diego JTTF determined that Mohamed was in charge of the "Western Somali Relief Agency" (WSRA).

WSRA was a fund raising entity that allegedly provided drought and humanitarian relief money to the people of Somalia and Ethiopia. During a US naturalization interview, Mohamed lied about receiving approximately \$350,000 from Global Relief Foundation. The US

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000693

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 06/18/2004

Treasury Department has frozen the Global Relief Foundation's assets and accused it of providing financial support to terrorism. Mohamed is currently in Federal custody in San Diego.

[REDACTED] Referenced EC accurately reflected Mohamed's known association with the Saudi Arabian IFTA office.

[REDACTED] All of Mohamed's known bank accounts have been subpoenaed and final financial analysis is being completed by FBI and ICE financial analysts. Investigative financial leads pertaining to final analysis of bank records will be set as appropriate.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Mohamed remains in federal custody and has shown no inclination to communicate with the prosecution.

Abdimagid Mohamed Omar

[REDACTED] Omar was not previously known to be a recipient IFTA funding. San Diego is [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) to fully identify Omar. It is probable that San Diego will [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Omar to attempt to determine his ties to the San Diego Muslim community and to the Saudi Arabian government.

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000694

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 06/18/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] Read and Clear.

◆◆

[REDACTED]
EO14040-000695

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of

transcription

Investigation on

at

File #

Date dictated

by

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;

it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

10/16/2001

On (G) 2001, (G) (G), (G) California was interviewed by Special Agents (SAs) (S) and (S) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (G) was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview. (G) advised as follows:

(G) recalled that Mohdar Abdullah was anxious to find an interpreter who could help him convince an INS official that he (Mohdar) is Somali and therefore entitled to refugee status. Mohdar sought advice from Omar Khadib on where to find an interpreter with unknown results. Mohdar was so desperate to find a cooperative interpreter that he offered (G) to (P), (G), an INS interpreter, if he would assist in the INS process but (P) declined the offer. Mohdar made a similar offer to Imam Anwar. (G) noted that he heard that Mohdar's girlfriend is (P), a Yemeni/Somali emigree residing in Lemon Grove, California.

(G) advised that (P) is an Afghan taxi driver who resides in La Mesa, California. He is loyal to an extreme radical group of Afghan warlords called Hekmatyar.

10/12/01

San Diego, California

(S), (F)

10/16/01

(S)

(F)

1

LEAD CONTROL NUMBER SD

(G)

The following investigation was conducted by Investigative Analyst (S) on November 6, 2001, in San Diego, California:

(O-1)

Computerized searches of IIIA revealed the following information:

Telephone (P) is associated with (P)

(P) computerized search of Telephone Applications for (P) was listed to Omar A. Mohamed, (P-1), La Mesa, California. Telephone (P) is listed to Omar Albayoumi, (P-1), San Diego.

A computerized search of ChoicePoint Online revealed the following information regarding Albayoumi:

Omar Ahmed Albayoumi, date of birth (P-1) 1957, Social Security Number (P-1) other names used are listed as Omar Ahmed AlBbayoumi, Omar Ahmen Al-Bayoumi, Omar A. Bayoumi, Radwan Lachhab, California driver's license (P-1) as a male. AlBbayoumi is also listed with a date of birth of 1919, with the same California driver's license number.

A computerized search of Anywho.Com revealed (P-1) (P-1) to be listed to Omar Albayoumi, with telephone number (P).

A computerized search of ChoicePoint Online revealed the following information regarding Omar Mohamed:

Omar Mohamed, date of birth (P-1) 1960, Social Security Number (P-1) (P-1) La Mesa, California, 91941 (as of July, 2001), male, California driver's license (P-1).

A computerized search of public source databases as well as FBI databases for the name Omar Khatib were inconclusive due to the commonality of the name and variations of spellings.

EO14040-000697

(F)

2

A computerized search of FBI databases for Al-Bayoumi
ated him in numerous documents, one being (F)
(F) wherein he is associated with Hanjour and Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar.
He was a known associate with these three and appeared on their
apartment lease and frequently paid their rent.

A computerized search of FBI databases for Omar Abdi
Mohamed revealed numerous references and (F) serial (F)
and (F) serials (F) A search of
Telephone Applications for Mohamed is referenced above.

EO14040-000698



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/23/2007

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (G)

Attn: [Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (G)

Attn: [Redacted] (G)

Riyadh

Attn: [Redacted] (G)

Sanaa

Attn: [Redacted] (G)





FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Ottawa **Attn:** (G)

San Diego **Attn:** (S)

Los Angeles **Attn:** (S)

Washington Field **Attn:** (G)

New York **Attn:** (G)

From: New (G)
ct: (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: OPERATION ENCORE
(A),(G),(J-1)

Synopsis: Initiate a Full Investigation (FI) on the below-described group.

(G)

Enclosure(s): 1 - Opening LHM
1 - (G) submitted under separate cover



[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 10/23/2007

Full Investigation Initiated: 10/23/2007

Reference: [REDACTED] (F)

Details: [REDACTED] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case file.

[REDACTED] Background: On 06/28/2007, New York opened a subfile under the PENTTBOM investigation to contain information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, New York believed that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[REDACTED] Specifically, New York sought to gain a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[REDACTED] Results: Over the past two months, writers interviewed multiple individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[REDACTED] **Exploitation of Muslim Community:** Multiple San Diego sources and other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. According to such sources,

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000701

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 10/23/2007

AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-provider, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-provider or to whom the tazkia-provider would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] believed that it was likely a person or multiple persons who had access to both the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]). It is important to note that the individual to whom AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were directed, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, as the above sources described, the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

[REDACTED] One individual reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. Additional documentation [REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. AL-THUMARY was previously a main subject of an FI based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (through phone connectivity) and his (AL-THUMARY's) potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. According to the closing EC [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] and supplemental closing EC [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], the FI was closed due to: [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED]

the U.S. Attorney's Office conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute AL-THUMARY at such time. However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol, as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community, appears to have been unknown at such time.

[REDACTED] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another individual(s), there may have been telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and such individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY's known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[REDACTED] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000703

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

with [REDACTED] (P) (main subject of [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from [REDACTED] (P) to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a [REDACTED] (P) student living in San Diego would [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[REDACTED] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

[REDACTED] Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the main PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] (P) However, the contact between [REDACTED] (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[REDACTED] According to Telephone Applications (TA), AL- YOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (L)

[REDACTED] to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ([REDACTED] (F)).

[REDACTED] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the [REDACTED]

EO14040-000704

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown.

[REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1),(D)

[REDACTED] During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY [REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM ([REDACTED] (F)). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE [REDACTED] (F). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[REDACTED] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE [REDACTED] (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States [REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1)

[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1)

[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1)

AL-JARRAH

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000705

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 10/23/2007

travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California"

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1) [REDACTED] prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients"

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000706

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

(F) . The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F)

During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P) (A), (G), (J-1) and the (P) owned by (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. (P) also the president of (P), had previously been associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI). At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) on his person.

(A), (G), (J-1) indicated that MOHAMED, a Somali extremist who immigrated from Toronto, Canada to San Diego, California in 1995 (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. MOHAMED was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F) (F). NOTE: AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization which rose to power in the early 1990s (according to DHS's Terrorist Reference Guide from 2004) and is designated a (G) terrorist group on the FBI's (G) MOHAMMED, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) received a stipend of approximately (A), (G), (J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F) Based on some of the above (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) it seems likely this stipend was administered by AL-THUMARY or AL-JARRAH.

However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F).

(P-1) Finally, the Saudi Arabian telephone number (P-1) is included merely because of its temporal proximity to the other telephone numbers called by AL-THUMARY. At this time

EO14040-000707

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 10/23/2007

the significance of the telephone number or of such contact is unknown.

[REDACTED] The significance of this [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED] remains unclear. However, a few things seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulate(s); 2) this network is reported to have had the purpose of distributing funds and support to sunni salafist extremists; 3) there were inexplicable telephonic connections between AL-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI; and 4) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[REDACTED] **Recruitment:** AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI do not appear to have arrived in southern California with an active local support network. However, it appears that once AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were vouched for, via tazkia, they may have begun to assess individual's suitability for recruitment.

[REDACTED] Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F). Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

[REDACTED] **Newly Identified Additional Individuals:** Through the intelligence collection effort under the [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (F) as well as additional analysis of telephone and financial activity and source reporting, some additional individuals, who's involvement with the above described group is still not fully understood, have been identified:

[REDACTED] **MOHAMMED BIN SULEIMAN AL-MUHANNA** [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) - POB: Likely [REDACTED] (P-1) DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) 1974 or [REDACTED] (P-1) 1974; Currently located in Saudi Arabia. AL-MUHANNA was previously a Consular Official at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, and is reported to have founded, with AL-THUMARY, the KFM. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] "AL-MUHANNA is a Sunni Islamic extremist associated with a radical form of the Salafi ideology...and a graduate of the Ibn Mohammad Islamic University in Riyadh" [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. AL-MUHANNA had numerous [REDACTED]

EO14040-000708

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

phone connections with AL-THUMARY, as would be expected, and with AL-JARRAH. In late March, 2003, FBI Los Angeles was directed to

(A)(G)(J-1)

plan

(A)(G)(J-1)(D)

(A)(G)(J-1)(D)

(A)(G)(J-1)(D)

he and his family left the United States for

gland.

(C-1)

(C-1)

(F)

FAISAL AL-MUHANNA

(F)

- POB: Likely (P-1) DOB: (P-1) 1976; Currently located in Saudi Arabia. FAISAL AL-MUHANNA is the brother of MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA.

(A)(G)(J-1)(D)

Predication for the Investigation

[REDACTED] As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) [REDACTED] established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia.

This methodology could possibly be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into" what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000709

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

At this point in the investigation, there are a number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Pertinent Sensitive National Security Matters

A sensitive national security matter exists as a number of individuals identified herein were or may currently hold diplomatic status in the Saudi Arabian government, including FAHAD AL-THUMARY, MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA and MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

Main Subject

Name -
Last: AL-THUMARY
First: FAHAD
Middle: I. A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1971
POB: (P-1)
PNO:
SOC:
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-THUMAIRY
First: FN
Middle:
Phone #: (P)
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

(A)(G)(J-1)

(A)(G)(J-1)

Main Subject

Name -

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

Last: AL-BAYOUMI
First: OMAR
Middle: AHMED MUSTAFA
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1957
POB: (P-1)
PNO:
SOC:
Phone #: (P)
Miscellaneous - (P)
(A)(G)(J-1) Subject is a non-USPER.
(A)(G)(J-1)

Main Subject

Name -
Last: AL-MUHANNA
First: MOHAMMED
Middle: BIN SULEIMAN
Race: W
Sex:
DOB: (P-1) 1974, (P-1) 1974
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-MOHANNA
Middle: S.
Phone #: (P)
Miscellaneous - (P)
(A)(G)(J-1) Subject is a non-USPER and
brother of FAISAL AL-MUHANNA
(A)(G)(J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Name -
Last: AL-MUHANNA
First: FAISAL
Middle: A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1)
POB: (P-1)
PNO:
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-MOHANNA, ALMUHALKA
Phone #: (P)

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

Miscellaneous -
(A)(G)(J-1)

Subject is a non-USPER and
UHANNA
(A)(G)(J-1)

Main Subject

Name -
Last: AULAQI
First: ANWAR
Middle: NASSER
Current Case # (F)

Main Subject

Name -
Last: (P)
First:
Middle:
Race: B/W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1975
POB: Mogadishu, Somalia
ARN: (P-1)
PNO:
SOC:
Address(es) -
House #: (P-1)
Street Name:
City:
State:
Postal Code: (P-1)
Country: Canada
Phone #: (P)

Miscellaneous -

Subject is an USPER.

Main Subject

Name -
Last: AL-JARRAH
First: MUSAED
Middle: A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: (P-1) 1960

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

POB:

[REDACTED] (P-1)

Phone #:

[REDACTED] (P)

Miscellaneous -
[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1)

Subject is a non-USPER.
[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1)

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Coordinate [REDACTED] (G) as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to process the [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] which is being submitted via email to the [REDACTED] (G) mailbox at [REDACTED] (G) case to the [REDACTED] (G) and appropriate supported systems.

◆◆



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/4/2007

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

(G)

(S)

(G)

(S)

From: New

(G)

ct:

(S)

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

(S)

Case ID #:

(F) (Pending)

Title:

ORE
(A) (G) (J-1)

Synopsis:

FBI New York requests (G) conduct baseboard traces on MUSAED AL-JARRAH

(G)

Details:

OPERATION ENCORE is an FBI New York Full investigation which includes MUSAED AL-JARRAH. FBI New York requests financial traces be conducted on this subject.

Background: On 06/28/2007, writers opened a subfile under the PENTTBOM investigation to contain information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further



To: [REDACTED] om: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 12/4/2007

exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

(S//NF,OC) Another individual of interest is MUSAED AL-JARRAH. AL-JARRAH worked for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE (203A-WF-226050, serial 217). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. [REDACTED] (O-1)

" [REDACTED] (O-1), AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) AL-JARRAH travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

" [REDACTED] (O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. [REDACTED] (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1)

EO14040-000716

To: Count [REDACTED] rom: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 12/4/2007

(O-1)

[REDACTED] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to [REDACTED] king in the state of California"

(F)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] AL-JARRAH appears to have been the sole distributor of funds in California.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

[REDACTED] At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Pertinent Sensitive National Security Matters

[REDACTED] A sensitive national security matter exists as a number of individuals identified herein, were or may currently hold

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000717

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 12/4/2007

diplomatic status in the Saudi Arabian government, including FAHAD AL-THUMARY, and MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH.

Descriptive Data:

[REDACTED] Main Subject

Name -
Last: AL-JARRAH
First: MUSAED
Middle: A.
Race: W
Sex:
DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) /1960
POB: Saudi Arabia
Phone #: 202-342-3700, [REDACTED] (P)
Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER.
Prior Case#: [REDACTED] (F)

(S) Questions r [REDACTED] (S) atter should be directed
to [REDACTED] (S) or [REDACTED] (S)

To: [REDACTED] om: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 12/4/2007

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1
Type: POSITIVE TERRORISM (DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE FBI)
ITU: [REDACTED] (G)

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1), (S)
Name: [REDACTED] (S)
Squad: [REDACTED] (G)

SSN: [REDACTED] (P-1), (S)
Name: [REDACTED] (S)
Squad: [REDACTED] (G)

To: C [REDACTED] om: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 12/4/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] Conduct baseboard traces on MUSAED AL-JARRAH.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] Read and clear.

◆◆



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/02/2004

To: San Diego

From: San Diego

(G)

Contact: SA [redacted] (S)

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [redacted] (F)

Title: [redacted] Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka, Et Al;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [redacted] (G) Reporting

(G)

Details: [redacted] On July 1, 2004, San Diego FBI SA [redacted] (S) met
with [redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [redacted] (G)

(G)

[redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] When Omar Abdi Mohamed, aka Omar Khaib, lived in Canada he was an outspoken proponent of jihad against non-Muslim movements taking place in Somalia. Specifically, Mohamed supported armed actions against Ethiopia and Christian organizations that operated humanitarian missions in Somalia. Mohamed believed in jihad as the only way to unite Somali's to form a unified Islamic government.

[redacted] Mohamed bragged to the Somali community in San Diego about working for the Saudi Ministry of Dawa and Islamic Affairs. Working for the Ministry of Islamic Affairs was prestigious because you were being paid directly by the Government of Saudi Arabia.



To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: (F) , 07/02/2004

Other workers received their payments from the Saudi Government indirectly through Saudi supported charities. To work for the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, one had to be trained in a Saudi supported madrassa and, more importantly, you had to be recommended by an influential Islamic Scholar. The Ministry allowed you to choose the community where you wanted to work.

In the United States, Ministry workers reported directly to the Saudi Embassy in Washington D.C. Mohamed's point of contact at the Saudi Ministry of Islamic affairs was Khaled al-Sowailem. Al-Sowailem visited San Diego one time with a group of about 9 other people. Al-Sowailem met with Mohamed, (P) (P), and an unidentified business associate of (P) (P)

(P) was another person paid by Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs. (San Diego believes (P) to be (P) (P) is a Somali born (P) (P) father is a prominent Islamic scholar (P) studied Islam in a madrassa in Saudi Arabia. After studying in Saudi Arabia he returned to Africa and requested political asylum in the United States. (P) had a lawyer named (P) who helped him fill out his asylum claim. (P) convinced (P) to fill out the asylum request claiming that (P) (P) . It is common knowledge in the Somali community that (P) (P) has since been deported from the US.

(P) used to report to a Saudi Ministry officer named Fahd Althumairy. Althumairy worked out of the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, California, and oversaw the disbursement of Saudi money to Saudi religious workers in San Diego. At one point Althumairy became angry with (P) because (P) was holding a job at (P) in addition to being paid by the Saudi government. Althumairy believed that (P) was supposed to be dedicated to working for Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs since they were giving him money. Althumairy had since left the United States.

Mohdar Abdullah had been deported to Yemen. (A), (G), (A), (G), (J-1)

Mohdar rented an apartment from (P) when Mohdar was living in San Diego. Mohdar called (P) several times at home and on his cellular telephone. Mohdar wanted (P) to join him as a partner in an import/export business. (P) was very angry that Mohdar kept trying to contact (P) and forbid

[REDACTED]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 07/02/2004

(P) [REDACTED] to communicate with Mohdar. Many people in the San Diego Muslim community feel that Mohdar is nothing but trouble and should be left alone.

(P) [REDACTED] is also running a charity called (P) [REDACTED]. (P) [REDACTED] wanted to close the charity down, but was urged by a San Diego (P) [REDACTED] to keep it operational. (P) [REDACTED] himself had been denied his application to open a tax exempt non-profit organization. Because (P) [REDACTED] was denied, he wanted to use (P) [REDACTED] and (P) [REDACTED] as his personal fund raising organization. (P) [REDACTED] was resistant to the idea of being (P) [REDACTED] puppet. But, (P) [REDACTED] convinced (P) [REDACTED] open for (P) [REDACTED] because (P) [REDACTED] worked for (P) [REDACTED] at his (P) [REDACTED] and thought (P) [REDACTED] was a good guy.

(P) [REDACTED] is very involved in fund raising and charitable causes, but he is not a radical. He is very naive and easily manipulated out of his desire to help poor and needy Muslims worldwide.

◆◆

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/22/2005

To: San Diego

Attn: [Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (S)

From: San Diego
[Redacted] (G)

Contact: [Redacted] (S)

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID,
aka Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah;
[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1);
[Redacted]

[Redacted] OMAR ABDI MOHAMED,
aka, Omar AlKhatib;
[Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [Redacted] (G) debrief [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted] (G)
[Redacted]

[Redacted] (F)

Details: [Redacted] On November 29, 2005, SA [Redacted] (S) and SA [Redacted] (S)
[Redacted] met with [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) [Redacted] (G)
[Redacted] (G) provided the following
information:

[Redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego

Re: (F) , 11/22/2005

(G) described Mohdar Abdullah as a brilliant, articulate, and manipulative man who could easily transition between being a traditional Muslim and a modern westerner. (G) believed Abdullah spoke Arabic with a Yemeni accent. (G) did not know how Abdullah learned English, but (G) was impressed with Abdullah's English proficiency.

(P) A Somali taxi cab driver named (P) prepared Abdullah's original asylum request for (G). When Abdullah approached (P) to be his translator for the subsequent asylum interview, (P) again requested (G). Abdullah did not have the money to pay another (G) for the asylum interview, so Abdullah went to Omar Abdi Mohamed (F). Mohamed did not want to help Abdullah, so Mohamed referred him to (P). Abdullah met (P) approximately one week before Abdullah's immigration hearing in Anaheim, California, in 1999, at (P) San Diego, California. (G) believed that Abdullah portrayed himself as having a Somali mother and a Yemeni father. According to (G), there is a significant Yemeni population in Somalia. Most Yemeni's in Somalia are wealthy merchants, and it's not uncommon for Somali females to marry rich Yemeni men. Abdullah wrote on his immigration paperwork that he spoke a dialect of Somali and Arabic.

(P) Abdullah drove to Anaheim for Abdullah's asylum interview. (A), (G), (J-1) Abdullah was interviewed by a Hispanic immigration agent who did not ask in depth questions with regards to Abdullah's alleged tribal history and the history of Somalia. (A), (G), (J-1) Abdullah was lucky because some immigration agents ask probing questions about tribal history, and if the questions aren't answered appropriately the asylum application is denied. (P) and Abdullah spoke to each other in Arabic during the immigration interview. When the immigration agent asked why they were speaking Arabic, (P) explained that he did not understand the Somali dialect that Abdullah noted on his asylum application. (P) didn't know Abdullah spoke fluent English until much later. (A), (G), (J-1) since the immigration interview is one of the final steps in the asylum process, he believed the asylum process had already vetted Abdullah as being a legitimate asylee.

(P) After Abdullah was arrested, and while he was being held in immigration custody, he used (P) as a go between to deliver messages requesting (P) to find (P) Abdullah believed (P) could help him win his immigration case.

EO14040-000725

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego

Re: (F) , 11/22/2005

(G) saw (P) at the Starbucks on University and Fairmont around mid 2004. According to (G), not many Somali's are named (P) because (P) is usually an Arabic name.

(S) (G) believed that the San Diego Police Officer named (S) knows (P) and would be able to set up an interview.

(P) After Abdullah was granted conditional asylum, he returned to the (P) and asked (P) to fill out his work authorization permit and green card. (P) referred Abdullah to the International Rescue Committee (IRC) office on 30th Street.

(P) Abdullah introduced Samir Abdoun to (P) Abdoun was Algerian. Everyone in the Muslim community liked Abdoun, and many San Diego Muslims blamed Abdullah for getting Abdoun arrested and subsequently deported.

(A)(G)(J-1)

(P) Abdullah met (P) twice after September 11, 2001. One time at the Living Room coffee house and the second time Denny's on Alvarado Road and Highway 8. Abdullah took Samir Abdoun to both meetings.

(P) After Abdullah was deported he called (P) two times. (P) was angry that Abdullah was calling his house and trying to contact his son (P). (P) forbid (P) from talking to Abdullah. Abdullah is currently in Yemen, but he is trying to immigrate to England.

(P) (P) is very intelligent and well studied in Islam. (G) believes that he will be a future leader of the San Diego Muslim community. (P) has a dedicated youth following but he has not yet reached the age to which Islamic elders would value his leadership skills and input. (P) respects Dr. Waleed Basyouni, (A),(G),(J-1), and (P) (A),(G),(J-1).

(P) San Diego notes that on (P) was charged by the Federal Grand Jury (P) with a superceding (P) indictment alleging that (P)

EO14040-000726

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: (F) , 11/22/2005

(P)

In (P) trial was argued, and the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts on (P)

(P) family is trying to arrange a marriage between (P) and a Libyan woman who is living in Canada.

(P) is currently married to a Libyan woman. The marriage was arranged through family members who were living in Libya. (P) pays a lot of alimony and child support to his Libyan ex-wife. (San Diego believes this ex-wife to be (P) (P).) (P) wanted (P) to return to Libya, but she refused. (P) got very angry when (P) Islamically married an individual named (P) (P) frequently attends the masjid Ar-Ribat.

(A)(G)(J-1) (P) runs the Ar-Ribat mosque like a dictator. The Ar-Ribat mosque was founded by several Saudi's and funded by Jameel Faqeih, aka Jamil Faqih. The Ar-Ribat has had several radical extremist leaders including Mohamed Zaky, who was killed fighting in Chechnya, Kifa Jayousi, who was rabidly anti-American, and Jameel Faqeih, who fought in Afghanistan in the early 90's and is currently married to an American living in Saudi Arabia. (P) was very involved with the mosque leadership when Zaky, Jayousi, and Faqeih were in attendance.

Nothing goes on in the Ar-Ribat without (P) knowledge. (G) did not believe that Nawaf AlHazmi, Khalid AlMihdar, and Anwar Aulaqi could be meeting regularly in the library or upstairs rooms of the Ar-Ribat without (P) knowledge. (A)(G)(J-1) (P) keeps the key to the upstairs on his person so that people who want access to the library or any upstairs room have to ask him for it. (P) stays involved with the lectures that the Imams give and with inviting guest speakers or fund raisers to the mosque.

Abdusattar Shaikh was a Saudiphile who strived to be included in Arabian society. Shaikh had a love/hate relationship with Omar Albayoumi. He liked being around Albayoumi because he was Saudi, but he didn't like Albayoumi as a person. Albayoumi didn't like Shaikh because Shaikh wouldn't help Albayoumi get a green card. Well before September 11, 2001, Shaikh spoke about two strange house guests that were brought to him by Albayoumi. According to Shaikh,

EO14040-000727

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 11/22/2005

the two men were Saudi who had no money, often used the internet, never used the home phone, and often made telephone calls from payphones. In particular, Shaikh spoke about it being strange that the pair never had any money. Shaikh also asked about how to get the pair enrolled in English as a Second Language (ESL) classes. In retrospect, [REDACTED] (G) believes the two house guests were Khalid AlMihdar and Nawaf AlHazmi two hijackers who flew a plane into the Pentagon. Shaikh was always suspicious of Mohdar Abdullah because Abdullah brought people by Shaikh's house when they needed a place to stay.

◆◆

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000728

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/03/2006

To: San Diego

Attn: (G) [Redacted] (S) [Redacted]

From: San Diego

(G) [Redacted]
Contact: [Redacted] (S)

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID,
aka Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah;
(A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted] Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka Omar AlKhatib,
Omar Khadib,
Cumar Khadhiib,
abu Hafsa;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [Redacted] (G) debrief [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

[Redacted] (G) [Redacted]

[Redacted] (F)

Details: [Redacted] On [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1) 2006, [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1), [Redacted] (G) provided the following information:

[Redacted] (G) has not heard of Anwar Aulaqi attempting to contact anyone in San Diego. [Redacted] (G) believes that many people in

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

the San Diego community are wary about being associated with Aulaqi because of his publicized ties to the 9/11 terrorists.

[REDACTED] (G) understands that Mohdar Abdullah is still in Yemen and has not yet traveled to England. [REDACTED] (G) believes that Abdullah wants to go to England because he enjoys living in the West more than the Middle East. According to [REDACTED] (G) many people who have been deported from the United States make an effort to immigrate to England or Australia.

[REDACTED] One Somali named Ahmed Murshid, was deported from San Diego in the late 1990's and moved to England. Murshid was of Somali/Yemeni descent and his father was a well known Somali pilot.

[REDACTED] The Somali community in San Diego recently collected money for the wife of Omar Abdi Mohamed. If Mohamed is deported, [REDACTED] (G) believes that he will attempt to immigrate to Kenya, or more likely, the United Arab Emirate. [REDACTED] (G) believes that Mohamed's San Diego wife will leave the country to follow Mohamed if he is deported. Mohamed's Australian wife will probably also leave Australia to follow Mohamed. Almost all of the Somali community believe that Mohamed still has access to the \$350,000 he received from Global Relief Fund.

◆◆



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [Redacted] (G)

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [Redacted] (S)

(G) **Attn:**
Los Angeles
San Diego

New York

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (S)
Attn:
Attn:

Attn:

From: Los Angeles
[Redacted] (G)

Contact: [Redacted] (S)

Approved By: [Redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [Redacted] (S)

Case ID #: [Redacted] (F)

Title: [Redacted] (A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: [Redacted] To document interview of [Redacted] (G),
DOB [Redacted] (G) [Redacted] (G)

[Redacted] (G)

Full Investigation Initiated: [Redacted] (A) (G) (J-1)



To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: (F) (G)

Enclosure(s): Document provided to the agents by Attorney (G) (G) with the concurrence of (G) at the time of interview.

Details: Investigation of (G) has determined that Benomrane was reportedly associated with, Mohdar Abdullah, (G), a well known subject of the 9/11 investigation who was an admitted associate of two hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar. Benomrane was said to have witnessed, along with Mohdar Abdullah, an Islamic Marriage ceremony performed by Fahad Al Thumairy, Imam, between two individuals at the King Fahd Mosque in Culver City, California. The couple was identified as (P) and (P), (A), (G), (J-1), who worked with Mohdar Abdullah at the same Texaco Gas Station in La Mesa, California where Nawaf Al-Hazmi was briefly employed while Al-Hazmi resided in San Diego, California.

On (G) 2008, writer and SA (S) to the Law Office of (G) located at (G) (G) San Diego, California, 92108, telephone (G) (G) to conduct a pre-scheduled interview of (G) client, (G) (G) After advising both men of the identity of the law enforcement officers, writer and SA (S) initiated an interview of (G) (G) in the presence of his Attorney, (G) (G) (G) provided the following contact information: (G) (G)

(G) was shown an unmarked photograph of (G) Oualid Benomrane. (G) did not recognize the man depicted in the photograph. (G) was shown a photograph of (P) (P). (G) recognized the man depicted in the photograph as (P) (P) (P) the Texaco gas station located in La Mesa, California, (G) (G). Al Assal was also shown an unmarked photograph of (P) whom he recognized (G) (P) (G) employee of the Texaco gas station mentioned above.

(G) was shown an unmarked photograph of Mohdar Abdullah, in which he recognized the man in the photo as Mohdar, who was (G) (G) at the La Mesa Texaco gas station. (G) Investigators asked about the (G) (G) and whether it was possible that (P) participated in an Islamic Marriage ceremony with (P) at any

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: (F) , 04/17/2008

time during the year 2000 or 2001 time period. (G) demeanor indicated to the agents that he was surprised and shocked by the assertion and replied quite certainly that it was impossible for this alleged marriage ceremony to have occurred, for several reasons. (G) reasons in (G) ed that (P) was a very nice man and (G) he would never have that kind of relationship with (P) (G) observed a situation in the past in which a (G) (P) (G) he would never get involved (G) because he was married. Another reason for his disbelief was that (P) and (P) were both married to their respective spouses during that time period. An Imam would not perform a marriage ceremony knowing that the participants were already married. (G) (G) suggested we contact the Mosque where the ceremony occurred for verification.

(G) began to provide information related to (G) (G) (P) when he was interrupted by (G) who provided a document to (G) in order to refresh (G) memory. (G) stated that he and his client have been working on the document together for the past three years and that the events and dates depicted in the document would be the most accurate. (G) then provided a copy of the document to agents after getting the concurrence from (G). The document was addressed to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, specifically I-751 Adjudications. (This document is enclosed with this EC).

(G) provided that he met (P) in (G) 1999. (G) was employed (G) businesses at the time to include (G) (G) typically (G)

(P-1), (G)

(G) only remembered attending the Masjid Abu Baker, San Diego, California, on one occasion either in the year 2000 or 2001. This Mosque was where he saw Mohdar and the guys, meaning Mohdar's friends. (G)

(G)

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: (F) 04/17/2008

(G)
(G) Investigators asked if (G) influenced (P) to convert to Islam in which his response was negative. When asked who would have influenced her, (G) surmised that Mohdar Abdullah and the guys may have influenced her to convert (G)

(G)
(P-1), (G)

(G) was shown an unmarked photograph of Nawaf Al Hazmi. (G) recognized Al Hazmi as a person who used to work in the car wash at the Texaco gas station. (G) also learned, after 9/11, that he was one of the 9/11 hijacker's. (G) stated that he met Nawaf on four occasions. (G) drove his car through the car wash at the Texaco gas station on three occasions. (G) exchanged greetings with Nawaf as he tipped Nawaf for wiping his

(G)
(G)
(G)

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: (F) [REDACTED], 04/17/2008

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] did not recognize an unmarked photograph of Khalid Al-Mihdhar. (G) [REDACTED] did not recognize a still photograph taken from a video depicting an unknown individual, aka UNSUB, taken at the LAX airport in the year 2000. (G) [REDACTED] did not recognize an unmarked photograph of Omar Al Bayoumi.

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] listed the people he knew

(G)

Nawaf Al-Hazmi
Mohdar Abdullah
Omar Bakerbashat

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] could not remember anything that he witnessed back in 2000 or 2001 that he felt now was related to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, except for a particular situation that occurred sometime after 9/11. (G)

(G)

[REDACTED] It took a little while for (G) [REDACTED] to realize that the photograph Mohdar was pointing at was Nawaf Al Hazmi. (G) [REDACTED] realized at that point that one of the hijacker's in the n s r was the same man who had previously worked at the Texaco car wash. Until that moment, (G) [REDACTED] did not realize that Nawaf was involved in the 9/11 attacks.

(G)

EO14040-000735

To: Counterterrorism
Re: (F)

From: Los Angeles
04/17/2008

(G)

(G)

To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: (F), 04/17/2008

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

For information only.

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EO14040-000737